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ABSTRACT
The main purpose of this thesis was to develop a constructivist theoretical
understanding of insight, including how people come to it, what the experience is like
and what meaning it has for its 'recipients'. In addition, this work aims to reveal
something of the nature of the human being capable of insight. The main findings of the

predominantly 'cognitive' insight literature reviewed here are that insight involves hig
levels of abstraction, that both tacit and explicit mental processes are involved, that
'emotion' has a very important role in this, and that there are important social and
pragmatic processes within insight. It is argued that within this literature there is a
trend towards constructivism. Accordingly, Personal Construct Psychology (PCP) is
shown to most fruitfully integrate these findings, providing a coherent and

comprehensive account of insight and of the proactive, anticipatory person capable of it

It is argued that Kelly's Creativity Cycle, involving skilled alternations between loose
and tight construing, is central in understanding insight. Related to loose and tight
construing, a unifying theme is Suzanne Langer's distinction between presentational and
representational thought. The PCP account is elaborated and placed within the broader
view of mind (including its emotional, 'unconscious', enactive, embodied and
metaphorical nature) which, arguably, PCP was in the forefront of developing. It was

concluded that essential to insight is a 'third mode' of construing, a type of 'meditati
thinking' which does not head directly to insight, but which waits patiently and nonselfconsciously upon it. This playful, exploratory and receptive attitude reveals
something of the affective and relational nature of mind and person. The joy of insight

is characterised as a 'return' to one's anticipatory 'fit' with one's world, perhaps wit
one's cosmos. A study involving semi-structured interviews with seven successful

Australian fiction writers about their insights augmented the theoretical discussion and
provided strong support for the theoretical understanding presented. Implications for

future research into both insight and PCP are explored. It is concluded that our potenti

for insight is a restorative, an antidote to both the sterility of objectivism and to th
despair of relativism. Insight, it is proposed, reunites us with the world we seek to
understand, a world which includes yet always transcends us.

1

SECTION 1:

ILLUMINATING THE DOMAIN OF INSIGHT

2

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO INSIGHT

W e can pursue scientific discovery without knowing what w e are looking
for, because the gradient of deepening coherence tells us where to start and
which w a y to turn, and eventually brings us to the point where w e m a y stop
and claim a discovery. (Polanyi, 1969, p. 60)

1.1 MENO'S PARADOX

At the heart of this inquiry into insight is a paradox dating back to at least the f
century BC and attributed to Meno. It seems to contradict our experiences of
inquiry, of searching for new understandings, and of the dawning of insights. Plato
paraphrased it thus:
Meno: And how will you investigate, Socrates, that of which you know
nothing at all? Where can you find a starting point in the region of the
unknown? A n d even if you happen to come full upon what you want, h o w
will you ever k n o w that this is the thing which you did not know?
Socrates: I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome
dispute you are introducing. Y o u argue that a m a n cannot inquire either
about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he
knows, he has no need to inquire; if not, he cannot; for he does not know the
very subject about which he is to inquire. (Jowett, 1953, pp. 277-278)
The problem seems to be straightforward: if one already knows what one inquires

into, the inquiry is unnecessary, and if one does not know, one's task is impossible
How then do we create genuinely new ideas and understandings? Are all new ideas

merely extensions of past ideas? Is the experience of insight — loosely at this stag
the subjective feeling of certainty that one knows something new — necessarily an
illusion? Plato's response was that all knowledge, and insight is an instance of
knowledge,1 is based on recollection, on knowledge drawn from the soul's existence

1

M o r e precisely, insight is an instance of understanding. Although all knowings are not cases of
understanding, all understandings must include knowings. For example, one might k n o w Newton's laws,
yet have no understanding of them (Scheffler, 1965). In any case, when w e understand something for the
first time, w e add something to our repertoire of knowings. See also Warren (1998) for a discussion of
the various aspects and styles of knowing.

3

in the realm of ideal forms. Strangely enough, echoes of this idea are discernible in
some current cognitive science accounts which conclude that insight is
fundamentally an instance of knowledge retrieval (though, as far as one can tell, not
from the realm of the forms!). In such accounts, mnemonically coded prior
knowledge suddenly becomes available when activated above a threshold level. So,

as in Ecclesiastics (1:18), is it really the case that 'there is no new thing under th
sun'?
The paradox relies, however, on a particular objectivist view of knowing.2
For example, it requires that knowing is an all-or-nothing, objective affair. Either
we know something, or we do not. Knowing, however, does not always fit neatly
into this either-or mould. In some ways it seems to. For example, one either knows
your name, or does not. But what if he or she had forgotten it, temporarily, and then
recalled it later? Was it the case that he or she did not know your name before, but
does now? Furthermore, knowing is usually partial. For instance, one may know
how to operate a formula or mathematical procedure, but may not know what it
means, or when to use it. One may not construe it as having aesthetic beauty, as
being elegant. One may not know how to combine it with other operations or apply
it in other situations. Accordingly, knowing always has the possibility of growing
and adapting, of being extended or challenged.
At this point it is important to distinguish between the philosophical and the
psychological sense of knowing. The former is more strictly concerned with
epistemological, logical or metaphysical questions (What can be known? What are
the grounds for knowledge? What is the nature of Truth? What is the place of logic
2

By objectivist is meant the philosophical assumption of some ahistorical, foundational framework to
which w e can appeal in deciding upon what is objectively rational, true, good and so on (Warren, 1994).
M i n d is thereby conceived of as a minor to nature (Rorty, 1980) and objectivity is achieved by directly
perceiving (receiving) the correspondence of one's thoughts or beliefs with the rational structure of the
world. Thus w e can k n o w for sure, and be sure w e know. Objectivism corresponds, therefore, to a
fixedness of outlook, or pre-emptive construing. O n the other hand, objectivity is here taken as a striving
for, or openness to, the w a y the world m a y be (Deutscher's, 1983, 'objecting'). A n objective outlook is
an egalitarian frame of mind, an important feature of which is being willing to put oneself in an other's
place or manner of construing and to be open to the effects of bias and 'emotion' in one's o w n opinions.
The term 'knowing' is here preferred to the noun 'knowledge'. In so doing it is hoped to emphasise the
active, constructive nature of construing rather than suggesting a static entity as m a y be implied by the
use of the word 'knowledge'. Knowing, then, can be taken as interchangeable with 'construing'.
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and of the relations between propositions in knowing?). The latter, however, is
concerned with how people actually go about making sense of their world (their
psycho-logic, the meaning events have for them, the judgements they make). In
these terms the current work is concerned with the psychology, or the psycho-logic,
of insight. As such it will focus on how we come to insight, what the experience is
like, what meaning it has for the 'recipients' and so on. The primary interest is in
how people come to new understandings, to judgements and beliefs held with the
particular, felt conviction that accompanies insight. In addition, insofar as this

investigation will try to place insight within the context of a broad view of mind, i
may shed some light on issues relevant to what Warren (1997) calls 'Philosophical
Anthropology'. That is, it may tell us something of the nature of the human being
who has such insights.
This question of knowing can be looked at from another angle. From a
philosophical and logical point of view 'knowledge' is an achievement and is to be
distinguished from believing or accepting something (Scheffler, 1965). One cannot
half-know something or know something mistakenly and so on. One either knows
or does not. Yet, at the psychological level one may be certain that one knows, but
be quite mistaken. The fallacy involved in objectivism is the move from "the
certainty of an object of knowledge to the certainty of a cognitive faculty or
performance taken to be constitutive of knowing" (Scheffler, 1965, p. 30). For
example, knowing that two plus two equals four is true by definition, but is in no
way dependent on the infallibility of one's mental processes. It is a logical, not a
psychological matter. The objectivist move inherent in Meno's paradox comes from

a mixing of categories, in this case a philosophical or logical sense of knowledge (a
an all-or-nothing affair) and a personal, psychological sense of knowing, which is
more properly considered an activity or process: a striving for knowledge. Thus, the

'knowing' to be discussed in relation to the psychology of insight is to be understoo
as an interpretation, judgement, or construal. It is a measure of one's personal
understanding of the phenomenon at hand, the (coherent) meaning it holds for us.
Therefore, a distinction is here drawn between knowing-about and a more subjective

5

and intersubjective understanding: knowledge by participation (Orange, 1995) or
'personal knowing' (Mair, 1980). At the psychological level, insight, as a type of
new understanding, is measured against the (ever-growing) complexity of the
person's socially-immersed purposes, motives and history of understanding.
In this growing complexity can be seen other features of knowing, its
dimensional and layered nature. By this is meant that knowing is both located
within a system of hierarchically structured implications (its dimensional nature),
and that each act of knowing or construction is a manifold of mental aspects,
including feelings and thoughts at various levels of awareness (its layered nature).

Rather than considering that knowing is 'purely cognitive', it is here assumed that al
knowings are constituted by 'cognitive', 'affective' and 'conative' aspects. It is
further assumed that aspects of this manifold are variably available to conscious
reflection. Consequently, we never know something in isolation. When we come to
know something it comes enmeshed in a network of other related knowings without
which it makes little or no sense. Imagine trying to understand the sentence 'Two
plus two equals four' without also knowing the English language, having command
of its grammar, knowing the rudiments of arithmetic and so on. In addition, one
may have an aversion to mathematics such that even this seemingly neutral knowing
may come tinged with feeling, or may imply a history of some classroom
profundities. It may seem strange to think of knowing as indeterminate and
multifaceted in this way. Yet it is obvious that even our appreciation of 'two plus
two is four' may change over time from a mechanical, rote-learnt formula, to a
glowing admiration for the power of abstraction that it could come to represent for
us.
Meno's paradox also fits certain styles or modes of thought better than
others. If all thought were logical, propositional, and at a high level of awareness,
then perhaps the paradox would signal the futility of inquiry. For we would indeed
be aware of the clear boundaries between what we know and what we do not. We
may thereby be confined to quantitative extensions of what we already know. But, it

6

will be contended, not all thought is easily available for reflection and with such
clear boundaries. Firstly, there is the common distinction made between
unconscious and conscious thought processes. Without attempting to define
'unconscious' here, suffice it to say that it is widely held that we 'know more than
we can say' (Polanyi, 1967). So it may be the case that although we do not 'know'
something (in the sense of being able to report on it), we may not necessarily be
without the guidance of more implicit or tacit knowings. Thought appears to utilise
both verbal and non-verbal modalities (the latter including visual, kinaesthetic and
cross-modal imagery). In fact, tacit structures of knowing may determine what we
can know at a high level of awareness.
Finally, thought can be anticipatory or hypothetical. It is frequently
metaphorical, imaginative and creative. That is, because our thinking can be
reflexive (we can reflect on our thinking) and, because we can imagine objects and
events that are not present, we have the possibility to invent new combinations of
ideas and to play with mental images and concepts. We have a certain independence
from immediate circumstances. Much as an artist may experiment with new
combinations of textures, colours, patterns and so on, so can the mind be understood
as a type of canvas on which thought continually experiments. As such, thought can
bepredicational (Rychlak, 1990, 1991) in that it does not only mediate the various
sensory experiences it is subject to (associationism), but actively projects meaning
onto circumstances. We anticipate reality as well as react to it. In moments of
anticipation we grasp a pattern or meaning in circumstances, we bridge some gap in
understanding. This moment of insight or new understanding allows a new
engagement with the world. It may be experienced as an 'inner' thought experiment,
but it both stems from and leads to an empirical engagement with the world to
discover if outcomes meet anticipations.
So what differences do the above, 'non-objectivist' views of knowing make
to Meno's paradox? Well firstly, as knowing is always partial and layered, knowing
something does not render further inquiry redundant. There is always more to know

to deepen and add dimensionality to what w e already know. It follows, there will be
degrees of knowing from vaguely felt penumbras of understanding to highly explicit,
formulated knowings. There will also be degrees of ignorance. It is rare, probably
impossible, to inquire into something of which we know nothing. Thus our knowing
may be limited and an imperfect guide in our search for new understanding.

Nonetheless, it usually has us in the 'right ball park', as it were. We do not normal

ask the dentist for solutions to our financial problems, nor the accountant for advic
on dental hygiene. Although, as we will see, often the greatest insights, the most
creative breakthroughs, come in circumstances or from domains ostensibly unrelated
to the subject of inquiry.
Secondly, we commonly know that we have areas of ignorance. We may
know that we cannot speak Chinese, or know we cannot repair computers, or know
we do not know who will win the next Melbourne Cup. Note here there is typically
a blurring of knowing and ignorance. We know that we could learn Chinese by
taking classes, that repairing a TV could involve re-soldering broken connections

and so on, and that, at the very least, it will be a horse that triumphs in the big r
on the first Tuesday in November in Melbourne! This makes sense if indeed
knowing only arises within a network of implications and other knowings. Thus one
may be aware that one's knowing in some area is insufficient. One may even know
certain aspects, dimensions and features of the new knowing required. Frequently
we know the 'shape' of the answer, the criteria it must satisfy, the type of terrain
must traverse to reach if. Puzzle-solving is an example of this. We frequently know
much about the desired 'end-state', we have relevant information and we have some
idea of how to interrelate and apply such information. Thus, although we do not yet
know the solution, we know something of the path to that solution.
It probably is true that if one knows nothing of the matter into which one

inquires, one's endeavour is hopeless. But, as has been suggested, it is unlikely tha
we could be aware of something in the first place unless it was embedded within a
framework of prior knowings, beliefs and experiences. That is, to know something
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is to be aware of it within some context. Nonetheless, we may be confronted with

ill-defined problems (which, arguably, constitute most of life's important questions).
Sometimes we are not quite sure what it is we wish to know and we have no idea
how to proceed. We just know that there is something we need to know, or that
something is not working. In these circumstances, finding the right question to ask
(problem finding) constitutes the main insight - perhaps turning the ill-defined
problem into a puzzle to be solved (see Heidegger, 1977, for a similar contention).
So Meno alerts us to an important feature of insight: the sense of being stymied in
inquiry, of knowing that aspects of what we know already block our inquiry, but also
being aware that we do not know which new avenue we should take.
Meno's paradox is relevant to this present inquiry not because it highlights
the impossibility of genuinely new knowing, but because it reveals the subjective
dilemma that confronts us whenever our search for new insight is frustrated. We
may have reached an impasse in our efforts to solve some problem, or to complete
some project. Our previous knowings, strategies and experiences, so valuable up to
this point, may have failed us and we are driven to acknowledge their inadequacy.
Furthermore, we may have some intimation that it is our previously useful concepts
and ideas themselves which are leading us astray. One difficulty is we do not know
which of them blocks further progress. So where is the way forward? It seems not
to be implied in what we know already. Yet we fear that we will be both lost and
rudderless without our established structures of understanding. The dilemma, we
realise, is that we nonetheless need to enter uncharted waters if we are to succeed.
How are we to proceed?
But we are not entirely without bearings, nor are we entirely rudderless. We
may have been in this type of dilemma before and have experienced a sudden,
possibly joyous, certainty that the problem has dissolved. How did we do it? We
may have backed up and examined the general lineaments of the problem. Perhaps
we abstracted its general features, and the lie of the land. We may have
experimented with the fanciful, the seemingly absurd. We did not reject our
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previous strategies and concepts all at once. W e m a y have loosened up one, then
another, of our ideas. Possibly we made strange combinations between previously
unrelated conceptions. We probably adopted different styles of thought, becoming
more sensitive to intuitive and tacit intimations. In short, we most likely adopted a
more playful, experimental attitude to the question at hand. We sought new
experience, new feelings, new events in the world. We cast hypotheses and tested
them in behaviour. We conducted thought experiments, allowing in imagination
what had been denied by habits of thought. We made our way towards the unknown
by continued and gradual reformulations of the problem, eventually following a
'gradient of deepening coherence' as Polanyi (1969) put it. And it is this welldocumented capacity to create new understandings that undermines the validity of
the paradox.
Faced with the seemingly undeniable existence of new understandings,3
either in ourselves or as evidenced throughout history, Meno's paradox strikes us as
counter-intuitive, as discordant. It challenges us to examine closely what it is to
search for, and find, new understandings. Thereby, it may inspire us to transcend the
objectivist view of knowing it embodies. We notice something important here: the
paradox temporarily confounds us. We reach an impasse in our understanding. We
experience a certain tension, even discomfort. Through inquiry and reflection
gradually a new coherence grows, or perhaps emerges after setting the conundrum
aside. We may suddenly experience an insight which can accommodate what we
previously knew with this novel, seemingly contradictory, information. In this case,
the insight that 'we need to expand our notion of knowing' may lead us to a series of
implications and potential avenues of inquiry which may or may not verify the
insight. In short, a paradox which questioned the possibility of insight has,
ironically, led us to insight.

3

T h e reader's attention is drawn to the distinction Anderson (1963) highlighted between knowing (vague
knowledge) and understanding (real knowledge). Understanding is 'being able to give an account of
things' or 'knowing the reason for' something as distinct from mere opinion. It will be taken that insight
is more akin to understanding in this sense. Despite this, the word 'knowing' will also be used in this
work and is not to be taken as meaning 'opinion' or 'vague knowing'.

The following inquiry is an attempt to verify the idea that the existence of
insight itself points to the necessity of a view of mind and of knowing freed from
objectivist strictures. A s such, insight is not here considered to be the grasping of an
immutable, capital't' Truth. The history of its occurrence makes it clear that today's
accepted truths become tomorrow's quaint beliefs. Neither is insight considered to
be inconsistent with efforts to c o m e to a more 'objective' position in the sense that it
must m o v e beyond 'mere subjectivity' (what w e would like to be the case). The
inquiry will lead us to incorporate levels of knowing, as well as social, emotional
and motivational aspects into the fabric of thought -— not merely as additional
factors influencing the progress of thought. Accordingly, as you progress through
this work, it m a y be helpful to reflect upon your o w n mental life. D r a w upon your
o w n experiences of insight. Test within your o w n experience the claims and
hypotheses found herein. Locate instances where you were committed to some
inquiry in which you bogged down, where you experiencedfrustrationand impasse,
and no-one could help you. Perhaps you set the problem aside in discomfiture, only
for it to pervade your idle moments. Perhaps too you recall the sudden thrill, the
strong conviction, the Aha!, that your bafflement was over, and the subsequent
desire to communicate the breakthrough. A n d maybe you will regain some of the
sense that this process involved more tacit, affective andfigurativestyles of thought,
and that you 'felt' the insight as m u c h as you 'thought' it. But I a m getting ahead of
myself, and putting too m a n y suggestions to the reader. So,first,let us familiarise
ourselves with the phenomenon of insight. W h e n w e talk of 'insight', what it w e are
referring to?

1.2 DESCRIPTIONS OF INSIGHT

1.2.1 Hutchinson: The Creative Cycle
Hutchinson (1949a, 1949b, 1949c) produced a series of papers on insight exploring
in detail the antecedents and phenomenology of insight. His comprehensive
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collection offirst-handaccounts and his o w n summaries will form the basis for this
descriptive section. Following Wallas (1926), Hutchinson characterised insight as
being divided into four stages. These stages he called " The Creative Cycle" .4 The
cycle consists of:
1. "A period of preparation often ending in trial-and-error activity.
2. A period of renunciation of the problem during which effort is temporarily
abandoned.
3. A period (or m o m e n t ) of insight.
4. A period of verification, elaboration, or evaluation". (1949a, p. 422)

Insight, thus described, appears to be a general phenomenon, common to all
domains of inquiry and to all peoples. What seems to be required is that the person
has before him or her some problem or project requiring solution or production. But
for some period of time, perhaps months or even years, this problem remains
unsolved. Attempts at solution or production have ended only in frustration. But
suddenly, often when the project has been temporarily abandoned and/or one's
attention is taken up by other matters, one experiences insight into the solution. One
suddenly 'feels' as though one understands the whole of the matter, that one has
achieved a real integration of previous experience and knowledge. Usually one feels
a degree of elation and satisfaction, the degree of which depends on the prior level of
frustration and the importance of the insight. Importantly, the contents of this
moment must be grasped and articulated, or they may be lost. Thus follows a period
of elaboration and verification whereby the contents of this usually short period of
intellectual excitement are judged under the critical light of articulation and
experimentation. Bertrand Russell described a typical cycle:
In all the creative work that I have done, what has come first is a. problem, a
puzzle involving discomfort. Then comes concentrated voluntary application
entailing great effort. After this a. period without conscious thought, and
finally a solution bringing with it the complete plan of a book. This last
stage is usually sudden, and seems to be the important m o m e n t for
subsequent achievement, (cited in Hutchinson, 1949a, p. 388, italics in
original)

4

There does not appear to be any direct link between Hutchinson's phrase and Kelly's (1955) exposition
of what he called "The Creativity Cycle". The latter will be discussed in some detail in later chapters.
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Hutchinson (1949a) contended that the most instructive insights are those
which follow a high degree of difficulty and frustration, and where there is a strong
and persistent drive toward accomplishment. This thesis will, in part, focus on such
notable creative insights as a window onto more everyday insight processes. Of
course all insight is, by its nature, creative. Nonetheless, I will examine larger scale
instances to see what light is shed on more everyday creative insights. Judging by
the extensive literature on insight and creativity, such notable breakthroughs are by
no means rare. According to a survey by the American Chemical Society regarding
the frequency of insight in scientific problems, 83 per cent of 232 directors of
research laboratories — chemists, mathematicians, physicists and biologists —
reported that insight experiences were important in their work (Hutchinson, 1939).
Hutchinson's own research (1949a) also found that about 80% of artists, writers,
musicians and others reported the same. More recently, a study by Marton, Fensham
and Chaiklin (1994) has revealed that 72 out of 83 Nobel laureates interviewed
strongly implicated intuitive breakthroughs in their successes.

1.2.1.1 Preparation
This stage may be short or can extend to years, even a lifetime's effort, as the person
struggles with his or her problem or purpose. This includes ongoing systematic,
constructive work towards solution. The person immerses himself or herself in the
relevant domain, learning all he or she can about the topic at hand. The person
searches through and utilises past experience, strategies and knowledge. Often,
however, one's repertoire of technical abilities and domain-specific knowledge
proves to be futile. The resulting tension and frustration frequently results in many
false starts, trial-and-error attempts, even desperate random efforts in the face of a
seemingly insoluble task. The greater the frustration, the greater the need for more
intuitive methods of solution.
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1.2.1.2 Incubation Or Renunciation
If no solution is forthcoming eventually a period of renunciation (Hutchinson,
1949a), where the person puts the problem aside, is entered into. Hutchinson
(1949b) presented a compendium of common reactions or 'adjustments' to the
frustration. These adjustments may include repression, regression or compensation
(Hutchinson's adjustments are analogous to 'defense mechanisms' drawn more-orless directly from psychoanalytic theory). The person may 'dissociate' from the
problem, removing it from consciousness. Alternatively, he or she might revert to a
type of childishness or compensatory excess in other areas — a phenomenon
frequently observed in the highly creative in their 'bad' periods. Hutchinson
(1949b) made two important points here. Firstly, that these forms of 'neurosis' are
caused by creative frustration and are not the causes of one's creativity. Indeed, he
gave examples of creative figures suffering from prolonged or extreme repression,
regression and compensatory reactions and concluded that they are mostly inimical
to creative insight.
Since Hutchinson believed that mental suffering is not conducive of insight,
his second point was that there are more effective, more healthy ways of adjusting to
strong creative frustration:
I suggest as the most effective way [to adjust is via] an acceptance of a
period of renunciation or recession, a turning to unrelated interests, a
purposive rejection of the problem from consciousness. (1949b, p. 415)

This voluntary suppression is a deliberate attempt to systematise the creative process
and anticipates the important role of 'metacognitions' discussed in contemporary
cognitive science accounts of insight. The person may consciously decide to relieve
herself of the emotional strain, often taking up some recreational pursuit or activity.
The duration of the break may be planned with definite intentions of resuming the
activity at a specified time in the future. In this 'recession', of course, the project
comes into one's mind from time to time, or even quite frequently. But, as the time
is given over to more desultory mental activity, perhaps day-dreaming or some
diversion, the intrusion of the problem is not rejected, but is balanced against the

alternative concerns one has taken up. O n e is on 'holiday', as it were, from
conventional, socially-prescribed work practices. Yet in this state one is available to
both the problem and to incidental events or details, whether in the world or in one's
thoughts, which may grab one's attention and occasion insight.
The nature of one's diversionary activities is an important factor in preparing
the ground for insight. Hutchinson (1949b) made it clear that unconventionality for
its own sake is not the answer. Rather, one's diversions need to be tailored to the
individual and the type of strain he or she has been under:
For anyone looking forward to the advent of insight, the diversion must be
regulated according to the symptoms offrustration— voracious reading,
organized selection of materials, excursions into secondary fields,
invigorating contact with objective life, quiet recreation, rest — anything to
balance the possible introversion, regression, inferiority and continuous
preoccupation with the self. (1949b, p. 417)
What is required is a balance between creative discipline and leisure. Attaining the
freedom to step back from one's efforts in order to replenish one's emotional,
physical and intellectual stocks is an important means of managing one's creative
endeavours. As one scientist put it:
The half drowsy moments of a lazy Sunday morning are as good a time as
any in which to do real creative thinking. It is surprising h o w fertile the
mind becomes w h e n not interrupted, or restricted by criticism in thefreeand
often fantastic expression of its ideas. The best moments are those, I find, in
which I let the imaginative thought become a game. (Hutchinson, 1949c, p.
423, emphasis in original)

1.2.1.3 Intuition Or Intimation Of Insight
Hutchinson (1949c, p. 430) believed that often before the actual insight there is a
"tenuous and fleeting intimation that insight is about to appear". Mostly such
intuitions appear soon before the actual moment of insight and the reasons for its
appearance are usually not obvious to the person. The key symptom is an emotional
quickening, a feeling of satisfaction or even excitement. Hutchinson interpreted this
as a type of half-way house between deeply unconscious or implicit thinking and the
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eventual articulated expression that emerges in an insight. Wallas (1926, reported in
Hutchinson, 1949c, pp. 431-432), whose four stages of insight Hutchinson adopted,
reported on these intuitive premonitions in his own work experience. He spoke of a
'vague feeling' that he should stop reading and begin working, of 'becoming rather
closely absorbed' preceding the arrival of a key word or phrase. And he said of this
that" I must let them come, and that the process of letting them come, begins before
the point is clear enough to set down" (p. 432).
Often such intuitions or intimations emerge in periods of relaxation and
reverie, or come as images immediately preceding or immediately following sleep
(hypnogogic and hypnopompic imagery respectively). They emerge in a state of
mild dissociation and often occur amidst or following physical, repetitive or
automatic activities. These activities include quiet meditation, walking, shaving,
ironing, driving a car, pacing up and down, having a bath, and so on. When one is in
such a state and happens upon a propitious stimulus, the mind, being only partly
occupied, is able to seize upon the hint and apply it to the unsolved problem.
Hutchinson distinguished between two types of accidental stimuli:
1. Those in which the stimulus is directly related to the insight or solution.
2. Those where the stimulus is merely a catalyst, and is not a part of the final
product.
Examples abound in the insight literature, so one of each will suffice here.
Archimedes' famous Eureka! experience in the bathhouse on Syracuse is an example
of the first type. King Hiero wanted Archimedes to determine whether his crown
was pure gold or was mixed with more base metals. The rise in the water level
following his immersion was a direct analogue of Archimedes' solution in terms of
specific gravity (a pure gold crown would displace more water when weighed in
water). An example of the second type of accidental stimulus to insight is given in
Hutchinson. He described how Jacob Boehme, struggling with his inability to find
peace within the church, was one day distracted and then absorbed by a pewter dish

shining in the sun. It was while in this state of almost hypnotic abstraction that the
essence of his philosophy came to him.5

1.2.1.4

T h e Insight Experience

The experience of insight can be vivid, surprising and seemingly automatic in
nature. The following account by Dr. Banesh Hoffmann, Oxford mathematician and
physicist, captures these features well:
I had been attempting to work upon a problem that had puzzled me for at
least two years. I m a d e some sporadic, half-hearted calculations on odd bits
of paper; but nothing came of them. In the evening I had to go to a lecture
upon an entirely different subject. After the lecture, and an argument with a
friend about the lecture, I went to m y room and decided that I would read for
the rest of the evening (a book by Trotsky on Lenin), and go to bed early.
But s o m e h o w this idea of reading did not appeal to me. I picked up some
scraps of paper, and straightway, without realizing that there was any
difficulty in the problem, I wrote out the solution with hardly a pause. I
knew s o m e h o w or other that something had solved itself at the back of m y
mind, but had no idea of the solution until m y pencil almost automatically
wrote it out. I can't remember m y feeling during the hours in which I
worked [amnesia], being, I suppose, too absorbed in production to notice
actual surroundings. But after I had the solution d o w n infrontof m e , /
remember that I was elated, and though the hour was late, I had no longer
any desire to go to bed. I went over to the auditorium and practised singing.
There had been no conscious results until this moment, (cited in Hutchinson,
1949a, p. 389, italics in Hutchinson)

We see in this account many of the features we have observed thus far. Hoffmann
had reached impasse in relation to this problem after extensive work and had placed
it in abeyance, attending a stimulating lecture on an entirely different topic. We see
that when the insight came it flowed suddenly and easily. He was totally absorbed
in his task, losing awareness of the passage of time and of his surroundings.
Importantly, he was elated by the experience. Most accounts of major insights share
these qualities, particularly of the affective components. Hutchinson summarised
these typical features:

5

In the Theravadan tradition of Buddhism, a meditative practice called 'Vipassana' (from the Sanscrit
Vispashyana meaning 'insight') deliberately cultivates just this stilling and calming of the mind in order
that the person m a y have insight into the nature of mind and of Being.
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the energy, plenitude and exuberance of it; the renewed sense of purpose to
be fulfilled, and of the power to accomplish it; the abolition of a narrowranged consciousness and the substitution of a more integrated personality;
the surge of self-confidence; the comprehension of the significance of the
dreary periods of earlier effort; the occasional sense of impersonality,
automatism and detachment; the tragedy of interference with the process.
(1949c, p. 333)

Insights are also expressed and experienced in a wide variety of forms. Often they
come in succinct verbal form, such as Wallas's 'striking phrases', which then seem
be self-expanding. But just as frequently they take non-verbal forms. Composers
may 'hear' melodies and harmonies. Novelists and playwrights 'hear' dialogues or
'see' important scenes. A musician's insight may 'play itself on the instrument, his
or her fingers seeming to have a kinaesthetic intelligence of their own. Einstein's
famous thought experiments and Kekule's vivid visual imagery are well-known
examples of non-verbal, frequently cross-modal insights (see Gruber, 1995; and
Sternberg & Davidson, 1995 for accounts of their insights). Writers frequently
report insights in which they experience a type of 'emotional tone' associated with a
particular character or scene in their mind, which forms the expanding core of the
developing work (Epel, 1993).

1.2.1.5 Elaboration And Verification
Hutchinson (1949a) referred to insight as a state of "intermediate awareness" which
is only "temporarily self-sustaining" (p. 403). The creative act of insight is not
completed until it is captured in some form, be it in writing, speech, dance, paint and
so on. Moreover, in so doing, the insight is then available for elaboration and
verification. The more technical, more standard 'logical' processes, held in
abeyance after impasse, are once again employed to express and test the insight.
Hutchinson (1949c) drew a contrast between such logical, progressive, steadily
integrating processes of thought and the more a-logical, intuitive and suddenlyintegrating modes of thought he associated with insight itself. The two modes of
thought are considered as extremes working in dynamic interplay:
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Logical minds advance their problems deliberately, progressively with a
m i n i m u m of trial and error activity, and with full awareness of the meaning
of each step taken. But the person w h o relies on insight, having employed
every k n o w n technical and dialectical device of the science involved and
being yet fundamentally baffled, is forced in sheer desperation and defense
of emotional balance, to relax his efforts for a time. The problem
meanwhile is not forgotten, but seems to sink back upon more profound
levels of mind for gestation (support this with whatever theory you will).
W h e n it reappears again as insight, or solution, it more fully represents the
whole range of mental experience, the entire intellectual and emotional
background, than the less generalized products of the logical method.
(Hutchinson, 1949a, p. 393, italics in original)

The present thesis will indeed try to support the notion of insight as an expanded,
more flexible mental state given depth by its inherently intellectual and emotional6
nature. Thus, the insightful person will be characterised as being capable of
alternating between, and combining, different styles of thought in more-or-less
continuous cycles. But for now, courtesy of Hutchinson, we are reasonably familiar
with the phenomenology of insight. It is to the Gestalt psychologists that I next turn
to become familiar with the 'language of insight', a language still utilised in
contemporary research into insight.

1.3 GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LANGUAGE OF
INSIGHT
Early psychological explanations of insight were mostly put forward by Gestalt
psychologists (Dunker, 1945; Kohler, 1925, 1929; Maier, 1931; Scheerer, 1963;
Wertheimer, 1945) who considered insight in the light of their work on perceptual
restructuring. Insight was explored primarily in the context of problem-solving. A
classic example of this approach can be seen in Kohler's refutation of Thorndike's
(1911) associationist view that problem-solving is merely the result of trial-and-error
leading to repeated (accidental) success. According to Thorndike, this success then
6

Few terms have caused as much confusion and disagreement within psychology as the term 'emotion'
and its frequent synonym, 'affect'. For now, I will conform to c o m m o n language usage by merely
pointing to the commonly-experienced states such as love, anger, fear, anxiety, and so on, as examples of
emotions. A later chapter will analyse in some depth the nature of emotion and affective experience and
their role in insight.
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becomes a learned response to be reproduced given similar stimulus situations. To
illustrate this, Thorndike placed hungry cats in cages so designed that hitting a pole
inside the cage would open the door allowing the cat access to a bowl of food
outside the cage. At first the cats would rash around the cage occasionally colliding
with the pole. After repeated trials the cats seemed to learn to knock the pole,
eventually doing so immediately on re-introduction to the cage. For Thorndike, the
trial-and-error successes became a learned response automatically associated with
being placed in this situation.
Kohler (1925, 1929), on the other hand, believed that we, and certain
animals, can solve problems by having insight into the problem's structure. Solution
is often, thereby, a matter of suddenly restructuring the problem. For example,
Kohler (1929) observed an ape tying together two poles to reach a bunch of bananas
outside its cage. After some trial-and-error efforts with a stick, this ape sat quietly
for a while, suddenly jumped up, joined two sticks and retrieved the bananas. This
example demonstrates the Gestalt distinction between reproductive and productive
problem-solving. Reproductive problem-solving, in this instance, may involve
reaching with a single stick, a skill likely learned by the ape in the past, whereas the
ape's solution was interpreted as productive because it implies insight into the
situation which produced new behavioural possibilities. The ape was reported to
have suddenly jumped up and set about retrieving the bananas, suggesting the insight
came to him all at once. Finally, the ape's behaviour, in its novelty and
appropriateness, appeared to be goal-directed rather than being directed by
mechanical associations.
Another key Gestalt notion relevant to our inquiry is functional fixedness.
According to this idea we become 'fixated' on some aspect of the problem. Duncker
(1945) illustrated this concept in his well-known experiment involving a candle, a
box of tacks, some matches and several other objects. The task was to attach the
candle to a wall near a table such that the lit candle did not drip on the table. The
solution is to empty the tack-box, tack it to the wall and thereby use it as a base for

the candle. Most people tried to stick the candle directly to the wall using the tacks
or by using melted wax. Duncker argued that people could not see past their fixated
view of the tack-box's function as a container to restructure its function as a base.7
The same sort of fixation w a s also shown to apply to strategies people use to solve
problems (Luchins & Luchins, 1959). The important theoretical implication of
fixation is that, contrary to associationist claims, past learning can actually impede
the person's progress to a solution. In summary, Gestalt psychology provided a
lexicon for insight that is still very m u c h in use. Constructs such as 'restructuring',
'functional-fixedness', 'fixation', 'reproductive thinking' and 'productive thinking',
and 'goal-directed behaviour' have been revived in contemporary research. They,
along with the four stages of insight (Wallas, 1926; Hutchinson, 1949a), inform
m a n y current discussions of insight.

1.4 WHY IS UNDERSTANDING INSIGHT IMPORTANT?
This m a y seem an obvious question. Insight itself is clearly important. The
chronicles of famous creators, the biographies of geniuses, revolutionary insights
which have changed the course of history and of culture; all these seem irresistible
reasons for embracing the value of insight. Moreover, insight is ubiquitous. It is
found in all people, and stands behind the creativity of h u m a n thought. For some it
occursfrequentlyand for others lessfrequently,but to all of us it is familiar. S o m e
insights are momentous, others m a y pass by barely noticed. Despite its ubiquity, w e
k n o w little about this act of transcending understanding (Lonergan, 1978). Insight is
an act which places the evidence and clues available to us within a unique,
explanatory framework and marks the progression from one's seeming cognitive
incapacity to an awareness of the startling obviousness of the solution to one's
inquiry. Assumedly, w e have all had this experience, yet still w e understand it
dimly.

7

See next chapter for Maier's (1931) two string problem and Scheerer's (1963) nine-dot problem for
more examples of functional fixedness.

W h y is it important to understand this capacity? The first answer is that by
so doing we may hope to increase its occurrence. We may learn how generate
insights to more frequently, as it is obvious that some people have developed just
this ability. Secondly, we may improve in our capacity to avoid 'oversights', the
continual inadvertence to the insight we 'should' be having. We may gain some
familiarity with the factors within human life that predispose us to not have certain
insights. It may, moreover, be the case that some insights are unwelcome or cannot
be incorporated and so should be avoided for the time-being.8 At the very least, it is
clear that learning how to manage insight is potentially very useful.
From a different perspective, attending to the nature of insight may guide us
to a richer understanding of mental life. The stages of insight, characterised as they
are by a person's enduring purposes, emotional fluctuations, and social encounters
and meanings, signal a psychic life more passionate and multi-dimensional than is
suggested in models of the mind as a deductive and inductive processor. We may
have been beguiled by the allure and promise of cognitivism, by the belief that mind
can be, eventually, definitively modelled as a special type of computational device.
Or else, we may have lost touch with the lived psychological experience of a person
struggling for understanding, believing instead that mind can be adequately redescribed at the quasi-psychological level represented by connectionist neural-like
networks. Neither of these explanatory systems regards our emotional, physical and
social experience as integral to, and constitutive of, understanding. At best we read
of emotions as responses to or precursors of (cognitive) insights (Kitchener, 1983;
Smith, Ward & Finke, 1995). Social processes are considered as important
'external' factors in some approaches (Dunbar, 1995; Gardner, 1993; Gruber, 1981,
1995), but they are rarely theoretically implicated within the structure of thought or
of insight itself.
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This indicates, of course, that insights can be upsetting. Yet it seems that h u m a n beings are frequently
driven to replace uncertainty with understanding, even if the implications of that understanding are
painful.

At times one could be forgiven for forgetting that w e are embodied creatures
whose feelings, emotions, purposes and circumstances occupy us moment-tom o m e n t and form the seed-bed from which all our mental life grows. W e all
struggle with understanding and anticipating the vast complexity around and within
us. This universal predicament is neither passionless nor purposeless. O n the
contrary, insight reveals the emotionally-nuanced, anticipatory commitment w e
bring to most thought. Relatively 'passionless' thought is arguably a developmental
achievement, a derived capacity (Langer, 1972; Shanon, 1993; Zajonc, 1980) and
one with an important, but limited, applicability. In general, emotion is a crucial
part of effective thought (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1997; Damasio;
1994; Goleman, 1995; Peters, 1974; Spinoza, 1967; Warren, 1987) and such thought
is channelled by what is important to us, including our socially-derived projects in
life. These ideas will be revisited by w a y of a later, more thorough discussion of the
relationships between emotion, insight and mind.

1.5 DEFINING INSIGHT
1.5.1 The Focus Of This Work
There is a family of phenomena and experiences which over time has been labelled
'insight'. I will attempt not to stray too far from the c o m m o n language usage of the
term. That is, what is meant by insight is the sudden, usually pleasant experience of
understanding that comes as a relief to a period of inquiry, effort and impasse in
understanding. The descriptions of insight given earlier (see 1.2) constitute a
starting point. The assumption in this work is that insight is an inherently important
and a characteristically h u m a n act. Because it has m a n y expressions, aspects and
manifestations, the goal is not to produce a single andfinaldefinition of the
'essence' of insight. Rather, care will be taken to build a multi-dimensional,
integrative picture of insight, and to understand insight by summarising the research
literature, by drawing from theories of mind and consciousness relevant to insight,

and by presenting this in the context of some accounts of insights experienced by a
particular illustrative group of insightful people: Australian fiction writers.
The present study will be confined to insight within the context of a creative
solution to an impasse, whether in problem solving or in creative endeavour, which
leads to breakthroughs in expression and understanding. Primarily, the focus will be
on the phenomenology and experience of insight (aha! experiences) and what
practices and strategies people employ to maximise their occurrence. Neither of
these is centrally concerned with an imputed 'essence' of insight. To link these to
the research literature a theoretical — as in the sense of a coherent — account of
insight will be attempted. This will necessitate a move beyond the 'insight'
literature drawing from broader psychological and philosophical thought. But first it
will be necessary to deal with some methodological issues in defining 'insight'.

1.5.2 Essentialist Versus Nominalist Definitions.
In order to form constructs and concepts (such as 'intelligence' or 'depression') we
notice in the flux of events certain replicable features (and simultaneously features
different in some relevant way). For the construct to remain viable (useful,
explanatory, predictive and, above all, meaningful) we assume it is an approximation
to some aspects of reality. In attempting to explore the nature of insight we may ran
up against the problem of 'essentialism'. For example, the Shorter Oxford
Dictionary defines 'nature' as: "the essential qualities of a thing; the inherent and
inescapable combination of properties essentially pertaining to anything and giving
it its fundamental character." Note the accent on 'thinghood'. Our subject predicate
language, especially its 'indicative mood' (Kelly, 1955; Mc Williams, 1996), often
predisposes us to reify or hypostatise our concepts (McWilliams, 1993). That is,
when we think of the nature of insight we may be tempted to look for the 'essence'
of insight, its essential and necessary properties, its 'thinghood'. What I mean by
exploring the 'nature' of insight, however, has little to do with a necessary and
sufficient 'essence' that somehow lurks behind instances of insight. Rather, what I

hope to do is to examine the ways in which the concept of 'insight' can help us grasp
what it is to suddenly understand that which eluded understanding a moment before.
The use of the concept 'insight' allows us to operate in the world, not
necessarily to objectively know the essence of insight. It helps us deal with events,
subsuming specific activities and experiences. Thus, we observe behaviours of
others or ourselves and the concept provides for us more meaning and anticipatory
leverage. We notice that there is a difference between suddenly remembering
something forgotten and suddenly having the sense that we have overcome an
impasse in our understanding. We know that one is a memory, but there is a distinct
strangeness to a new insight — somehow familiar, somehow mysterious, especially
when the 'solution' is not yet explicit or fully shaped. Yet we are confident that the
solution has somehow been attained in advance.

1.5.2.1 Essentialist Or 'Real' Definition
An essentialist, often called a 'real', definition (Miles, 1967; Popper, 1945) of
insight would say that if we know something (directly, intuitively), we can then
define it (provide a defining formula). A proper definition would provide an
exhaustive description of, for instance, insight. As Popper (1945) said, we read from
'left to right': 'puppy' => is a young dog; 'insight' => is the sudden experience of
understanding. We keep comparing our intuitive grasp of the left hand term with
exemplars and defining formulas (the 'right hand' side) until we are satisfied that the
right hand side fully corresponds to the left. Aristotle (see Miles, 1967) reasoned
that all demonstrative proofs derive from accepted premises or intuitive graspings.
He argued there was an inevitable problem of an infinite regress unless we begin
with some intuition of basic premises or essences — what Lonergan (1978) called
'primitive terms'.
Given such a 'real' definition we can compare an exemplar with the intuitive
grasp of the essence of the term defined in order to say 'Yes, this is an insight' or
'No, this is not'. The problem, of course, is that such self-evident, intuitive

knowings often prove to be wrong or insufficient. Such a definition also assumes
that a word or term has one settled and precise meaning and, often, that such
classification is done for us by nature. The essence is assumed to be there in nature
waiting to be discovered (Rorty, 1980). Defining 'insight' itself in this essentialist
way leads to a curious irony. Essentialist or 'real' definitions rely on an unmediated
insight into, or intuition of, the essence of something. So an essentialist or 'real'
definition of insight has a circular, tautological character: an insight is defined as an
insight into the truth. Of course there is a 'definitional' regress here which is at least
as problematic as Aristotle's regress mentioned above. Defining 'insight' requires
an unexamined notion of insight, which itself requires defining, and so on ad
infinitum.
Essentialist definitions are sometimes called 'real' definitions because they
attempt to tell us about the essential or objective nature of things. Apart from the
problems of objectivism implied here, it is not at all clear that insight is a 'thing' in
the common sense of the word. This is not to say that insight is not real or is not
suitably related to the real. Insight is a concept that refers to a unifying act of human
understanding which is characterised by a cluster of elements and features (such as
described by Hutchinson). Further, it may be better understood as & family of
activities (Popper, 1964) related to an overcoming of impasse in understanding. It is
not an essence that stands behind these acts of understanding. It is a term we use to
describe such activities.
The 'essentialist' tends to forget that it is we who have created labels and
terms and who have abstracted and generalised from the flux of experience. The
'essences' we are trying to define are themselves creations dependent on our ability
to focus on aspects of reality. Thus any imputed essence can only be a limited
aspect of reality and can only be set apart from other things (as 'essential') in terms
of the limited dimensions we have managed to apply to events. That is, the
'essence' is a construction which we use to anticipate and understand reality, it is not
the reality which we are trying to anticipate.

1.5.2.2

Nominalist Definitions

On the other hand, to form a nominalist or lexical definition one begins with events
and behaviours expressed in defining formulas and then one decides on a label or
term to fit. Such definitions derive from how people tend to use the term in question
(Miles, 1967). We read from right to left: 'what shall we call a young dog?', and the
answer might be a 'puppy'; 'what shall we call the sudden, enlivening experience of
new knowledge etc.?', and we might call it 'insight'. The term 'puppy' or 'insight'
becomes useful shorthand for the longer formula. It is not the case that an
examination of historical usage will reveal the essence of insight (Popper, 1964).
Rather, one might say that the notion of 'insight' (itself an arbitrary term) becomes
more and more useful and meaningful as it is enriched and made to symbolise more
comprehensively events and experiences in the world. The events, or exemplars,
define the term 'insight' and not vice versa. That is, the question shifts from 'What
is insight?' to 'What is the family of activities and experiences by which we know an
insight?', or 'What is the value or role of insight'? or 'How does one develop
insight?' 'How might we explain its development and experiential features?' In
short, 'insight' is a term that can be applied to a family of events, activities and
experiences.

1.6 THE PRESENT APPROACH TO INSIGHT
When using the term 'insight' in this work I will be referring to the sudden
experience of understanding which follows upon a period of impasse or frustration.
That is, it will be a psychological approach to insight. In attempting to understand
insight the classic stages of Wallas (1926; Hutchinson, 1949a, 1949b, 1949c) will be
adhered to. That is, it is assumed that insight does not occur in isolation, but in
concert with a person's full involvement in some enduring purpose or project. It
begins in a preparation stage where the person pursues the solution to some problem
or project, but reaches an impasse in his or her efforts. The problem is set aside, or
direct attention to it is relaxed. The end of this period of 'incubation' is marked by

the insight experience itself, usually emerging spontaneously. A final stage of
verification and elaboration follows wherein the value of the new understanding is
tested and, frequently, shared.9 The sudden experience of insight often includes a
profound certainty that a struggled-for solution to a problem has been found. It can
be marked by excitement and unusual psychic activation. Positive emotions,
feelings of well-being, a strong desire to communicate the insight, flurries of ideas
and implications, not to mention occasional major contributions to humankind: these
are some of the sequelae of insight.
Of particular interest are the factors which lead to such experiences.
Questions which clamour for investigation include: What sort of people have
frequent insights? Why do some have more frequent and/or more profound insights
than others? How does one nurture insight? What activities and conditions seem to
be conducive to ongoing insights? What are the respective roles of the so-called
emotive, cognitive and volitional aspects of such an experience? In what ways are
insights expressions of the pragmatic, social immersion and embodiment of the
person? What role does unconscious mental activity play in insight?
There is much overlap in discussions and theories of insight, inspiration,
creativity and intuition. For current purposes, they will be distinguished as follows:
Creativity is seen as a more embracing, longer-term combination of purposes,
activities and products (Gardner, 1993; Gruber, 1981, 1995). An important,
arguably crucial, element within this larger creative process is the experience of
insight. Thus a 'creative' person may be expected to be someone who has the
relatively frequent experience of insight. In similar fashion, intuition is here
considered to be an important aspect or stage within the movement towards insight.
Thus, the ability for intuitive mental activities should be a part of the ability to
experience insight. Finally, inspiration is distinguished from insight. Insight is
considered as proactive understanding, while inspiration is characterised as a more
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It is worth pointing out that an insight is 'creative' or 'insightful' by reason of its being new or novel f
the experiencing individual. Whether or not it is considered to be creative, insightful, useful, artistic, and
so on by the social group is another question.

passive 'reception' of ideas. This latter is derived from the ancient belief that
insights into (spiritual) truths were 'breathed' into the soul or mind by 'spirits'.
As a generalisation, the more mechanistic cognitive theories have tended to
rely on essentialist definitions, while broader accounts have moved in the direction
of nominalist (lexical) definitions. Because insight is here considered to be a
multifaceted phenomenon, requiring multiple metaphors for its explication
(Schooler, Fallshore & Fiore, 1995; Sternberg & Davidson, 1995), it will be the
nominalist approach that will be important in this work. What this thesis will
attempt to do is provide an integrative, theoretical understanding of insight which
can accommodate these various metaphors. To do so, this understanding will
necessarily be at a high level of abstraction, but attempts will be made to ensure it is
consistent with empirical findings within cognitive science generally, and with
various contemporary accounts of mind.
'Intelligent' is a "disposition word" (Miles, 1967, p. 163). That is, it
indicates a certain disposition to act in certain ways given certain circumstances (to
score highly on IQ tests; to think before one leaps; and so on). In the same way,
'insightful' and 'insight' are disposition words which indicate a mode of being and
behaving given, for example, the difficulties of impasse. Insight will be defined in a
combined way: nominally (lexically), in terms of how people have used the term;
and descriptively, in terms of possible manifestations or exemplars. This represents
a move beyond just 'correct usage' of the term 'insight', to link it with
independently discoverable events. Such events could be, for example, the
frequency with which a person has breakthroughs in understanding, or sequences of
behaviour which may reliably precede and follow insight experiences.
Thus the interviews with Australian fiction writers will form a very important
part of defining and understanding insight. In one way the interviews will be quasihypothesis testing. Given the factors to be identified in this research, and the
theoretical understanding of insight to be proposed, it will be interesting to see if it
reflects the experience of successful creators. But it will only be quasi-hypothesis

testing because the interviews will be exploratory and it is expected the writers will
reveal many things not included or adequately dealt with in this developing
theoretical understanding of insight.
What seems to be missing in the literature is an account which can reconcile
the full, reported phenomenology of insight with the empirical findings from
experimental psychology. In particular, two aspects of insight are poorly dealt with
in the insight literature. Feelings and emotions have been mostly considered as
effects of insight rather than as active, constitutive components. This shortcoming
will be herein addressed. In particular, an attempt will be made to clarify some of
the complex relationships between emotion, intuition, feelings of knowing, and
propositional thought.
Secondly, the research literature, with notable exceptions (Csikszentmihalyi,
1990, 1995, 1996; Gruber, 1981, 1995; Simonton, 1995), has tended to ignore our
physical and social embodiment. Generally speaking, research into insight has been
presented from an intra-psychic or individualist perspective (Waterman, 1981)
dominated as it by an image of the person (or at least of the 'mind') as a discrete
computational device. Contact with the world is limited to inputs from outside
resulting in outputs (insights and behaviours). Much of the modelling, relying as it
does on terminology derived from the computer and biological sciences (even from
solid state physics and spin glass dynamics, as with connectionism, for example), is
impersonal. In contrast, the present work will present a view of insight that avoids
this Cartesian-derived separation of the person from world, of the mind from the
body. In this view, mind is considered to be structured interpersonally and as
reflective of the structure of the social, as well as the physical, world. It is also
considered that our embodiment is 'built into' the personal nature of our insights.
We do not merely 'think' insights, they are personally experienced.
Given the earlier reservations about an often objectivist cognitive literature,
the question may be asked 'Why include it'? One answer is simply that the findings
are very interesting and useful. The present concern is not so much with

methodology nor with the reliability of the results within this literature, it is with
their interpretation. It will be attempted to show that a broader, constructivist
metatheory can happily incorporate them. More generally, there are two rationales
for covering such wide territory in this integrative project.
The first is that cognitive psychology and cognitive science tend to
concentrate on everyday, mundane insight, as a part of normal 'cognition' and this is
an area largely ignored in the earlier Gestalt-inspired research into insight. On the
other hand, experimental cognitive research into insight is relatively negligent when
it comes to exceptional creativity and insightfulness, a topic covered better in
broader approaches. For example, Weisberg (1995, 1986) thinks exceptional
creativity and insightfulness is just an extension of mundane cognitive processing, so
an approach from 'below' is all that is necessary. In contrast, Simonton (1997)
thinks it unlikely there would be no 'quantum jumps' along the quantitative
dimension between everyday and extraordinary creativity; that new cognitive
processes would 'kick in' representing different combinations of'lower' processes,
thereby producing emergent qualities. And of course, occasional experiences of
exceptional insight are likely within any 'ordinary' life: we all have our moments.
For these reasons a dual approach from 'below' and from 'above' offers the most
promise for a comprehensive theoretical understanding.
The second rationale is that the research within experimental cognitive
psychology and cognitive science is, understandably, insufficient to account for the
full phenomenology of insight in terms of its experiential, embodied and socialpragmatic facets. Even so, the current trend in this literature shows a much stronger
emphasis on the subjective and interpretative features of mind. In this regard I wish
to draw a basic distinction between a distinctly psychological level of analysis where
the processes studied are laden with meaning and intentionality, and 'below' this a
sub-semantic, quasi-psychological modelling of brain processes (be that in either
'standard' information processing or connectionist accounts). The latter processes
have no inherent 'aboutness' or intentionality, and are subdiscursive (Harre &
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Gillett, 1994). This distinction entails a reinterpretation of cognitive psychology's
talk of memory, mind, insight, recognition and so on, as appropriations from a
meaning-laden, properly psychological level. The current work will be pitched at
this psychological level, but every effort will be made to ensure it is consistent with
what we know of the biological and quasi-psychological levels.
This parallels the distinction between essentialist and nominalist definitions.
Mainstream cognitive psychology has been predominantly objectivist (Costall &
Still, 1987; Stevens, 1998; Still & Costall, 1991), based as it is on a Cartesianinspired view of mind in which somewhere between our actions and our biology a
'mind' intervenes. Within the 'Cognitive Revolution', such a mind has been
characterised in computational terms, the basic units being objective, discrete
entities, namely, symbolic representations (Shanon, 1991, 1993). As such,
essentialist definitions predominate in cognitive psychology where the essences
sought are discoverable, fundamental, presumably neural, entities which form the
basis of thought.
From a pragmatic, constructivist point of view (Butt, 1996; Kelly, 1955;
Stevens, 1998), the 'mind' is a description of our functioning within a world of
meaningful action. The concepts reified within cognitive psychology (such as
memories, representations, retrieval) are, properly, nominalisations applied to people
in the acts of remembering, representing, retrieving and so on. There is no inner
mind causing our action. Our action itself is inherently 'minded' (Butt, 1996; Harre
& Gillett, 1994; Johnson, 1987; Radley, 1977; Shanon, 1993). Mind, from this
perspective, is also considered a wider concept incorporating emotion, feeling, and
thinking as well as being embodied in action. In this sense it cannot be reduced to
information processing, itself presumably a model of brain processes. Brain
processes are the media underlying thought, feeling and action. Such processes are
its essential substrate, but neurones and patterns of activation do not think, feel or
act. These latter are predicates properly applied to the person.

1.7 A MAP OF THE THESIS
A distinction made by Kelly (1955) between 'loose' and 'tight' construing will be
central to this current work. Kelly called the skilled alternation between these two
modes of anticipation the Creativity Cycle. Within such creativity cycles one
'provisionally' tightens one's loose thinking to find if something promising is
emerging. In such cycles, the person attempts to keep his or her thinking relatively
loose and creative, not too-hastily closing off speculation, experimentation, toying
with absurdity and so on. Not coincidentally, though admittedly not purposely, the
structure of the following work has emulated this alternating pattern.
The work is divided into four sections (see Figure 1). The first three are
divided by two 'interregnums' which summarise 'what we have so far' and 'what we
still need' for an adequate account of insight. These intermediary chapters can be
considered to be provisional tightenings making sense of what has been presented
thus far and mapping out a rough sketch of the journey ahead. Of course, towards
the end of the thesis, in Chapter 11, Section 4,1 will attempt to tighten up and
present a coherent account of insight and will expect to see it reflected in the
interviews with creative fiction writers. But true to the creative subject of this work,
it is most important that this work also attempts to map out new territory and
provides the reader with expanded horizons, with a sense of new, unanswered
questions, and with a certain impatience to explore and to test the speculations and
implications of this work. If that is achieved, the thesis will have done justice to its
subject matter. More specifically, the contents of the current work are as follows.
The aim of Section 1, 'Illuminating the Domain of Insight', is to review the
psychological research into insight. The present chapter has illustrated and defined
what I mean by 'insight' and suggested why it may be an important process to study.
The type of philosophical and theoretical approach that will be utilised in this work has
also been indicated. The second chapter, 'Mechanistic Cognitive Approaches to
Insight', will summarise the mainstream information-processing accounts of insight,
while Chapter 3, 'Broader Cognitive, Experiential and Contextual Approaches', will

indicate that in order to do justice to the complexity and multifaceted nature of insight,
there needs to be a move beyond the metatheoretical assumptions and implications of
mainstream cognitive approaches. Accordingly, in Chapter 4 ('Interregnum') it will be
argued that while I have gathered reliable and consistent findings in relation to insight,
there is much of the phenomenology and reported experience of insight that is either

ignored or insufficiently treated within these largely descriptive accounts. It is proposed
that the theoretical difficulties in accounting for such features of insight within these
mainstream cognitive accounts have led to an increasingly constructivist outlook in the
literature.
Chapter 5, 'Constructivism and Personal Construct Psychology', will outline
a pragmatic constructivist position which will help in the explication and integration
of the findings of Section 1. Chapter 6, 'Personal Construct Psychology and
Insight', will present a particular constructivist account of insight which will form
the basis for the developing theoretical account of insight. Again, Chapter 7,
'Interregnum', will outline how Personal Construct Psychology (PCP) has helped in
this inquiry and what remains to be explored. More specifically, it will be asserted
that while PCP provides an excellent general framework in which to understand
insight, there are important aspects of mind highlighted by insight experiences which
Kelly's account under-specifies. These include a broadened understanding of
rationality, supplementing the 'normal' conscious representational mode of thought
with a looser 'presentational' mode. More specifically, the link between emotion
and abstraction needs to be expanded, Kelly's account of loosening and tightening
needs to be developed, and the ways in which PCP accounts for intuition and tacit
intentionality require elaboration. Insight also reveals the 'enactive' and embodied
nature of mind and frequently leads to an experience of a different sense of self and
of 'connectedness'. Finally, a metaphoric and 'imagistic' mode of thought centrally
implicated in insight needs to be accounted for.
Consequently, Chapter 8 will explore the relationship between 'Emotion and
Mind' and how this is related to insight. Chapter 9, 'Matte-Bianco, Kelly and
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An overview of this inquiry into insight.

Insight', will elaborate the P C P notions of loose and tight construing in terms of MatteBianco's account of the system unconscious. The final chapter of Section 3,
'Embodiment, Enactment and Metaphor: Paths to Insight', will link these ubiquitous
features of insight to the work of Merleau-Ponty and to contemporary theories of
imagination and mind. These approaches will be shown to be compatible with my
reading of PCP as a pragmatic constructivism. This chapter will conclude that insight
emerges within a type of 'meditative thought'.
The final section, 'Viewing Insight as a Whole', will begin with a 'Theoretical

Understanding of Insight' (Chapter 11) which will integrate the findings and ideas of the
previous chapters within a constructivist framework. This will be followed in Chapter
12, by a discussion of methodological issues and a summary of the types of features
expected to emerge in the interviews with eminent Australian fiction writers. This is in
preparation for the discussion of the interviews reported in Chapter 13 ('Insight in
Action: Talking to Fiction Writers'). The themes and theoretical understandings of
Chapter 11, and the proposed features and factors of Chapter 12, will be discussed in the
tight of these writers' reported experiences of insight.
Chapter 14, 'Conclusions and Beginnings' will summarise this investigation into
insight, propose its meanings and significance and point to the ways in which it
represents an opening to further inquiries. In particular, it will be proposed that the
constructivist understanding of insight is supported strongly by the interviews with the

writers. The Creativity Cycle of Kelly (1955) provides a solid theoretical foundation for
an understanding of insight and is compatible with a view of mind and understanding
that moves beyond the strict dualism of reason versus emotion, of inner mind versus
outer world and of conscious versus unconscious mental processes. It will be concluded
that insight represents a 'return' to one's anticipatory fit with one's world, an

experiential refutation of dualism or of separateness. The selective capacity to let go o
knowing and to dwell in uncertainty, it will be argued, provides the platform for
genuinely new understandings.

CHAPTER 2: MECHANISTIC COGNITIVE
APPROACHES TO INSIGHT

2.1 INFORMATION PROCESSING ACCOUNTS: GESTALT
PSYCHOLOGY REPHRASED.
M o s t of the current information-processing or cognitive-representational research into
insight uses concepts drawn from early research, particularly utilising language drawn
from Gestalt psychology (Duncker, 1945; Kohler, 1925, 1929; Maier, 1931; Mayer,
1995). Typically, theorists use concepts and terms such as Preparation, Impasse and
Fixation, Incubation, sudden perceptual-like Restructuring leading to Illumination or
Insight, and Verification and Elaboration — all drawn from the Gestalt lexicon.
In contrast to Gestalt psychology, the c o m m o n metatheoretical assumption
uniting such approaches (as well as Connectionism or Parallel Distributed Processing
[PDP]) is associationism, and it is this assumption that lends these approaches their
mechanistic feel. That is, drawing on an ancient tradition from the Greeks, through
Hobbes and Locke in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the mind is viewed as a
container of ideas and is constituted by the mechanical associations between them.10
Thinking is mechanistically determined1' by links between sensations and ideas in terms
of the strongest associations between them (Thorndike's L a w of Effect). This leads
naturally to the view that insight is merely a special case of stimulus-response
association; that it is caused by a more-or-less continuous process of associations being
activated until a fortuitous encounter with the appropriate stimulus triggers the correct
response (see Weisberg, 1986, 1995) — which of course begs the question as to h o w the
person k n o w s it is the right 'response'. A s will be seen, a major problem these
approaches encounter is h o w genuinely n e w understandings, based on n e w
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Though it is noted that Locke did acknowledge the mind's power of reflection which was creative,
That is, 'efficiently' determined. See the later discussion of determination (the 'four causes') in 4.2.1
for an alternative theoretical approach.
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representations, are formed from these largely 'unconscious', subdiscursive, associative
processes.

2.1.1 Insight As A Special Vs. Ordinary Cognitive Process
There are differences of opinion as to whether the insight experience expresses a special
or distinct cognitive process or whether it is continuous with 'normal' cognition.12 This
is perhaps best captured in the debate between Weisberg and Metcalfe (Metcalfe, 1986;
Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987; Weisberg, 1986, 1995; Weisberg & Alba, 1981). Metcalfe
represents the 'special process' view of insight. She has shown that people differ in
their subjective 'metacognitions' when attempting to solve so-called 'insight' versus
'non-insight' problems.13 Using participant 'warmth ratings' (which reflect how
confident the problem-solver is that he or she is approaching the solution), Metcalfe and
Wiebe (1987) found that subjective confidence in an impending solution increases
incrementally for non-insight problems, but in insight solution there is a sudden jump in
warmth ratings immediately prior to solution. That is, subjective metacognitions are
predictive of non-insight problem solution, but not of insight problem solution. Indeed,
incrementally increasing confidence while attempting insight problems negatively
predicts solution. The researchers concluded: "Thus we propose insight be defined in
terms of antecedent phenomenology" (p. 243). They argued that the warmth protocols
themselves can be used to differentiate insight and non-insight problems, thus
overcoming problems of definition by looking at the experiential phenomenology of
insight.
Weisberg and others (Perkins, 1981, 1995; Weisberg, 1986,1995; Weisberg &
Alba, 1981) rejected many of the Gestalt notions of insight as a special cognitive
12

This of course reflects earlier debates in the creativity literature about the distinction b
(divergent thought) and intelligence (convergent thought).
13
So-called 'insight' problems are those that require a non-incremental solution resulting in an 'insight'
experience. Solving a long multiplication would be a good example of a non-insight problem (as long as
the person had the requisite arithmetical knowledge). The problem with such terminology is of course
that the 'insight' does not reside in the 'problem', but in the person. So what may be an 'insight' problem
for me, may not be one for you. This constitutes a serious methodological problem in a good deal of this
type of research (as Weisberg has pointed out).

process. A s Weisberg (1995) argued, the occurrence of an 'Aha!' experience in itself is
insufficient evidence that an insight has occurred. He proposed instead a limited
definition of insight where there must be some discontinuity of thinking with the past
and where there is restructuring or " a change in the thinker's representation of the
problem" (1995, p. 163). He pointed out (1995) that even in 'insight' problems, if the
person has encountered analogous problems, there is continuity with the past and
therefore not a restructuring. Generally speaking, Weisberg and colleagues emphasised

that past experience and the information available in the current situation are sufficient
to explain most problem-solving: that insight, when it does occur, is merely an
extension of perceiving, learning and conceiving. Taking a type of 'default' position,
Weisberg (1986, 1995) asserted that until the essence of insight is tied down and
demonstrated empirically, the term should be avoided.
Davidson and Sternberg (1984; Davidson, 1995) disagreed with this default
position, arguing instead that there are three insight process: Selective Encoding —
knowing which data are relevant to the problem or task (thereby avoiding an exhaustive
search); Selective Combination — knowing how to combine information into a unified
whole; and Selective Comparison — relating newly acquired information to past
relevant information. The mere occurrence of these processes is insufficient for an
activity to be termed 'insightful'. If the solution to some problem does not occur
immediately, if the solution occurs abruptly when it does occur, and if the solution
reflects a new representation of the problem, then Davidson (1995) concluded the use of
these three processes is insightful.
There are theoretical problems here, however. Smedslund (1984) defined
common sense as "... a system of implications shared by competent users of a
language" (p. 242). He further observed that, frequently, valid propositions in
psychology are explications of common sense and so are true by definition, thus
tautological. An implication of this is that they are not empirical propositions at all.
Smedslund (1984) has demonstrated this with reference to a wide sample of
psychological theories, including Bandura's (1977, 1978) Social Learning Theory.

Following Smedslund, Kline's (1991) critique of Sternberg's (1985) Triarchic Theory of

Intelligence is directly applicable to Davidson and Sternberg's (1984) triarchic theory of
insight — because it is the same as Sternberg's (1985) theory of intelligence! Kline
(1991) demonstrated that Sternberg's components (selective encoding, combination and
comparison) are true by definition, and hence non-empirical, and that it is pointless to
support such statements empirically (as Sternberg and Davidson have claimed to have
done). For example, in insightful learning one must be attending to relevant information
(how could we not be if we are being insightful?). Or again, could it be possible to have
an insight where information was not combined 'selectively'? Davidson (1995) himself
seemed to be somewhat aware of the problem, characterising the theory as
"descriptive" (p. 133). What we seem to find here, and in many of the informationprocessing accounts of insight, is a redescription of everyday, discursively-informed
understanding, but now located at an inner 'representational' level. Explaining insight
has not progressed. Indeed, the problematic relationship of 'inner representation' and
'outer world' is now an additional explanatory burden.
Be that as it may, there is substantial support for the special process view within
the experimental cognitive literature. For example, Mayer (1995) believed it is not so
much the strength of associations between ideas which determines successful versus
unsuccessful attempts at solution of non-routine problems, but whether the solution
attempt better fits with the person's schematic anticipation of the operation to be
executed. Mayer pointed out that people are information interpreters as much as
information processors and that insight follows both suggestions from above and from
below.
To illustrate, Mayer (1995) discussed Maier's famous (1931) two-string
problem. In this problem participants are confronted with two strings hanging from the

ceiling in a room with various objects on the floor, including a pair of pliers. The task i
to grab hold of both strings, one in each hand. The problem is that the strings are too
wide apart. Very few people solved the problem initially. However, when Maier

'accidentally' brushed against one string, thus setting it in motion, a sizeable proportio

of the participants then solved the puzzle (by tying the pliers to one string, setting it in
motion, grabbing the other string and catching the 'pendulum'). Most interestingly,
very few participants reported being aware of the experimenter's 'hint'.
Mayer saw this as evidence for two complementary processes within insight:
1. The reformulation of the givens (a suggestion from 'below' where the brushing of
the string enabling the person to 'see' the inert string as a pendulum); and
2. The reformulation of the goal (a suggestion from 'above', perhaps enabling the
person to understand the problem now in terms of trajectories rather than distances).
There is no doubt that these processes are not independent of past experience, but what
counts is not what one's specific past experiences were, but what one has gained from
those experiences. What made insight processes special, for Mayer, is that expert
problem-solvers tend to reason at a more abstract qualitative level before focusing on
specific solutions (see also Seifert, Davidson, Patalano & Yaniv, 1995). As with
Metcalfe (1986), Mayer considered these metacognitive skills as important avenues for
research.
Schooler, Fallshore and Fiore (1995) proposed a two-process model of insight,
simply defining it operatively as the experience of a problem solver suddenly moving
from a state of not knowing how to solve a problem to a state of knowing how to solve

it; that is, as a transitional event. Consequently, impasse is an important part of their
definition, differentiating it from routine cognition. In theorising about how people
overcome impasses, they combined the Gestalt visual metaphor of sudden illumination
or perceptual gap-filling with a problem space metaphor (which we will encounter again
below). One process involves pattern-recognition comparable to visual perception in
which one 'sees' possible 'directions' in which to move. The complementary process
selects one of these directions and executes the 'movement'. Schooler and Melcher
(1995) and Schooler et al. (1995) linked the suddenness of insight to such perceptuallike pattern-recognition processes and drew on previous research showing that

recognition of out-of-focus pictures was the best predictor of solving 'insight' problems

resulting in similar, sudden shifts of comprehensibility. O n c e again this indicates that
insight processes are distinctive.
Such examples of contemporary research considering insight to be 'special'
could be multiplied. For example, most of the analogous discussions of what
distinguishes 'mundane' from 'exceptional' creativity (Ward, Smith & Vaid, 1997)
concluded that more creative and more insightful thinking, at some point, manifests
qualitatively distinct cognitive processes. In any case, the distinctiveness of insight
from more routine thought will also be evident in the discussions that follow. Indeed,
the 'specialness' of insight is also implicit in the distinction, found frequently in the
literature, between problem-solving and problem-finding.

2.1.2 Problem-Solving And Problem-Finding
Many discussants of insight within the cognitive tradition have made reference to the
distinction between problem-solving and problem-finding (Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer,
1995; Davidson and Sternberg, 1984; Kitchener, 1983; Perkins, 1995, 1997; Simonton,
1995, 1997). In cases of exceptional creativity and insight, for example, it may well be
that the discovery of important new questions or problems constitutes the biggest
breakthroughs and insights (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Gardner, 1993; Gruber, 1981,
1995). Kitchener (1983), for example, expressed this in terms of 'puzzles' as against

'ill-structured problems', the latter constituting most of life's challenges (see Heidegger,
1968, for a similar distinction taken up later in this work).
As for Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987), Kitchener considered that for ill-structured
problems metacognitions (where a person monitors his or her own progress in the task
at hand) are crucial. In puzzles, all elements for solution are available and can be solved
by the application of an appropriate algorithm.14 In ill-structured problems, on the other
hand, the person must actively search for clues and information which will help to

14

Many of the 'insight' problems used in cognitive research are puzzles in these terms. Usua
problems 'garden-path' the solver by leading them towards more stereotyped associates or procedures,
whereas the solution takes an unexpected, yet available path. Many jokes have this structure.

define the problem. This requires reflection on the nature of the problem, on the
strategies one should use, about the success or failure of one's strategies, and so on.
Importantly, one's automatic, routine mental processes have proved inadequate to the
task, and other modes of approach need to be utilised.

2.1.3 The Importance Of Fixation And Prior Knowledge
The preceding issue concerning problem-solving versus problem-finding overlaps with
the issues of fixation and prior knowledge. Fixation is defined as "the
counterproductive use or undesirable effect of prior knowledge" (Smith, 1995, p. 234).
The Gestalt attack (Duncker, 1945; Kohler, 1929; Maier, 1931) on the thencontemporary behaviourist and associationist theories (Hull, 1930; Thorndike, 1911)
took two forms. Firstly, the sudden, perceptual-like experience of insight was seen as
evidence of a discontinuous, qualitatively different form of thought. Secondly, the

demonstration that the direct use of past experience often led to problem-solving failure
(due to functional fixedness or fixation on a method of solution) was argued to show
that mere associations with past learning were not only inadequate, but had to be
overcome. It was asserted, therefore, that thinking was not merely reproductive, but
was also productive, where the latter is characterised by a departure from a mere re-use
of past knowledge and by a restructuring of the problem leading to insight.
But it has been found (Weisberg & Alba, 1981) that removing mental blocks
does not automatically lead to insight. For example, in the famous nine-dot problem

(Scheerer, 1963, see Figure 2) participants have to join all the dots using four straight
lines, not taking pen from paper. Most people fail to solve this, presumably because
they are fixated on solutions within the space defined by the dots. The solution is to
move outside the nine dots as shown below. But many, when told they can go outside

the dots, still fail to solve the problem. Nonetheless, breaking fixation (impasse) greatl
increases the chances of solution.
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Figure 2. The solution to the 'nine-dot' puzzle: going outside the dots.
In experimental situations it has been shown that fixation can be induced in a
number of ways. For example, Smith (1995a, 1995b) reported on his research where
engineers were asked to design disposable, spillproof coffee cups. They were given
examples with design faults but told to ignore them. The majority of the engineers
included the design faults in their creations, despite the explicit instructions to the
contrary. Smith (1995b) has shown both retroactive and proactive interference effects
leading to fixation. This is typically achieved by priming competitors in memory tasks,
making it more difficult to retrieve the target. These attempts are often accompanied by
tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) experiences where subjects feel (mostly incorrectly) that
success is imminent. Similar effects are achieved in Remote Associates Tests (RAT)
where subjects are primed with words which 'garden-path' them. Such effects recall
Duncker's (1945) notion of 'functional fixedness' where context induces a mental set.
This can be seen in the two-string problem described earlier: where the pliers are not
'seen' as a pendulum-like weight but as something with which one grasps objects.
Of course prior information does not only have a retrograde influence on insight
and problem-solving. In earlier related problem-solving and novice-expert literature,
existing knowledge, usually conceptualised as the direct application of schematic
knowledge to the problem at hand, is the most important feature of theoretical accounts.
For example, in the Problem-Space Theory of Newell and Simon (1972), problems are
solved using initial state knowledge, goal state knowledge and various stored strategies
called heuristics (non-algorithmic 'rules of thumb'). Solution is conceptualised as a
search through a space of possible alternative moves guided by these stored structures.

This use of heuristics and the general notion of goal-directed, non-associationistic
thinking, is derived directly from the Gestalt distinction between reproductive and
productive thinking mentioned above. The limitation of this research, and of research
into the differences between experts and novices, is that it is largely confined to well-

defined puzzles where all the information for solution is available, and the goal is also
clearly defined (Eysenck & Keane, 1990). As discussed earlier, it is probably in relation
to ill-defined problems (the majority of real-world events we confront), however, that
insight becomes most relevant and necessary.
Another major area of research emphasising the role of prior knowledge in
insight, beginning with Koestler's work on creativity (1964), is that concerned with the
use of analogy in problem-solving. In response to ill-defined problems, this research
has focused on the alternative ways by which knowledge is accessed and used. An illdefined problem is defined in terms of the knowledge that a person brings to bear upon a
problem. The less knowledge, the more ill-defined the problem. In this situation the
person may use analogical mapping (Gentner, 1983) where the characteristics of a base
domain (often involving a 'remote' analogy) are mapped onto a target domain (compare
to Davidson and Sternberg's 1995 notion of 'selective comparison').
A classic example was Gick and Holyoak's (1983) use of Duncker's (1945)
'radiation problem'. The radiation problem is as follows: a doctor wishes to use
radiation to destroy a malignant tumour. The problem is that the high intensity required

will kill the healthy tissue around the cancer, while a lower intensity ray will not kill
tumour. The solution is one of 'convergence' where the doctor uses low intensity rays,
but uses a number of them simultaneously from a variety of angles thus adding up to the
right intensity only at the tumour. Gick and Holyoak (1983) gave subjects an analogous
story about a General not being able to storm a fortress because the roads leading to it
were mined to explode if large numbers of soldiers were to use any one of them. Of
course the solution was to send smaller groups of soldiers by various roads leading to
the fortress. By giving the problem-solvers this analogous problem and solution, and
asking them to use it in solving their target problem, solution rates jumped from 10% to

8 0 % . However, if subjects are not told to use the analogous scenario, they often fail to
notice its relevance. Keane (1987) concluded that what seems to distinguish significant
acts of creativity is the creator's ability to retrieve and use such remote analogies.
M o r e recently, numerous theorists (Smith, 1995a, 1995b; Smith, W a r d & Finke,
1995; Ward, 1995; Weisberg, 1986, 1995) have also considered that insight can be best
understood in terms of retrieval and in terms of the novel use of stored information.
Indeed a cursory inspection of recent collections of work on insight (Sternberg and
Davidson, 1995) and on creative cognition (Smith et al., 1995; W a r d et al., 1997)
reveals general agreement on this. It is at this point, particularly in terms of how w e
restructure the problem and overcome fixation and impasse, that recent accounts begin
to diversify.

2.2 THE CRUX OF INSIGHT: OVERCOMING FIXATION AND
RESTRUCTURING THE PROBLEM.
W e have seen h o w important prior knowledge is, but the point is h o w w e use our prior
knowledge, h o w w e combine it and apply it and h o w w e selectively search for and open
ourselves to n e w information. It is here w e enter into the heart of the matter. N o matter
what theoretical language is used, the crux of the problem of insight is h o w do w e form
a n e w view of the problem at hand, a genuinely n e w construction? H o w do w e
overcome fixation? H o w do w e restructure our representations? It is also here that
boundaries begin to blur and there are found interesting mixes, for example, of standard
representationism and connectionism (Schooler & Melcher, 1995; Schooler et al, 1995;
Seifert et al., 1995). Connectionism, the more recent evolution of cognitive science is,
however, by no means in complete metatheoretical harmony with the idea of discrete
symbolic representations (Shanon, 1991, 1993; Harre & Gillett, 1994). In addition,
current theorising on insight often utilises analogies with evolution and adaptation
(Perkins, 1981, 1995, 1997; Simonton, 1993, 1997). Accordingly, some connectionist
accounts of insight, then several neo-Darwinian approaches will n o w be summarised,
followed by a return to some information processing theories.

2.2.1

Martindale: Connectionism A n d Insight

Martindale's (1995) connectionist account of creativity and insight is both elegant and
thought-provoking. A s a model, it is consistent with m u c h of the phenomenology of
insight, including its stages, and will be referred to later in this work as a plausible
description of the neural network, subdiscursive substrate of what w e experience at the
personal, psychological level as insight (Harre & Gillett, 1994). Accordingly, some
time will be spent here outlining his proposed theory. I will begin with a brief summary
of Connectionist or Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) models.
Rather than conceptualising thinking in terms of computational processes
applied to discrete representations, P D P (Rumelhart, Hinton & McClelland, 1986)
proposes that cognition has no discrete location but is radically distributed across
neurone-like networks, called Hopfield Nets (Hopfield, 1982). Modelling of cognition
is in terms of processing units or nodes (which are not as complex as actual neurones).
It is assumed that there is a limited amount of energy available to the system of
networks and that consciousness depends on certain nodes being activated beyond a
m i n i m u m threshold. Accordingly, a small number of highly activated nodes would
correspond to focused attention while spread patterns of less activated nodes would
represent less focused attention. Long term m e m o r y is conceptualised as the excitatory
and inhibitory patterns of connectivity established between nodes. These 'learned'
patterns are usually conceived of in terms of Hebb's law (Martindale, 1995), according
to which if two nodes are activated simultaneously then the connection between them is
strengthened. Finally, the networks of connections are divided into modules, similar to
the modularity of the brain. Each module is further divided into several layers with
vertical connections being excitatory and lateral connections being inhibitory
(Martindale, 1995).
Martindale (1995) summarised the stages given by Wallas (1926) and
emphasised that while insights are always combinations of old ideas, what provides the
insight is not usually the ideas consciously considered in the preparation stage, but ideas

previously not thought to be relevant. In the language of cognitive psychology, these
are ideas that are distant associates or analogues. Furthermore, he agreed that insights
are rarely a product of purely conscious calculation. Martindale then summarised three
approaches to creativity, each of which is worthy of comment here:
1. Common Sense and Some Facts.
2. Blind Variation and Selective Retention.
3. Defocused Attention.
1. Since insights are combinations of old ideas, it would seem to be common
sense that the more mental elements one had, especially in one's domain of expertise,

the higher the chances for a creative idea. Martindale pointed out, however, that this is
not exactly so. Very often creative ideas come from people who are not quite experts
within a domain (Simonton, 1995). Experts solve problems because they know what is
relevant, and "... the disastrous part — what is irrelevant. A creative solution is one
involving ideas that were previously thought to be irrelevant" (Martindale, 1995, p.
252). Thus, creative insights are often produced by people with expertise across
domains, often with the use of analogy (Martindale gave the example of neural network
theory itself being derived analogously from Hopfield's knowledge of spin-glass
dynamics).
2. According to Campbell's (1960) Blind Variation and Selective Retention
model of creativity, our thoughts are quasi random. This nee-Darwinian theory (see
below for other such approaches) considered creativity to be a matter of chance. This is
a 'business-as-usual' approach to insight and creativity whereby a random event may
suggest the solution to one's problem. Martindale re-interpreted it in connectionist
terms suggesting that when connections between nodes are strong, thought is routine
and unsurprising. When no connections exist, no thoughts can link them, and when
weak or indirect connections exist, say between planetary orbits and the structure of
atoms (as for Rutherford prior to his famous theory of the structure of the atom), the
"arousal system bombards the cortex with non-specific activation; the latter multiplies
the activation of already activated nodes" (Martindale, 1995, p. 253-254, italics added).

This further activates the already partly activated 'distant' nodes and the relationship
between them is retained ('selective retention'). It is important that, following a weak
connection between nodes, the system undergoes a broad, non-specific activation. This
fits well with anecdotal reports of vague associative mental play preceding insight —
and, it will be argued, this gives a plausible neural-net analogue for the 'loosening' and
'tightening' of construing that, for Kelly (1955), constituted creativity.
Nonetheless, Martindale (1995) believed this approach is limited. Because of
the sheer number of combinatorial possibilities, an individual should have, at most, one
creative idea in his or her lifetime. The problem is that people frequently generate many
more than this. It may be the case that a monkey randomly hitting keys on a typewriter
would eventually type out all of Hamlet (Campbell, 1960), but Martindale estimated it
would take trillions of years! Although Campbell's (1960) theory may give some idea
of how creative ideas arise, it is also silent on the psychological processes involved.
Martindale argued that since it is necessary to be conscious of creative combinations

when they arise, differences in attentional capacity may explain differences in creativity
thus he turned to a theory of defocused attention.
3. Mendelshon (1976, cited in Martindale, 1995) argued that the greater the
attentional capacity of the person, the more likely were creative, combinatorial leaps. In
highly focused attention, few elements are activated, while in relatively unfocussed
attention, more nodes are activated, each with less 'energy'. With more elements
available for combination, creativity is more likely. The idea that creative people can
utilise this type of'loosened' thinking was supported, for example, by findings that
'creatives' show less cortical arousal on creativity tests than 'uncreative' subjects,
actually averaging below their resting or baseline measures — yet they show similar

levels of arousal as 'uncreative' subjects on conventional intelligence tests (Martindale,
1995). 'Creatives' also showed less cortical arousal than 'uncreatives' on concentration
tasks (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), suggesting they are less fixated and can more easily
enter into absorptive states (Hunt, 1995). Of importance here is the contention that
people with a record of significant creative insights can probably hold more ideas or

elements in mind (be that in Short T e r m M e m o r y or focal attention), with less effort,
than most other people.

2.2.2 Martindale's Theory Of Insight

2.2.2.1 The Stages Of Insight
So how does this map onto the stages of insight? The preparation stage would be
marked by highly focused attention with only a few nodes 'encoding' ideas relevant to
the problem at hand. For problems that reach impasse, because the critical 'irrelevant'
idea has been ignored, the incubation stage is entered. In this stage, for the incipient
'insightful' person, the nodes associated with the problem remain partly activated and
thus the problem is still in the 'back of the mind'. As the person goes about his or her
daily affairs, countless other nodes will be activated, and if one of these is related to
problem the latter will be further activated and cross the threshold of focal awareness.
This constitutes the experience of insight, the person having discovered a creative
analogy. This parallels Thagard's (1997) distinction between coherence-driven and
incoherence-driven conceptual combination.
Coherence-driven combination is algorithmic and relates to my earlier definition
of puzzle-solving. On the other hand, incoherence-driven combination involves "... the
potentially more creative cognitive processes of analogy and abduction" (1997, p. 140),
where abduction involves the generation and acceptance of explanatory hypotheses
following surprising or unexpected results. It will be later seen how this alternation
between highly focused attention, defocused attention amid action in the world, and a

return to focused attention to verify the insight, fits very well with Kelly's (1955) not
of alternating stages of loosening and tightening embedded within a larger cycle of
experience. In similar fashion, abduction can be seen as the principle that Kelly used to
explain the basic creative capacities of people as they construe their world (Warren,
1989). That is, abduction marks the dialectical process between the person's

anticipations and the world which both constrains and transcends those anticipations.
Events always provides surprises to the person open to the unexpected.

2.2.2.2 Associative Hierarchies
Since within PDP accounts it is assumed that the total activation in layers of nodes is

relatively constant, when there is strong focal attention there is more lateral inhibiti
other nodes. As attention defocuses, there is a more equitable spread of the activation
among a larger number of nodes. In the latter case, there are relatively more nodes held
within short term memory and a wider associative hierarchy is activated. For example,

in a steep associative hierarchy, in response to a word-association task one would expec

more stereotyped responses. So in response to the word 'table', the associates 'chair' or
'food' may almost always be given (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3.

Steep and flat association hierarchies (from Martindale, 1995).

In contrast, a person with a flat associative hierarchy may respond in variable
fashion, being more likely to come up with more idiosyncratic, remote associates such
as 'ocean'. Two people, (as represented by 'A' and 'B' in Figure 3) may have the same

relative ordering of associates, but differ in the steepness of their associative hierar
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'Uncreative' people would be expected to produce fewer associates faster than
'creatives' w h o m a y be expected to respond more slowly with a wider variety of
associates. Thisfitswell with research on the matter. Subjects w h o correctly solve
insight problems tend to take longer than non-solvers w h o typically m o v e more quickly
into solution attempts (Metcalfe, 1986) and m a k e more stereotypical responses (Smith
1995a, 1995b).

2.2.2.3 Creativity, Insight, And Primary And Secondary Process
Thinking
Many accounts of creativity, both theoretical and anecdotal, utilise language and
concepts drawn from the psychoanalytic tradition. Frequently, creators will talk about
'unconscious processes', or of the work of the 'subconscious', and of 'primary
processes', as feeding into their creative insights (Epel, 1993). Martindale (1995) also
drew explicitly from this tradition. In particular, he stressed the role of 'primary process
thinking' within insight. Before discussing his views, however, w e need to familiarise
ourselves with the general features of the Freudian 'conscious' and 'unconscious', and
the types of thinking which characterises each of them.
The Freudian Conscious and Unconscious
Generally speaking, Freud characterised conscious thinking as that aspect of mind that
encompasses all that one is momentarily aware of. It is usually defined in contrast to
unconscious mental processes. The type of thinking that characterises conscious
processes is secondary process thinking which is thinking attuned to the demands of
reality, and which is rational and logical (Freud, 1911). It is typified by an ability to
delay gratification and by an absence of emotional influences on the thinking process.
A s Laplanche and Pontalis (1973, p. 340) put it, secondary process thinking "must
concern itself with the connecting paths between ideas, without being led astray by the
intensities of those ideas" [emphasis added]. These 'connecting paths' are the logical
relations between ideas. Such inferential relations are typically transitive and
asymmetrical (not reversible) in that ideas are arranged hierarchically in patterns of

inference. A n example of an asymmetrical relation is 'A is bigger than B ' — which
cannot be reversed without changing the meaning radically ('B is bigger than A').15
On the other hand, Freud distinguished three senses of the term 'unconscious'
throughout his writing (Reber, 1985). The descriptive sense denotes any thought that is
not in consciousness at the present moment (which includes repressed contents as well
as the easily accessible preconscious). The dynamic sense is more specific, explaining
the reasons many thoughts are unconscious. The most important mechanism for
producing and maintaining unconscious contents is repression. The third sense of
'unconscious' is the systematic sense which describes the rules and processes operative
in the unconscious conceptualised as a semi-independent system of thought. It is this
'system unconscious' that will form the focus of our attention.
Rayner and Tuckett (1988) summarised Freud's definitions of the (system)
unconscious. The five principal features of the unconscious given in 1900 (and
elaborated by eight further characteristics in 1915) were: The absence of mutual
contradiction; Condensation; Timelessness; Displacement; Replacement of external by

internal reality. For the purposes here, it will suffice to indicate that these five feat
are typical of primary process thinking which is often irrational and tends to be freeassociative, 'autistic', analogical and emotive. It is governed by the pleasure-pain
principle and is not cognisant of the constraints of space and time. Most importantly,

the system unconscious selectively treats the converse of any relation as identical to it

It frequently treats logically asymmetrical relations as if they were symmetrical (MatteBianco, 1988). In terms of my example above, 'A is bigger than B' may be considered
to be equivalent to 'B is bigger than A'! Thus, primary process thinking tends to find
similarity and sameness where secondary process thinking finds distinction and
difference.
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These matters will be given a more detailed treatment in the later section on the psychoanalyst and
mathematician, Matte-Bianco. In particular, the depiction of primary process thinking as being largely
composed of symmetrical relations and secondary process thinking by asymmetrical relations will be
pivotal in elaborating George Kelly's Creativity Cycle and building a theoretical framework for
understanding insight.

Martindale (1995) discussed the assertion (Kris, 1952) that creative people are
more adept at alternating between primary process and secondary process thinking.
Kris (1952) believed that creative people can use primary process thinking to apply to
abstract and to more emotionally-neutral ideas, whereas non-creative people can only
use it to deal with emotive, personally-relevant material. As such, creative thinking is
enriched by some of the features of primary process thinking, particularly being more
analogical, free-associative and figurative, without necessarily implying an 'autistic',
pathological separation from reality.
Martindale's use of the terms 'primary process' and 'secondary process' to refer
to thinking was, however, purely descriptive.16 He used them to merely distinguish
between the type of thought present in reverie or fantasy (primary process) from more
rational and intellectual styles of thought (secondary process). This is supported by the
fact that, for example, 'creative' people report more fantasy and reverie and are more
easily hypnotised (Hunt, 1995). Furthermore, Martindale echoed Shallice's (1978)
assertion that primary process thinking " corresponds to a state in which large numbers
of nodes are equally or about evenly activated" (1995, p. 259). Clearly, this represents
a flat associative hierarchy, the use of which makes analogical and free-associative
thinking more likely. This mirrors my accent on primary process thinking as being
more sensitive to 'sameness' or 'symmetry' because — from a secondary process point
of view — it allows 'remote' associates to be activated roughly equally to 'near'
associates. Such equivalencies between distant associates may appear absurd or
completely illogical to conscious, rational thought (secondary process) based as if is on
asymmetrical logic.
Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Relationships
Importantly, Martindale (1995) pointed out one constraint on Hopfield networks.
Unlike the brain, they are predicated on symmetrical relationships between nodes and
complete interconnectedness between network nodes. Apart from the astronomical
combinatorial possibilities this would imply, such interconnectedness would correspond
16

Freud's more expansive treatment of unconscious thinking will be returned to later when considering
the role of combinations of symmetrical and asymmetrical thinking in generating insights.

to a mind operating exclusively in primary process fashion, with limited inferential and
(classical) logical capacity. The connections between neurones are, however, largely
asymmetric. They are not simply being either on (+1) or off (-1) (Hunt, 1995).
Furthermore, the brain is of modular character as not all neurones are connected to all
other neurones (Damasio, 1994). That is, the neurological evidence clearly supports the
notion that thinking also needs to be conceptualised in asymmetrical terms. Such
asymmetricality, as I have suggested, should support our capacity for secondary process
thinking.
As it turns out, making the weights asymmetric in modelling equations based on
Hopfield nets does not affect performance of these models. In fact, allowing nodes to
take a continuum of values gives better modelling results (Martindale, 1995) —
supporting the intuitively satisfying idea that thought involves both symmetrical and
asymmetrical relationships. Again, I will return to these notions in my later discussion
of the psychoanalyst Matte-Bianco (Matte-Bianco, 1988; Rayner, 1995), linking them to
both his distinction between symmetrical and asymmetrical thought, and to Kelly's
(1955) distinction between loose and tight construing.

2.2.2.4 A Summary And Some Speculations
Martindale (1995) summarised his connectionist account of insight as follows:
T o build a neural network capable of creative insights,firstw e need to
fill the nodes with a wide diversity of knowledge. Second w e need to
present the network with a problem that it cannot solve. If the problem
can be solved at first glance, the solution will most likely be
algorithmic or uncreative... . Next, w e want the nodes representing the
problem to remain partially activated so they can 'filter' other nodes
corresponding to perception and thoughts. If these other nodes give a
hint at the solution, connections will be strengthened, and the solution
will pop into mind. (p. 261)

We have seen that a crucial element in the above process of coming to insight is the
alternation between different modes of thought corresponding to differing levels of

cortical arousal. To increase the likelihood of a creative link, a state of low arousal o
defocused attention, is entered into. Such a state, for example, is found in particular

meditative and/or hypnotic states (Hunt, 1995). This state will increase the chances that

all the relevant nodes will be simultaneously, partially activated. Take for example,
Rutherford's analogy between planetary orbits and the structure of the atom. After

preparatory efforts at solution, and the setting aside of the problem, the various releva
nodes needed to remain simultaneously activated (in this case perhaps representing the
ideas of a larger body orbited by smaller ones, of 'gravitational' forces between
elements, of dynamic trajectories, as well of the crucial notion of a planet being
orbited). How can the structure of the atom be conceptualised to include these
characteristics? And then the insight: 'by conceiving of it in terms of a planet being
orbited by moons'. Chance plays some role here too. We do not know in advance how
to forge the link. Perhaps it depends on a fortuitous phrase in conversation, on
something seen in the environment, or on an 'irrelevant' memory being allowed to be
held within the same context as our problem. But of course, this can only happen to a

prepared mind. Finally, the insight must be verified, signalling a return to high arousal
with more steep associative hierarchies and 'secondary process', asymmetrical thinking.

Again, it is seen that insight is a part of a wider sequence of alternating styles of tho
and of styles of cortical arousal.
The question is, do we have a brain that is designed to operate in this alternating
fashion? The answer appears to be yes. Martindale (1995, p. 266) mentioned three such

biological cycles characterised by alternating cortical arousal: the arousal system (whic
stimulates the cortex about ten times per second), the ultradian cycle of 90 minutes

duration, and the diurnal cycle. Verifiable in our subjective experience is the alternati
between periods of more-or-less intense concentration (high arousal) and taking a break
or musing quietly about the problem at hand (low arousal). This latter alternation is
widely reported by creative people in all fields (Gardner, 1993; Gruber, 1981,1995).
Martindale speculated that there is yet another fruitful analogy with solid state
physics. Hopfield (1982) assumed that all physical systems evolve so as to minimise
energy or settle into a global energy minimum. Neural systems should be no exception
and should in practice settle into both global and local energy minima. He used the
example of annealing — the heating of a flawed crystal (a local energy minimum) until

it is fluid, followed by slow cooling to allow it to form a perfect crystal (a global energy
minimum). He then described simulated annealing on a Hopfield net: high temperatures
would correspond to low arousal or primary process thinking. At very high
temperatures nodes would be going on and off in a near random fashion, while "nodes
receiving moderate inputs [moderately low arousal] do not yet have to commit

themselves to being on or off and thus are not trapped in the system as a whole in a loca
minimum" (p. 265). Slowly the temperature drops (arousal increases) and thought
becomes more crystalline. Thus, impasses in thought can be likened to flaws in a
crystal or a local minimum. To overcome this local minimum (in favour of a more
global energy minimum) the thinking process needs to return to a more 'primary' state
to allow the basic 'atoms' of thought to most efficiently align themselves. On cooling
(returning to secondary process thinking), the insight would become manifest and open
to verification and elaboration.

2.2.3 Neo-Darwinian Accounts: The Evolution Of Insights
Simonton (1993) lamented the paucity within cognitive science of theories of creativity
which take account of the role of personality or social context, and indeed the absence
of any general incorporative theory of creative insight. Accordingly, Simonton's
historico-metric methodology placed insight and creativity within the context of
creators' creative outputs throughout their lives. Following large scale empirical
investigations Simonton concluded that, overall, it is the number of creative variations
creators produce that determines the occurrence of durable insights. It is a question of
statistical probability that fluctuates with individual differences in productivity. An
eminently creative person must spend about 10 years (see also Gardner, 1993) building
up a huge reservoir of discipline-relevant knowledge and understanding. The person
often turns out to be a 'maverick', frequently from a very stimulating or chaotic
household. Notable creators are also often early voracious readers. Simonton (1995)

pointed out that creativity, like evolution's variations, is a very wasteful business. Mo

insights are ultimately unsuccessful, not surviving the harsh light of subsequent testing

either by the creator, or by thefield.Accordingly, "... the odds of producing a

successful work in any one period of a creator's life are simply a probabilistic functio
of the total number of insights offered" (1995, p. 487).
Mention has been made earlier of searching a problem-space — in computing
terms, often called a possibility space (Newell & Simon, 1972) — and of Campbell's
(1960) 'Blind Variation and Selective Retention' evolutionary theory. Simonton's
(1993) 'Blind Variations, Chance Configurations, and Creative Genius' follows in this
tradition. His view was that as problems become more novel and complex, one's
repertoire of heuristics and algorithms are inadequate to solve them. The person must
make his or her mind "accessible to chaotic combinatory play" (1995, p. 470) which is
analogous to random genetic mutations in evolution. He said that cognitive psychology
(Newell & Simon, 1972) tends to reject the notion of chance configurations, concerned
as it is with defining a space of givens, goals and operations, and with determining a
path through these given some heuristic. He contended (1993, 1995), moreover, that the

free-associative 'search' so necessary for genuine novelty is even less ordered than tri
and error and likened it to primary process thinking. This latter point about the
unstructured nature of primary process thinking will be countered, however, in my

discussion of Matte-Bianco and the logic of the unconscious, particularly in relation to
what Matte-Bianco (1988) called 'bi-modal' thought.
The 'search'17 that Simonton referred to is not 'blind' in the sense of completely
random trial and error (which leads to an inefficient, often hopeless, 'combinatorial
explosion'), but was 'blind' in that its results are unpredictable. The latter type of
searches require more luck or 'chance' as the number of alternative representations of
the problem and of alternative heuristics to solve it expand, and importantly, become

equiprobable. That is, the problem solver cannot, a priori, decide which associative path

is most likely to lead to success. Frequently, it is a fortuitous event in a person's li
which 'primes' one string of associations over another.

17

Simonton, true to his Darwinian metatheory, was careful to remove any connotation of conscious
intention or any teleology from this notion of 'search'.

For Simonton (1993), the only requirement for creative insight was that in this
impasse situation one's associative processes take place within broad horizons. This
more free-associative mental play does not take place in core consciousness, but"...
can occur on the periphery of awareness, deflected this way and that by the random
intrusion of subliminal events" (1993, p. 228). Incubation, in his scheme of things, is
described as waiting for external priming (which does seem to underplay the role of
'internal' mental phenomena such as imaginative reverie or dreams). Insight, when it
arrives, is not deliberate and is not achieved with foresight:
Nevertheless, when the succession of subconscious images chances
upon a bona fide insight, core consciousness will suddenly change
focus and spotlight the discovery. The upshot is the dramatic
subjective experience of illumination or inspiration. (Simonton, 1995,
p. 477)

Notice the insight is somehow 'chanced upon' by the subconscious images themselves,
surely a problematic, homuncular, notion. In my view, insight is an act of
understanding properly understood as occurring at the level of the person, whatever
unconscious processes may precede it.
Perkins (1995, 1997) was another neo-Darwinian contributor to the research on
creativity and insight. Perkins (1995) compared Generative Breakthrough Events
(GBEs) within evolution to insights. GBEs have three characteristics. Firstly, they
involve long 'searches' through spaces of possibility — particularly 'Klondike Spaces'.
These latter are possibility spaces with vast, relatively clueless regions in the midst

which occur rich 'veins' of clues. Secondly, they require a precipitating event. Finally
they are marked by a rapid culmination whose rapidity is a function of the topography
of Klondike spaces. Once again, 'searches' are to be understood in terms of adaptations
to the perturbations and demands of the environment, rather than as involving conscious
intentionality. Although Perkins (1995) distinguished human intelligence and cognition
from the mindlessness of evolution's creativity, the parallels are suggestive: human

insight often follows a long search, often discloses the hidden, is generative of change
begins with a precipitating event and is achieved rapidly. Perkins (1995) noted that
humans are peculiarly well-adapted to operate within Klondike Spaces, as well as within

the more c o m m o n , clue-rich 'homing' spaces such as are predominantly dealt with by
cognitive science (Newell & Simon, 1972; Chi, Glaser & Rees, 1983).
The distinction between Klondike Spaces and H o m i n g Spaces parallels the
distinction m a d e earlier between ill and well-defined problems, as well as between
problem-finding and problem-solving. A person within a Klondike Space needs not
only conventional clue-oriented expertise, but also requires a more divergent style of
search which looks for mini homing spaces within the wider clueless expanse: " casting
a wide net, avoiding redundant coverage of the same regions, searching for n e w regions
altogether..." (Perkins, 1995, p. 515). In life in general w e rely on an enormous
knowledge base to negotiate smoothly most situations (using general and specialised
knowledge to turn potential Klondike Spaces into H o m i n g Spaces).
Despite this, m a n y situations pose problems which outstrip our heuristics and
knowledge base. But it is our ability to cope with this, our insightfulness, that
distinguishes us from "the blind search processes of natural selection" (Perkins, 1995,
p. 521). Natural selection has no memory, whereas w e begin with options in our
searches. W e can brainstorm w h e n impasse is evident. In fact, w e look for generativity
itself on purpose, andfinally,because w e accumulate experiences, w e also operate with
'planning spaces' which are possibility spaces of goals and plans. The best illustration
of the latter is the existence of 'mefacognition' (our reflexive ability to think about our
thinking). Finally, Perkins rejected the notion of incubation as unconscious reasoning,
preferring to characterise it in terms of forgetting entrapping assumptions and noticing
clues in the environment.

2.2.4 Information Processing Mechanisms Of Insight

2.2.4.1 Unconscious Processes
Koestler (1964) considered that the unconscious played the major role in insight. H e
discussed the insights of Poincare, and considered incubation to be characterised by
unconscious combining and recombining of previously unrelated ideas until an

occasional combination is 'appreciated by the unconscious' and is 'delivered' to the
conscious mind. As we saw in relation to Simonton, (1995), this raises the spectre of a
'mind-within-a-mind' or a homunculus. We now have an 'insight' at an unconscious
level which is in just as much need of explanation as the conscious level insight which
first inspired this inquiry.
This notion that ideas combine unconsciously has been given a new form within
information processing psychology (Ohlsson, 1993; Schooler & Melcher, 1995;
Schooler et al. 1995). According to this interpretation, impasse and fixation are caused

by the excessive activation of inappropriate 'operators' (knowledge and actions one uses
to solve a problem). The incubation period allows this activation to dampen, which

increases the likelihood that more appropriate operators will be activated on subsequent
attempts. Eclectically drawing from the PDP metaphor of neural nets and theories of
semantic activation (Ohlsson, 1993; Yaniv & Meyer, 1987), the authors argued that this

alteration in activation allows a wider spreading activation which eventually reaches th
relevant concepts which are activated sufficiently to be suddenly 'recognised' as the

solution. But note that these theorists (Schooler & Melcher, 1995; Schooler et al., 1995

have not specified at what level the insight takes place. Sufficient activation of nodes
properly, a correlate of conscious awareness, and therefore of insight. Do we 'see' or
'recognise' at the level of neural nets and nodes, or are they terms best reserved for a
person seeing and recognising?
These are difficult matters which the authors acknowledged: "While this
analytical approach has allowed us to make real progress on the topic, we must concede

that there is little in this chapter that can be characterized as a true insight about i
(Schooler & Melcher, 1995, p. 128). In the same chapter they summarised the
(convincing) evidence that non-reportable processes play their part in insight. Thus,
concurrent verbalisations impair insight problem solving, but have no effect on equally
difficult analytical problems. Further, they found that in insight problems there are
more metacognitions and less logical arguments used in solution. The two measures
found to be most correlated with insight were pattern recognition and avoidance of

context-induced mental set (fixation), which they took as more support for earlier
Gestalt-like views of insight as quasi perceptual, as akin to visual recognition.
Perhaps at this point a distinction could be suggested: non-reportable processes
may still be 'logical' and be available to awareness, but simply are not verbal. Thus
what Schooler and Melcher (1995) call the 'ineffability of insight' may merely be a
different style or mode of awareness or thought. It may in fact be quite 'palpable',
though difficult to report on. This type of distinction was suggested by Langer (1957,
1972) who distinguished between representational and presentational modes of
thought, the latter being a non-discursive (non-linguistic) symbolic mode highly
sensitive to the medium of expression, to mood and to aesthetic appreciation.
Representational consciousness, on the other hand, is best characterised as being
expressible in propositions and is somewhat context and medium insensitive.18 Indeed,
Schooler and Melcher (1995) were aware that other modes of cognition are important.
They made passing reference (p. 128) to subliminal perception, implicit learning,
implicit memory and to hemispheric specialisation. They pointed out that the right
hemisphere is associated with non-verbal cognition, visual-spatial processing, and

appreciating metaphor and humour, all of which are related to insight. In particular, the
right hemisphere shows broader patterns of spreading activation in priming tasks,

perhaps providing a physical substrate of the retrieval of remote associates so importan
in the generation of insight. In fact, Schooler and Melcher's (1995) own findings that
verbalisation interferes with insight processes lends support to both the notion that
presentational modes of thought are a necessary, non-reportable stage within insight,
and to the important role of non-verbal (right hemisphere-dominant) cognition.

2.2.4.2 Causes Of Impasse

As mentioned earlier, Schooler et al (1995) considered that insight is best understood in
terms of two metaphors: insight as 'perceptual', and as a search in a 'problem space'.
But here the 'search' is not carried out by an unconscious mentality, but is a non-
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Representational and presentational consciousness will be discussed in more detail in later chapters.

intentional, spreading activation. Thus, impasse is caused by failures in recognition and
in terms of searching the wrong problem spaces. Recognition failures can result from
overemphasis of irrelevant cues and under-emphasis of relevant cues. In the former
case, for example, Smith (1995a, 1995b) and Finke (1995) found that inventors can be
'garden-pathed' by experimenter-provided suggestions. The other side of this coin is

that available relevant knowledge is ignored, or put another way, 'selective comparison'
(Davidson, 1995) is not achieved. Alternatively, impasse can be considered as a search
being conducted in the wrong problem space. The person does not have the potential

solution in front of them and must move to a new vantage point, that is, construct a new
representation of the problem.
Of course this talk of 'recognition' and of 'search' raises a fundamental
philosophical problem for spreading activation theories and connectionism in general.
That is, while authors have been careful to not anthropomorphise their concepts,
especially within PDP, at some point consciousness, intentionality, and self-awareness
are assumed to emerge from these networks. At what point? Who or what 'recognises'
the sufficiently activated remote associate? It is salutary to consider the process,
however, in the reverse direction (Harre & Gillett, 1994). For example, playing a good

shot is best understood in terms of the full context of the game being played, and is l
well understood in terms of biological and kinaesthetic processes. That is, the meaning

and understanding of the shot is only possible in full lived context (see Chapter 10 fo
development of this idea).

2.2.4.3 Overcoming Impasse
Given their view of the causes of impasse, Schooler at al. (1995) outlined the ways to
overcome impasse. Problem-solvers must: Reduce the salience of inappropriate cues;
increase the salience of appropriate cues; effectively search for a new problem
representation. To reduce fixation on irrelevant cues they suggested a person
consciously de-emphasises those cues,19 that they allow the passage of time to reduce
19

This suggestion seems illogical: if the person knew what was inappropriate, they would not be fixated
on it. But matters are not usually so clear-cut. The person does k n o w that repeated attempts using the

their salience, and that they consider the problem in a different physical or

psychological context. It is significant that none of these suggestions are specifically

'information processing' solutions, but really can be derived from both anecdotal report
and from a common sense understanding of the term 'insight' (Kline, 1991; Smedslund,
1984). More salient cues can be recognised by the " simple encounter of a cue in the
environment, or the spontaneous surfacing into consciousness of some relevant bit of
information" (Schooler et al., 1995, p. 571). Again, it could be said that this is
commonsense 'dressed up' in scientific-sounding language.
However, other researchers (Seifert et al., 1995) have proposed two mechanisms
drawn from cognitive science which advance commonsense. Firstly, they referred to
'failure indices' and secondly to a fairly standard account of spreading activation (or

'unconscious retrieval'). The latter notion has been dealt with above, while the idea of
failure indices was also picked up by Schooler and colleagues (1995): "mental markers
or indices that keep the mind ever-vigilant for relevant information" (p. 571). Because
the concept of failure indices is drawn from the 'Prepared Mind' perspective of Seifert
at al. (1995) to be discussed below, the present treatment will be brief.
In the 'memory-for-problems' paradigm (Seifert et al., 1995) subjects show
superior memory for unsolved problems only when allowed to reach an impasse. This
phenomenon is known as the 'Zeigarnik effect', after the Russian psychologist Bluma
Zeigarnik who found that when participants were subjectively dissatisfied with their

attempt at a task they were much more likely to remember the details of the task (Reber,
1985). Evidence for this idea of some special 'marker' for unsolved problems is found
when, in tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) studies, subjects benefit from prior exposure to target
items only when those items correspond to definitions that they had already failed to
produce in earlier TOT tests (Seifert et al., 1995). Schooler and colleagues (1995) did

not mention the emotional aspects of this effect, the subject's personal disappointment,
same approach has been ineffective and may be encouraged to experiment and play with ideas, rejecting
the 'obvious' and trying on the seemingly 'irrelevant'. The problem with this suggestion is it is made
from the perspective of the k n o w n solution and not from the perspective of the bewildered problemsolver. Furthermore, it implies clear-cut judgements of the relevance of cues are possible, whereas it m a y
be that w e operate more in terms of family resemblances and prototypes rather than formal, well-defined
concepts.

and this is an aspect arguably of the utmost importance, and one which will be discussed
in a later chapter. But for now, the notion of 'failure indices' — which mark
information in memory associated with the original impasse — is an important one.
The question may be asked, 'why do we bother to overcome impasses, or what is our
motivation for setting up these markers'? But an attempted answer to that will be made
within the context of a later discussion of a more complete psychology of the person.
In order to form a new representation of the problem, to enter a new problem
space, Schooler et al., (1995) suggested we must first recognise we are lost. This
metacognition leads to conscious efforts to redefine the problem (Gick & Lockhart,

1995) such as noticing invariants of one's previous solution attempts. The authors liste
attributes associated with this ability to find alternative approaches:
• Perseverance, which recalls Simonton's (1995, 1997) observation that it is the most
(quantitatively) productive who are most likely to succeed.
• Risk-Taking, which is necessary given that unconventional discoveries are 'long
shots'.
• Playfulness, which recalls the importance of indulging in imaginary combinatory
play (Koestler, 1964).
• Broad Knowledge, which all theorists emphasise.
• Ability to Recognise Analogies, which may be merely another way of describing
insight.
Again, it can be seen that this list could mostly be derived from commonsense and is not

explicitly derived from particular theoretical considerations. The suddenness of insight
however, was argued to be a function of its perception-like nature, was compared to

Gestalt perceptual gap-filling, and was tied to a type of inner recognition of a coheren
analogous with visual recognition:
... our cognitive information processing system may be structured to
recognize coherent patterns of information in the environment in a
manner comparable to that by which the visual system determines
invariances in the visual world, (p. 579)

In fact, the authors reported on previous research in which they showed that the best
predictor of insight problem solution was an ability to recognise out-of-focus pictures.
it w a s argued that there m a y be some shared resources here involved in perceptual gapfilling and in one's capacity for insight.
Another information-processing theory of h o w w e overcome impasse is Ward's
(1995) 'path-of-least-resistance' model. For Ward, creative ideas are structured in
predictable ways, based on the properties of existing categories and concepts. W h e n
W a r d asked people to draw imaginary animals they typically produce animals with
fairly standard sense organs and appendages arranged into symmetrical wholes. A s he
put it: "These default tendencies determine the paths along which imaginative ideas are
most likely to be guided" (1995, p. 162). This 'predictive encoding' does not, however,
represent absolute constraints. N e w imagined entities can be innovative if the person
begins by considering a 'highly abstract characterization' of what the desired product
should contain. This high level abstraction is a superordinate structure which channels
what is possible, yet is permeable enough to allow for creativity. For Ward, it provides
a starting point which is not fully specified, thus requiring additional information before
commitment to an 'answer' is required.
W a r d (1995) also believed that such abstract levels of thought help overcome
'retrieval blocking'. W h e n thinking of a specific exemplar, activation is heightened,
making retrieval of alternatives less likely. But "... by going back up a hierarchy, one
m a y be able to go back d o w n a different path toward an alternative solution" (1995, p.
172). In terminology resonant with Martindale's 'associative hierarchies', W a r d talked
about 'steep' and 'shallow' 'generalization gradients'. The more abstract
(superordinate) the activation, the more shallow the gradient, allowing m a n y more
specific-level items to become available. Such abstractions can help the person
restructure the problem representation by clarifying the broad requirements or higherorder relations needed for the problem. G o o d analogies, w h e n realised, maintain these
guiding relations. Finally, W a r d called this the 'path-of-least-resistance model' because
people are assumed to only use this high abstraction path w h e n they are highly

motivated or under special constraints. The path to insight is often one of sustained

struggle, and it remains to be seen why it is important to us to undertake this struggle.
2.2.4.4 The Prepared Mind Perspective And The Stages Of Insight
We have already introduced Seifert et al.'s (1995) idea of failure indices — 'marked'
information in memory associated with the problem. It will be obvious that it shares
features with Ward's 'highly abstract' ideas. It formed a part of their 'opportunistic
assimilation and prepared mind' perspective whereby "... insight may emerge from a
combination of information processing phases whose joint interactions enable
subconscious quantum leaps during the generation of new mental products" (1995, p.
75). This theory saw insight as impasse-driven learning. Our attempts at solution
'prime' our mind (predictive encoding) to be sensitive to potentially useful conceptual

or physical elements that the answer should have. It is 'fortuitous contact' with stimuli

relevant to the problem which then activates the failure indices and allows impasse to b
overcome. Ward (1995) added, somewhat vaguely, that suddenness is explained by the
automatic nature of normal perception and comprehension processes.
Ward's account of the stages of insight was roughly as follows. In Preparation,
the person constructs a representation of the problem which fails. He or she construes
this failure (Impasse) and failure indices are stored, marking episodic information
associated with the problem. When new relevant information is encountered, the
indices 'guide' the person back to the problem. In the interim, information processing
on the problem is suspended. In Incubation, the sheer passage of time is irrelevant, the
main purpose being to allow the person to be incidentally exposed to stimuli. When the

new relevant information is encountered, the failure indices are retrieved and "the fina
step to insight may be subconscious, as linked with normal perception and
comprehension processes" (p. 116).
But I return to a now-familiar problem within mechanistic accounts of insight.

Stimuli are said to activate an inner representational structure, much like an alarm bel
ringing to wake up some dozing inner executive mind. But there is a slippage, very
common in this literature, between the usage of the terms 'stimulus' and 'information'.

The former term is appropriate for subdiscursive, probably biological, processes. The
latter denotes a person-level interpretation or understanding of some 'inner' or 'outer'

event. Is it the failure indices which 'recognise' the 'relevance' of the 'information' an
which then 'guides' the person back to the problem? And what of the " subconscious
quantum leaps" which (somehow) emerge from a combination of information
processing phases (p. 75)? Is it not these quantum leaps in understanding we are trying
to explain? To anthropomorphise these hypothetical inner processes, or to slip in some
new inner understanding which is delivered to the conscious mind, does not advance

one's understanding of insight. But the account of Seifert and colleagues (Seifert et al.
1995) is intuitively plausible and I think this is so because the authors have attempted
stick closely to the phenomenology of the insight experience.
The stretching of theoretical boundaries in order to accommodate the
phenomenology of insight (for example, its suddenness, its seeming spontaneity, its
unexpectedness and the immediate satisfaction it provides) is probably necessary in
information processing accounts wedded to mechanistic associationism. For where is
the shift from biological processes, or networks modelled on them, to intentional,
proactive mentality? How do representations and patterns of activation achieve their
reference, their meaning? At some point a switch to the personal level, and to the

language appropriate to that level, is required. This pattern will be more in evidence in
the following chapter which will explore broader cognitive approaches which take into
account more definitively psychological phenomena such as intuition, tacit knowing,
emotion, and social interaction.

CHAPTER 3: BROADER COGNITIVE, EXPERIENTIAL
AND CONTEXTUAL APPROACHES
3.1 INTRODUCTION

It is often the case that theorists over-reach themselves in attempting to be faithful t
subject of their inquiry, where a type of a-theoretical, even ad hoc, eclectic turn is

evidenced. In this regard, fairly standard information processing (representationist) an
connectionist accounts is found to be supplemented by a new language: of 'feelings of
knowing' (Ippolito and Tweney, 1995), of'inceptions' (Ippolito & Tweney, 1995), of
'the ineffability of insight' (Schooler & Melcher, 1995), of'themata' and 'feeling tones'
(Briggs, 1990) and of'intuition' (Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990). Such
concepts sit uneasily within the usual lexicon of 'retrieval', 'priming', 'activation
thresholds' and so on. This is not meant to be a harsh criticism. As mentioned earlier,

such extra-theoretical excursions are more-or-less obligatory given the elusive nature o
the antecedents of insight and its multidimensional, complex nature. These theorists
were, I believe, obliged by the reported phenomenology of insight to make these moves.
In any case, it is arguable that cognitive psychology is moving away from its
associationistic past towards a more constructivist and pro-active rendering of the
person (Mahoney, 1988, 1993;Neimeyer, 1993; Stevens, 1998).
In this vein, recent cognitive psychology volumes, including Creative Thought
(Ward, Smith & Vaid, 1997) and Frontiers of Cognitive Therapy (Salkovskis, 1996),

reflect this diversity, mixing functionalist, information processing accounts of insight
with broader, more eclectic cognitive approaches.20 This chapter will deal with some
such broader approaches to insight which nonetheless still fall under the 'cognitive'
banner. Such approaches understand insight as emerging within the dynamism of wider
social, motivational and affective systems. The present treatment will be selective,
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Indeed, contemporary cognitive theorising about therapy (Salkovskis, 1996) has moved very much in a
'constructivist' direction emphasising dynamic subsystems of emotions and motivations as very m u c h a
part of 'thought' rather than as resulting from purely cognitive processing. Even Beck (1996), in his
chapter with the telling title 'Beyond belief: a theory of modes, personality and psychopathology', n o w
talks of 'modes' which are networks of "cognitive, affective, motivational, and behavioural components"
(P,2).

examining only those approaches that point towards the constructivist model of insight
presented later in this work. Some of the approaches discussed in Chapter 10 (Gibbs,
1997; Glucksberg; Johnson, 1987; Kittay, 1997; Lakoff, 1987; Thagard, 1997),
particularly those related to 'Cognitive Linguistics', could be held to be a part of this
'broader' cognitive approach. This is true, but they are placed in the later chapter
because they endorse more constructivist assumptions than traditional cognitive
approaches.
Inquiring into insight is much like the mythical dilemma of mariners attempting
to navigate the straits of Messina, avoiding both the monster Scylla in her cave and,
opposite her, the whirlpool of Charybdis. On the one hand, we may miss the creative,
generative, characteristics of insight in their entirety (which inspired this inquiry in
first place) by scrupulously avoiding the dimly lit cave of new creation. On the other
hand, we risk being sucked into the whirlpool of mysticism and romantic speculation —
a type of vague, Nietzschean 'some things cannot be known' approach. The present
quest to understand such shadowy phenomena as 'intuition', 'imagination' and 'feelings
of knowing' threatens to remove insight from the realm of rigorous, scientific inquiry.
But the evidence of our own experience, and that reported by so many others, seems to
require that I should attempt to include these features in a comprehensive account of
insight.

3.2 INTUITION

Intuition has been earlier distinguished from insight as being an important antecedent of

insight. I will use 'intuition' as a general rubric for a variety of conceptions, includi
'tacit knowing' (Polanyi, 1967) and 'feelings of knowing' (Ippolito and Tweney, 1995).
Bowers, Farvolden and Mermigis (1995) defined intuition as follows: "... the
perception of clues to coherence that tacitly activates and guides thought toward an
insight or hunch about the nature of the coherence in question" (p. 31). For Bowers and
colleagues (Bowers et al., 1990; Bowers et al., 1995) this preliminary perception of
coherence, or intuition, depends on mnemonically encoded prior knowledge. Insight,
according to this analysis, has two distinct phases:

1) A guiding stage of insight: an initial intuitive phase marked by a graded process of
activating responses stimulated by, and increasingly appropriate to, the clues
available.
2) An integrative stage of insight: an insight phase defined in terms of a conscious
recognition that one of these responses is the solution to the problem at hand.
There are two features of this approach worth emphasising. The first is that the insight
experience is a consciously mediated process. It is not something that is delivered
complete to the conscious mind from an unconscious mind:
Appreciating the biphasic nature of the model helps to underline that it
is not the case that a hypothesis or fully fledged solution occurs
unconsciously and is then simply transferred to consciousness. Rather,
the very notion of hypothesis or solution implies conscious appreciation
of h o w a particular thought or idea organises or fits the pattern of clues
(Bowers et al., 1995, p. 31).
Secondly, the suddenness can be understood in terms of suddenly recognising
the solution within the (unconsciously generated) arrangement of elements — rather
than in terms of a sudden gestalt-like restructuring of the problem itself. That is, the
process of generating the potential solution by graded semantic activation (Yaniv &
Meyer, 1987; Anderson, 1983) is assumed to occur without conscious awareness, is not
sudden, and is distinct from the insight experience itself. Cognition, as such, is
considered to be inherently intuitive because it depends on the activation of mnemonic
networks, and such processes are not conscious. Eventually, clues and problem-relevant
information cause the activation to reach the threshold of consciousness, and the person

'sees' the solution. It is as if the 'intuitive' sub rosa activities continuously re-arran
the elements of the solution and 'plausible' arrangements (those that activate
representations of the problem due to semantic connections) are presented to
consciousness for recognition as the solution (or not). So we feel or 'know' that certain
paths or ideas are relevant, that there is some coherence holding them together. But we
have not achieved an overarching understanding (yet) as to what that coherence is.
Achieving the latter understanding is to experience insight.
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Intuition m a y not always be reliable (Bowers, 1981, Claxton, 1998), but there is
strong evidence for its existence. People regularly respond with discrimination to
coherences they cannot identify (Harre & Gillett, 1994). In the Waterloo Gestalt
Closure Task (Bowers et al., 1990; Bowers et al., 1995), participants were asked to
identify which of a variety of drawings are gestalt closure stimuli, and which are
meaningless stimuli. Subjects chose the incomplete drawings derived from coherent
shapes more often than those derived from incoherent shapes — even though they did
not know what the completed shape might be. Given a four-word choice, one of which
is the correct name for the coherent drawing, subjects chose the correct word 52% of the
time (where chance equals 25%). In a variety of word-association tasks (Dyads of
Triads Task, Partial Word Task and Accumulated Clues Task) Bowers and colleagues
have shown that people can identify coherences at above chance levels even though they
cannot state what the particular coherences are.
These authors concluded that the processes underlying insight are graded and
continuous. It should be pointed out that the types of language-based task they have
used are more likely to lead to this conclusion than real-world, ill-defined problems.

The tasks used do not necessarily require restructuring of the problem for their solution
being basically well-defined puzzles with clear answers. For example, the Accumulated
Clues Task (ACT) predisposes subjects to a graded approach to the solution as relevant

evidence is added one piece at a time. The subject is given, one at a time, up to fifteen
clue words which are semantic associates of the target word. Their task is to guess the
target as soon as possible. This corresponds to a clue-rich 'homing space' (Perkins,
1995) rather than a 'Klondike space' requiring problem-finding strategies. Nonetheless,

it is clear that we are implicitly or intuitively informed in our efforts towards coheren
understandings, regardless of whether the approach to insight is continuous or
discontinuous.
But there is a theoretical slippage in this account of insight. Firstly, to say that
the conscious mind 'recognises' the imputed, previously unconscious, arrangement of

the elements as the solution begs the question,21 for I have defined insight as just this

grasping of an intelligible, conceptual meaning that previously eluded us. Quite rightly,

Bowers et al. (1990, 1995) remind us that this integrative act of understanding is define
by being conscious. But, this conscious 'recognition' is another way of describing the
act we wish to explain. Secondly, the authors' account depends on a more-or-less clear
separation of unconscious and conscious levels of awareness. Indeed, it is this
separation that they use to explain the perception-like suddenness of conscious
recognition. We have here two levels of mind: the subdiscursive, quasi-psychological
level of automatic associations which is unconscious, and the conscious insight
experience which is deGnably psychological. Most of the 'work' towards insight is
done at the mechanical level of automatic associations or responses. Yet the authors
acknowledged that it takes a person's capacity for insight (which is what we are trying
to explain) to turn these sub-intentional associations into insightful understanding.
An important question is, therefore, 'how do the intuitions enter into our
awareness such that they can guide our understanding'? It seems commonplace for
people to become aware of intuitive preferences or leanings towards certain ideas or
strategies before they understand the coherences that may unite those preferences (as we
have seen above). The conscious 'mind', in ongoing efforts to solve some problem,

must be in ongoing interaction with this difficult-to-articulate level of thought. As suc
conscious awareness may not be defined in terms of the 'on/off threshold which
Bowers and colleagues used to explain suddenness. That is, there must be
'communication' between these levels in an ongoing fashion for our thought to be
'guided' by our intuitions.
What is useful about this account is that it tried to account for the experimental
re-arranging of the elements, the playing with the data of experience, which may well

occur at a low level of awareness before the actual insight. It also drew attention to the
intimations of knowing, to a type of knowing which one is not immediately capable of

verbalising and which is nonetheless pervasive. At the very least, it signals a need for a
21

It also raises again the spectre of the mind-within-a-mind. In what way can one's conscious mind 'see
something presented or arranged by another part of mind?

more complex layering to our knowing — that there are layers within knowing which
simultaneously inform each other, mutually providing context and depth. Bowers and
colleagues have suggested we are 'guided' in our efforts to understand before we
consciously appropriate the coherence underlying that guidance. If it is granted that
intuition is the process whereby we are guided by a level of knowing that is difficult to
articulate, what is still needed is an account of how this guidance may take place.
'Inceptions' are an intermediary-type mental process that Ippolito and Tweney (1995)
suggested may assist in this account.

3.3 INCEPTIONS
Improvement makes strait roads, but the crooked roads
without Improvement are roads of Genius.
(William Blake, Marriage of Heaven and Hell)
Ippolito and Tweney's (1995) account of insight focused on the preparation phase.
They reasoned that it is here, as with expert problem-solvers, that the more insightful
person differs from most other people in terms of strategies and skills. The authors
identified the following characteristics as predicting insightfulness: superior memory,
the capacity to recognise complex patterns, having a 'deep' representation of the
problem, having a 'qualitative' analysis of the problem, persistent self-monitoring
(metacognitions), and being specialists in that domain. Clearly, possessing a superior
memory would be an advantage in both accessing remote analogies and being able to
draw upon the wealth of knowledge a specialist might be expected to have in his or her
field. However, the capacities to recognise complex patterns and to have a 'deep'
representation of the problem seem, once again, to merely 're-describe' the features of
insight (Kline, 1991; Smedslund, 1984). More positively, persistent self-monitoring
suggests a goal-directed purposefulness that recalls the Gestalt emphasis on intentional
restructuring of the problem. It also suggests a constant interplay between conscious
awareness and one's more tacit or intuitive modes of thought — suggested as being
required in the previous discussion of intuition. Being able to form a qualitative
analysis of the problem recalls the above-reported findings within the cognitive

literature that it is an advantage to be able to draw back from the problem and see it in
more abstract terms (Gick & Lockhart, 1995; Schooler et al., 1995; Ward, 1995).
Together with periodic re-examinations and re-arrangements of the elements of the
problem, this latter characteristic led to Ippolito and Tweney's (1995) twin concepts of
'perceptual rehearsal' and 'inceptions'.
A ubiquitous practice among artists is to immerse themselves in the media of
their artform. Writers may simply write words to stimulate their creative energies,
painters may experiment with lines, colours and textures, and musicians or composers
may simply extemporise on their instrument, listening as much as 'directing' the flow of
notes (Epel, 1993; Gardner, 1993; Gruber, 1995). Ippolito and Tweney (1995) referred
to this saturation of the senses with aspects of the phenomena of interest to the
discoverer as 'perceptual rehearsal'.
In a manner which recalls Martindale's (1995) 'defocused attention' (causing
shallow association gradients), this type of domain-specific reverie was theorised to
perturb "the typical process of automatic selection that yields perceptions, thereby
expanding the ability of the problem solver to contemplate the unexpected" (Ippolito &
Tweney, 1995, p. 439). Consistent with William Blake's observation above, rather than
taking a more obvious 'improved' and 'strait' road, a relatively creative, circuitous
('crooked') route is preferred. It was theorised that this perceptual rehearsal absorbs
capacity of short term memory thus preventing premature closure, entrenchment and
functional fixedness. Frequently it takes the form of a deliberate delaying of one's
commitment to a hypothesis, a type of circumspection which is capable of learning from
failures. The authors likened it to Keats' 'negative capability':
... that is, when a man [sic] is capable of being in uncertainties,
mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.
[letter to G. and T. Keats, 21 Dec. 1817]. (Page, 1965, p. 53)

I note here for the first time, but certainly not for the last, an indication of an emoti
capacity that may be tied to the potential for creative insight. This is a type of
transcending state of calm which allays the anxieties 'normally' attendant upon
confusion and the inability to anticipate events. A question arises: 'why do we continue

searching and struggling for understanding if it is upsetting'? A n answer to such a
question is not forthcoming in Ippolito and Tweney but will later be argued to be
connected to a transcending affective calm which engenders confidence in one's
capacity to negotiate successfully periods of uncertainty and suffering. This will be a
key issue in the later discussion of the role of 'emotion' in insight.
Perceptual rehearsal eventually gives way to what Ippolito and Tweney (1995)
called 'inceptions'. The authors considered these inceptions critical to insight. From
the Latin 'to take in', inceptions are "the ability to recreate the workings of selected
aspects of the world, independent of sensory receptor input" (p. 442). They are a type
of half-way house between the perceptual and symbolic levels and are abstract enough

to generate novelty, yet concrete enough to map onto practical events. Inceptions recall
the types of playing with images so characteristic of anecdotal reports of creative
breakthroughs. A good example of this is Einstein's report of his own creative
processes:
(A) The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not
seem to play any role in m y mechanism of thought. The psychical
entities which seem to serve as elements in thought are certain signs
and more or less clear images which can be 'voluntarily' reproduced
and combined... .
... (B) The above mentioned elements are, in my case, of visual and
some of muscular type. Conventional words or other signs have to be
sought for laboriously only in a secondary stage, w h e n the mentioned
associative play is sufficiently established and can be reproduced at
will, (cited in Hadamard, 1945, p. 142)
We will later see various parallels to this idea of combinatory play and looser, perhaps
cross-modal, 'imageable' thought. For now, Einstein seems to be describing something
very close to inceptions which arise from perceptual rehearsal (associative play with
mental imagery22). These selected sensory reconstructions are, in terms of one's
intended purpose, motivated by a desire to achieve logically connected concepts, but

they are initially chosen intuitively. Note in addition that, when established, they can

22

'Mental imagery' is meant to include all types including visual, olfactory, kinesthetic and
'somesthetic', auditory, and gustatory imagery.

manipulated 'at will' — again confirming the view that there is a continuing dialectic
between rational consciousness and less reportable forms of thought. Ippolito and
T w e n e y (1995) considered that 'feelings of knowing' guide the selection of inceptions.
They called this the 'selection touchstone':
... an individual's belief, unsubstantiated by factual information, that
he or she is capable of proceeding in a w a y that will lead to a successful
solution to the problem at hand, the sense that therightanswer is within
the reach of the problem-solver. (1995, p. 447)

What forms this selection touchstone is both domain-specific knowledge and one's past
problem-solving experience and, probably, "high generality heuristics" (1995, p. 448)
— the latter recalling the importance of abstracting the problem and of 'failure indices'
(Seifert et al., 1995). This is the 'gradient of deepening coherence' that Polanyi referred
to and these authors related this to the emotive aspects of the insight experience. The
joy of the A h a ! experience, according to Ippolito and T w e n e y (1995), is a function of
self-validation. T o discover something is to confirm that one's anticipatory,
interpretative ability is intact and working well, especially considering the impasseinduced anxiety experienced in earlier attempts at solution.

3.4 WIDENING THE NET: INTERACTIONS OF KNOWING,
PURPOSE AND AFFECT WITHIN A SOCIAL CONTEXT.
The creativity literature places insight within a more panoramic landscape. T o
understand insight more fully it is helpful to locate it within a wider motivational,
emotional and social context (rather than the relatively narrow, intrapersonal cognitive
emphasis w e have examined thus far). For example, w e have seen that experimental
psychology has tended to define insight in terms of problem solving. Gruber (1995),
however, broadened the definition of insight. H e reminded us that Kohler (1929) hardly
mentioned problem solving in the context of insight. Rather, the latter emphasised
insight as a subjective sense of understanding, a feeling that things m a k e sense. A s
Kohler put it, insight reveals a verstdndlicher zusammenhang

or 'understandable

relationship' which emerges w h e n one experiences a sense of insight. This feeling of

understanding is not confined to words or propositions, but includes affective and
aesthetic feelings of 'lightness' as m u c h as perceptual or 'cognitive' shifts in
understanding. The traditional stages of insight can still be maintained, only n o w with a
more inclusive phenomenology of insight, moving beyond a 'cognitive'-only content for
insights.

3.4.1 Insight: A Multifaceted Phenomenon
Consistent with this multifaceted approach to insight, Wallace (1991), in her study of
sudden insight in the creation of literature, believed that insight pertains to a 'family' of
phenomena. " T h e family includes problem finding, ... problem resolution, synthesis,
discovering similarities, analogies, increase in certainty, recognising error, the mot
juste... " (1991, pp. 41-42). Moreover, each insight has various facets:
1. Firstly, it has a developmental facet. Although insight m a y be experienced as a
sudden discontinuity from previous efforts, " it is actually an intricate, microgenetic
process" (1991, p. 48) embedded within a larger purpose or project.
2. The second is a modality facet. Insight m a y be unimodal or crossmodal.
3. Thirdly, the organisational facet refers to the integration of previously unrelated
elements into an harmonious whole — often in literature a work is structured around
a central or seminal image or insight.
Insights can also be classified in terms of combinations of the precipitating conditions
and the person's state at the time. Thus, the precipitating conditions m a y involve
observations of an external event, conversation or dialogue with others, apparent passive
'reception' while alone, or direct work on the problem or task. In relation to
psychological and mental states, the person m a y be consciously focusing on the task,
m a y be fully awake but not focusing on the task, or m a y be in a state of reverie.

1. The Developmental Facet
Insight, according to Wallace (1991), is a 'microgenetic' process or rapid sequence of
developmental change which is embedded in a larger developmental sequence or

'macrogenetic' process. She described Dorothy Richardson's invention of the 'stream
of consciousness' genre in novel-writing, as evidenced in her thirteen volume
Pilgrimage. Wallace showed how the 'sudden' insight that made this invention possible
was deeply rooted in years of extended searching and struggle with the conventional

narrative form. Moreover, Richardson's breakthrough was twofold: she first identified a

problem in literary form (the first major insight). She then solved that problem with h
subsequent insight into a revolutionary narrative form, the stream of consciousness.
2. The Modality Facet

Richardson's first insight included a visual, and probably kinaesthetic, image which wa
the kernel for her massive work. This was in the form of a mental image of the central
character, Miriam, walking up some stairs. This provoked Richardson's question "But
who was there to describe her?" [when she disappeared from view up the stairs]. The

solution to this question was to do away with the all-seeing author, to be replaced by a
'stream of consciousness' from the character herself.
Another classic example of cross-modal, insightful thinking is given in Kekule's
famous account of his insight into his Structurtheorie. In 1890 Kekule described his
(1854) reverie while on an omnibus:
... and lo, the atoms were gambolling before my eyes! Whenever
hitherto, these diminutive beings appeared to m e , they had always been
in motion; but up to that time I had never been able to discern the
nature of their motion. N o w , however, I saw how,frequently,two
smaller atoms united to form a pair; h o w a larger one embraced two
smaller ones; h o w still larger ones kept hold of three or even four of the
smaller; whilst the whole kept whirling in a giddy dance. I saw h o w
the larger ones formed a chain, dragging the smaller ones after them,
but only at the end of the chain.... I spent part of the night in putting
on paper at least sketches of these dream forms, (cited in Gruber, 1995,
p. 408)

We see here, not mere imagery, but a mode of 'visual thought' that Kekule (a trained

architect) habitually practised. In a manner similar to Einstein's account given earlie

'muscular images' (images with a kinaesthetic, perhaps visceral or 'somaesthetic' feel),
the images are thoroughly informed by abstract and domain-specific chemical
knowledge. The images are consolidated by utilising another mode of thought

(sketching them later) and eventually are re-expressed in words and equations. Indeed,
as Gruber points out, the structures that remain invariant across these modal
transformations are the author's ideas. It should also be noted that here again is seen
the spontaneity and exteriority of the imagery: the atoms 'gambol' before his eyes as if

they have a life of their own. Finally, it will be left to a later discussion of cross-mo
synesthesia (Hunt, 1995), to prepare the ground for this feature of insight to be
incorporated into a theoretical understanding of insight.
3. The Organisational Facet:
Following much struggle and 'preparation' Richardson's approach to novel-writing was
suddenly reorganised as was her method for this particular work. Wallace (1991) went
on to report how novelists frequently describe " a grain, a seed, an image from which a
whole novel evolves" (1991, p. 45). Novelists also often describe an image or dream
which stimulates and 'organises' the subsequent story (Epel, 1993). Usually these
accounts reflect the sense of being 'given' the insight or of a 'listening' to dialogue
which seems to come from 'outside'. Thus a common feature of insight is its
spontaneity and its concomitant feeling of exteriority or objectification (Gruber, 1995).
Importantly, however, Wallace (1991) emphasised the active anticipation and

preparation, the readiness, that precedes and makes possible the 'receipt' of insights. I
fact, when one examines a creative life closely, as Gruber (1981, 1995) has done,
insights come in the context of episodes within episodes of inquiry, one sequence
overlapping the other. The inquiring person covers the 'same' ground many times, from
different angles, using different modalities of thought and different transformations of
images, 'feeling' the significance of elements as much as 'thinking' them. Gruber
(1981, p. 58) concluded: "The multiplicity of perspectives grows slowly through hard
work and sets the stage for the re-cognition we experience as new insight." This latter

point should not be mis-interpreted. As I understand Gruber here, 're-cognition' is not a
matter of recalling or retrieving a previous cognition, but is more a matter of a fresh
understanding of the elements and events one has explored.

3.4.2

Evolving Systems Approach To Insight

What is seen emerging in Gruber's (1981,1995) and Wallace's (1991) approaches to
insight is the need to move beyond understanding insight only in terms of the

organisation of knowledge, but to also see it in terms of the organisation of the person
purposes and affects. Gruber's (1995) 'Evolving Systems Approach' understands
insight as a part of a coherent, purposeful life. His approach was to examine the diverse
psychological and psycho-social dynamics that constitute our lives. Thus he used a
detailed case-study methodology, a type of biographical 'sleuthing', to fully place
accounts of insight in personal, historical and cultural context. With his detailed
accounts of famous creators, Gruber (1981,1995) argued convincingly that insight, a

definably 'private' experience, nonetheless always reflects social history and the conte
of the time and the field. Accordingly, an insight is not considered solely an
intrapersonal phenomenon.
For Gruber (1995), creative insights are regulated by the thinker's conscious and
enduring purposes. Summarising the views of Poincare and of Einstein on the genesis

of their insights, Gruber concluded that the great creators set up a mental situation wi
specific constraints, " all promoting the likelihood that thinking will go in a certain
direction" (p. 418). Having an enduring purpose does not mean the path to fruition is
pre-determined. Rather, as we have seen in the experimental cognitive literature,

creative people work from first principles (abstract frameworks and heuristics) and have
only a very general sense of the shape the final product may manifest, the process being
at times intuitive, or 'unconscious' in its progression.
Gruber (1995) criticised the image presented in some contemporary accounts of
insight of the person as being in an 'affect-less state' until some event triggers an
emotion. In contrast, he considered that people simultaneously manifest a stream of
thought, a stream of purpose and a stream of affect, all of which are in constant
interaction. In his descriptions of the period leading up to and following Darwin's
'Malthusian' moment (when he reputedly had his big insight into natural selection),
Gruber (1995) highlighted the air of excitement that led up to, and followed, this
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discovery. O f central importance here is that Darwin did not immediately take up the
implications of his discovery while reading Malfhus. Gruber demonstrated that Darwin
was, at this time, generally intellectually stimulated and excited (as evidenced by his
notebooks and letters) wherein he was working long hours with insights coming thick
and fast.
There is little doubt that Darwin was experiencing a 'gradient of deepening
coherence' fed and maintained by the intrinsic rewards (Amabile, 1990) of his efforts.
As Czikszentmihalyi (1990, 1995, 1996) would express it, he was in 'flow'. And it may
be that this general state of passionate absorption, emotional satisfaction, even joy,
marks the emotional dimensions of Martindale's (1995) 'defocused attention', an
emotionality not discussed in his account. This altered state of consciousness — where
creative tasks require less cortical activation than normal, and where the person has the
capacity to attend to many more aspects at once than he or she usually can — is widely
reported in both the insight and creativity literature.
For people in this state, attention is not distracted, nor is it narrowly focused.
Normally we think of effective mental work resulting from a person 'concentrating
hard' or 'working hard', but here the relevant description is more likely to be
'concentrating easily' or 'working easily'. Furthermore, creative people report an
absence of self-doubt, self-judgement and self-concern while in this state (Epel, 1993)
In fact, this state is often experienced as a type of liberation from 'self (Varela,
Thompson & Rosch, 1996) in which nothing but the field of awareness is felt to exist.
Many creators in the single-minded pursuit of this experience forsake other areas of

their lives, often sacrificing both relationships and health. Gardner (1993), in his study
of famous twentieth century creators, called this their 'Faustian bargain' — a type of
"semi-magical, semi-mystical arrangement" (p. 386) whereby the creator believes they
are special or called to higher duties. This creative mode, even if it is not commonplace,
promises to highlight features of creative insight. Accordingly, I will now explore the
psychology of 'flow'.

3.4.3

Insight A n d 'Flow'

3.4.3.1 The Flow Experience
Csikszentmihalyi (1990) defined the flow experience as:
... the state in which people are so involved in an activity that nothing
else seems to matter; the experience itself is so enjoyable that people
will do it even at great cost, for the sheer sake of doing it. (p. 4)

This occurs when a person's capacities are stretched to their limits in efforts towards
project both difficult and (to them) worthwhile. It is reminiscent of Kelly's (1955,
1980) Experience Cycle (see Chapter 6), an optimal m o d e of being for h u m a n beings as
experience is enthusiastically sought in the service of one's anticipations. The
phenomenology of flow, according to Csikszentmihalyi (1990) is characterised by the
following eight interconnected features:
1. Flow occurs w h e n w e confront tasks w e have a chance of completing.
2. W e are able to concentrate on what w e are doing.
3. This concentration is m a d e possible partly by clear goals.
4. O n e also must have immediate feedback.
5. Immediate feedback allows one to act with deep and effortless involvement "that
removes from awareness the worries andfrustrationsof everyday life" (p. 49).
6. Enjoyable experiences allow people to exercise a sense of control over their lives.
7. A s concern for self disappears, paradoxically, a sense of self grows stronger.
8. One's sense of time is altered.
This list of aspects both recalls features of insight w e are familiar with and helps
clarify n e w avenues of inquiry. Firstly, however, it is necessary to point out that 'flow'
and insight are not the same thing. Insight m a y or m a y not occur within this powerfully
absorbing experience. Nonetheless, it would seem that the experience of flow would be
highly conducive to insight — or m a y even be stimulated by the experience of an

insight — and there is m u c h overlap between the two experiences. For example, the
literature examined so far has accustomed us to the idea that the search for insight is a
goal-directed activity [3], that insight occurs within an ongoing immersion in a project
and draws upon available but 'un-grasped' relationships between the elements of
solution [1]. Further, we have seen that particular modes of attention or concentration,
for example defocused attention (Martindale, 1995), are associated with creative insight
[2, 3]. Finally, the emphasis on immediate feedback [4] is reflected in the importance
granted to metacognitions (Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987; Perkins, 1995; Seifert et al, 1995)
within the insight literature.
Aspects 5-8, on the other hand, suggest additional avenues of investigation and
stimulate questions only occasionally referred to in the mainstream literature. I have
made passing reference to the importance of emotion in the insight process (Gruber,
1981, 1995), but here emotion is seen as a defining condition, a constituent of flow. An

important question arises: 'Is emotion also a defining condition or constituent of insight
rather than a mere precursor or response to insight?' In addition, the lack of selfconcern and self-awareness is presented by Csikszentmihalyi (1990) as leading to both a
sense of control and, perhaps surprisingly, to a stronger sense of self [5, 6, 7].
Consequently, another question presents itself: 'What relationship is there between the
capacity for insight and a capacity to be (relatively) free of self-concern?'
In particular, assuming that identity or core aspects of self are involved in
people's creative pursuits, how do people deal with the inevitable frustrations and
potential personal invalidations implicit in the notion of impasse? Impasse and
frustration clearly play a role in generating thought and creativity, but they also

threaten to de-rail it. To what extent is the task perceived as a 'test' of one's ability o
identity within a field, and to what extent is it pursued for its own sake? We are
reminded here of the role of intrinsic motivation (Amabile, 1990). If the task is
inherently enjoyable [6], then presumably impasse and frustration is less likely to
threaten one's self-image and less likely to cause deep-seated anxiety. Therefore, the
capacity not to have one's efforts be driven by performance criteria (either bringing

material or 'reputational' rewards) m a y well be related to the capacity for creative
insight.23 Finally, reference is made to an altered mode of consciousness in which one's
sense of time is changed [8]. Is insight, therefore, characterised by an altered mode of
consciousness? These questions will be taken up in the passages and chapters that
follow.

3.4.3.2 An Altered Sense Of Self
As we have seen, much of the phenomenology of flow resembles the experience of
insight itself. Both resemble aspects of meditative and presentational states
(Hutchinson, 1949c; Hunt, 1995; Langer, 1957, 1972; Varela et al, 1996). As
Csikszentmihalyi (1990) put it: "Loss of self-consciousness can lead to selftranscendence, to a feeling that the boundaries of our being have been pushed forward"
(p. 64).24 This experience is reported as being intrinsically rewarding. In fact,
substituting extrinsic rewards for these inner ones usually results in less creativity
(Amabile, 1990). Csikszentmihalyi called this flow experience an 'autotelic'
experience, from the Greek auto = self, and telos = goal. The 'autotelic' nature of
insight is reflected in anecdotal reports describing the insight experience as selfgenerating, as if it had a life and goal of its own (Epel, 1993; Hutchinson, 1949c). We
will see later that this aspect of insight corresponds to what Rychlak (1977) calls our
innate capacity to telospond (as distinct from respond).
Csikszentmihalyi (1990) considered that flow experiences lead to further
differentiation and integration of consciousness — although he was not very explicit
about what this entails. He argued there is an optimal balance between anxiety and
boredom wherein we either increase our skills or attempt to decrease the challenges
which confront us. Too much avoidance leads to boredom and psychological decline,
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The case is not being made here that this relative freedom from self-concern or self-judge
evidenced inflowor in creative insight experiences should necessarily extend beyond the domain of
those experiences. That is, there is no reason to believe that creative artists, insightful scientists and so on
should evidence more than average insight into their personal relationships, for example, or would show
less personal doubts and worries than other people outside their speciality. On the contrary, Gardner's
(1993) account seems to suggest the opposite.
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See also Matte-Bianco (1988) and the experience of being absorbed into the infinite 'other', of feeling
absorbed into the media around us.

while challenges beyond our skill levels lead to anxiety. In addition, two processes,
anomie and alienation, are considered antithetical to flow (Czikszentmihalyi, 1990).
Both of these experiences were considered by Czikszentmihalyi to be socially mediated
and are represented by the extremes of anxiety and boredom respectively.
Anomie is literally a lack of rules: one's behaviour, values and beliefs become
erratic and meaningless. It is akin to a type of attentional disorder. What prevents flow
is a fragmentation of attentional processes reflecting inner anxiety. Given that one
determinant of insight is what Czikszentmihalyi called the 'Domain' (a symbolic system
of rules and procedures defining permissible behaviour in one's 'Field'), failures to

internalise the rules of the domain, or indeed a lack of rules within the domain itself, c
lead to an inability to anticipate and function in that field. When there is too much
challenge, and not enough clues to guide inquiry, the person's efforts are hampered by
anxiety. Alienation, on the other hand, occurs where people feel constrained to act in

ways that go against their goals and values and beliefs. It leads to excessive rigidity an
boredom. Creativity and insightfulness, for example, can be inhibited within
organisations where employees feel their goals, and skills and ideas are being ignored in
favour of imposed standard procedures. At a personal level, a type of 'psychic entropy'
can extinguish insightfulness.
The psychic entropy peculiar to the human condition involves seeing
more than one can actually accomplish and feeling able to accomplish
more than what conditions allow. But this becomes possible only if
one keeps in mind more than one goal at a time, being aware at the
same time of competing desires. It can only happen w h e n the mind
k n o w s not only what it is, but also what it could be. The more complex
any system, the more room it leaves open for alternatives, and the more
things that can go wrong with it. (1990, p. 228)

Inner conflict is the result of competing claims on attention. Too many desires, too
many incompatible goals struggle to marshal the available psychic energy towards their
own ends. It follows that the only way to reduce conflict is by sorting out the essential
claims from those that are not, and by arbitrating priorities among those that remain.
Otherwise the person either suffers the anxiety of increasingly distracted attention, or

endures the stultifying effects of narrowing one's thinking, of suppressing the
complexity one feels threatened by.
3.4.3.3 The Pragmatics Of Creating Insights
Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer (1995) presented illuminating accounts of the working
regimes and of the subjective experiences of eminently creative people. Their
respondents were people who had made creative contributions to the arts, social
sciences, natural sciences, politics or business, most of whom were over sixty and who
were still actively involved in their specialist domain. Keeping to their distinction
between presented problem-solving (puzzles) and ill-defined problem-solving ('reallife' problems), they discussed everyday insight and larger, more ground-breaking
insights.
For day-to-day insights a relatively short preparation stage of a day or two, with
incubation periods measuring in the hours, are followed by small 'working' insights,
often daily, and often in the mornings. Talking to colleagues is important to most
respondents and structuring the day to include a period of solitary idle time to follow a
period of hard work is almost universal: "Many of [the respondents] told us that without
this solitary, quiet time, they would never have their most important ideas. ... Several
respondents keep their mind idle by engaging in repetitive physical activity on a daily
basis" (pp. 347-348). Almost invariably the insights come in this idle time where they
may be evaluated straightaway or later shared with colleagues.
Large-scale insights to 'discovered problems' followed the same pattern, but
over extended timescales and usually involved extensive knowledge across domains.
For example, a physicist described a groundbreaking discovery in quantum
electrodynamics:
You have six months of very hard work first and get all the components
bumping around in your head, and then you have to be idle for a couple
of weeks, and then — ping - it suddenly falls into place. Then I had to
spend another six months afterward working out the details and writing
it up and so forth, (p. 350)

The preparation phase can take years while one is in apprenticeship to afield:learning

the basics, keeping current with others' work, internalising the social norms and so on.
Gardner (1993), in his study of eminently creative people, concluded it takes about ten
years to master a domain. Most respondents described a period on vacation or
sabbatical (incubation) as leading up to major insights. Indeed, "most respondents had
rich, well-developed metacognitive theories of the importance of'off-time'"
(Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995, p. 352). This 'incubation' period was often
described in terms of unconscious ideas or half-conscious, dreamlike knowledge:
Somewhere in your mind, there is a great variety of things,
disconnected fragments of ideas and thoughts and symbols and so forth.
The creative process is s o m e h o w just shaking and sorting these until
s o m e h o w a combinationfitstogether and makes sense, (p. 353)
All respondents in this research (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi &
Sawyer, 1995) had richly elaborated narratives about their insights (all of which
occurred following periods of incubation). Nonetheless, most also in hindsight

recognised how much a part of the 'field' and of their times their insights were. Again,
respondents emphasised the social dimension following an insight: the need to develop
insights into complete solutions and to communicate it to colleagues or to publish it
(elaboration and verification).

3.4.3.4 Insight: A Social Phenomenon
Csikszentmihalyi (1990, 1996) and Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer (1995) saw insight as
a social phenomenon. According to their 'systems model', all creative insights emerge
from the interactions of three elements: the Domain, the Individual, and the Field. The
Domain is a symbolic system of rules and procedures defining permissible behaviour,
while the Field is a group of gatekeepers who select what is worthwhile. All insights
occur within the constraints of the symbolic system in which the individual is working
(physics, musical composition, fiction-writing and so on), are dependent on the skills

and capacities of the individual (including his or her capacity to interact with and le
from others), and are either accepted or rejected by those who hold power within the

'field' (the 'gatekeepers'). Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer (1995) argued that the social
dimensions of insight have been largely ignored: ".. the moment of insight appears as
but one short flash in a complex, time-consuming, fundamentally social process" (

1995, p. 331). It is the periods of hard work preceding and following the flash of insight
that are deeply rooted in interactions with colleagues and marks the insight itself as a
largely social process. They found in their interviews that creative individuals, when
describing a moment of creative insight, provided:
... extended narratives that described not just a single moment but a
complex, multi-stage process, withfrequentdiscussions of
interpersonal contact, strategic or political considerations, and
awareness of the paradigm, of what questions were interesting as
defined by the discipline". (1995, p. 334)
They concluded that insight would be meaningless outside that social context. More

radically, they considered that insight is structured socially. With explicit references t
the pragmatism of Dewey, Mead, Vygotsky and James, they suggested that the 'mental'
is internalised social activity. As will be seen in the next section, in attempting to
explain insight, they also presented an explanation for how the social 'enters into' the
individual's mind
3.4.3.5 Explaining Flow And Insight
Csikszentmihalyi (1996) asked 'what happens during mysterious idle time'? He cited
neurophysiological evidence that those who report regularly experiencing flow, when

concentrating their attention on brief light flashes, showed decreased cortical activation
while subjects who rarely experienced flow showed increased activation. For people
adept at flow, concentration seems to require less effort. It may be that irrelevant
cortical activity is somewhat suspended allowing the person a more sustained, nondistracted attention. To help explain this phenomenon, Csikszentmihalyi (1996) made
reference to a distinction between serial and parallel processing. He speculated that
conscious thinking is serial or linear and thereby more familiar or predictable. In the
non-linear 'subconscious', however:

... ideas can combine and pursue each other each and every which
way. Because of this freedom, original connections that would at first
be rejected by the rational mind have a chance to become established.
(1996, p. 102)

Csikszentmihalyi theorised that the unconscious is an internalisation of previously
conscious learning which still, thereby, reflects social constraints and structures (see
also Hunt, 1995; Polanyi, 1967 for similar arguments). It should be noted that ideas
would not, therefore, 'combine and pursue each other each and every which way' (note
the anthropomorphism) as he suggested, but are likely to be quite structured in terms of
the relevant domain — as my earlier foray into the cognitive literature suggested. In
fact, inconsistent with this 'every which way' portrayal of unconscious processes, he
went on to implicate social ordering of the mind: "We internalise the knowledge of the
domain, the concerns of the field, and they become part of the way our minds are
organized" (1966. p. 102).
For Csikszentmihalyi (1996), the key component of insight was the 'filtering
mechanism' by which socially-mediated, conscious material is passed into the
subconscious. Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer (1995) claimed that it is the social
influences of the Domain and the Field which, through acculturation, mentoring,
reading and apprenticeship, build the 'subconscious filtering network'. A three level
model of the preparation and incubation stages was given:

1. Conscious attention (serial processing) in the preparation stage.
2. Semiconscious filters formed as an internal mental image of the Domain and Field.
3. Subconscious processing entities or the Society of the Mind position (Minsky, 1985).

Sustained conscious work allows the person to master the domain and to attempt
solutions to problems and challenges. The authors argued that the unconscious filtering
process is structured by the Field and by the Domain, particularly by discourse:
Although the subconscious network cannot be manipulated directly by
consciousness, the conscious creation and development of this filter
(through education, mentoring or apprenticeship, through reading

books) can influence the subconscious network indirectly.
(Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995, p. 341) 2 5

The third level above is based on PDP and a spreading activation metaphor. This
subconscious network comprises distributed and parallel 'processing entities' which
'view' multiple pieces of information simultaneously. Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer
(1995) speculated that the links between such pieces of information are treated in a
" subconscious generate-and-test fashion ... [whereby] many smaller entities are
interacting randomly and perhaps collectively working on many problems" (1995, p.
342).
It should be obvious by my use of 'scare quotes' in the above that
Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer have arguably slipped into anthropomorphizing and

reifying these hypothetical processes. Thus patterns of activation are said to be entiti
that can view information, can test it, can interact and can work on problems. Again,
found here is a projection of the types of properties, skills and capacities normally
attributable to a person onto hypothetical inner processes. This is reminiscent of
Dennett's (1983) explanation of the genesis of consciousness in terms of an 'army of
idiots', and it shares the shortcomings of that explanation. According to Dennett, at

each descending level of processing complexity, the processing units ('idiots') are mor
'stupid' than the last, eventually descending to mindless physiological processes. As
Dennett himself conceded, however, this is just pushing the problem to a vague
explanatory remove. The problems are obvious: who is doing the viewing, testing,
interacting and working? And where does the insight occur?
These questions are apparently answered by Csikszentmihalyi (1996): "The
insight presumably occurs when a subconscious connection between ideas fits so well
that it is forced to pop out into awareness" (p. 104). Thus, the insight occurs at the
conscious level where the person recognises something about this 'subconscious
connection'. This account, however, shares a major flaw with standard representational
computational theories of cognition (Shanon, 1993). That is 'somebody' in the
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See later (in particular in discussion of Harre & Gillett, 1993 and Shanon, 1991, 1993) for more
detailed treatment of how, it is argued, that discourse structures the mind.

unconscious must have decided the idea 'fitted' (had the insight that it w a s an insight)
and thereby the unconscious is endowed with the sorts of (conscious) properties if was
invoked to explain. This, for example, parallels the 'standard' account of m e m o r y as
retrieval. In remembering, the unconscious processing must 'know' 1) what it is
looking for in order to retrieve it, in which case there is no m e m o r y task, and 2) whether
what itfindsmatches or not, which again presupposes the m e m o r y issue.
Quiterightly,Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer recognised that the "paradox for the
creative individual is s o m e h o w to direct this un-directable unconscious process so that
useful insights result" (1995, p. 339). The authors revealed that insight is, after all, "a
type of information retrieval, the reverse of the information storage flow in the
preparation stage" (p. 343). H o w this can be is not clear. For what defines insight is
the 'seeing' of a new pattern of relationships or new connections between previously
k n o w n information. This n e w act of understanding w a s not 'stored' in the preparation
stage. The elements of the solution m a y have been placed in memory, but not the
solution itself.
Further, Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer (1995) went on to suggest that a
'constructive' process is in operation whereby the subconscious 'recognises' similarities
between ideas and configurations in different domains and combines them in novel
ways. Clearly this novelty was not stored and then retrieved. In the end the insight
process is shrouded in mystery, placing h u m a n skills and abilities in the dark recesses of
the 'subconscious'. It is not to deny a role for 'unconscious' processes in the generation
of insight, but it is to suggest that such processes need to be placed within a framework
which does not merely redescribe the process it professes to explain.

3.4.4 'Emotional' Themata And Thinking
We have seen that Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer (1995) believed that negative
emotional processes such as anomie and alienation are inimical to insight and to the
experience of flow. In contrast, positive emotional experiences such as lacking self
concern, feeling in control, and enjoying intrinsically motivating activities are felt to be

conducive to insight. Accordingly, I will n o w begin to link 'emotional' processes and
insight by way of a discussion of Briggs' (1990) concept of 'themata'.
In his evocatively titled Fire in the Crucible Briggs (1990) considered that
clusters of presuppositions or 'gut' assumptions are the guiding, visionary elements
leading to creativity. Borrowing from Holton (1978), Briggs called these
presuppositions 'themata'. They are emotionally important, enduring ideas or themes
which have aesthetic and emotional qualities. He gave as examples the assumptions
that the universe is basically symmetrical (or asymmetrical), or that the true order of
things is hierarchical, or that the structure of reality is in constant flux, and so on.
Although these are highly abstract ideas, Briggs emphasised they are more like a
'concrete feel for the world' which often have a visual component and which are often
tacit or unconscious. Such themata 'attune' us to certain features of the world,
predisposing one to 'see' or 'feel' the world in certain fundamental ways. Importantly,
themata are characterised by an emotional 'nuance', an " aura or nimbus that surrounds a
thema or several themata, the energy that infuses thematic convictions" (Briggs, 1990,
p. 26).
This emotional nuance is characterised as a 'feeling tone' whereby thoughts and
memories may be coded or 'logged' into the brain. Briggs (1990) utilised the work of
systems scientists LaViolette (1980) and Gray (1979) who emphasised the
neurophysiological connections between the 'limbic system', particularly the amygdala
(largely implicated in our emotional experience), and the neocortex (associated with
reasoning and 'higher' systems of thought). In particular, he discussed the role of the
'PCDT loop' (prefrontal-cortex-dorsomedial-thalamic) which complements the 'Papez

circuit', linking the limbic system to the rest of the brain. Complex streams of relative
'raw' or unprocessed impulses first pass through the thalamus into the limbic system
and subsequent thoughts are abstracted from this emotionally-nuanced complex. As
LaViolette put it: "Thoughts are stereotypes or simplifications of emotional themes"
(1980, cited in Briggs, 1990, p. 50). It is not only that these 'feeling tones' are prior

conscious thought, but also that a sensitivity to such feelings before they are abstracte

into a thought puts the person in touch with "data of far greater complexity. Such

sensitivity fosters creativity and the ability to see things in new ways" (Briggs, 1990, p
56, based on an interview with LaViolette). Not wanting to move too far away from the
thrust of Briggs' discussion here, I will discuss contemporary research into emotion and
thought, and how these ideas of Briggs may find support there, in a later chapter. It is
enough to indicate here that Briggs was enmeshing emotion with thought and linking
such 'emotional thought' with creative insight. Significant too was his conviction that
emotional thought may be more, rather than less, complex than conscious thought.
Briggs (1990) believed thought that is fundamentally polarised. That is, in
everyday thought we assert one pole of a discrimination over another. He considered,
however, that creative people differ from others in that they can better tolerate
ambivalence (Keats' 'negative capability', see above 3.3). When one is no longer
asserting one opposite or another of the basic polarities of thought, but undergoes a
momentary "suspension of thought" (p. 115), one experiences what Briggs calls
'omnivalence'.26 Briggs called this capacity for omnivalence 'Janusian thinking', an
ability to conceive of multiple opposites or antitheses simultaneously. Such

omnivalence leads to a need to transcend the level of contrasts, and in so doing to create
images of 'wide scope'. This recalls Ward's (1995) notion of a 'highly abstract
characterization' which allows one to move up one implicative chain and to descend a
different one opening up new solution possibilities. If also is compatible with Ippolito
and Tweney's (1995) notion of 'inceptions' as a type of bridge between tacit, quasiperceptual imagery and more conscious awareness. Such images, for Briggs, "... seem
often to mark the first surfacing into a concrete form of the inchoate, emotional, and
sensory qualities of a creator's vision" (1990, p. 194). In this way Briggs' more
figurative theoretical language finds support in the cognitive literature generally.
Finally, Briggs (1990) summarised the features that a creative person develops.
The person must be able to turn deficits into talents, to make "maps of maps in the brain
to enrich synaesthesia" (1990, p. 265), to develop the capacity for absorption, to form
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This anticipates the experience of non-distinction or infinity that Matte-Bianco (1988) attributed to
'symmetrical' thinking, a thinking he said is characteristic of the unconscious (see Chapter 9).

images of wide scope and to practice Janusian thinking. This leads to what Briggs
called the "creative self-organising structure" (1990, p. 266) which feeds on selfcriticism, constant feedback (metacognitions) and a playful absorption in the activities
of the domain. Such an 'autocatalytic' process is thereby more resistant and enduring ii
the face of failure andfrustration(impasse) because contraries are seen as clues feeding
into the 'gradient of deepening coherence' as the person moves towards insight. The
'lightning flash' of insight must, therefore, be seen in context of a dynamic, dialectical
system involved in a larger self-organising process.
It is n o w time to stop and to gather up what w e k n o w about insight, and to
consider what w e further require to build an adequate theoretical understanding of
insight. T o pre-empt somewhat, it will be noted that a trend is discernible in the insight
and creativity literature. This trend has been away from a purely associationistic
metatheory towards more 'constructivist' themes. Such themes include an emphasis of
the proactive, 'feedforward' role of the individual projecting schema and 'themata' onto
the data of experience, of a teleological or anticipatory basis to insight, of the inclusion
of tacit and emotional dimensions within thought, of larger units of analysis including
enduring life purposes and commitments, of the socially-inscribed nature of insight, of
the person conceived of as a self-organising system, and as insights being sociallyembedded and socially-inscribed. But n o w to assess what w e have so far and what w e
yet require in this pursuit of insight into insight.

CHAPTER 4: INTERREGNUM AND PROSPECTUS
A really intelligent man feels what other men only know.21

4.1 WHAT DO WE HAVE SO FAR?
In the previous three chapters we have found a consistent and generally accepted
sequence of events identified with the occurrence of insights. Following the early
terminology of Wallas (1926) and Hutchinson (1949a, 1949b, 1949c), most researchers
have characterised insight in terms of four stages: Preparation, Impasse leading to
'Incubation', a moment or period of Insight itself, and the Verification and Elaboration

of the insight. The literature freely utilises the Gestalt notions of 'fixation' leading t
impasse, and of'productive thinking' which 'restructures' the problem culminating in a
sudden, perception-like 'seeing' of a solution. Generally speaking, there is a consensus
that insight involves special processes or modes of thought and, given this, that it
involves a distinct mode of mental activity. Consistent with the view that insight is a
multifaceted phenomenon, this distinct mode of thought or awareness is characterised
by a family of often-correlated features.
Generally, the phenomenology of insight is taken to include sustained work on a
problem until impasse is reached and the problem is set aside. This marks the
'incubation' stage, the resolution of which is variously explained by:
1. The forgetting of misleading assumptions and approaches.
2. The accidental encounter with the appropriate 'solution' stimulus.
3. The effects of a slow spreading activation which finally nudges the partly activated
'solution' above the threshold for consciousness.
4. The broadening of the number of elements and approaches which can be
simultaneously activated allowing for remote associations, analogies and
metaphors.
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Montesquieu, Essai sur les causes quipeuvent affecter les espirits et les caracteres, 1736. Cited
Gross (1983, p. 248)

The impending culmination of the 'incubation' period isfrequentlymarked by an
intuitive, highly abstract 'feel' that one is on the way to solution (Metcalfe, 1986;
Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987). This intuitive stage is often characterised by a general
mental 'playfulness' and frequently by a tolerance of the 'absurd' or the seemingly

contradictory. Negative emotion is inimical to insight, especially at this stage, probabl
because insight requires a sustained 'defocussed' attention characterised by a nonselfconscious, emotional calm (Martindale, 1995; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). This calm
or reverie is often achieved by the person engaging in trivial or recreational tasks,
frequently just daydreaming. The occurrence of the 'Aha!' experience is universally
reported as enjoyable, even rapturous, and the experiencing person may lose awareness
of the passage of time and of his or her immediate circumstances. Finally, a return to a
more 'rational', 'logical' and less 'emotional' self-consciousness marks the testing and
elaboration of the insight. Let us now summarise those features of insight that underlie
this general phenomenology.

4.1.1 High Levels Of Abstraction
Whether in terms of the use of metacognitions (Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987), of high
generality heuristics (Perkins; 1995, 1997; Ward, 1995), of schematic anticipation
(Mayer, 1995), of the use of analogy and metaphor (Gentner, 1983; Smith, 1995a,
1995b; Weisberg, 1995) of themata (Briggs, 1990), of failure indices (Seifert et al.,

1995), or of inceptions (Ippolito & Tweney, 1995), the path to insight entails the use of

high levels of abstraction. The defining feature of these abstractive styles of thought i
that they are permeable structures allowing the person to entertain a wide array of
elements, ideas and images. They are conducive of a looser style of imaginary
associative play and the entertaining of unusual, even absurd, combinations of ideas and
elements. As we saw in relation to the flat associative hierarchies of Martindale (1995)
and the shallow generalisation gradients of Ward (1995), remote analogies are rendered
much more likely given the greater number of possibilities entertained. New chains of
implication become possible as broad levels of abstraction entrain a much wider

network of subordinate categories and ideas. Given the mastery of one's domain, or
even better, given expertise in more than one domain (Simonton, 1993; Gardner, 1993),
at this higher level of generality connections may be grasped between otherwise
'irrelevant' or 'remote' conceptions. In such cases domain-altering insights can be the
result of this cross-fertilisation.

4.1.2 Two Types Of Mental Process: Tacit Versus Explicit
Alongside higher levels of abstraction, and consistent with the idea of insight as a
special process, a recurring feature of the insight literature is that insight reveals an
alternation between different styles or modes of thought. There is a near-universal
emphasis of the role of intuition. This sensitivity to tacit knowings is variously
described as 'feelings of knowing', as 'primary process thinking', as combinations in
the 'subconscious', as quasi-perceptual and 'imageable' thinking, as 'defocused
attention' marked by lower levels of cortical arousal, as the ability for 'absorption' or

reverie, as an ability for entering 'flow', as 'perceptual rehearsal', and as playful cross
modal imaginings. All of these modes of knowing represent a type of 'loosening' of the
more familiar conscious processes of thought.
When confronted with challenges of understanding and anticipation that our
habitual and well-worn patterns of knowing cannot overcome (such ill-defined problems
being characterised earlier as 'Klondike spaces'), insight is needed to overcome the
impasse. Metacognitions such as 'there is nothing going on in my mind that's really of
a verbal fashion', or 'I don't know what I'm thinking', are positively correlated with
insight problem solution (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). Verbalisation and
'thinking too much' is frequently counterproductive in such cases and a more divergent
'productive' (as against reproductive) style of thought is required. And the road to
insight is somewhat 'crooked', requiring less direct and predictable mental operations
leading to larger numbers of equiprobable solutions. Here is found the widely-reported
profligacy of insight processes, with many possibilities entertained only to be later
rejected. A capacity for 'omnivalence' is required in which 'normal' thought processes

are suspended and contradictories can be held in mind simultaneously. Such a capacity

for 'Janusian thinking' (Briggs, 1990) recalls the 'negative capability' that Keats prize

so highly and recalls the flouting of the law of contradiction characteristic of 'primary
process thinking'.
Although the evidence points strongly in the direction of another, somewhat
elusive mode of knowing, care must be taken to not conceive of this in terms of two
distinct 'minds'. There must be the constant possibility of these modes of thought to
intermingle and to 'in-form' each other — or how else can we become self-consciously
aware of our intuitions? Perhaps it is better to consider mind in terms of a 'layered'
consciousness with varying levels of awareness simultaneously constituting our thought.
What we normally think of as 'rational mind' is represented by those contents of mind

we can easily reflect upon and express in words. This level of mind is at a high level of
cognitive awareness, to paraphrase Kelly (1955). But much, if not most, of mind may
not be so easily grasped and expressed. Of course it has been commonplace, especially
since Freud, to conceive of levels of mind in terms of unconscious, subconscious and
preconscious processes (see the earlier discussion of Freud's system unconscious in
2.2.2.3). The possible role of these levels of awareness within a more complete
psychology of insight will be treated in some detail in the chapters that follow.
As well as the speculation that there are levels or layers within thought, the
reported phenomenology of insight suggests a thorough 'dimensionality' of thought.

Most anecdotal accounts of insight reveal that when insight is experienced it brings with
it a plethora of implications and relationships which seem to reveal themselves in a
flurry to the person concerned (Gruber, 1981,1995; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990,1996).
Artists, for example, often report that a whole work was 'seen' in one flash of insight
(Epel, 1993; Gardner, 1993). Whatever the validity of such retrospective accounts,
there seems to be consistent evidence that conscious, propositional thought is more like

a spotlight which brightly illuminates one idea at a time, while insightful breakthroughs

are more akin to viewing city lights from a lookout high above. In the latter case, there

is a subjective sense of beauty, of wholeness and of relationship between the m a n y
elements, and it is frequently grasped at once.
i

If thought is simultaneously multi-dimensional, as PDP accounts and patterns of
cortical activation seem to suggest (Damasio, 1994; Harre & Gillett, 1994), then
conscious understanding (that at a high level of reflexive awareness) may 'summarise'
or 'symbolise' many different aspects and dimensions of meaning, including affective
and aesthetic 'feels' for that which is understood. Rather than conscious thought being
the 'tip of the iceberg' of unconscious urges and processes, thought might be
characterised as being holographic in that each dimension of understanding is reflexive
of the whole in a dynamic unity. This is consistent with anecdotal reports of the
phenomenology of the moment[s] of insight whereby the affective and aesthetic
qualities of the experience, as well as its 'intellectual' import, are experienced as a
dynamic whole. More precisely, however, such reports are retrospective and it seems
that the absorption required (perhaps in the form of 'defocussed attention') does not
allow for much simultaneous conscious reflection of this sort. Indeed such reflection is
reported as destructive of the experience. It would seem that the person is too busy
'enacting' or 'being' the insight — almost as if the person is the location or space in
which the insight occurs rather than the conscious director of the process.
In any case, this layered and dimensioned awareness needs structures of
considerable permeability and generality to 'hold' all these aspects together. Ordinarily
we are not aware of the presence of such structures, but perhaps moments of creative
insight reveal the fuller complexity of our processes of understanding. Ippolito and
Tweney (1995), for example, proposed 'inceptions' as a mode of guidance which
underlies intuitive knowing. These are 'sensory reconstructions' or high generality
imagery described as being somewhere between perceptions and symbolic thought.

This parallels Wallace's (1991) view that insights are in various 'modalities' and can be
unimodal or multi-modal. I will later discuss Langer's (1957,1972) idea of a
'presentational' mode of thought as a collective term for all these types of looser but
more aesthetically rich and personally 'felt' modes of mental awareness.

O n e result of this 'presentational' modality m a y be to bring about an unusual

experience of self. It is widely reported that insight is experienced as both spontaneous

(as having a life of its own) and as exhibiting a quality of 'exteriority', as if comin
from outside oneself (Gruber, 1981, 1995). The person commonly experiences a lack of
self-awareness and self-concern and may lose track of time and space. Ironically, this

self-forgetting appears to renew one's sense of self and of one's capacities and personal
well-being. There also seems to be a sense in which the experiencer is loathe to be
distracted from the role as 'spectator' or to critically reflect on what is occurring.
Typically, there is a suspension of one's usual judgement and evaluation processes.
Indeed, attempting to articulate the process in words while in this stage seems to be
counterproductive and disrupts the 'flow'. Again, we are reminded of Langer's (1957,
1972) distinction between presentational and representational consciousness, the latter
being structured 'discursively' (by which she means in terms of conventional
language)28 and being more or less inimical to artistic expression.
Although I discussed Martindale's (1995) connectionist theory of insight at
some length, it is not here considered a comprehensive psychological framework. It is,
for example, a strangely 'passionless' account of insight, a limitation characteristic of

connectionism. But we know from the review of the literature that it is widely accepted
that emotion plays a central role in the genesis and experience of insight. Nonetheless,
Martindale's creative and thought-provoking theorising may help us show that the
psychological processes that define the experience of insight 'map' onto the neural-like
model he proposes. In so doing this will hopefully lend some 'ecological validity' to
my account for, as a basic principle, such an account must be consistent with what we

know about cortical function. I will later link what Martindale has said to both MatteBlanco's (1988) notion of symmetrical and asymmetrical thought and to Kelly's (1955)

28

W e will, however, use 'discursive' in a broader sense to include any symbolic m o d e of expression and
communication. This is done because non-propositional modes of expression and communication can be
obviously semantic (as in the visual symbolism of art, for example). Thus the symbolic, but nonlanguage-based, presentational modes of consciousness (which Langer called 'non-discursive symbolism)
are here considered to be 'discursive'. It is hoped that this is still in keeping with Langer's general
project of distinguishing between a more linear propositional thought which is not medium-sensitive and
a morefigurativeand emotionally-nuanced m o d e of thought wherein the medium is part of the message.

concepts of loose and tight construing. Meaning and understanding always arise within
networks of related meanings and this multi-dimensionality sits easily with what we
know about the experience of insight and with connectionist conceptions of thought as
being massively parallel.

4.1.3 The Role Of Emotion

We have seen in the above literature that the role of 'emotional thinking' in insight is
cardinal importance. 1 will later distinguish between emotion and affect following
Rychlak (1977). For now it is enough to say that the term 'affect' always implies some
judgement or assessment process, whereas emotion may be differentiated in terms of the
degree of conceptualisation involved from relatively instinctive, pre-conceptual
reactions and action tendencies to highly refined, affective nuances (see also Spinoza,
1967, for a distinction between passive and active emotions). In these terms, animals

clearly experience primitive (passive) emotions (fear, anxiety, satiation and so on), but
is by no means clear as to whether they generate affective experience (for example,
confidence, dread or amusement). To jump ahead a bit, what may be pivotal in the
production of insight is the capacity to become aware of one's implicit, affective prejudgements as judgements which determine networks of sequacious (logically
subsequent) meanings (Rychlak, 1977). This may then allow for alternative meanings
to be predicated.
In examining the role of emotion I hope to shed some light on the aphorism by
Montesquieu which opened this chapter. What does it mean that a really intelligent
person 'feels' what other people only know? Presumably, Montesquieu is here
distinguishing between some form of 'deeper' or wiser knowing as against a purely
intellectual grasp of something. Clearly he is pointing to a fuller, more 'feeling'
expression of our rationality and intelligence. And because such 'feelings' reportedly
accompany insight, it may be that insight brings about an alignment of our
psychological capacities somewhat akin to Montesquieu's understanding of a 'feeling'
intelligence.

This 'feeling' intelligence implies a type of understanding which includes and
goes beyond 'mere' calculative thinking towards a more 'meditative' thinking
(Heidegger, 1959/1966). Significantly this 'going beyond', this meditative thinking, is
marked by an affective awareness and sensitivity. According to Heidegger (1959/1966),
calculative thinking is akin to puzzle-solving in that the person has the elements of

solution at hand. It is typified in the types of tasks required in IQ tests: where answers

need to be fast, are often required under pressure, are in response to impersonal, abstrac
questions which are clearly defined and have a single correct answer. Meditative
thinking (for Heidegger, 'real thinking') responds to ill-defined problems, those we have
little idea of how to approach. Such a style of thought is more receptive, attentive and
absorbed in the task at hand. It involves the whole being of the person in a patient,
receptive attitude, or what Heidegger (1959/1966) called 'releasement'. It is also
significant that from this fuller, affective stance prudent action follows. What I find
here is 'cognition', 'affect' and 'behaviour' in tight harmony. This reminds us that the
derivation of 'e-motion' ('e' = out of; 'motion' = movement) also implies a dynamic,
enactive process and this fits perfectly with my emerging conviction of the complexly
embodied nature of mind. As we will see later, it also sits comfortably with Kelly's
(1955) image of the person as 'a form of motion' (see also Butt, 1995, 1997, 1998a;
Radley, 1977) in which distinctions between emotion, motivation and cognition are
eschewed in favour of a more complex incorporative notion of construing.
There is a simple sense in which emotion is involved in the overall insight
process in terms of the frustration and despair of impasse, in the often stubborn
determination that pervades a person pressing for resolution, and in the excitement of
finally 'cracking' the problem. This seems obvious enough: the role of emotion might
in this way be understood as a response to various 'cognitive' processes. But if we have

learned one thing thus far it is that frequently lurking behind an 'obvious' fact is a far

more interesting possibility. The possibility in this case is that we think emotionally, o
to say it the other way around, we 'emote' cognitively (and desirously and purposefully
for that matter). That is, the moods and affective qualities so characteristic, for
example, of'flow' (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 1996) are constitutive of insight processes,

not merely consequent upon them. In the same w a y 'themata' (Briggs, 1990) are
emotionally-nuanced 'cognitions', not cognitions which lead to emotions. In short, as
Briggs would say, there is indeed 'fire in the [mental] crucible'.
Briggs (1990) summarised neurophysiological evidence that thoughts and
memories may be coded or logged in the brain according to their 'emotional nuances or
feeling tones'. In line with this, insight may represent an awareness and utilisation of
this orderly, affective 'coding'. Events and elements of understanding (including
moods, thoughts, patterns of colour and so on) are grasped as comprehensible or as
being within some orderly relationship, and this comprehensibility is affectively informed. In my later discussion of Le Doux's (1991, 1995, 1998) neurophysiological
accounts of emotion, of Goleman's (1995) theory of emotional intelligence, of
Damasio's (1994) 'somatic marker hypothesis' and of Rychlak's (1977) notion of
'affective assessment', I will attempt to sketch an account of emotion which is
compatible with the phenomenology of insight and contemporary neuropsychology. In
particular, I will note that emotionally-laden 'feelings' or intuitions, which may
determine decisions about advantageous courses of action, are experienced and acted
upon before there is any conscious justification for such action (Claxton, 1997,1998;
Bechara et al., 1997).
Not disconnected to the role of emotion in insight is the question of failure and
disappointment. We have seen that when people are disappointed in their stymied
attempts to solve a problem they are much more likely to remember its elements (the
Zeigarnik Effect). This phenomenon is probably ecologically advantageous, for our

survival depends on our ability to anticipate and deal with the 'problems' that life pose

It would be an advantage, therefore, to recognise similar, perturbing situations quickly.
Alternatively, as we have seen, stray events or thoughts may subsequently provide the

clue to the still-available 'representation' of the problem, and insight may soon follow.
Thus Schooler and his colleagues proposed we store 'failure indices' which are
reactivated and which 'guide' us to insight. But they have not elaborated the emotional
and personal dimensions of this phenomenon.

A n assertion to be developed in the chapters to follow is that identity,
particularly those aspects concerned with our survival, is also likely to enmeshed with
our ability to anticipate events successfully (Kelly, 1955; Leitner & Faidley, 1993).
That is, in terms of Kelly's PCP (1955), core construing (construing concerned with self
and one's maintenance processes) is superordinate and is tied into our capacity to
anticipate and thereby to survive. Thus, failures to anticipate events would lead to
anxiety. Doubts about our general ability to anticipate would be even more threatening.
Consequently, it is 'natural' for us to avoid situations of continuing uncertainty or
impasse. Under conditions of considerable threat and anxiety, thinking and behaviour
may become predictable and stereotyped and, thereby, unlikely to lead to insight. In
contrast, we have seen that these situations where we cannot assimilate the situation at
hand are also potentially those situations which may provide for breakthroughs in our
understanding. Such baffling circumstances may aid us in expanding and refining our
capacity to anticipate, or as Piaget (1952) would have expressed it, to accommodate our
mental structures to the world. These musings bring us again to Keats and 'Negative
Capability'. Given the confusing complexity of our post-modern times, where notions

of Objectivity and Truth are in serious question, such an ability to tolerate uncertainty
perhaps even more urgently required. As Bertrand Russell expressed it:
To teach how to live without certainty, and without being paralysed
with hesitation, is perhaps the chief thing that philosophy, in our age,
can still do for those w h o study it. (1946, cited in Page, 1996, p. 103)

The capacity for insight, and the flow of ideas and actions it entails, may well be
tied to our capacity to deal with the 'normal' anxiety or threat one may experience when
one becomes frustrated by impasse. If the matter is one of importance to the self and all
one's efforts are in vain, then one may begin to question one's overall capacity to
anticipate — one may feel considerable threat. Conversely, the joy of insight may be
tied to the renewed confidence in our capacity to anticipate that validation brings
(Ippolito & Tweney, 1995). Again, this points to a type of emotional intelligence or
ability which affords us a certain serenity, mental playfulness, and 'looseness' in the
face of failure.

4.1.4

The Social And Pragmatic Dimensions Of Insight

Generally speaking, the cognitive literature underspecifies the social dimension of
insight (Simonton, 1993, 1997), emphasising instead its hypothesised intrapsychic
mechanics. Wallace (1991) has argued that insight has a developmental facet — the
'microgenetic' flash of insight being only one aspect of a larger and ongoing
'macrogenetic', largely social, process. We have also seen broader, more 'sociological'
investigations (Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995; Gardner, 1993; Gruber, 1981, 1995)

which placed insight within historical, cultural, professional and interpersonal milieus.
There is still a yawning gap, however, between the person's 'inner' (mental) processes
and the 'outer' (social) forces acting upon them and a paucity of explanation for how
that gap is breached.
For example, Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer (1995), with explicit reference to the
American pragmatist tradition, argued that insight reflects social processes and

discourses. I have already analysed this account (see 3.3.3.4) but it is worth revisitin
several aspects. It will be recalled that the key component of insight is the 'filtering
mechanism' whereby the unconscious is structured by socially-informed conscious
learning. The person through processes of acculturation, mentoring, reading,
apprenticeship and so on, builds a 'subconscious filtering network' which 'pre-judges'
incoming information. Drawing on Minsky's (1985) notion of the 'Society of Mind'
and on the spreading activation metaphor, many subconscious processing entities are
described as acting simultaneously on incoming data, testing hypotheses and generating
hunches. But as was pointed out earlier, this merely pushes the problem of explaining
insight to vague inner reaches — effectively attributing these inner 'minds' with the
properties of insight we wish to explain. All this points to dualism between inner and
outer, the intrapsychic and the social, the cognitive and the emotional, the mental and
the physical. And these explanatory problems are deeply rooted within a
representational view of mind, a view I will shortly critique.

Csikszentmihalyi (1990, 1996) is illuminating, however, in his detailed attention
to the pragmatics of generating insight. H e described in some detail the working lives
of eminently insightful people. W h a t emerges is an ongoing alternation between
solitude and social interaction and between hard work and idle time. In accounting for
their insights, all his respondents recognised h o w m u c h a part of theirfieldand the
current Zeitgeist their contributions were. All were keenly aware of the state of the
current paradigm, the political considerations within theirfield/sand of the importance
of conversations with respected colleagues. All also stressed h o w important to them
was the communication and elaboration of their insights, especially to trusted peers. It
is important to them that their insights 'work' and are accepted. This pragmatic 'test',
the viability of insights, emerges within cycles of creativity and within larger cycles of
experience in which these insights are socially embedded.

4.2 WHAT DO WE STILL NEED?

The cognitive literature has been very useful in this inquiry into the nature of insight.
particular it has revealed more-or-less universal themes and empirically-observed
features of the stages of insight. The following sections will propose, however, that
these approaches are limited and will indicate a trend towards more 'constructivist'
approaches to insight. Given the limits of cognitivism, it will be argued that a more
thoroughgoing constructivism is needed to account for what w e n o w k n o w about
insight.

4.2.1 Problems With The Representationist Accounts
The reader will have noticed along the way certain criticisms of the cognitive accounts
of insight. A major explanatory flaw has been the tendency to merely re-describe
insight at a supposed 'inner' representational level. This flows directly from the
representationist metatheory which underlies these accounts. Within cognitive

psychology and cognitive science, cognition is usually defined in terms of processes
involving internal rules (procedures) and representations — or what I will call
representationism. According to a representational philosophy of perception, the basic,

direct object of perception is taken to be sense datum, not the object itself. The mind is
modelled in terms of abstract symbolic structures that are manipulated according to
innate, law-like procedures which 'rebuild' the sensory data into veridical
representations of the world.
As with computers, however, the 'representational' status of representations —
their reference or intensionality29 — is derivative. That is, it derives from the meanings
we attribute to them. But if representations are our mode of thought, how do they ever
point past themselves? How do they gain semantic content? Moreover, how is
solipsism avoided? Either there is a slide to dualism and idealism, or a need for some
form of direct access to reality to confirm a match with one's representation (which
immediately undermines the need for representations). Consequently, in its reaction
against behaviourism, cognitive representationism has reasserted the cognitive
dimension of psychology at the cost of meaning or intensionality.
Within cognitive psychology, for example, Fodor (1980) reluctantly accepted
what he called 'methodological solipsism' whereby it is acknowledged that
representations cannot account for their semantic relation to the things cognised. In
similar fashion, we have seen that Dennett (1981) has proposed smaller and smaller subcomponents of representations handled by stupid homunculi — an army of idiots
making simpler and simpler decisions — to account for our intensional understandings.
This is not the place to undertake a thorough critique of cognitive representationism.
For such critiques see Costall and Still (1987), Hacker (1986,1991), Harre and Gillett
29

'Intensionality' with an 's' will be used throughout following Shanon (1991) and Husain (1983). This
is meant to preserve s o m e of the meanings normally attributed to intentionality with a 't' but to add a
strong sense of 'meaningfulness' to our mental processes. That is, intensionality is meant here to suggest
not only the 'aboutness' of our mental processes, that they are directed at things, but, as a contrast to
'extensional', it is also meant to emphasise that our mental processes are constitutionally meaningful,
they are intrinsically semantic. That is, they are not content-less, formal structures which 'represent' their
objects by their syntactic (computational) patterns of arrangement (representationism). Rather, the
qualities of thoughts, feelings and behaviours are intrinsically meaningful. In this w a y of understanding
h u m a n awareness, the m e d i u m of expression is highly semantically relevant and semantics is by no
means limited to the domain of language.

(1994), H y m a n (1991), Johnson (1987), Rychlak (1968, 1977), Searle (1980), Shanon

(1991, 1993), Still and Costall (1991) and Varela et al. (1996). For now, it is enough t
say that the types of explanatory problems identified generally in relation to
representationism, emerge once again in the cognitive insight literature.
These problems include the difficulties formal representations would have in
keeping up with contextual complexity. With respect to language, Shanon (1991,1993)
has argued convincingly that the 'representational computational view of mind'
(RCVM) cannot account for the meaning of words largely because a set of given terms
or definitions could never keep up with contextual variations including polysemy, misusages, context and translation. Given the emphasis of the role of figurative thought,
metaphor and analogy in the insight literature, this is a serious shortcoming for a
representational account of insight. These contextual problems also appear in the
insight literature as an underspecification of our fully-embodied immersion in our
complex social and physical world. It will be seen that it is precisely our ability to

navigate and 'resonate' to such complexity that allows for the possibility of insight a
which contributes to its dynamic, 'flow-like' nature.
In addition, we have seen that information-processing or RCVM approaches
underplay the role of emotion and larger motivational purposes in the generation and
experience of insight. Accordingly, emotion is generally seen as an effect of insight
(Gick and Lockhart, 1995; Smith Ward & Finke, 1995) rather than as a constituent
element within the process. We have also seen that the account of intuition and of
'primary process' has been shackled by theoretical vagueness when it comes to
specifying 'where' and by 'whom' insightful solutions are recognised. The RCVM,

derived as it is from the computational metaphor, falls easily into a brain-mind equati
Thus the body, when mentioned at all, is pictured as a type of prosthesis under the
brain's direction. Feelings and passions, the qualia of everyday existence, become
epiphenomena merely consequent upon the mind's (brain's) activity. Again, this image
of the person is strikingly foreign to the image we have seen of the insightful person

purposeful, passionate actor engaging in day-to-day efforts, immersed in the media of
his or her pursuit, bringing his or her whole being to bear on the pursuit at hand.
Generally speaking, as mind is to be derived from fundamental representational
(ultimately neural) structures, a reductionist imperative underlies these accounts. Thus,
such accounts are drawn ineluctably towards essentialism as they attempt to locate the
basic atoms of mind, or the essence of understanding, which is usually identified
exclusively as patterns of association or (neural) activation. These tendencies
themselves derive from objectivist assumptions about the foundations of knowledge and
are usually expressed in terms of the accuracy or truth of representations in their
reference to the world (the 'correspondence' theory of truth). Following naturally from
this is the assumption that the experience of 'insight' must refer to the discovery of
something self-evidently true (in an objectivist, 'essential' sense). The problem, of
course, is by what 'extra-cognitive' standard can we ever know something is true in this
way? This tack merely recapitulates the dualist 'inner-outer' and 'mind-within-minds'
problems I have discussed in previous chapters.
This essentialist explanatory bias also derives from a widespread rejection of
teleological considerations ('final' causes30) in psychological explanation as being
unscientific. Aristotle (1975) considered there to be four natural causes, or explanatory
factors — Material, Efficient, Formal and Final — any combination of which could be
invoked to explain phenomena. Modelled on the natural sciences, however, psychology

has heavily relied on material and efficient ('billiard ball') causation, and to a lesser
extent on formal causation. That is, psychological phenomena (behaviours, thoughts)
are theorised to be caused by the combined effects of the physical properties and
potentialities of substances being pushed along or given impetus by antecedent events.
For example, neurones (material cause) are triggered by the action of sensory
30

This material is derived largely from Rychlak's (1977) discussion of the four causes, as given by
Aristotle, in relation to psychological explanation. In 1977 Rychlak pointed out that the thencontemporary cognitive psychology could be characterised as 'mechanistic' and 'mediational' in that it
relied exclusively on material-efficient explanation and cognitions merely mediated between antecedent
causes and subsequent effects or behaviours. O n the other hand, humanistic psychology was
characterised by formal-final explanations in which purpose or teleological considerations were given
priority. So, rather than attempting to account for purpose in efficient and material terms, the humanist
attempts to demonstrate purpose scientifically.

stimulation operating across time (efficient causation) acting to bring about

psychological effects. Formal cause refers to the recognisable pattern or organisation in
the way some thing or event is constituted (formed) which thereby determines the
possible manifestations and interactions for that thing or event. Thus, the patterns of
mental construction a person has achieved will co-determine (along with the other

causes) possible future constructions. Final causation, on the other hand, is the 'that f
the sake of which', the purpose for which, something occurs or comes about (Rychlak,
1977). Applied to inanimate objects, it makes little sense to say, for example, that a
rock falls to the ground because it desires to be joined with the earth. But teleological
explanation (from the Greek word 'telos' meaning 'end') is most relevant to this inquiry

into insight as it speaks to the reasons, intentions, the premising meanings, the directi
in which we envisage outcomes, that in-forms our mental life and behaviour generally.
It is irrelevant, teleologically, whether or not the end actually comes to pass. What is
important is the predicational capacity, the self-reflexive intelligence of the human
being (as distinct from machines and inanimate substances generally) which can
conceptualise unformed possibilities and thereby potentially bring them into existence:
The crux of the issue remains that initial capacity, ability, potential, of
the organism to contribute something to the knowledge it acquires by
w a y of experience without having 'learned' to do so. (Rychlak, 1977,
pp. 214-215, italics in original)

Thus we come again to the distinction between mediational and predicational
models of the person (Rychlak, 1977, 1990, 1991; and see earlier, 1.1). A mediational
model describes psychological processes as mediators or conveyors of information
taken in, as given, from the environment. The meanings are always taken in as a given
meaningful unit "that exists in its original form even before it is taken in by the
mediational process from environmental experience" (Rychlak, 1990, p. 9). Facts are
imprinted on the mind, in Lockean fashion, according to principles such as contiguity
and frequency, as exemplified by the information-processing models I have discussed.
Predicational models, on the other hand, are based on a view of the meaning-making
process as an active projection of meaning and categories onto the objects of experience.

Ill

Rychlak (1990) viewed such processes as based on dialectical reasoning and hence
"bounded by oppositionality " (p. 9, emphasis in original). That is, meaning is not

established as an unipolar given, but is rather chosen or predicated by the person within
the complex of contrasting or contrary possibilities. And these possibilities are not an
either-or, binary logic (of the classical form of A and Not-A). Rather, as will be
discussed in later chapters, they are affirmations of precedent meaning within
personally-relevant contrasts.
The difficulties and shortcomings of the cognitive and mechanistic approaches
to insight reduce to this point. We have seen that there is a explanatory tendency to
account for insight in terms of increasingly 'inner' and more non-intensional units, such
that the act of insight is equated with a threshold being exceeded, or with a chance
encounter setting off chains of associations which then present consciousness with a
new possibility (it 'pops' into awareness). Meaning is 'taken in' and rearranged in
mostly unconscious processes so it can be presented to the conscious mind for
recognition in the insight experience. Formal causes (the shape or organisation of, for
example, mental phenomena) are seen as the result of the combination of efficient and
material causation and final causes are rejected as a type of impossible, reversed
efficient causation: as if somehow 'effects' in the future reach backwards through time
to bring about their own causes: the 'teleological fallacy' (Reber, 1985).31 But, as has
been argued, these mediational accounts take as unproblematic the capacity to affirm

new meaning, to 'see' the point, as it were, when insights pop into mind, whereas this is

precisely the capacity which I am attempting to explain. In contrast, I will argue that th
capacity for insight depends on an innate capacity for the predication of meaning, not
merely on associationistic processes (which undoubtedly are important) which 'teach'
us how to know and understand. This initial capacity to create meaning, or

31

But as Rychlak (1977) makes very clear,finalcausation operates independently of time. That is, as he
put it, "Future goals, like present sightings of doorways, both c o m e into play at the point of the premise
— that is, encompassed in the meaning taken on. The process, 'for the sake of this, that follows', stamps
a mentality as telic, not the fact that it has future goals or expectations in mind toward which it works"
(1977, p. 287). In other words, a precedent meaning is asserted and the meanings that follow
'sequaciously', or are determined by it, are not determined efficiently, but logically or necessarily.

telosponsivity, as opposed to responsivity (Rychlak, 1977), is what is required tofillthe
explanatory gap left within mechanistic accounts.

4.2.2 What We Need from An Account Of Insight
Given the above findings and shortcomings, what is needed is a psychological
framework for insight that can accommodate a view of mental processes as being
simultaneously personal and social, as being abstractive yet affectively embodied, and
as being defined by intensionally-laden cognitions, emotions and behaviours. W e need
an account of insight that can locate the complex social and physical facts of existence
within the intrapersonal structure of awareness, and that can place individual insights
within a larger context of a person's enduring purposes and meanings and thereby can
incorporate teleological explanation as being uniquely appropriate for higher human
mental life. A n adequate theoretical understanding of insight must also conceive of an
interplay of unconscious (tacit or low levels of reflexive awareness) and conscious
processes constantly working in tandem to produce our characteristic psychological
experience. W e need to understand h o w it is that our largest mental breakthroughs can
seemingly c o m e unbidden and can be beyond our conscious direction and awareness.
H o w can meaningful behaviour be both an expression of our personal system of
meanings, yet be mostly too elusive to articulate? Indeed, the effort to articulate or
reflect on such mental processes as they happen seems to inhibit their full realisation
and expression. W e also need to be able to account for the not-infrequent reports of the
person having a sense of s o m e h o w ceasing to be as a separate 'cogniser', the latter
experience being a type offirst-handrefutation of dualism and of the hard-and-fast
separation of person and world.
Implicit in the above is the requirement to break d o w n the strict duality of inner
versus outer, of cognition versus emotion, of action versus thought, and of conscious
versus unconscious processes. A s revealed in the literature reviewed thus far, the
insightful person m a y have a superior capacity for holding contradictories together in
mind and coming to transcend those contradictories — for dialectical thought. This

capacity to create n e w meaning from contradiction32 m a y reveal the 'heart' of insight.
In this fashion, insight appears to be preceded by a type of 'undoing' of thought, where
a mode of observant acceptance, a 'negative capability', may become evident following

impasse. And in my efforts to build an integrative, theoretical understanding of insight
we too may need to develop this capacity for 'omnivalence', for tolerating, even
dwelling in, apparent illogicality with equanimity. In so doing we may loosen the tight
polarities and the obvious contrasts of our thought and we may move closer to our
hoped-for insights into insight.

4.2.2.1 Some Specific Questions
The following questions stem from the findings about insight so far and from the wide

theoretical requirements outlined above. They will anticipate and point to discussions i
the chapters which follow. Although it is expected that answers to these questions will
overlap somewhat, overall they should lead towards a broad enough theoretical
understanding capable of subsuming the diverse features of insight.

• How is the proclivity for metaphor and figurative thought, which is highlighted
in insight, connected to our mentality in general?

We have seen that much of insight involves the creative use of analogies and crossdomain fertilisation. A very important manifestation of this shifting in abstractive

domains is the oft-reported use of metaphor and figurative thought. The latter processes

seem to play such a ubiquitous role in insight that they too will need to be accounted fo
in more detail. The ability to think in a metaphorical way indicates not only the
important role of language, but, to presage later discussions somewhat (Johnson, 1987;
Kittay, 1997; Lakoff, 1987; Shanon, 1991,1993), it may tell us something about our
basic symbolic and mental capacities.
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It will later be argued that this is brought about by an affective shift or awareness which becomes
predominant at the breakdown of demonstrative, propositional thought.

• H o w is our mental life tied into our embodiment?

Linked to the above discussion of the figurative dimensions of thought is the question
h o w our embodiment m a y 'in-form' our structures of understanding. It will be later
argued, following Hunt (1995), that cross-modal, 'presentational' synesthesia m a y
provide the template for later more 'representational' mental structures. This will be
compared to theories which find in language evidence of the embodied nature of
thought (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Shanon, 1993) and to the 'enactive' approaches
of Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1964), Butt (1996, 1998a, 1998b), Shanon (1991, 1993) and
Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1996).

• How is the social inscribed in our thought?

It is ironic that although insight appears to be a paradigmatically 'personal' or subj
experience, it is by no means merely an 'individual' or 'inner' one. N o insights occur
outside a cultural, social and physical milieus. It will be argued that the 'social' is not
an added external influence, but is an intrinsic feature of thought (Harre & Gillett, 1994;
Johnson, 1987; Shanon, 1993). Rejecting the dualism of inner and outer, it is more
appropriate to say that w e are socially 'in-formed'. Just as w e are immersed in an
ecosystem which pervades our very physical being, w e swim within social currents and
w e can never 'get out' (should w e ever want to). H o w w e resonate to and influence the
social 'affordances' (Gibson, 1979; Noble, 1991,1993) or 'perturbances' (Varela, et al.,
1996) w e are subject to will form an important part of m y theoretical understanding of
insight.

• What are the types of psychological processes which reflect defocussed
attention, 'loose' thinking and tacit knowing?

We need a more detailed account of how remote analogies and 'looser' thinking are
accomplished. That is, what happens at the psychological level to generate these new,
intuitively felt possibilities? To answer this question an attempt will be m a d e to

interweave the contributions of, among others, Martindale (1995), Matte-Blanco(1988)
and Kelly (1955). It is clear that a theoretical understanding of insight must include a
coherent account of such shifts in modes of abstraction and states of awareness.

• How is emotion a part of high level abstraction and of thought generally?

The pivotal role of emotion in the genesis and experience of insight requires that a way
is found of marrying abstraction with emotion. Again Matte-Bianco (1988) and Kelly
(1955) will be called upon, as will other contemporary research into the relationship
between emotion and thought (Bechara et al, 1997; Claxton, 1997, 1998; Damasio,
1994; Goleman, 1995; LeDoux, 1998; Mair, 1980; Rychlak, 1977). T o anticipate the
later discussion somewhat, if 'representational' thought is derived from emotional and
'presentational' symbolism (Langer, 1957, 1972; Rychlak, 1997; Shanon, 1993), then
such emotional-symbolic structures m a y well be quite superordinate in the person's
systems of understanding. A s such, although not necessarily propositional in form and
available to conscious verbal reflection, such affective dimensions m a y well be quite
abstract and thereby would influence substantial subsystems of thought. Thus, a
recurrent theme in this investigation is the idea of various modes and levels of thought
and consciousness. There also seems to be a more meditative style of thought
(Heidegger, 1959/1966) implicated in insight which relinquishes algorithmic, meansend-type mental processes in favour of a more contemplative, receptive attitude. In the
transitions represented by n e w insights a type of transcending affectivity, or evenly
hovering equanimity, commonly characterises the period before insightful breakthrough.

4.3 CONCLUDING COMMENT
W e have found that the phenomenology of insight is reliably described in terms of the
stages of preparation, impasse, incubation, insight, and elaboration. It is clear that high
levels of abstraction are always involved, as is a subtle interplay between tacit and
explicitly conscious mental processes. Emotion and affective judgements are integral in

the process of coming to insight. In addition, insight was found to be always in-formed
by social and pragmatic considerations. It was concluded that an adequate theoretical
understanding of insight needs to be able to surmount dualism generally. It needs to
provide an account of our intensional capacities and our ability to deal with contextual
complexity. A more detailed portrayal of the relation between emotion and abstract
thought is required as well as an understanding of how embodiment in-forms our
structures of understanding. The capacities to predicate meaning, to deal with
contradictories and to come at the world teleologically were argued to be necessary.
Finally, a different sense of self, frequently experienced in insight, needs to be
accounted for. In psychological constructivism we appear to have a metatheoretical
approach towards insight that is promising. Accordingly, the coming chapter will begin
with a discussion of psychological constructivism and, more specifically, I will present
a 'reading' of George Kelly's PCP (1955), a theory which in broad terms covers the sort
of ground a theory of insight must cover. This will prepare the ground for a more
explicit presentation of Kelly's views on insight in Chapter 6.
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SECTION 2:

INCREASING THE ILLUMINATION

CHAPTER 5: CONSTRUCTIVISM AND PERSONAL
CONSTRUCT PSYCHOLOGY
5.1 GATHERING THE THREADS CONSTRUCTIVELY
Having summarised the features of insight, and outlined the requirements for an
adequate theoretical understanding of it, h o w can these be combined within one broad
theoretical approach? For this complex task constructivist psychology shows
considerable promise. It shows this promise particularly because of its metatheoretical
commitments and its attendant emphases. This is so because constructivism is at h o m e
with an approach to knowledge processes as hypothetical, multi-valent and uncertain, as
pertaining to personal meaning rather than to objective access to 'facts'. Just as
fundamentally, psychological constructivism avoids hard-and-fast distinctions between
emotion and thinking, and between mind and body, preferring to see such distinctions as
constructions — not 'God's eye' descriptions of an extra-conceptual reality. A s such, a
constructivist approach should be at h o m e with the relative absence of such distinctions
between emotional, cognitive, embodied and behavioural experiences so commonly
reported as part of the phenomenology of insight.
I have in passing referred to a trend towards constructivism within cognitive
psychology generally (Mahoney, 1995), as well as within the insight literature.
Accordingly, I will first present a brief account of psychological constructivism and
then attempt to m a p this onto the researchfindingsso far, and then onto the
requirements for an adequate theoretical understanding of insight. That done, I will
present a reading of one psychological constructivism, George Kelly's (1955) Personal
Construct Psychology (PCP), in preparation for the following chapter's analysis of
_

Insight within P C P .

5.1.2

Psychological Constructivism

It is difficult to simply describe 'psychological constructivism' because it represents
such a diversity of theoretical, and sometimes metatheoretical, positions (see Botella,
1995; Chiari and Nuzzo, 1996; Lyddon, 1995; Mahoney, 1988 for attempts to
distinguish the various types of constructivism). There are, however, some common
and identifiable epistemological and ontological commitments (Mahoney, 1988,1993;
Neimeyer, 1993). Psychological constructivism expresses some of the aspects of the
larger contemporary revolt against the ideals of the Enlightenment33 and more recently
of logical positivism and empiricism, particularly against the belief in foundational

truths and unchallengeable belief systems. Thus it celebrates multiplicity and 'local' o
'situated' knowledge. Constructivism, as an alternative to rationalist views of mind,

generally endorses an anti-objectivist, anti-foundationalist view of knowledge. That is,

knowledge of reality is not seen to be simply a matter of 'taking a look' at the 'facts'
the world in order to detect the degree of correspondence of those facts with our

thoughts or beliefs (whether this be by direct perception or via accurate representation
Rather, what we take to be a 'fact' is assumed to be at least partly a function of our
proactive outlook or predicational framework of understanding (Kelly, 1955; Rychlak,
1990). Consequently, 'insight' is not understood as a normative term delineating the
agreed-upon, objective essence of some imputed mental process, it is understood as a
personal experience. What may be an insight for me may not necessarily be one for
you. But its 'acceptance' might require intersubjective agreement.
Psychologies drawing on constructivist metatheories take knowledge to be a
proactive achievement. It is both hypothetical and anticipatory (Botella, 1995;
Mahoney, 1988,1993; Neimeyer, 1993) in that it is underdetermined by the sensory
stimulation we receive from the world. That is, understanding and knowledge derive
33

This eighteenth century project was to free the mind from ignorance and (religious) superstition and,
by the power of reason, to c o m e to a deeper understanding of the person's place in his or her social,
psychological and material world. It championed science and technology and held an optimism in
contrast to the stagnation and despair of the 'dark ages'. The postmodern critics of the enlightenment
oppose what is seen as the 'rationalist' and 'modernist' excesses that allegedly have flowed from this,
replacing faith in religion with an unwarranted faith in reason and technology.

from both 'feedback' and 'feedforward' mechanisms. A s such, psychological
constructivisms are primarily concerned with meaning and 'personal epistemologies'
based in personal experience, rather than with objective propositions about reality.
Insofar as we build our struggles for objectivity on the basis of our 'personal
epistemologies', constructivism has relevant things to say about 'objectivity'. Thus, to

the extent that we strive for anticipatory leverage on the future, we also strive for a m
objective outlook. That is, not just any construction will do precisely because the world
will not have it so. Nor will we have it so: in addition to the 'pragmatic' test of our
constructions, we want some reassurance of understanding, not being satisfied with
mere opinion. More speculatively, although constructivism holds that any particular
construal is always partial, never the absolute truth, this implies an objective world
which stands as an inexhaustible ground or source of our anticipatory efforts. This

source is prior to, beyond, yet within, our constructions. It transcends yet inheres in u
It is always the occasion for our constructions, but is never entirely encapsulated by
them. In short, in its totality it is the Truth that anchors all our understandings and
misunderstandings. Thus, even if all my construals of the world are systematically
mistaken, this still implies that there is a world about which I am systematically wrong.
I am right, wrong, viable, coherent, and so on, about something other than those
construals (see Anderson, 1962, for a similar argument in favour of the existence of the
mind).
Given this anticipatory view of knowledge or truth, constructivists tend to
endorse viability and coherence as appropriate 'epistemic values' (Botella, 1995;
Stevens, 1998; see also Noaparast, 1995). Such values are quite distinct from traditional
realist values such as naive correspondence or accurate representation. Because
successful construction is shaped by its anticipatory viability and by its coherence,
knowledge is viewed as evolutionary, as that which 'survives' or is 'selected' via the
processes of validation and invalidation.
The ontological assumptions of constructivism reflect the above epistemological
commitments. It is assumed that the type of world we live in does not 'tell' us what to

think or believe (Chiari and Nuzzo; 1995; Soffer, 1993) 34 . Objects, to paraphrase Kelly
(1955), do not come with their names stamped on their backs. The type of person who
inhabits such an ontologically non-directive world needs to be proactive. Meaning is
created by action in the world and thereby constructivist psychologies focus on the

'psycho-logic' (Warren, 1997) of the person, or of the social collective, rather than on
the proposed inherent 'logic' of the world and its imputed properties and relations.
Reality is assumed to have an 'error tolerance' (Rescher, 1987, cited in Noaparast,
1995) which, while not all-forgiving, allows for a variety of competing hypotheses and
constructions. It could only be in a world which allowed such degrees of
epistemological freedom that viability and coherence could themselves be viable and
coherent epistemic values. However, where this error tolerance is exceeded, where the
world says 'no' to our constructions, we appear to experience our most direct
epistemological contact with the world: it seems we are not so much told what to think,
as what not to think. Put another way, rather than directly prescribing what we should
think or believe, the world merely proscribes some of our attempted constructions and
behaviours.
Mahoney (1995) considered that there are three principles of human experience
which underlie constructivism generally:
1. That humans produce their own experience (perception, memory and knowing is
proactive or predicational).

2. That most of the organising processes active in people's lives are at tacit levels of
awareness.

34

This raises the difficult question of whether constructivism is antithetical to realism. Opinions vary
greatly on this but it can be argued that a more useful w a y to understand constructivism is as a half-way
house between objectivism and relativism and between traditional realism and idealism (Stevens and
Walker, 1997). Thus constructivist approaches m a y be considered to assume a 'minimum realism'
(Stevens, 1998). That is, while our constructions are always fallible and are always partial, they are also
always approximations to a constraining world which frequently says 'no!' to our attempts to anticipate
(see Orange, 1995 and her use of the term 'perspectival realism' for a similar argument in relation to her
version of self psychology).

3. That h u m a n experience and psychological development reflect "individualized, selforganising processes that tend to favor the maintenance (over the modification) of
experiential patterns" (pp. 44-45).
While these very general features of constructivism may not be held exclusively by
constructivists (Botella, 1995), they do mirror the facets of insight highlighted by the
current inquiry. Firstly, we have come to acknowledge that there is an active,
'predicational' quality to insight. There is an active comprehension at the heart of
insight which is unsatisfactorily described in relatively passive, associationist terms.
Rather, we have seen that there is purpose or intent underlying insight, and this
introduces teleology into insight. Such a forward-looking intentionality need not be at a

high level of cognitive awareness but it is saturated in meaning, as a part of the person'
ongoing, largely implicit 'project' in the world. Secondly, insight is always
characterised by unpredictable processes of tacit awareness and such processes seem to
hold the clue to breakthroughs in understanding. In this way insight fits in well with a
constructivist approach which is at home with meaning processes other than wellordered cognitions. Thirdly, impasse in efforts to understand not infrequently can be
experienced as an affront or perturbation to one's capacity to anticipate one's world, to
one's 'core ordering processes' (Mahoney, 1991). Such perturbations are frequently

pushed aside or out of awareness as they threaten one's experiential stability, one's sel
organising integrity. Upon insight, it may be argued, one's experiential relationship
with the world, one's capacity to anticipate, is restored.
To satisfactorily explain human insight processes it may have to be considered
that a move beyond material and efficient causation will be useful. Although much of
cognitive science draws also on formal causes (for example, in terms of the architectures
of connectionism, or in systems of schema and cognitive structures), such architectures
and structures are usually understood as mere products of material and efficient causes
and not as causes in themselves. In contrast, a defining feature of many constructivist
approaches, whether explicitly stated or not, is a commitment to formal and final
(teleological) causation. The predominant image of the person is as a self-organising

system whose knowledge/understanding processes reflect his or her structure (formal
causation).
The person is also understood as a meaning-maker whose grasp of the world is
hypothetical and anticipatory, that is, teleological. This latter includes our capacity

reflexive consciousness, our capacity not merely to react to stimuli (efficient causatio

according to our physical makeup (material causation), but to also be able to conceive of
the purposes, outcomes and directions of our behaviour, and, in so doing, alter their
possible manifestations. Such 'conceiving' need not be verbalised and may only be
'vegetatively sensed' (Kelly, 1955), but it involves anticipatory commitment and action
in the world. Such action contributes to the unfolding reality which it seeks to

anticipate. This is not to deny the utility of material and efficient cause explanations,
but only to say that an exclusive reliance on them is insufficient to capture the full
experience of insight. In this regard insight is the example, par excellence, of
predication: the affirmation of a premise or anticipation for the sake of which meaning

is created. In these general terms, therefore, psychological constructivism appears to fi
well the phenomenology of insight.

5.2 PERSONAL CONSTRUCT PSYCHOLOGY (PCP)

Kelly (1955), in his two volume The Psychology of Personal Constructs, delivered to
the world a comprehensive and radically forward-looking theory of personality. It has
been commented that Kelly anticipated much of the 'cognitive' revolution in
psychology (Bruner, 1956; Mahoney, 1988) as well, of course, of later more postmodern constructivist psychologies (Botella, 1995; Chiari and Nuzzo, 1996; KalekinFishman & Walker, 1996). The purpose here is to present the reader with a very brief
summary of the theory (for more detailed secondary source introductions to PCP see
Bannister & Fransella, 1986; Dalton & Dunnett, 1990).

5.2.1

Constructive Alternativism
We assume that all of our present interpretations of the universe are
subject to revision or replacement. ... W e take the stand that there are
always s o m e alternative constructions available to choose a m o n g in
dealing with the world. No-one needs to paint himself35 into a corner;
no one needs to be completely h e m m e d in by circumstances; no one
needs to be the victim of his biography. (1955, p. 15, italics in original)

This statement of Constructive Alternativism establishes the philosophical base from
which all of Kelly's theorising arises. He painted an image of the universe which is
vastly, dynamically complex. It is independently real, fits together lawfully, is everchanging but is beyond our individual capacities to encompass. Although we can only
grasp aspects of that universe, or perhaps because of that, there is always an infinite
variety of alternative, useful ways to construe things (and these, Kelly said, are
discriminable from an infinite variety of less useful ways).
Our construals are assumed to be partial relative to the vast processes of reality
and such anticipatory successes and limitations are encountered as personal experiences
of validation and invalidation. As such, we are urged by Kelly to constantly use our
subjectivity in search of the objective. In such circumstances Kelly's metaphor of 'manthe-scientist' can be considered as both description and as prescription (Walker, 1992).
That is, Kelly felt it was useful to consider people as z/they were scientists, building
theories, making predictions, implementing behavioural experiments, taking note of
validation and invalidation, adjusting hypotheses, and ultimately theories, as
appropriate. This is an ideal in a world so open to interpretation, so characterised by
uncertainty and change. And of course we are not all good scientists in this sense. We

frequently hold onto invalidated constructions (Kelly's definition of hostility) or limi
ourselves to what we 'know' already, failing to 'aggressively'36 chase after new
understanding. Given the type of world we inhabit and the limits on our constructive
processes, Kelly's metaphor also provides a therapeutic ideal to aim for — one
conducive to the generation of new insights as I have been defining them. And this
35

Kelly exclusively used the masculine pronoun. We will not apply the parenthetical 'sic' to each
subsequent usage, but w e do not thereby endorse this now-inappropriate practice.
36
Kelly defined 'aggression' as the active elaboration of one's perceptual field.

ideal applies reflexively just as m u c h to therapist as to client, to 'scientist' as to 'lay
person'.

5.2.2 The Fundamental Postulate And Its 11 Corollaries
A person's processes are psychologically channelized by the ways in
which he anticipates events. (Kelly, 1955, p. 46)

Kelly's Fundamental Postulate forms the foundation for his theory. His eleven
corollaries, while not derived logically from the postulate, flesh out and clarify its
meaning. The theory is idiographic in emphasis, focusing on the person construed not
as a fixed entity, but as an ongoing process. The personal processes the theory mostly
pertains to are psychological (as against neurological or sociological and so on). There
is a suggestion of order or structure in the postulate as psychological processes are
'channelized' in particular, idiosyncratic ways. And these ways are teleological or
anticipatory. The person, as a form of motion, directs his or her action according to his
or her anticipations. This is no armchair speculation, but anticipation as committed
involvement in the events of one's life. Finally, it is not things or 'rewards' that pull
push us forward, but the person's anticipation of life itself in terms of the personal
meaning of events one has managed to distinguish from the temporally-ordered flow.
By anticipating events Kelly meant we look for ways in which some event will
occur again or be replicated in terms of some feature/s (The Construction Corollary).
The event which is replicated is always defined idiosyncratically (Individuality
Corollary) in terms of personally relevant bi-polar contrasts (Dichotomy Corollary).
Construing is a way of simultaneously dividing the elements or objects of attention into
like and unlike 'poles'. Embodied in this contrast is the construct's discrimination.
That is, we understand the world relationally and contextually. For example, the
discrimination inherent in a construct of 'size' might, for an individual, be inherent in
the contrast between 'large' and 'small'. Because we each have our unique histories and
natural endowments, and because we grasp the world in terms of idiosyncratic contrasts,
we each experience unique constructive trajectories throughout life.

Kelly proposed that construing can be usefully understood as being organised in
systems of constructs arranged hierarchically (Organisation Corollary). That is, in any
one act of construing some constructs will be relatively superordinate, some
subordinate. Superordinate constructs determine subordinate implications (in a logical

or semantic sense). This allows for logical, transitive relationships between constructs
For example, a superordinate construct may be 'happy' (versus 'sad'), and a subordinate
construct to 'happy' could be 'confident' (versus 'nervous'). If we know someone is
happy we can predict that they may be confident rather than nervous. This hierarchic
implicatory structure also implies that understanding and meaning emerges from
patterns of relationships between constructs. Constructs rarely exist in conceptual
isolation as they are embedded within chains of implications (Hinkle, 1965).
Because construing is bi-polar it always provides choice. Kelly considered that
such choices are in the service of the extension or definition of one's construction
processes (Choice Corollary). Thus, when applying an element (person, event, and so
on) to a construct we must choose which pole of the construct best applies to it. The
choice will hopefully either expand the anticipatory range of the construct system or

will make its structure and anticipations tighter or more defined. If neither pole appli
the element is considered to be outside the range of convenience of that construct
(Range Corollary).
Kelly seems to have assumed that time is a fundamental given, a 'categorial a
priori' (Husain, 1983). Thus, the idea of 'motion' and of successive acts of construing
pervades his work. It would be a mistake to conceive of a construct system as a static
arrangement of permanent discriminations. Rather, we are always changing, forever in
motion, yet like a river we somehow maintain identity over time. We change our
system of understanding by successive anticipations (Experience Corollary), not all at
once. Indeed the changes to one's system are limited by the permeability, or openness
to new experience, of the particular construct/s being applied (Modulation Corollary).
Some constructs are relatively closed to new elements, others are quite accommodating.
These successive processes of system change can frequently lead to construct

subsystems which are 'inferentially incompatible' (Fragmentation Corollary). That is,
our idiosyncratic chains of implications are not 'logic tight' (Kelly, 1955), but are
'psycho-logically' pragmatic. Therefore, in one particular situation w e m a y construe
and behave in one way, then in another set of circumstances w e m a y understand and
behave in an antithetical way. If w e become aware of this inconsistency w e m a y
experience anxiety and feel the need to reconstrue.
Although construing is personal and largely idiosyncratic, it is also inherently
social. If every person's construing was entirely idiosyncratic then w e could never
communicate with one-another. Apart from universal species-based features, w e
frequently share language and cultural experience, and w e m a y inhabit the same town,
suburb, street or house. The validational resources open to us, therefore, exhibit varying
degrees of commonality, and to the extent that w e construe events in similar ways w e
will experience such events (emotionally, cognitively, behaviourally) in similar ways
(Commonality Corollary). Kelly also considered w e have a fundamental empathic
capacity. W e can construe the constructive processes of another and, depending on the
degree of this empathic understanding, our interactions with that other person will be
genuinely social (Sociality Corollary). Kelly m a d e here an important distinction
between treating others as if they were 'objects moving on the horizon', as against
entering into the experience of the other. Acting towards the other on this latter
empathic basis enables 'social processes'.

5.2.3 Types Of Constructs And The Development Of
Construing
Kelly's theory is by no means fully summarised in his Fundamental Postulate and 11
Corollaries. There are m a n y more theoretical distinctions Kelly m a d e concerning types
of constructs and m o d e s of construing (for example, core versus peripheral, permeable
versus impermeable, and comprehensive versus incidental constructs; propositional, preemptive and constellatory modes of construing, and so on). Rather than trying to
explain all these here, some of these distinctions and conceptualisations will be

introduced as they are relevant in the sections and chapters to follow. It is enough here
to stress that construing is complex and dynamic. For example, it operates at various
levels of 'cognitive awareness' from being highly conscious to being 'vegetatively

sensed'. In addition one can dilate or constrict one's perceptual field. Kelly (1955) al
suggested that the construct system is best conceived of as operating in multidimensional space. These features will be relevant in the later discussion of PCP and
insight.
Not only is there this type of structural and dimensional complexity, Kelly
characterised construing as ever-changing over time. The earliest construing is mostly
dependency construing (largely 'preverbal' construing relating one's maintenance or
survival processes to other people). Such construing is based on sociality or
interpersonal empathy. Arguably, this basic empathic capacity or sociality implies that

we are primarily interpersonal creatures. Kelly's idea of sociality has implications for
both how we experience our self, and also for how we conceptualise the influence of the
social within construing. In addition, this empathic capacity may extend to experiences
of a more general ecological connectedness, a speculation I will take up later in the
piece.
Movement or change within the construct system was also characterised by
Kelly as operating within cycles over time. The three cycles he proposed were the
Circumspection, Pre-Emption and Control Cycle (CPC), the Creativity Cycle, and the
Experience Cycle. The CPC cycle concerns decision making. It begins with the
surveying of one's repertoire of constructs relevant to the current circumstances
(circumspection), followed by the selection of one construct (pre-emption) and ends
with the choice of which pole best elaborates one's system of anticipation (Control).
The CPC cycle is not, therefore, about the creation of new constructs (it is, however,

relevant to the 'preparation' stage of insight leading up to impasse). It is the Creativ
Cycle embedded in ongoing Experience Cycles, however, that will occupy our time in
the later discussion of PCP and insight.

5.3 A PERSONAL READING OF PCP
Given these (very) 'bare bones' of Kelly's formal theory, and before w e see what Kelly
had to say about insight, it is important to clarify what type of reading of Kelly I will
use. This is by no means straightforward. Reactions to Kelly's earliest writings within
a P C P framework have linked his views with diverse, seemingly contradictory
psychological positions ranging from behaviourism to existentialism, with others inbetween. Even within constructivism, disagreement exists concerning its nature and
alignment with other constructivisms (Chiari & Nuzzo, 1996; Mahoney, 1995;
Neimeyer, 1995; Stam 1998; Warren, 1998). Furthermore, Kelly's therapeutic practice
was avowedly eclectic and while this m a y be a major strength clinically, it can lead to
confusion theoretically.
At least part of the explanation for this lack of agreement arises because of the
development of Kelly's theory between the early 1950s and his last papers in 1966. A s
Mair (1989) put it, 'his is a psychology itself in motion'. The contrast between the first
volume of the Psychology of Personal Constructs (1955) and Kelly's numerous papers,
which were in m a n y cases subsequently published (most notably Kelly 1969), has been
remarked on by a variety of writers.
T o illustrate, Mair (1989) contrasted the relative conventionality of Kelly's
earlier theorising and its focus on h o w experience is structured, with the more radical
perspective of his later work in which the m o d e of his presentation modelled the kind of
psychology he seemed to be reaching towards. That latter psychology gave "invitations
for participation in psychological realities shaped by the manner and style of his telling,
by a rhetoric of humor and disrespect, tradition and innovation, that he employs to speak
a frame of mind into life" (Mair, 1989, p. 4).
But the characterisation of the earlier Kelly that is most relevant here concerns
its relatively individualistic focus, a focus more amenable to a cognitive reading (Butt,
1995, 1998a; Radley, 1977). B y this I m e a n that 'cognitive' interpretations tend to reify
constructs as something people 'have' rather than as something they 'do' and hence use
a mechanistic metaphor for the person (Kirkland & Anderson, 1990). Thus constructs

are often treated as internal processes that are 'efficient' causes of (subsequent)
behaviour. When we opt for extension or definition of our system (the Choice
Corollary), the cognitive interpretation would consider this choice as a type of
prediction based on introspective knowledge of the (internal) construct system. This
'cognitive', individualist approach to PCP also reveals a relative neglect of the
interpersonal or social dimensions of construing, leaving a dualism between 'inner' and

'outer' that is difficult to transcend. Either this leads to a fairly mechanistic render
social 'inputs', or a to an idealist position that sees construing as exclusively a
projection of the person's 'inner outlook' and regardless of the nature of the world
construed.
An alternate reading would emphasise construing as anticipation within situated
action (Radley, 1977; Butt, 1998b). This alternate view would tend to see the
'elaborative choice' (Choice Corollary) as a post hoc judgement, as a way of
understanding people's choices, made (mostly) un-selfconsciously amid the flurry of

life's events. It is this approach which is more consistent with Kelly's later writings.
Choice is then understood as pragmatically co-determined by the exigencies of the
social situation, its discourses and resources, and by the position and nature of the
person within that situation. From such a viewpoint, most construing emerges within
action, without conscious prediction or forethought (Butt, 1995).
This reading sits more comfortably with Kelly's insistence that PCP was not a

cognitive theory and with his repeated rejection of the assumed necessity to distinguish

cognition, affect and behaviour in certain philosophical and psychological traditions. I
is also consistent with his proposal that behaviour be considered as if it were an
independent, not a dependent, variable. The later Kelly (1966b, 1966c, 1977), and even
the Kelly of the second volume (1955), tended to write about behaviour as a question,

rather than as a test of a construction. Notably one of his last papers was a re-working
of his 1963 paper "Autobiography of a Theory", entitled "Behavior is a Question"
(1966a).

Arguably, this later approach is m u c h more compatible with the emphasis in the
insight literature on tacit and unconscious awareness and on the attendant uncertainty
and emotionality of insight processes. I agree with Butt (1996) and Radley (1977), w h o
rejected the dualist image of the person w h o construes then behaves, or w h o predicts
and then finds out. While important dimensions of our construing m a yfitthis pattern,
most is more tacit and more affectively charged in terms of our pressing interests and
actions. I believe that understanding P C P as a pragmatic constructivism will be more
amenable to an understanding of the genesis of insight.

5.3.1 PCP As A Pragmatic Constructivism

I began in Chapter 1 by delineating a type of approach to insight distinguished as 'nonessentialist' and as leading to a view of mind and understanding freed from objectivist
strictures. T h e present reading of Kelly's theorising is consistent with that approach.
That is, Kelly is here considered to take a non-essentialist view of all construing,
including insight processes. Being a reflexive theorist, Kelly (1955) explicitly extolled
the virtues of an 'as if approach not only to construing reality, but also to his o w n
theory, asking the reader to temporarily try on the theory's assumptive structure to see if
it proved useful and meaningful. In this non-essentialist w a y a construct's meaning is
created by the contrast of elements within its context rather than by an application of an
a priori distinction to independent objects in the world.37 Constructs are not
descriptions of the world, but are tools for approaching it.
But if Kelly's approach to reality was always an 'as if one, does this m e a n that
his brand of constructivism w a s antithetical to realism? In the following it will be
argued that while Kelly w a s uninterested in answers orfinal'insights' into reality, he
was very m u c h concerned with the search for truth (Stevens & Walker, 1997). In
proposing that Kelly's pragmatic constructivism was a form of realism (Stevens, 1998),
it is important to m a k e several distinctions. Firstly, Kelly's w a s a modest realism

See 1.5.2.2 for the analogous role of 'exemplars' within nominalist definitions.

asserting only that the world exists or develops in ways that, at least sometimes, are
independent of our desires or opinions concerning that world. In this 'minimum'
realism there is assumed to be an ontological counterpart to our constructions, but our
knowledge of it is partial and fallible. An appreciation of this will help us understand
Kelly's seeming ambivalence concerning the value of insight. To pre-empt the
discussion in the following chapter somewhat, Kelly was opposed to an objectivist sense
of 'insight'38 (mis)understood as the Truth. But he was passionate about the ongoing
generation of insights understood as prompts to further inquiry into the truth presumed
to stand behind, yet transcending, our anticipations.

5.3.1.1 Not Objectivism: Objectivity
Frequently, psychological constructivism is accused of propounding radically anti-

realist, relativist and subjectivist positions. As far as PCP is concerned, I consider a
three of these accusations are unwarranted.
As we have seen, Kelly was opposed to an objectivist understanding of 'insight'
which would conceive of it as sure-and-certain knowledge. By Objectivism I mean that
family of philosophical positions that assumes the existence of some ahistorical
framework to which we can appeal in deciding upon what is objectively rational, true,
good and so on (Warren, 1992). More particularly, Objectivism assumes there are truths
which exist independently of human wishes and beliefs, and that there are ways of
establishing these truths. In opposition to such notions Kelly frequently derided what
called "accumulative fragmentalism" (1955)39 and examples of Kelly's anti-objectivist
stance are commonplace: "... no firm points of departure immediately accessible to us,
'no givens', nothing that we start out by saying we know for sure" (1977, p. 5). Thus

insights were not to be uncritically collected as permanent 'nuggets of truth', but rat
were to be seen as propaedeutic to further inquiry. As such, ideally, they lead to an

'objective attitude' on the part of the inquirer in his or her commitment to 'objectivity
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He always used 'scare' quotation marks when he intended this sense of insight.
39 T h e objectivist notion that foundational 'nuggets' of truth can be accumulated to form sure-and-certain
knowledge.

(Warren, 1988). The latter represents the willingness of the person to m o v e beyond h o w
he or she might conceive or wish the world to be (subjectivism), towards an openness to
the ways in which it continually transcends our understandings.
5.3.1.2 Not Subjectivism: Subjectivity
The uncritical acceptance of'insight' m a y also lead to subjectivism. This latter term
implies that it is subjective experience (of individuals or of humanity generally) that is
the sole foundation of factual knowledge. A n extreme position sometimes associated
with subjectivism is idealism (the claim that only mind or mental states exist). At times,
Kelly sounded very m u c h like a strong subjectivist: "... everything w e think w e k n o w is
anchored only in our o w n assumptions" (1977, p. 6). Nonetheless, he explicitly
rejected idealism, opposing it with his version of realism: "it is a real world w e shall be
talking about, not a world composed solely of theflittingshadows of people's
thoughts" (Kelly, 1955, p. 5). Constructs, including insights, are 'inventions', but just
as importantly they are open to validation or invalidation in the context of discovery.
Kelly described this interplay between invention and discovery as follows:
W e validate our constructions, not by memorizing them, but by
discovering whether or not the events they lead us to expect actually
turn up. Ideas are not discovered, they are invented. It is events that
one discovers. (1959, p. 7)

Clearly the world too has its objective role in relation to our constructs. We saw in th
discussion above that it was important for Kelly that w e use our subjectivity in the
service of our objectivity. In the interplay between invention and discovery our
subjectivity can be understood as a process of commitment to the world not only as it
conceivably m a y be, but to h o w it m a y become. A s w e will see, 'genuine' insights for
Kelly had both these properties of creativity and invention in understanding and of
discovery and viability in experience.

5.3.1.3 Not Relativism: Pragmatic Constructivism
The objective attitude described above is also not compatible with an endorsement of
relativism. Relativism denies the possibility of any objectivist, ahistorical framework

and asserts instead that w e cannot get beyond conceptual frameworks, language games,
theoretical assumptions and so on (that our relation to things is included in the
properties of those things). Objectivity is endlessly deferred and a thoroughgoing

relativism asserts that, in the absence of any coherent notion of objective truth, any vi
— or in this case, any insight — is arguably as 'justified' as any other. Again, textual
evidence abounds that Kelly was not satisfied with an 'anything goes' type of
relativism. For example:
[a construct] must conform to events in order to predict them. The
number of alternative ways of conforming are, as far as w e know,
infinite, but discriminable from the infinite number of ways which do
not conform. (1955, p. 19)

Thus 'insights' derived from an 'overdilated perceptual field', for example, should not

be uncritically accepted. Kelly was committed to a degree of relativity, but certainly no

to complete relativism, and, ultimately, he believed the world constrains our construals.
All construing, including insights, must be verified and elaborated.
I have mentioned that this view of PCP as a pragmatic constructivism is one that
views construing as being manifest in action rather than as the activation of 'inner'

cognitive entities. That is, I interpret literally what Kelly said when he called behavio
an experiment or an 'independent variable'. Considering construing as 'enactment'
means our embodiment is central to anticipation (Butt 1998b). Conceiving of a
construct system as standing 'behind the action' is merely a heuristic device, a way of
abstracting from the complex of feeling, acting and thinking. According to this
interpretation of PCP, there is no collection of'things' called 'constructs' inside the
person waiting to be retrieved or set into motion. This pragmatic approach
conceptualises construing as activities, as the ways we appreciate or find ourselves
engaged in the different courses of action available to us. Kelly (1958) once said "Man

lives in anticipation; we mean it literally — he lives in anticipation!"^. 88, italics in
original). In similar fashion insight can be understood largely as a form of enactment,
sometimes occurring in the absence of obvious physical behaviour, but much more
frequently evident in the person's engagement in some act of anticipation. And Butt

(1998a, p. 108) further considered that "Anticipation refers to one's bodily stance

toward the world, one's attitude toward it which embodies silent questions and the sorts

of questions one is open to." Such an embodied interpretation of psychological life will
be useful in accounting for the phenomenology of insight and so will be further
elaborated in Chapter 10.

5.4 CONCLUDING COMMENT
Psychological constructivism is well-suited to the reported phenomenology of the
insight experience. In particular, its anticipatory view of understanding, seeing it as
multi-valent and uncertain, as proactive rather than mechanistic, as emotional and
behavioural as well as 'cognitive', and always as an ongoing process — all this fits in
well with the active and complex processes we have encountered in this inquiry into
insight. The philosophical assumptions of constructivism seem to be particularly apt to
deal with the range of features associated with insight processes. For example, I have
proposed that PCP is a type of pragmatic realism and constructivism that encourages
continued inquiry, verification and elaboration of construing. This fits perfectly with

the idea that insight processes are often profligate, with many 'insights' not living up

the initial hopes held for them. Insight is also an anticipatory and teleological busine
It is defined by a search for solutions and ways out of impasse. And this process is
coloured with uncertainty and varying levels of awareness. It is also an emotional

process, continued impasse threatening as if does one's experiential stability. Insightf
breakthroughs are frequently preceded by a looser, more relaxed mental mode and are
just as frequently followed by satisfaction, even joy.
I have proposed that ill-defined problems are in day-to-day life the norm rather
than the exception. As such, we implicitly search for insight much of the time. This

anticipatory attitude is caught well in PCP. Kelly's theory presents an image of a world

radically open to interpretation, requiring constant proactive inquiry — inquiry defined
by action and commitment-in-living as much as by 'inner' thought. Finally, it has been
proposed that an interpretation of construing as embodied inquiry, socially and
pragmatically imbued, will allow us to encompass some of the aspects of the insight

experience not so well dealt with by the cognitive literature. Thus, I a m n o w in a
position to discuss what Kelly said about insight and then to elaborate this somewhat in
later chapters as I build a theoretical account of insight.

CHAPTER 6: PERSONAL CONSTRUCT
PSYCHOLOGY AND INSIGHT

I am not saying that the nature of man is the nature of the extraordinary
man. W h a t I a m saying is that the nature of m a n is revealed in his
extraordinary moments... . (Kelly, 1963, p. 214)

6.1 INTRODUCTION
Kelly's references to insight were mostly 'negative' in tone. They were made
exclusively in the context of therapy and, as such, he was reacting to the types of
therapy in which he considered therapist and client were more committed to

understanding the past than to changing the person's present and future. Such 'insight
he considered prevented change, either because the client was required to wait for
sufficient understanding, or because it tied the person to the past without sufficient
implications for future change. So, overall, one could be forgiven for thinking that

Kelly's theory is the last place one should look for an account of insight. But Kelly w
only criticising a particular attitude and use of 'insight':
... the key to therapy might be in getting the client to get on with a new
w a y of life without waiting to acquire 'insight'. After all, is not that the
w a y m a n has been treating himself for thousands of years? Rarely does
one k n o w where he is going w h e n he launches out into a n e w w a y of
life, and even less often does he k n o w what is wrong with the pathway
he abandons. (Kelly, 1969, p. 59)

Seen here is Kelly's rejection of merely cognitive or 'intellectual' insight, an insig

an answer or end to a person's struggles. He urged instead that the person be helped to
experiment with his or her day-to-day activities and social roles in order to generate
therapeutic change. The 'insight' he rejected is one at a high level of cognitive
awareness and one that does not necessarily imply improved psychological and social

functioning. What Kelly said is interesting: 'Do not wait for insight, involve yoursel
commit yourself to some new project.' As he pointed out — and as we have seen in

relation to the insight literature — w h e n confronted with genuine impasse in response to
ill-defined problems one does not know where the solution lies or even where one is
going wrong. Ironically, Kelly's enactive solution is, of course, suggestive of the
playful, creative experimentation we have seen reported again and again in the research
into insight. It also recalls last chapter's reading of construing as embodied and
experimental. In other words, this recommendation for experimental action, rather than

waiting upon 'insight', reflects the types of creative approach consistently reported by
insightful people.
Kelly was simply telling us not to sit around waiting for 'insight' as if that in
itself would solve our problems. Note the 'scare quotes' he used for 'insight'. Kelly
was not opposed to insight in the terms that the current research has been developing.
As will be seen, when he used the term 'insight' (with inverted commas) he seems to
have in mind only the Aha! experience (mis)conceived by the 'recipient' as objective
access to Truth, and not the full sequence of insight processes with which we have
become familiar. Indeed, what he has described here is the best way he knew of

generating what he did call 'genuine' insight. This is, of course, entirely consistent w
his therapeutic strategies of enactment and fixed role therapy.40 Although Kelly's
treatment of insight may appear to be at the very least ambivalent, it is subtly nuanced,
and a close analysis promises a further illumination of how it is we come to genuinely
new understandings following impasse.

6.2 THE 'NEGATIVE' POLE
Most of Kelly's references to insight are negative in tone. Indeed, the majority of his
uses of the term 'insight' are in 'scare quotes', sometimes expressing scepticism, at
other times outright disdain. His strongest disapproval is reserved for (presumably
psychodynamic) therapists who may see their job as providing insights for the client to

internalise: "Insight, as we see it, is too often applied by clinicians only to those cl
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Where the client and therapist develop a new role for the client as a preferred alternative to the client
current self-characterisation. After considerable co-operative development of this role in the therapy
room, the client then tries on the n e w w a y of living over a period of several weeks.

w h o adopt the clinician's pet constructs" (Kelly, 1955, p. 359, italics in original).
Clearly, therapist-centred 'insight' of this type was to have no place in PCP. But of
course clients will not be bereft of their own insights. For Kelly, however, there are
problems here too. These 'insights' may be the result of an overdilated perceptual field
— where the client believes his or her every thought is a wonderful insight. Kelly
(1955) lampooned this as the "I-see-it-all-now type of reconstruction" (p. 842).
Kelly's concern was not only that an 'insight' may be trivial. If it is indeed a
"comprehensive construction of one's behavior" (1955, p. 917) — Kelly's definition of
a 'new insight' — then he warned that it"... can be extremely threatening. It may
throw a client into a state of panic" (p. 917). When discussing the Generalization of

Insight in the context of a 'hostile' client,41 Kelly sounded a dire warning to overzealou
therapists:
If therapy is 'deep', there will come a time when the therapist will
expect the client to see that his hostility is more widely diffused than he
realized during the early weeks of treatment. If the therapist is
impatient to pass this landmark, he m a y wake up some morning to find
that his prize therapy case has ended up in suicide or in a psychotic
break. (1955, p. 891)
More generally, Kelly believed that brilliant therapy room insights may actually block
future movement by locking the client into the past or into fatalist constructions. "The

client finally has a satisfactory formulation of 'how he got that way', but his 'insights
are not sufficiently permeable to carry implications as to 'what he can do about it'"
(1955, p. 1091).42

6.3 THE 'POSITIVE' POLE
That insight was not a goal of psychotherapy, however, did not mean it was unimportant
in the therapeutic process. Indeed, Kelly discussed favourably the nature of "new
insight" (1955, p. 917) and his entire therapeutic project could be characterised as an
41

In Kelly's terms 'hostility' refers to the non-acceptance of invalidation and to the distortion of the
evidence tofitone's anticipations.
42
" A construct is permeable if it admits newly perceived elements into its context" (Kelly, 1955, p.
563).

attempt to assist the client to c o m e to just such insights. Considering his theory's
philosophical basis in 'constructive alternativism', whereby it is assumed that "all of
our present interpretations of the universe are subject to revision or replacement"
(Kelly, 1955, p. 15), it could reasonably be expected that reconstruing and seeing
matters in a fresh light would receive Kelly's unambiguous approval. In fact, there is
support for this expectation: "Only when new events are unexpectedly brought into the

display is it likely that genuinely new insights can be instigated" (1959, p. 24, italic

added). So here it is seen that 'genuine' insight is possible. Compare the positive tone
of the following passage to those presented earlier:
... a genuinely new insight does what all experienced therapists have
long k n o w n that it does; it changes not only the w a y a particular
problematic event is seen, but also the w a y m a n y others are seen. It
changes them so that the client often refers to them as if they all had
somewhat different identities now. (Kelly, 1959, p. 24)

Kelly obviously had in mind here the positive potential of genuine insight. He went on

to say that such a burst of insight must be tested against future events; that it may fa
"point as sharply to subsequent events as it should" (1955, p. 44). Nonetheless, the
context also makes it clear that there is no thoroughgoing therapeutic movement without
this type of insight. When one considers PCP, the capacity to build new constructs and
to change with a changing world (Creativity Cycle), to extend and define one's system
of constructs (Choice Corollary), to never be boxed in by circumstances but always to
have the relative freedom of reconstrual (Constructive Alternativism) — in fact nearly
everywhere one looks — there is room for the fresh outlooks that insight implies.

6.4 INSIGHT AND RECONSTRUCTION IN PCP
Because insight marks a change in a person's understanding, the ways in which Kelly
conceptualised reconstruction promise to be a useful place to start. The purpose of

Personal Construct Therapy is reconstruction, that is, to assist clients in changing th
active anticipations of themselves and of their world. Kelly, on a number of occasions
(1955, p. 941 and p. 945), described three types of reconstruction. Where the client

I) reconstrues without altering constructs or the existing construct system, 2)
reconstrues by reorganising the construct system, and 3) reconstrues by developing new
constructs.

6.4.1 'Non-Insight' Reconstructions
The first two reconstructions above are 'non-insight' reconstructions. For example,

each construct, being bi-polar, offers the possibility of contrast reconstruction or 'sl
rattling' as Kelly (1955) called it. That is, the person reconstrues by shifting one of
elements in the construct context from one pole to the other. For example, in a
construct 'safe—dangerous' the client may construe the therapist as 'safe' one day, and
as 'dangerous' the next. As such, there is no new dimension of understanding formed.
Alternatively, the person can reconstrue by surveying his or her repertoire of relevant
constructs (Circumspection), by choosing one (Pre-emption), and choosing the most
'elaborative' pole of the construct (Control). This CPC cycle (Circumspection - PreEmption - Control) does not create new constructs or new insights.
In similar fashion, Controlled Elaboration (1955, pp. 938-939) is reconstruction
in which the hierarchies of the system are reorganised (often superordinate constructs
are tightened) in order to better integrate constructs. This internal consistency leads
more certainty and this experience may be (rashly) labelled 'insight'. Kelly warned that
controlled elaboration may be over-valued by those who believed therapy should aim
for verbal consistency, which often entails a sort of false 'insight' where the client

merely agrees with the therapist. Finally, the reduction of constructs to impermeability

may limit the use of a problematic construct by tying it tightly to specific elements, or
by tying it to the past. While there is no substantial change to the conceptual basis of

the construct, this process often leads to the development of a new construct that better
deals with the elements now excluded from the original construct.

6.4.2

Reconstruction Involving Insight

It is the third type of reconstruction, the development of new constructs, that repea
earned Kelly's highest praise (e.g. 1955, pp. 134-135, 187, 586, 941) and that is most
relevant to our interest in insight. Kelly (1955) considered the development of new
constructs as central to Personal Construct therapy:
In addition to producing superficial movement, or seesaw movement, in
some instances, and using the method of controlled elaboration in
others, the psychoclinician's role is most fundamentally one of helping
the client to revise constructs, (p. 586)

The development of new constructs allows for new understandings, for understandings
not possible within the existing construct system. There are two main avenues to n e w
insight: 1) n e w elements applied to old constructs, and 2) n e w constructs applied to
existing elements.

6.4.2.1 New Elements Applied To Old Constructs
Developing n e w constructs m a y be achieved by increasing the range of convenience43 of
a construct, making it more permeable. This makes it applicable to more events and
m a y thereby lead to a need to alter the construct's conceptual basis and thus, to
experiencing n e w insights. Take, for example, a person w h o may, somewhat
simplistically, consider that people w h o are religiously active are either 'dogmatic' or
'spiritual'. If this construct is causing the person problems, the therapist m a y introduce
new, challenging elements for the client in an effort to encourage more differentiated
construing in this regard.
The therapist m a y help the client to see, for example, that what he or she has
been labelling 'dogmatic' might also include an experience-based, thoughtful conviction
in the wisdom of central doctrines of one's faith. O n the other hand, some behaviour
that has been seen as 'spiritual' m a y be understood to include a person w h o practices a
non-reflective, pre-emptive (that is, dogmatic) rejection of all religious dogma! To

All those events to which a construct m a y be usefully applied.

incorporate these n e w elements Kelly (1955) speculated that the construct axes must be

'rotated' which would have the effect of bringing the construct into a new relation wit
the rest of the person's system of constructs. The label of the construct ('religious
people') may remain the same, but the discrimination at the heart of the construct may
be quite different and it may come under the regnancy of different (perhaps more
permeable) superordinate structures.
In the above case, the 'dogmatic' pole may be replaced by a notion of

'unthinking inflexibility', while the 'spiritual' pole may now reflect 'genuine religi
experience' (independent of whether any particular dogma is professed). The reigning
superordinate construct may now be a more permeable (perhaps more abstract) one from
the person's repertoire, something like 'close-mindedness'—'openness', for example.
Because these new elements have brought about a 'rotation' of the construct, further
new elements, once not relevant, are also now within the range of convenience of the
revised construct and allow for further new insights. This revised construct will
embody new behavioural implications, some welcome, some problematic. In other

words, new insight emerges progressively from series of Creativity Cycles as the person
'fine-tunes' the developing construct dimension/s.

6.3.2.2 New Constructs For Old Elements
Another strategy the therapist may use in developing construct revision is helping the
client "impose new constructs upon old elements" (1955, p. 939). Normally, constructs

introduced by the therapist in this way are relatively incidental.44 That is, they apply
non-comprehensively to elements and people not central to the person's identity and

core experience. In terms of the above 'religious person' construct, a new construct of
'close-mindedness' — 'openness' may be 'provided' by the therapist and applied to
specific people quite removed from the person's day-to-day life (perhaps by way of an
analogy, fable or story). Gradually, as the construct allows the person to better

44

This is to minimise the likelihood of threat. As the person finds the new construct useful and
meaningful, it can be allowed to subsume more and more events, eventually becoming more
comprehensive without being too threatening.

anticipate reality, it m a y be applied to more and more familiar people and perhaps

finally to the client's self. As this happens, the old construct of 'dogmatic'—'spiritual
can be reduced to relative impermeability and confined to the particular people and
incidents that occasioned its formation. The new construct 'takes over' many of the old
elements, and the 'same' events are now seen in an entirely different light.

6.5 THE CREATIVITY CYCLE: PRODUCING NEW INSIGHTS

Construct revision and replacement is facilitated by successive Creativity Cycles. These
cycles are characterised by alternating sequences of loose and tight construing:
Loosening is defined as characteristic of those constructs leading to
varying predictions, while a tight construct holds its elements firmly in
their prescribed contexts. Under loose construction, an element
classified at one pole of a construct on one occasion is envisioned at the
contrast pole on another. (1955, pp. 1029-30)

Such a loosened construct is elastic, shifting the allegiance of elements to its poles (
dreams) and also allowing new elements to become relevant as the discrimination at the
heart of the construct becomes less precise. Thus in a dream a person may appear, for
example, to be a man. Then, without any apparent subjective sense of contradiction, the
person changes into a woman. Kelly considered such loosening " a necessary stage of
creative thinking" (1955, p. 1030). Loosening can lead to more construct permeability.
That is, it can develop constructs that more easily admit newly perceived elements into
their contexts. If such (permeable) constructs are superordinate enough, they open up a
whole field of further, subordinate construct variations, including an openness to new
experiences. When the tightening phase of the creativity cycle is reached one may
experience new insight, as the newly-formed construct allows one to 'see' things in
ways not possible before. This is why large scale insights can alternatively be so

liberating, or so threatening: being superordinate, they can carry great implications fo
the person.
Kelly (1955) described loosened construction as a type of rubber template cast
over events. Because the person allows for approximate results, or non-exactitude,

previously rejected elements m a y n o w be subsumed by constructs, or existing elements
may even be placed at the opposite ends of the construct concerned. This can only
mean that the discriminative function or contrast implied by the construct is weakened
making the poles less 'different'. Bi-polar constructs were defined by Kelly as
embodying the ways in which some elements are similar yet different from another
group of elements. Under the loosening of a construct elements that were previously
contrasted may now be viewed as relatively the 'same' (belonging to the same pole). I
will return to this idea in my speculations linking symmetrical and asymmetrical
thought (Matte-Bianco, 1988; Rayner, 1995) with Kelly's Creativity Cycle.
An example of this exploratory use of loose construing may help. Using a bipolarity 'gentle—violent', one might may understand one's friend as a gentle person
today and as violent tomorrow, and perhaps gentle again the next day — even given
relatively similar contextual conditions.45 Shifts in the meaning of 'gentle—violent'

account for this inconsistency in construction and the allegiance of elements to 'their'
poles becomes tenuous. Loosening, therefore, is a description applied to construing
which operates amid this type of 'polar' shifting of elements. Such a style of construin
may also reduce anxiety by not exposing prediction to exact test. An awareness that
one's friend 'really' is violent may be quite threatening or guilt-provoking, so
loosening-up the meaning of 'gentle—violent' may help one avoid these discomforts.
The difference between 'gentle' and 'violent' is allowed to blur. In quite loose
construing almost any experience can fit one's anticipation because the differences
between elements are downplayed in favour of their similarities (with respect to the
construct). Even if predictions appear to be discontinued (to an onlooker), the loosely
construing person may say: "... that is practically what I said" (Kelly, 1955, p. 854).
But even in the loosest of construing Kelly maintained there is always some
discriminative structure.

45

This differs from 'slot rattling' because in slot rattling the discrimination inherent in, for example
'gentle—violent', stays the same, but in loosening the construct meaning must change to accommodate
the shifting of elements within its range. It is also significant to note that this shifting of discrimination
m a y not be disturbing to the construing person, but m a y be quite alarming for those around him or her
(particularly for one's 'friend'!).

A construct does not exist in isolation. It is a summary term for an act of
discrimination, an awareness operating within a system of associated meanings. The
particular rules of association Kelly defined were ordinal, operating in terms of
superordinate structures determining subordinate ones. Loosening, therefore, is

simultaneously a description of the altered relations within a (subordinate) construct a
of the hierarchies which subsume that construct. Loosening involves an act of
construing in which superordinate hierarchies do not highlight what in tighter modes of
construing we might have considered 'illogicalities'. In short, intransitivities of
thought, or fragmentation, is ignored. Indeed, Kelly (1955) considered that loosened
construction was relatively un-bound by superordinate structures. Rather than operating

within strict ordinal relations, loose construing may involve more 'lateral' associations
either invoking more than one chain of construct implications at a time, or in
succession. Such lateral associations and linking may involve constructs which share
elements, whose range of convenience is similar (Chiari, Mancini, Nicolo & Nuzzo,
1990). This possibility will be taken up in the later discussion of Matte-Bianco's (1975,
1988) notion of 'symmetrical thought'. This lateral 'logic' may also help account for
the expanded range of convenience of loose constructs because the weakening of a
construct's contrast function may allow for additional 'similar' events to be
incorporated within the construct.
One effect of loosening is to help us tolerate ambiguity while we experiment
with ideas. On initial tightening, or what Kelly called 'provisional tightening', this
experimentation is often rejected in the face of relevant evidence. This provisional

tightening clearly parallels the metacognitive strategies outlined in the insight literat
It suggests a superordinating point of view which is playful and experimental, ready to

relinquish tight 'logical' control over thought. If the new construct proves anticipatory
however, it may enable the person to understand or 'fit' with events in new, perhaps
improved ways. That is, tightening sometimes leads to new insights. Nonetheless, for
Kelly, these new insights must be tested and integrated info the construct system before
they earn the title of 'genuine new insights'.

Kelly seemed to mostly use a narrow definition of 'insight', one that was
restricted to the 'Aha!' experience where loosened construction is provisionally
tightened. Thus he viewed the " n e w constructs which arise out of loosened
construction, not as the 'true thoughts' or 'insights' of the person, but as n e w
hypotheses which still must be tightened up and tested before they are to accepted as
useful" (1955, p. 530). O f course this view fits neatly with the insight literature's
emphasis on the profligacy of insight (Perkins, 1995; Simonton, 1997) and of the
universal need to verify and elaborate the 'Aha!' experience (for it to be integrated
within the person's broader matrix of meanings). That is, this type of Kellian emphasis
on pragmatic criteria is found in most contemporary accounts of insight. A P C P
understanding of the integration of n e w constructs should, therefore, contribute to an
understanding of the nature and experience of insight.

6.6 THE EXPERIENCE CYCLE: THE PATH TO GENUINE NE
INSIGHTS
The Experience Cycle represents the pathway to optimal psychological functioning in
P C P , and is where insight, for Kelly,findsits proper home. Roughly, the cycle is as
follows: construal within a situation, imaginative involvement or commitment,
affirmative anticipation in action, assessment of outcomes, and finally, reconstrual. Or,
as Kelly put it:
... imagination, once stirred, often leads to initiative, and initiative to
action, and action produces something unexpected for m e n to
contemplate and experience, and, finally, the newest experience throws
the recollections of prior experiences intofreshperspective. (1977, p. 8)

A direct parallel between the traditional stages of insight and Kelly's Experience Cycle
(1955) can be made. With the exception of an incubation period, these stages of
experience match closely the classic stages of insight put forward by Wallas (1926):

1. Preparation

=> construal, involvement, commitment.

2. Impasse •=> unexpected events, invalidation, perhaps
hostility.
Incubation •=> no clear match.
3. Insight => stirred imagination; affirmative participation
4. Elaboration and Verification •=> assessment and reconstrual.
This process of experience exemplifies Kelly's definition of a 'genuine new
insight' as a "comprehensive construction of one's behavior" found to be permeable
enough to anticipate or fit with new events. Our invented constructs must be supported
by discovery, by pragmatic results. New constructs need to be devised and revised, not
because any construct is as good as another, but because of their relative efficacy.
Indeed, the world and the person are co-specified in our construals and, within validated
(viable) construing, person and world merge. Within invalidated (non-viable)
construing the person 'bumps' into the world, experiencing this as a perturbation to the
smooth flow of living or anticipation. When one no longer anticipates or fits with one's
world, separateness (anxiety46) is born. Reconstrual will likely follow in an attempt to
restore our sense of connection with our world, especially with others, even if it be via
'hostility' or denial.
We have seen that insight is frequently reported as a largely tacit, physically and
socially embedded process. It is developed within sequences of hard work and idleness,
conscious thought and dreamlike reverie, social interaction and deliberate solitude,

relatively detached calculation and affective sensitivity. In similar fashion, we see here
that Kelly urged us to enter into cycles of loosening and tightening (creativity)
embedded within cycles of experience. In this way insight may be understood as a
prompt to engage in more experiential or embodied inquiry rather than as an intellectual
full stop. In the terminology of the cognitive literature, life presents itself much more
an infinite series of 'ill-defined problems' rather than as well-defined 'puzzles' for us
46

Kelly (1955, p. 565) defined anxiety as the "awareness that the events with which one is confronted lie
mostly outside the range of convenience of his construct system"

solve. Such an existential plight requires more than disembodied, calculating reason. It
requires the fully affective, frequently tacit, engagement of the person's anticipatory
processes.
Significantly, it seems to be in the 'incubation' period that crucial work towards
an experience of insight is undertaken. It is probably here that construct axes are
(somewhat vaguely) 'rotated' as cycles of loosening and tightening are undertaken. The

term 'incubation', suggesting as it does 'sleep', betrays our cultural biases towards that
which can be verbalised and towards conscious experience, but this 'incubatory' period
is unlikely to be a period of mental inactivity — whatever that might mean for a living
person. Kelly's account of insight is under-specified in exactly this phase of awareness.
One will look in vain in Kelly's writings for an account of loosening (and tightening)
beyond descriptions of its effects or of methods for its manipulation.
This theoretical deficit is extraordinary given the importance of these processes
within his therapy. For example, in a recent PCP-list discussion on the Internet (1998)
Fay Fransella, a prominent PCP practitioner and author, recalled that Kelly repeatedly
said that 'loosening—tightening' was his most important theoretical construct. Yet
these processes are not built into the assumptive structure of his theory. As Bell (1996)

has indicated, apart from the detailed treatment of loosening and tightening as practical
strategies in therapy, they seem to fulfil an ad hoc theoretical role of accounting for
psychological phenomena, such as fragmentation and perhaps construct revision, that
are poorly accounted for by his formal fundamental postulate and corollaries. I will
attempt to make good this deficit in Kelly's theorising in the following chapters.

6.7 INSIGHT AS A MEANS TO THERAPEUTIC ENDS.
The contents of insights were secondary for Kelly to the person's overall psychological
adjustment and to the requirements of the construct system as a whole. Mastery of the

Creativity Cycle, while an essential skill to be learned in therapy, is not sufficient for
therapeutic success. The client must, in addition, learn to 'sort the wheat from the
chaff, as it were, in relation to his or her insights.

T h e therapist seeks only to have the client work through a series of
stages of 'insight', partly so that he will attain a particular better m o d e
of adjustment, partly so that he will learn a way to develop better and
better m o d e s of adjustment. The therapist teaches the client h o w to be
creative in reconstruing his life. (1955, p. 1085, italics added)

It is evident that Kelly was interested, not in producing particular insights, but in
engendering a way of dealing creatively with the world, of generating and enacting
insights in an ongoing fashion. Each client was to be trained as a 'constructive
alternativist'. Arriving at ever-fresh visions of what is worthwhile (Kelly, 1980) is a
goal that one never quite attains; it extends beyond the therapy room into the person's
future ventures. Developing the skill to generate and to integrate selected insights is a
major goal of Personal Construct therapy. O n e has to learn h o w to become open to n e w
elements in the context of one's constructs and h o w to 'try on' n e w constructs and
weave them into one's system of constructs.
While therapy is not the focus here, Kelly's emphasis on enabling clients to
develop their ability for creativity and insight is most relevant. In this regard, important
questions remain. B y what specific processes do w e produce these n e w insights? H o w
does a construct become more permeable or accommodate n e w elements within its
purview? H o w do w e assimilate a n e w construct, adjusting if and weaving if into the
fabric of our system? I will try to answer these questions by analysing Kelly's
descriptions of loose and tight construing and by moving into a more speculative (loose)
phase of this inquiry.

6.8 GENERATING INSIGHTS: ELABORATING KELLY'S
SCHEME
6.8.1 Loosening Construing
There were four therapeutic strategies for inducing loosening in a client described by
Kelly (1955, pp. 1033-1050). Loosening can be brought about by relaxation, by chain
association, by recounting dreams, and by the therapist's uncritical acceptance of the

client. Kelly (1955) did not explain h o w and w h y such processes lead to loosening,
except to simply say that relaxation produces loosening and "because the [loose]
structure is more resilient, [it is] often less likely to be shattered into anxiety" (p.
More will be said in a later chapter about why such strategies might be conducive of

loosening, but to indicate the path I wish to tread, being relaxed or feeling accepted an
unthreatened will be characterised as a form of construing, as a type of'transcending
affective awareness'. It will be characterised as a capacity to dwell in a non-anxious
way within multiplicity, openness and uncertainty. It may be that the 'normal'
implicative links to self-maintenance and core constructs are suspended for a time to
facilitate this.47
The effects of therapeutic loosening are varied. Because certain elements are no
longer 'logically' ruled out, 'forgotten' events might now be recalled. In addition,
preverbal constructs may now be allowed to have approximate form in words or in
figurative and non-verbal expression. Ideas can be combined in novel, experimental
ways and, finally, the loosening of a pre-emptive construct by the inclusion of new
elements may lead to the application or fashioning of other constructs relevant to the
elements at hand.
But what happens during loosening apart from the (vague) 'rotating' of the
construct axis? Kelly suggested new elements come into one's field of attention, not
now being 'ruled out by logic-tight construction' and new experiences are thereby
generated including different responses from one's associates. The looseness generally
extends the range of convenience of the construct and can make it more permeable to
new experience. In addition, a loosened construct, when it starts to tighten, "begins to
fall into place under some new forms of superordinate construction" (1955, p. 1050).
This allows for new patterns of implication, for new possibilities in meaning as the new
superordinate structure takes over, or subsumes, the remaining old elements in the
changed construct while introducing its own range of elements. But Kelly did not
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This m a y require the relative abeyance of dependency construing in insight processes (see 6.8.5
below).

explain how or why loosening leads to these effects, content as he was to describe its
general features and therapeutic manipulation.
The new connections with other subsystems of meanings frequently lead to a
flurry of new ideas, changing far more than the discrimination inherent in just one
changing construct. This is consistent with findings in the literature that when
experiencing insight the person may feel he or she is a witness or audience to the
unfolding of a network of associated meanings experienced as a whole. For example,
writers frequently report that their sudden insights are experienced as exterior and
spontaneous and may come as narrative wholes to which they 'listen' (Epel, 1994). In
therapy, Kelly (1955) was cautious about just this feature of insight because of the
unpredictable and comprehensive chains of implication that genuine insights may
occasion.
Kelly identified in loosening part of what he referred to as 'schizoid' thinking.
There is ample evidence that excessive loosening, that is loosening not subsumed within
adequately permeable and comprehensive superordinate structures, can lead to
considerable anxiety, even to a diagnosis of schizophrenia and thought disorder (Kelly,
1955, p. 497, see also Bannister & Fransella, 1966; Bell, 1996; Winter, 1992).
Nonetheless, it is clear that loosening is neither inherently adaptive or maladaptive:
... 'schizoid' thinking takes place, on occasion, in almost everyone;
that it is characteristic of transitional stages in one's mental
development; that it is even characteristic of the transitional stages in
solving an ordinary problem; that it appears in the course of creative
production; and that it m a y appear in some degree in any far-reaching
adjustment. (1955, p. 866)

Seen here is the positive potential for creativity and insight that loosening provides. A
crucial feature is that loose construction ('schizoid thinking') is a characteristic of
transition within the construct system, and this introduces the topic of emotion in PCP.

6.8.2

Loosening And Emotion

If you consider your own experience of moving from tight to loose and
back again to tight, do you regard this experience as best designated by
the notion of 'feeling' or best designated by the notion of 'thinking' or
is it not adequately designated by the construct at all? (Bannister, 1977,
p. 32)

One of Kelly's many original theoretical contributions was to characterise what
normally goes under the title 'emotion' in transitional terms. Bannister (see above)

neatly captures this sense of the blurring of the distinction between thought and emotion
in the movements between loose and tight construing. For Kelly (1955) emotion was
characterised as an awareness of the imminence of change in one's anticipatory

structures, in one's being. Kelly was not claiming this was all emotion was, but his way

of characterising it was explanatory and it carried with it implications for therapeutic
intervention. For example, 'anxiety' was re-conceptualised as an awareness that events
were somewhat outside one's capacity to anticipate. 'Threat' was defined as an
awareness of imminent comprehensive change to one's core structures. 'Emotion', in

Kelly's terms, is a type of construing (Crittenden, 1991) and this is consistent with hi
rejection of the tripartite division of mental life into cognition, affect and conation.
construing characterised by an awareness of the vicissitudes of construction and

reconstruction and, because it frequently involves changes in constructs, it is intimatel
intertwined with cycles of loose and tight construction.
One may fall into the error of considering that Kelly's is a very 'cognitive'
rendering of emotion, that feeling follows thought. This would be to misunderstand in a
most fundamental way what Kelly was trying to say. That is, our experience of emotion
is not typically preceded by conscious evaluation and consciously considered
assessment. Rather, we usually experience emotion as spontaneous, as rapid or even as
uncontrolled. In this way the nature of emotional experience reflects the nature of all
construing. Most construing is largely implicit, tacit, emergent-in-action. It is more
akin to walking, returning a tennis shot or holding a conversation, than as a result of
premeditation. Some emotional experience may result from construing at a high level

of awareness, but most seems to precede such clear verbally-mediated distinction
making. A later discussion of contemporary research into the nature of emotion (see

Chapter 8) will help us better understand this point and its relation to insight processe
McCoy (1977, 1981), in elaborating Kelly's 'emotional' scheme, reasoned that

positive emotion is generally related to awareness of the success of one's anticipations,
while negative emotions are related to an awareness of one's unsuccessful attempts to
anticipate. It is noteworthy that the content of a 'positive' emotion need not be
'pleasurable', only that anticipation was successful. As construct systems are dynamic
processes always in transition, emotionality is potentially always present within
construing — its intensity varying with the implications judged to flow from the
incipient changes. Construing may be 'non-emotional' to the extent that its content
does not include awareness of the validational fortunes and incipient changes within our
construct system.
Of particular interest here, in our inquiry into insight, is what occurs during and
after impasse. I have noted that impasse is frequently characterised by denial or the

transitional emotion, 'hostility', as Kelly defined it. That is, the problem-solver canno
see beyond previously invalidated solutions because these ways of being have worked in

'similar' situations in the past and/or because the implied changes to constructs are too

threatening. But what occurs when or if hostility is abandoned? Perhaps the person will

constrict his or her 'perceptual field', thus cutting off potential reconstruction as wel

the awareness of any need for change. Or if the person is confident in these matters of
impasse and insight, loosening may be a deliberate 'metacognitive' and 'aggressive'
strategy, one learned from previous triumphs over the frustrations of impasse.
Alternatively, anxiety may lead to a defensive loosening of construing as the person

attempts to defocus his or her 'inadequate' construing. Importantly, this latter strategy
implies that within quite loose construing we may experience less 'emotion'.48 When
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Though, as we will see this depends on how loose. The parallel we will draw later is between loose
construing and symmetrical thought (Matte-Bianco, 1988). Matte-Bianco said that the more symmetrical
(loose) our awareness processes are, the less conscious w e will be of them. The inferential
incompatibilities and intransitivities in thought that m a y normally give rise to anxiety and threat will not
be recognised. That is, negative emotion m a y not be experienced in quite loose construing as such
constructions are relatively unbound by superordinate structures.

one attempts to be aware of, to validate the implications of the now-tightening construct,
'emotional' experience m a y occur. A n d this brings us to the question of tightening.

6.8.3 Tightening Construing
Tighter construing is brought about by a wide variety of techniques. These include
time, place, person and word binding, judging or evaluating one's constructions, the
client or therapist verbally summarising the constructions concerned, using historical
explanation, relating one's thinking to others, the therapist asking for explanation or
clarification, the therapist challenging the client construction, enacting one's
constructions, forming clear concepts, and asking for validating evidence. The effects
of tightening include defining or making explicit what the person is predicting or
anticipating, stabilising construction so that the person's behaviour is less capricious,
facilitating the organisation of ordinal relationships within the construct system,
reducing s o m e constructs to impermeability, and encouraging specific experimentation
based on clear hypotheses. A n d I might add to these that it is often w h e n w e
provisionally tighten up loose construing w e m a y experience 'emotion'. That is, w h e n
w e b e c o m e aware, at some level, of the implications for our construct system of the
construing that is being tightened up, w e can be said to be construing 'emotionally'.
The basic operation withintighteningis placing the construct more firmly within
a structure of ordinal (hierarchic) relationships and implications. A s Kelly said: " W h e n
one construes loosely and his constructs are not bound by superordinate structures, he
m a y be 'experiencing' only. W h e n one construes tightly, if becomes possible, though
not inevitable, for his constructs to be fitted into a system" (1955, p. 1068). The more
explicit the placement of elements within a construct, the more 'tightly' it can be
subsumed within a hierarchical structure allowing for consistent implication and more
explicit anticipation. This implies that loosening corresponds to the relative undoing of
this hierarchic, implicative structure — a loss of structure normally associated with
anxiety. But perhaps deliberate loosening within superordinate 'emotional assessments'
of non-threat, or of one's overall anticipatory competence, allays potential anxiety. This

reflects the role given to 'metacognitions' in the cognitive insight literature which frame
what is happening, making difficulties and frustration meaningful, even subjectively
'positive'. In these terms, 'provisional tightening' may be an important metacognitive
strategy representing a type of relative security or serenity in the face of changing
understandings.

6.8.4 Tightening And Emotion
At an 'emotional' level of description (in terms of an awareness of the anticipatory
fortunes of our construing), such a 'fitting into a system' of a newly-formed construct
would be experienced as 'positive' (McCoy, 1977,1981), even if further down the track
the implications prove threatening or anxiety-provoking in other areas of the system.
And, not infrequently we may wish we did not come to certain insights, as we quickly
realise the new comprehensive sense we make of our world is quite disturbing.49 For
this latter reason Kelly was cautious about pre-emptively embracing moments of insight
in therapy. Nonetheless, here is seen a plausibly simple account of the joy and positive
affect associated with the moment of insight. In particular, the type and degree of
positive affect is related to whether core or peripheral constructs are involved, and
whether comprehensive or incidental change is at stake. For example, comprehensive
validation of core structures can lead to an experience of 'love' (McCoy, 1977), while

similar partial validation is related to 'happiness' and 'joy'. Or 'contentment' is relat
to an awareness of the adequate anticipatory functioning of one's system, and so on.
Such emotional states seem to be ubiquitous in insight experiences.
Alternatively, when loose construing is tightened and does not fit into a system
of implications (leads to confusion or contradiction), anxiety may be experienced due to
the perceived lack of anticipatory structure. This can lead to further loosening and to
distortions of thought and perception (Bell, 1996) and to an inability to predict and
make sense of events. On the other hand, if the person is open to creativity, ambiguity

In this sense 'threat' m a y sometimes be an example of an insight w e wish w e had not come to.

and experimentation, then his or her superordinate processes of understanding m a y be
relatively comprehensive and permeable. With such processes in sway, initial
anticipatory failures may be taken in the person's reconstructive stride. Further
'aggressive' Creativity Cycles may then be undertaken until a satisfactory new
constructive solution is reached.

6.8.5 Dependency Construing, Emotion And Insight
Dependency construing is concerned with our self-maintenance (biological and
psychological), primarily in relation to others. Kelly (1955, 1962) considered that as we
grow older we do not become less dependent, but rather we tend to distribute our
dependencies more widely as our construing becomes more differentiated. Mostly we
depend on others to help us meet our needs, but we also depend on ourselves, on
activities, animals and even objects to maintain our psychological balance. As Kelly's
Fundamental Postulate suggests, all our psychological processes are governed by the
ways we anticipate. Our very survival is tied to this capacity to anticipate and to find
novel ways in which to fit our environment. This question of survival or selfmaintenance introduces dependency construing into this inquiry into insight. Although
dependency construing is not concerned directly with creativity and insight, an absence

of self-concern and self-monitoring does seem to be a necessary condition for the looser
style of construction preliminary to insight. In other words, when we feel safe and not
concerned about our needs and survival, it is likely that dependency construing and core
construing are not predominant. And, as we have seen, these are conditions propitious
to insight.
Because dependency construing is so fundamental, it is likely to be very

superordinate in our systems of anticipation and probably has potential implicative link
to almost all our construing. At the same time, dependency construing — being

substantially established in the early years of life — is largely preverbal. This reveals
very interesting feature of construing: that level in the ordinal structure is not
necessarily commensurate with level of cognitive awareness. In other words, patterns of

construing m a y be at a low level of awareness, m a y even be entirely implicit or tacit, yet
be very superordinate. Thus, 'unconscious' construing may be simultaneously tied into,
including subsuming many chains of 'conscious' construing, yet we may be only

vaguely aware of that fact, and may not be able to verbalise such influential anticipato
processes. This means that relatively undifferentiated and inchoate emotionally-laden
themes may at times determine or subsume extensive networks of construing which may
be more consciously available. It will be seen in Chapter 8 that contemporary research
into the neuropsychology of emotion supports this hypothesis. The significance of this

in terms of insight is that the initial frustration, even despair, entailed by continue
impasse in understanding may implicate broad networks of meaning. If the person can

maintain this broad pattern of meaning without an urgency to predict a solution to one'
problem; and without anxiety and self-concern dictating the constructive outcome, then
an insightful resolution may come to pass.
Because Kelly defined various emotions in terms of a subjective awareness of
the anticipatory state of the construct system, dependency construing would tend to be
experienced as relatively 'emotional.'50 We have seen, for example, that the effective

functioning of our anticipatory system is fundamental to survival, and that awareness of
imminent comprehensive changes in core processes is experienced as threat. Generally,
the perceived inability to anticipate is experienced as anxiety. Kelly (1962), in
discussing the inchoate nature of much dependency construing, speaks of a "nameless
craving only, a massive loneliness, or a desperate urgency to find something or to be
with someone" (p. 199). Such 'monolithic', superordinate construing subsumes our
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Kelly pointedly and repeatedly refused to distinguish between cognitive and affective processes (1955,
1962). While the present work is basically in agreement with the spirit of this refusal, there m a y be
grounds to distinguish more 'emotional' and 'cognitive' construing (Critteneden, 1991). Contemporary
neuro-psychological advances have identified quite distinct brain pathways that are involved in and
which mediate 'emotional' responses and those involved in more linguistically representable cognitive
consciousness. However, as a generalisation, Kelly's theorising shows considerable foresight. Although
'emotional' pathways show some independence of higher cortical patterns of activity (LeDoux, 1998), it
is clear that our affective experience, our (slower) awareness of our emotional responses — the w a y w e
infuse them with meaning — means that 'cognition' and 'affect' are always mixed (LeDoux, 1998). It
m a y be the case that emotional responses (as in animals) are possible without reflexive cognitive
awareness (without 'knowing' one is undergoing an emotional reaction), but all reflexive awareness will
have some sort of affective 'tone' (Goleman, 1995). These matters will be given more detailed treatment
in Chapter 8.

anticipatory resources in service of our survival. Generally, Kelly believed w e needed
to develop more and more differentiated dependency construing so all our anticipatory
'eggs' were not all in the one basket. With undifferentiated dependency construing,
changes in a person's social circumstances are more likely to be perceived as
threatening — since the person depends on one or two people exclusively for his or her
needs.
Dependency construing can be quite abstract in the sense that it is highly
superordinate, and like Briggs' (1990) 'themata' (highly abstract and emotionally-tinged
basic assumptions about the world), such construing is probably of high generality, is
affectively-charged and is no doubt very permeable with a very wide range of
convenience. A s such, dependency construing is likely to be active m u c h of the time
and likely consumes, as it were, m u c h of our anticipatory resources. A suggestion to be
taken up at a later juncture is that in a state of subjective calm and lack of self-concern,
dependency and core construing m a y be in relative abeyance allowing for a more
playful and experimental approach to anticipation,freedup from the usual concerns
with self-maintenance and self-monitoring.

6.9 CONCLUDING COMMENT: TRANSCENDING THE
OBVIOUS
M y examination of Kelly's philosophical commitments in the previous chapter m a y
provide a further perspective on Kelly's understanding of insight. Coming to a genuine
n e w insight, or 'transcending the obvious', is not about an objectivist grasp of Truth and
not about accumulating nuggets of that Truth. It is very m u c h the result of full
commitment and involvement in the world in which w e recognise the relativity of our
understanding and are willing to use our subjectivity in pursuit of the objective.
Genuine insight is open to all, and the vehicle is experience sought in full cycle:
That is to say, if you go ahead and involve yourself, rather than
remaining alienated from the h u m a n struggle, if you strike out and
implement your anticipations, if you dare to commit yourself, if you
prepare to assess the outcomes as systematically as you can, and if you
master the courage to abandon your favorite psychologisms and
intellectualisms and reconstrue life altogether; well you m a y not find

that you guessed right, but you will stand a chance of transcending
morefreelythose 'obvious' facts that n o w appear to determine your
affairs, and you m a y just get a little closer to the truth that lies
somewhere over the horizon. (1977, p. 19)

Genuine insight requires courage and commitment in action. In addition, Kelly defined

insight not so much in terms of its 'essential' qualities or properties, but in terms of
pragmatic fate. It may be argued that an insight is an insight — regardless of its later
success or usefulness. In this sense, Kelly's definition of the term 'insight' is
ambiguous. Kelly's definition of insight, however, as a comprehensive construction of

one's behaviour, clearly emphasised it as a process that: 1) gives an elaborative breadt
of vision, as against isolated cognitive moments; and 2) is an active phenomenon
finding its apogee in behavioural experiments. 'Transcending the obvious' would

probably come close to the person-in-the-street's definition of insight and, given Kelly

egalitarian instincts, this is most likely a definition of insight he would have endorse
So now we have a theoretical language in which to talk about insight. Insight
can be described as a process that emerges within sequences of the loosening and
tightening of construing. The Aha! phenomenon, however, was not enough for Kelly.
He was adamant that genuine insights only emerged when the cycle of experience was
completed. In short, he measured insight by pragmatic criteria. 'Does it allow for more

options and more useful anticipations of the future?' 'Does it allow the person to breast
the onrush of events with more flexibility and resourcefulness?' We have also seen that
insight processes involve a breaking down and re-assembling of bi-polar and
hierarchical structure. Both in terms of the introduction of increased permeability
(allowing for the consideration of new elements) and in terms of introducing new
implicative chains of meaning, insightful construing implies there may be a more multidimensional, less linear or transitive logic that underpins creative thought.
As with the insight literature, the PCP account has also placed affective

processes in the 'heart' of insight. In order to encourage insight, one needs to tolerate
uncertainty and frustration, to free oneself from self-concern and to playfully and
actively experiment with possibilities. Perceived changes in our constructive processes

are affectively experienced and h o w w e construe these changes is crucial. Finally, in
relation to this transcending affective resilience, are issues related to core construing
(construing related to self) and to dependency construing (related to self-maintenance).
It has been indicated that these ideas will be elaborated in the chapters to follow. But
more immediately, it will be left to the next chapter to evaluate the contribution of PCP

to understanding insight and to indicate what is still required for an adequate integrativ
understanding.

CHAPTER 7: INTERREGNUM AND PROSPECTUS

7.1 WHAT DO WE HAVE SO FAR? PERSONAL CONSTRUCT
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE INSIGHT LITERATURE
It is now time to see what concordances and differences exist between my reading of
insight in P C P terms, and the four general findings of the insight literature reported
earlier. W e found that centrally implicated in the production of insight were the use of
high levels of abstraction, the alternation between tacit and explicit levels of
consciousness, the social and pragmatic dimensions of insight and the role of
'emotional' thought. All four of these features were shown tofitwell within
psychological constructivism and, more specifically, within P C P . A s a generalisation,
Kelly's constructivist approach has provided us with a framework comprehensive
enough to incorporate most of the features and reported phenomenology of insight. Not
only this, P C P goes a substantial w a y towards helping us understand the process and
genesis of insight. A s such, it constitutes an 'advance' on more contemporary theories
of insight all of which give relatively partial or non-comprehensive accounts and most
of which tend to be descriptive rather than explanatory.
In particular, P C P captures the proactive intentionality, the teleological spirit of
inquiry which seems to be so important in, and so characteristic of, insight. This
passion for understanding requires a view of constructive processes which mix the
'emotional' and the 'cognitive' and see such layered understanding as a form of action,
not merely as an 'inner' process which leads to action. Although Kelly's approach to
insight is, by itself, not sufficient, in P C P w e have a framework that can be elaborated
and built upon. So n o w to a summary of the contributions of P C P to an understanding
of insight and then to an outline of what is still required.

7.1.1

High Levels Of Abstraction

Kelly's account of loosening and tightening required that more permeable,
superordinate structures 'take over' the loosened construct and allow new elements and
new implications to be related to it as it takes new form. This movement to alternative
superordinate (abstract) structures begins with the weakening of the discriminative

power of the relevant construct/s. This looseness parallels the typical insight literatur
finding of a tolerance for ambiguity, a capacity to entertain 'contradictories'
(omnivalence) and the sort of 'metacognitive' processes (construing one's construing)
that Kelly's 'provisional tightening' may well represent. This shift to other construct
subsystems builds a bridge across which creative analogies and metaphors may be found
which, being at a higher level of abstraction, may reconcile the seeming contradictions.
As we have seen, Kelly explicitly considered that quite loose constructs are
relatively unbound by superordinate constructs. This temporary severing of implicative
structure, of previously-held meaning patterns, allows for provisional tightenings in
which the newly-forming construct is experimentally bound or subsumed by alternative
superordinate systems. These playful moves to other meaning systems allow for the
reported multidimensionality of new insight where not just one new idea is seized, but
far more typically, flurries of new ideas and connections are grasped. In PCP terms this
can be interpreted as gaining access to alternative hierarchies and subsystems of the
person's construing system. Unlike the CPC cycle and controlled elaboration (see
6.4.1), not only is an alternative existing subsystem used to understand the events at
hand, but this alternative subsystem is newly linked to the currently engaged subsystem,
changing both in the process. This is why Kelly (1959, p. 24) could say that"... a
genuinely new insight does what all experienced therapists have long known it does; it
changes not only the way a particular problematic event is seen, but also the way many
others are seen." As suggested earlier, however, Kelly provided little explicit
description of how or why this shifting between systems comes about — a matter I will
return to in the following chapters.

7.1.2

T w o Types Of Mental Processes: Tacit Versus

Explicit
Kelly (1955) proposed that construing be considered not exclusively, or even primarily,
a conscious experience. Rather, he invited his readers to imagine it taking place at
various levels of cognitive awareness, tacitly and intuitively as well as via highly
conscious, verbalised constructions. Kelly (1955) gave a number of reasons for
construing to be tacit. There may be a lack of viable structure in which the
discrimination can be presented for conscious reflection (submergence, suspension,
extreme looseness), or it may simply be 'preverbal' — a catch-all term Kelly (1955)
used to describe construing not symbolised in words. Generally speaking, verbalising

construing tends to make it tighter (though not all tight construing need be verbalised o
capable of being verbalised). Thus, as reported in the general insight literature,

verbalising tends to be destructive of more fluid, tacit and looser constructive processe
Parallels can be drawn between loose construction and tacit understanding
(understanding at a low level of cognitive awareness), and between tight construction
and more explicit, conscious understanding. Loose construction need not be tacit or
'unconscious', though it has this tendency because of its characteristic, fluid

discriminative structure. The looser the construing, the less likely it will be at a high
level of cognitive awareness.51 Tight construing, on the other hand, being well

integrated within ordinal structures of implication, is more often available to conscious
reflection. The alternation between loose and tight construing is directly comparable to
the typical, ongoing alternation between tacit and explicit mental processes so
frequently discussed in the insight literature as being predictive of insight. The
techniques Kelly devised to elicit loose and tight construction mirror those working
activities reported by eminently creative people (Epel, 1993; Gardner, 1993; Gruber,

1995). In addition, the understanding of construing as being implicit in action, as a way
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It will be noted, however, that one may become aware of the implications and apparent 'illogicalities'
of preverbal or tacit construing. But this is a successive or subsequent phenomenon and it is an important
awareness to develop in the production of insight. Such an awareness is likely to be experienced
emotionally as the intransitivities or the 'fragmentation' in thought are recognised. Later w e will relate
this to what Matte-Bianco (1988) has called 'bi-logic'.

of being and doing, is important in relation to the subjective uncertainty and fallibility
of the processes leading to insight. What needs to be done to come to insight is to

experiment, to be playful, to follow one's 'intuition' or feelings. And, as I will discus

in the next section, this pragmatic reading of construing allows one to consider insights
that emerge from immersion in one's projects not as revealed truths, but as
approximations to truth, as an ongoing 'conversation' with one's world.

7.1.3 Social And Pragmatic Dimensions Of Insight
Kelly entreated his readers to immerse themselves in the world, to embrace the
pragmatic nature of their anticipations. Pragmatism emphasises the inter-relatedness of
mind and world — especially our social world. We are constrained by, and are a part
of, the environing 'other'. The personal, social and the pragmatic are inextricably

intertwined as our psychological world is, arguably, firstly interpersonal and only late
apparently 'private'. For example, Walker (1996) has written of the misleading
implications drawn from the word "Personal" in the title Kelly gave his theory,
proposing instead that the 'personal' suggests only the location of construing, not its
circumscribed origin or its individualist nature. Indeed Kelly (1955, p. 179) admits to
entertaining the term "Role Theory" for his entire theoretical approach, thereby
positioning sociality in particular as central to his whole theory. Both the pragmatic
(Stevens, 1998; Warren, 1998) and social (Butt, 1998a, 1988b; Kalekin-Fishman &
Walker, 1996; Stam, 1998) implications of PCP are of current research interest. There
is still, however, much to be done in elaborating these.
Although Kelly (1955) did not spell out the social and pragmatic dimensions of

insight, his approach is thoroughly concordant with the insight literature findings in th

regard. What is clear is the parallel already drawn between the stages of insight and the
stages of the Experience Cycle. The person goes through characteristic alternations:
between abstract processes and concrete action; between solitude and social interaction,
between silence and conversation; between tighter, well-practised understandings and
looser, more fluid processes. Thus Kelly set out in some detail how to manage loose

and tight construing, especially in V o l u m e 2 of his grand opus (1955), and this is in
close concordance with the reported day-to-day practical engagement of eminently
creative people. Moreover, the whole thrust of his therapy is to integrate n e w
understandings within the person's life, to test and validate, to reconsider, to test again,
to reconstrue and so on. At a deeper level, the P C P approach to insight views it as
something one does, as a type of situated action. Insight processes are a pragmatic
coupling with one's environing 'other' — be that people, the physical world, discourses
and so on. In the chapters that follow I will elaborate this view of our embodied
intentionality and will also suggest h o w this is experienced as an altered sense of 'self
within insight processes.

7.1.4 The Role Of 'Emotional Thought' In Insight
We have seen that insight is constituted as much by 'emotional' as 'cognitive' processes
and w e have also seen that Kelly (1955) characterised construing in similar terms. H e
did not so m u c h banish emotional experience from his theory (cf. Bruner, 1956; Rogers,
1956) as offer a n e w w a y of conceiving of it. Emotions were presented as forms of
awareness and gone is the ancient opposition of irrational emotion and logical reason
(Bannister, 1977; Warren, 1998). Our 'rational' being is not separate from the 'lived
equivalence-difference patterns' (Radley, 1977) that define us including, for example,
the facial expressions, racing heartbeat, sweaty palms and short sharp breaths of panic.
M y elaboration of insight in P C P terms has posited a central role for affective
experience in coming to insight. Affectfrequentlyarises as w e become aware, at some
level, of the implications of newly-emerging constructs. Kelly (1955) under-specified
this affective role in his explicit account of insight. Generally, he considered that the
construct system w a s designed to be 'anxiety-tight', but in insight I see the possibility
for another motivational vector, the contrasting positive emotional experiences.
Fortunately, M c C o y (1977,1981) has elaborated Kelly's 'emotional' scheme,
supplementing his definitions with complementary 'positive' emotions. T o explain the
phenomenology of insight this is absolutely essential. A s w e have seen, negative

emotions are inimical to insight, while a state of evenly hovering, equanimous attention
is conducive of creative thought. This recalls McCoy's (1977) definitions of
'contentment' and 'satisfaction' as reflecting a subjective faith and security in one's

anticipatory abilities. Creative practitioners of all kinds have reported their deliberat
cultivation of this attitude in pursuit of insight (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Herein is a

paradox at the heart of creativity: we are born to anticipate events (Kelly's Fundamental
Postulate), yet Kelly (1977) encourages us to abandon even our 'favorite'
understandings, muster up daring, and expose ourselves to uncertainty — even to
'reconstrue life altogether'.
Within PCP, as with the insight literature, emotional experiences and challenges

are constitutive of insight. Calmness and relaxation, which I have conceived of as styles
of superordinate construing or as transcending affective stances, allow for subordinate
loosening. Self-consciousness (related to core construing) and concerns about selfmaintenance (dependency construing) are backgrounded and there is a slowing down of
'logical' thought, replaced by a flow of construction guided by subjective 'feel' rather
than by critical judgement. This is typical of a more 'meditative thought' (Heidegger,
1959) which allows for the suspension of judgement so widely reported in insight
research as a prelude to breakthrough. In Kelly's (1955) terms we need to put on hold
'pre-emptive' and 'constellatory ways of construing.52 This exploratory mode of
construing may then give way to a provisional tightening of loose construing, an
'affective assessment' which either concludes that impasse has not been overcome, or
grows into the realisation and joy of insight.

7.2 WHAT DO WE STILL NEED?
Insight reveals the need for a broader, more diverse view of rationality and mind. The
strategy for the remainder of this work will be to gather converging lines of evidence,
bringing together quite disparate theory and research, in order to work towards such a
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Pre-emptive construing is 'nothing but' construing. Kelly's example (1955, p. 563) is "If this is a ball
it is nothing but a ball". Constellatory construing is stereotypical or typological thinking.

view of mind. It will be an attempt to demonstrate both the plausibility and the farreaching implications of the integrative understanding being proposed. It is
acknowledged that in attempting to present such a wide purview full justice cannot be

done to these theorists or approaches. Be that as it may, the positive intent is to provid
an integrative framework in which we can avoid the relative narrowness of most
research into insight. Kelly (1955) suggested that the value of a theory was not only in

its plausibility in accounting for observations, but in its generativity. It is in this sp

therefore, that the remainder of this work aims to not only provide a plausible account of

the features and characteristics of insight, but to generate questions, to stimulate futur
research and to speculate about the implications flowing from the theoretical
understanding developed. But I will first need to indicate the shortcomings revealed in
PCP by my account thus far.
It was argued that Kelly's account of insight illuminates four major findings of

the insight literature: the importance of shifts in levels of abstraction, the alternatio
between explicit and tacit levels of awareness, the social and pragmatic dimensions of
insight and the role of 'emotional' thought. But along the way we have noticed certain
gaps in Kelly's discussion. While these gaps demand elaboration of the PCP approach
to insight, as well as excursions into other fields and theoretical approaches, I believe
these elaborations and additions can be coherently incorporated within a constructivist
framework.
More specifically in relation to Kelly's treatment of insight, there are two types
of theoretical deficits in the account:
1. Features and experiences reported in the insight literature which are absent or hardly
accounted for in PCP.
2. Insufficiently elaborated and developed theoretical detail within the accounts which
are given by Kelly.
Section 7.2.2 below will deal with those features Kelly missed, while 7.2.3 will discuss
those that Kelly discussed in insufficient detail. While these two types of deficits will
be treated separately in the following, it should be borne in mind that they overlap

considerably. A s well as describing these deficits, suggestions will then be m a d e as to
their solution — suggestions which will be taken up in the remainder of this work.

7.2.2 Altered Experiences Of Self And Feelings of
'Connectedness'
People commonly report an altered sense of self while experiencing insight. This
question of 'self is a slippery one,53 and one that will be returned to below (see 10.4.2)
Nonetheless, insight is frequently experienced as if it were exterior to the person and as
if it had its own spontaneous expressiveness to which the beneficiary is witness.
Paradoxically, this sense of exteriority also increases the person's sense of
'connectedness' or unity with the world, yet the person also somehow knows that she or
he is personally 'responsible' for the insight. It is as if in these breakthroughs people
are witnesses to a sharing of the world with themselves and this is often an euphoric
experience. I will return to this sense of 'oneness' in my discussion of symmetrical
thought (Chapter 9), as well in my integrative understanding of insight (Chapter 11). As
with Archimedes running from the baths in Syracuse shouting 'Eureka!', people also
often seem to need to include others in their breakthrough, excitedly sharing it with
those they think may understand. And there is great joy in being understood (Epel,
1993; Gruber, 1995).
This experience of connectedness (interpersonal and 'transpersonal'), commonly
felt while one enjoys a genuine new insight, was not discussed by Kelly. I have
suggested, however, that he considered sociality as if it were a fundamental empathic
capacity. This idea needs to be developed, especially in relation to two aspects of
construing. The first aspect is construing connecting others with one's selfmaintenance, that is, 'dependency construing'.54 The second is 'core construing', which
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Within PCP it is a much-discussed topic. For classic discussions see Mair (1977) Banniste
For a more recent analysis see Butt, Burr and Bell (1997).
54
Kelly (1955, 1962) argued that people were always 'dependent'. Rather than believing a person
ideally develops from a state of 'dependence' towards increasing 'independence', Kelly considered the
person ideally learns how to distribute his or her dependency needs more widely and appropriately. This

is construing concerned with one's maintenance processes ('self or identity are very
important aspects of this). The argument to be presented later is that dependency
construing is based on an innate capacity for sociality, a capacity that is preverbal,

affectively-toned and foundational for subsequently more explicit and reflexive thought.
Much core construing, on this reading, is derived from dependency construing — where
the latter is understood as the ways in which 'self is linked to the 'other'. Core
construing is constituted by an expanding repertoire of 'solutions' or ways of

understanding various situations and events in relation to one's self. Increasingly, suc
core-related construing becomes habitual and is drawn on, as a part of dependency
construing, when the person is aware, at some level, of some unmet need, some very
real problem in living.
The argument in brief (see Chapter 11) is that following the frustration
consequent upon the anticipatory failure of one's repertoire of dependency and corerelated construing, the more 'primitive', empathic mode of construction which underlies
dependency construing may be called upon to help generate new life-enhancing
solutions, thereby generating new insight. In more general fashion, I will argue that in
any frustration or impasse of construing, where use of our available constructive
resources continues to fail us, this looser more inchoate mode of anticipation may be
utilised. Yet, as we have seen, the breakthrough to insight is encouraged by the absence
of core-related construing such as may be associated with anxiety or self-concern. Thus,
a transcending use of our 'sympathetic'55 style of anticipation — at least for a while
removed from its usual association with self-interest and awareness of anticipatory
failure (anxiety) — seems to be requisite for insight.

7.2.2.2 Sense Of Reverie And Flow
A part of this feeling of connectedness no doubt is related to the reported 'flow'
experience (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996) that often accompanies insight. This different

important aspect of his theory has been best elaborated by Walker, Ramsey and Bell (1988) and by
Walker (1993).
55
'Sympathetic' as in sympathetic motion; feeling as the 'other' does (Mixon, 1999).

sense of self includes entering a type of reverie. The closest Kelly (1955) gets to
describing this is where he referred to the very loosely construing person as

'experiencing only' (1955, p. 1068). Kelly suggested this loose 'experiencing' stands in

contrast to the person being able to make 'judgements' wherein his or her construing is

bound by superordinate constructs. Related to this is the insight literature's emphasis

the importance of intuition and of feelings of knowing. Although Kelly's idea of looser
construing goes some of the way in explaining more vague and tacit feelings of
knowing, I will elaborate his ideas in the context of contemporary research into
intuition, the unconscious and emotion (Chapters 8 and 9). I will also develop some

ideas implicit in Kelly's thought concerning the embodied and tacit features of insigh

(Chapter 10). This latter discussion will emphasise the ways in which we think with th
people and 'things' of the world.

7.2.2.3 Why Embodied Happiness During Insight?
In general terms an 'embodied' reading of insight can be accommodated within PCP as
Kelly was careful to define construing in terms that incorporated feeling, thought and
action. Kelly (1955) suggested that construing might also be a way of describing what
normally we may call 'physical' processes, as types of lived equivalence-difference
patterns.56 But why do people often experience a physical sense of joy or rapture upon
insight? Maybe this is not so surprising when we accept that the conceptual habit of
separating mind and body, reason and emotion, might be misplaced. Such an

acceptance may remove the temptation to think of insight as an essentially 'intellectua
or non-physical process.
The degree of happiness experienced in insight is probably in proportion with
the implications tied into both the impasse and the breakthrough. The more
superordinate and comprehensive the implications, the more significant the emotional
experience may be. Returning to my discussion of 'connectedness' with one's world,
the positive emotion and awareness of the expansion in one's being-at-one with the
56

Though Kelly (1955) considered that the 'focus of convenience' for his concept of construing was at
the 'psychological' level.

world m a y be felt as a type of validation of one's most central core processes — which
is McCoy's (1981) PCP definition of an experience of love. A frequently expressed

sentiment concerning (interpersonal) love is that one has a profound sense of the othe

that one 'enters into' the other's being. This perhaps is less strange sounding when o
conceives of a person's being as not being exclusively skin-bound, but rather as a

process of 'coupling' with one's world. There is, it seems, a 'space-of-between' where
in moments of non-self-consciousness, the person and the 'other' can merge. In fully

giving oneself over to another, or to one's project, ironically, there appears to be n

of self, but a feeling of great happiness and connectedness. I will later expand on su
ideas, developing a more pragmatic and 'phenomenological' view of PCP (see Chapter
10).

7.2.2.4 The Role Of Metaphor And Associative Thought In Insight
There is certainly more to be said concerning Kelly's account of the linking of
previously unconnected subsystems of construing. As discussed earlier, this involves
finding types of sameness or similarity in what previously were 'obviously' different

elements. This requires a superordinating point of view that reconciles or can at leas

enable us to tolerate this seeming contradiction ('omnivalence' as Briggs, 1990, put i
This will be discussed in Chapter 9 in the context of a creative harmony between two
modes of consciousness (asymmetrical and symmetrical) proposed by Matte-Bianco
(1975,1988).
In addition, understanding such 'bi-modal' thought may even allow us to

conceive of the act of construing as itself being fundamentally metaphorical. That is,
polar construing describes how we simultaneously entertain the ways in which certain

'elements' (events, people, things) share features, yet are distinct. When one consider
the nature of metaphor — where the properties of one 'thing' are mapped onto another
'thing', yet the distinctness of the two domains is maintained — then a substantial
overlap between construing and metaphorical thinking can be seen. Kelly's (1955, p.

563) definition of a symbol ("An element in the context of a construct which represent

not only itself but also the construct by which it is abstracted by the user") m a y help in
this regard. That is, an element may at times come to stand for the whole construct,
including the 'opposite' elements. These ideas will be explored further in Chapter 10.
Metaphorical thinking may be related to an ability to think in images. The

insight and creativity literature consistently refer to a type of non-verbal construing
which is nonetheless very abstract and highly developed. Probably such thinking is
multidimensional, operating with ideas of great complexity but within an economy of
form. Think, for example, of the aural imagery of a melody. There is substantial

evidence that melodies are recalled as a whole having to be 'run through' rather than by
adding up parts — it is difficult, for example, to think of the third note of the tune
"Happy Birthday" without singing the preceding notes (Shanon, 1993). In similar
fashion, we usually remember the whole of a person's face rather than its individual
features. If a picture is worth a thousand words, then thinking in images may indeed be
highly efficient for complex, ill-defined tasks such as those that involve insight.
I do not find in Kelly's writings, however, the insight literature's emphasis on
abstract imagery. Again, however, the broad definition of construing allows us to
elaborate PCP in this regard (see Chapter 10). As a part of the pragmatic reading of
construing as a form of enactment, the basis of judgements of'similarity' (and
difference) may be 'sensorial' or modal — that is aural, visual or perceptual (Barsalou
and Prinz, 1997) rather than prepositional. Thus, for example, a smell can
simultaneously bring to mind various situations which may otherwise appear to be
logically (propositionally) unrelated. This is reminiscent of the findings concerning
state-dependent memory (Eysenck & Keane, 1990) where a sensorial 'trigger' or current
mood brings back a memory and or emotion. In similar fashion, homophones and

rhyme can help us unite quite ('logically' or propositionally) distinct domains by vir
of the similarity in sound of the words (Shanon, 1993). This type of thinking will also
be taken up in the next chapter under the heading of 'presentational' symbolism.
Such thinking is consistent with a view of construing as 'enactment' (Butt,
1998a; Shanon, 1993) and provides for a type of 'ecological' continuity where

developmentally earlier 'presentational' (see Chapter 8) and non-verbal modes of
consciousness are seen to be intimately intertwined with later more propositional or
'representational' modes of understanding. Such enactive knowing engages events as

complex wholes. It is usually tacit and typically emerges in embodied action rather th
in conscious thought and may be experienced as fleeting non-verbal imagery. Current
research into the embodied nature of such imagery and thought will be summarised in
Chapter 10. This 'imagistic' consciousness is described within contemporary research
under a variety of names (image schemata, cross-modal synesthesias, presentational
consciousness). Generally speaking, it is presented as being of very high generality,
setting the parameters of much subsequent thought. It is highly dimensional, being

difficult to articulate and to grasp consciously, and containing within its own econom
of expression, rich repositories of meaning. Such a mode of thought is likely to be
useful in creating genuinely new constructs.
One implication of this is that there may be a continuum in modes of construing
with perhaps more prototypical judgements based on 'sameness' at one extreme, and

tighter bi-polar judgements, based on 'difference' at the other. If one were to think o

constructs as sets of elements in relation (Bell, 1996; Caputi, 1986), more prototypica
construing would be represented as elements clustered around a prototype or exemplar.
Such a view of a construct emphasises the sameness of the elements with regard to the
prototype and would correspond to a 'loose' construct, one in which the differences
between elements is backgrounded.57 The prototype may also connect or 'symbolise' a

subset of constructs sharing these elements. In this way, such constructs may be relat

to each other 'symmetrically' (in terms of sameness) rather than hierarchically (based
difference). In this way symmetry may operate within as well as between constructs
(Bell, 1996). 'Thinking in images' may be one expression of such symmetrical logic
and would overlap with loose construing. On the other hand, constructs may be more
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A n important reminder m a y be in order here. Construing is here conceived of as a dynamic
'happening' rather than as the activation of already-formed 'things' called constructs. W h a t is being
suggested here is not that a construct has an 'essential', fixed nature' which is then distorted by
loosening, but rather that the w a y w e construe m a y be variable, sometimes clearly contrasting elements
within constructs, other times emphasising the similarities of elements.

clearly divided into distinct categories on the basis of clear differences between the
elements within the set (bi-polarity). Such bi-polar constructs would be related

asymmetrically (hierarchically) in terms of differences in 'level' in the hierarchy. Thes
ideas will be explored in my discussion of Matte-Bianco and Kelly (Chapter, 9).

7.2.3 Insufficient Elaboration In Kelly's Account Of Insight
7.2.3.1 How Does Loosening And Tightening Work?
Related to the above discussion of the possibility of symmetrical (non-hierarchic, and
not strictly bi-polar) construing is Kelly's account of loosening and tightening. It has
been noted above that, although Kelly gave no account for how cycles of loosening and
tightening allow us to shift between apparently 'unrelated' constructs systems, such
cycles of construing show great promise in explaining the quantum jump from impasse
into insight. It will be argued (Chapter 9) that the breakdown of the contrast function,
and the concomitant accentuation of the similarity function within looser construing,
opens the possibility of new insight. Loose and tight construing will be compared to
symmetrical and asymmetrical thought respectively (Matte-Bianco, 1975, 1988). While
loose or symmetrical construing 'opens new doors' for insights, it is more tight or
asymmetrical construing which allows us to recognise the possibilities thus revealed.
Within loosening, relationships between constructs may also be symmetrical,
that is based more heavily on sameness or similarity. I mentioned earlier that a more
'lateral' (as against ordinal) association of constructs is possible. The more loose the
construing, the broader the basis for such active, 'same level' associations. From a
tighter, more asymmetrical point of view, such a style of construing leads to quite
unrelated or distinct elements and constructs being equated. But this may merely imply
that there may be benefits in conceiving of construing not only in terms of tight bi-

polarities (based on similarity and difference), but as also potentially based on a loose
or 'fuzzier' clustering of elements around prototypes or exemplars without clear
contrasts being implied. Of course, these are relative matters as extremes of looseness

or tightness would both be disastrous in terms of our ability to anticipate and to deal
with life's ever-changing processes.
In any case, this looser, lateral association of construct subsystems can lead to a
broader or more multidimensional mode of construction. As in the architectures
postulated in Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) accounts of cognition, it may be
possible within more predominantly associative and loose construing that, in parallel,

there are multiple transitive chains of implication active (Martindale, 1995). It will b
suggested that this potential for multidimensional construing is implicit in Kelly's

theory, but is not elaborated. Again Matte-Bianco will be called upon to elaborate this

idea. This sudden availability of alternative chains of implications may help to explain
the oft-reported phenomenon whereby whole narratives or solutions seem to reveal
themselves to the person in the throes of insight.

7.2.3.2 Emotion And Abstraction
Contemporary research into emotion (Chapter 8) is consistent with my view that
intelligent understanding is as much a 'feeling' process as it is an 'intellectual' or
'cognitive' one. The multidimensionality I have pointed to in relation to looser
construing also seems to be reflected in the structure of the emotional 'pathways' and
hormonal processes operative in the brain and body. The idea to be developed is that

much, if not all, thinking has an affective nuance or quality. The 'emotional' centres o

the brain seem to have active and influential connections to most of the rest of the br
and also appear to have earliest access to incoming sensory stimulation. Summarising
research by Claxton (1997), Damasio (1994), Goleman (1995) and LeDoux (1998), it

will be suggested that contemporary findings fit perfectly with Susanne Langer's (1972)
view that reflexive consciousness emerged from human emotionality. This also accords

with Rychlak's (1977) contention that all construing is based on 'affective assessments
Langer's distinction between a more 'emotional' and non-verbal 'presentational' mode
of thought and a tighter 'representational' mode of thought will be an important
unifying theme running through the remainder of this work.

This 'new' view of emotion means that any absolute distinction between
emotion and reason is blurred as emotion is arguably implicated in, and crucial to
decision making, subtle inferential processes and reasoning generally. Emotion has
often been considered to be the antithesis of rationality, as being less complex, less
dimensioned, as necessarily inimical to 'higher' mental processes, as primitive and in
need of reduction. While emotion can at times run away with itself, cascading and
hijacking viable construction, anticipatory efforts devoid of affective processes are
equally maladaptive. It will be argued that an optimal balance or harmony between
'feeling' and tighter propositional thought is conducive to creativity and insight.
It has been argued earlier that understanding emotion as intrinsic to transition in
the construct system links affective processes to the occurrence of insight. It has also
been suggested that 'emotion', being considered an assessment of the vicissitudes of
construing, and often being related to self-maintenance, is relatively superordinate or
'abstract'. This link between affect and abstraction is well worth elaborating. Once
again, Matte-Bianco's account of emotion (Chapter 9) will be of assistance in redefining

the relationship between 'affect' and 'thought', particularly in relation to the relativel
high 'dimensionality' of emotional understanding. The suggestion has also been made
that positive emotion, or at the very least, freedom from self-consciousness and selfconcern is associated with insight. This implicates dependency and core construing in
insight processes — which are quite superordinate processes.
It has already been suggested that a different sense of self and of one's
relationship to one's world, often accompanied by euphoria, may be related to both the
validation of anticipatory breakthroughs as well as to a freedom from worry and selfconcern that predict those breakthroughs. This leads to a type of being-with-the-world,
a 'flow', that is intrinsically enjoyable. At the heart of insight may be a transcending
affective stance which enables such creativity. Finally, emotional construing highlights
the embodied nature of our anticipatory processes. We think with our bodies in interaction in the world. We 'know' with our bodies and emotionally-laden body signals
'warn' us of impending danger, for example, long before our discursive thinking can

reflect on the situation. Developing one's emotional sensitivities, one's 'emotional
intelligence' (Goleman, 1995), may offer us, therefore, access to more intuitive, and
perhaps more insightful ways of anticipating reality.

7.2.3.3 Intuition And Tacit Intentionality
It has been suggested above that the later Kelly was moving towards an understanding

of construing as predominantly a more embodied, tacit and intuitive process. This thesi
began with Meno's paradox which asked how can we intend towards that which we do
not know? The paradox, it was argued, can only arise if knowing is considered to
reflect a pre-ordered world waiting to be registered as knowledge in the mind of the
observer. In such an objectivist model, knowledge can be complete and is an all-ornothing affair. In contrast, I have a proposed a model of knowing processes in which
knowing is not only always partial, but is one way (among many) of carving a viable

path in one's environment, such paths being a function of our successful 'coupling' wit
our world. There are many ways of being viable and so (capital T) Truth is always
displaced in favour of personal truth or local knowing or understanding.
In addition, construing is, arguably, mostly implicit 'knowing from' rather than

'knowing that', and thereby describes a means of inquiry, only aspects of which are at a

high level of reflexive awareness. Knowing in this sense is a part of one's bodily stanc
to the world. Such tacit knowing develops within cycles of experience, not the least of
which are our formative social and empathic experiences. Even so-called 'inner' and

'private' mental processes can be considered as a type of derived enactive, ecologicall
immersed skill. This phenomenological and pragmatic understanding of construing will
be further developed in Chapter 10.
Intuition has been thoroughly implicated in insight. A certain intuitive

'guidedness', a 'feeling of knowing', is consistently reported in relation to creativit
insight experiences. Again drawing together conclusions from a variety of researchers,
it will be argued (Chapters 8 and 10) that a predominantly tacit mode of consciousness,
a presentational mode of knowing, always underlies more conscious, representational

thought. T o be 'intuitive' is to m a k e oneself more sensitive to this 'undermind'
(Claxton, 1998). I have already mentioned the distinction between tacit and explicit
knowing and, just as a (good) sportsperson plays 'instinctively', eliminating too much

conscious assessment from his or her actual playing, so the insightful person allows his
or her more subtle, knowing processes more free rein. Such subtle knowing processes
have been described variously, implicating image schema, cross-modal synesthesias,
'imagistic' thought, meditative thought, felt senses and so on. I propose that my
pragmatic reading of construing may help unite these various conceptualisations,
particularly in terms of the complex relationships between looser presentational and
tighter representational modes of thought.

7.3 CONCLUDING COMMENT
Overall, we have seen that Kelly's version of constructivism is an ideal framework
within which to understand insight. The four major findings of the insight literature —

the use of high levels of abstraction, the alternation between tacit and explicit levels
consciousness, the social and pragmatic dimensions of insight and the role of
'emotional' thought — all fit well within this one approach. Accordingly, the
contribution of PCP to an understanding of insight will be threaded through the next
three chapters, building towards an integrative understanding in Chapter 11.
Kelly's theorising about insight, however, needs considerable elaboration. This

elaboration will have implications not only for our deeper understanding of insight, but

for aspects of Kelly's theoretical position itself. By drawing on disparate theorists an
research the PCP approach will be considerably extended, elaborated and at times
challenged. The chapters that follow will gather converging evidence for the idea of a
broadened understanding of rationality, supplementing the 'normal' conscious
representational mode of thought with a looser 'presentational' mode. More

specifically, Kelly's account of loosening and tightening needs to be developed, the lin
between emotion and abstraction expanded, and the way in which PCP accounts for

intuition and tacit intentionality elaborated. Beyond this, important findings implicated

in insight need to be added to the Kellian account. These include the role of metaphor
and of associative thinking, the experience of a different sense of self and of
'connectedness', and the embodied joy which is often reported to accompany states of

reverie or 'flow'. As these features of insight overlap and intersect with each other, t
will not be dealt with in discrete order, but will be explored and revisited throughout
remainder of this work.
More specifically, in the next chapter I will undertake an analysis of current
findings concerning emotion because the research concerning insight and emotion
points to their intimate and complex relationship. What is needed is a way in which to
combine this broadened understanding of emotional thought with other features of

insight, including apparently illogical or quantum jumps in understanding as well as the

oft-reported altered sense of being and of self. It will be proposed in Chapter 9 that th
analysis and re-description of the (Freudian) unconscious by Chilean psychoanalyst and
mathematician, Ignacio Matte-Bianco (1975, 1988), will help us in this integrative task
as well as in understanding in more depth the processes of loose and tight construing.
Other features of insight not sufficiently accounted for up to this point include the
enactive, embodied and social nature of insight, and the ubiquitous role of metaphor in
its production. Accordingly, Chapter 10 will attempt to gather up these loose ends of
this inquiry and complete a broad enough survey of the characteristics of mind to allow
for an incorporation of these features into an integrative understanding of insight.
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SECTION 3.
DEEPENING OUR UNDERSTANDING

CHAPTER 8: EMOTION AND MIND
The quality of understanding is personally endured5*

8.1 INTRODUCTION
Psychological research into emotion has been influenced strongly by a rationalist
intellectual tradition which considers reason and emotion as distinct, mostly
antagonistic processes. This is reflected in the typically assumed contrasts of reason
versus emotion, thought versus feeling, science versus art, objectivity versus
subjectivity, and so on. In their excellent review of contemporary research into emotion
Cacioppo and Gardner (1999) express the traditional theoretical opposition in this way:
A n assumption by rationalists dating back to the ancient Greeks has
been that higher forms of h u m a n existence — mentation, rationality,
foresight, and decision-making — can be hijacked by the pirates of
emotion, (p. 194)

Within psychological research into emotion and cognition the central debates have
therefore been not so m u c h about whether cognition and emotion are really distinct
entities, but what roles each play, their relationship with each other and their relative
sequencing. Thus the 'emotion' literature has, to a considerable degree, been about the
relative influence of these two allegedly distinct systems, or the order in which they
occur.
T h e James-Lange theory of emotion (James, 1884), for example, placed bodily
feelingfirst,followed by cognitive interpretations which then constituted the full
experience of emotion. O r the Cannon-Bard theory (Bard, 1934; Cannon, 1927)
proposed that separate physical feelings and consciously experienced emotion arose
simultaneously following an emotion-arousing stimulus. Later cognitive views of
emotion emphasised the role of cognitive interpretations mediating physiological
arousal and subsequent emotional experience (Schacter & Singer, 1962), or of
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appraisals preceding and determining the experience of emotion (Lazarus, 1991, 1993).
But, essentially, emotion and thought were held to be quite different things.
The picture became more complex, however, when theorists such as Zajonc
(1980) showed that subjective likes and dislikes frequently precede conscious
appraisals, that is, independently of the person's conscious appraisals. The latter
findings (consistent with the psychodynamic claims that unconscious emotional states
affect conscious experience, thought and behaviour) began to blur the boundaries
between emotion and cognition. As we will see, some affective states have been
described as fast, tacit evaluations, as a different style of cognitive appraisal.
Furthermore, distinct modes of emotion itself have been proposed: some are argued to
be mediated by conscious explicit thought, largely implicating the hippocampus; some
are tacitly or unconsciously mediated, principally by the amygdala (Cacioppo &
Gardner, 1999; Le Doux, 1995).
Generally, this idea of the distinction or opposition between rationality and
emotion is changing and increasingly the important role of emotions in higher forms of
human experience is being recognised (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Damasio, 1994;
Goleman, 1995). This trend may force a reconsideration of the nature of 'cognition'
itself, expanding the definition to include tacit and affective appraisal processes. As
such, the utility of the distinction between 'cognition' and 'emotions' is called into
question — a conclusion that Kelly (1955) came to over forty years ago. Having said
this, it may be more parsimonious to say simply that there are different modes of mental
activity. For example, while there is evidence that the neural circuitry thought to
underlie affective evaluations diverges in part from that underlying non-evaluative

identification and discrimination, " affective and non-affective appraisal are not entir
different but rather rely on a number of common information processing operations"
(Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999, p. 199).
Recent research is also questioning the earlier assumption that 'cognitive

appraisals' give rise to, or cause in linear fashion, emotion. For example, Frijda (1993)
has contended that reciprocal causation takes place, with 'emotion' instigating

'cognition' as m u c h as m u c h as the other w a y round. Lewis (1996), using non-linear,
dynamic systems theory went further, arguing that appraisals have no beginning or end.
That is, there is just an "ongoing trajectory of cognitive-emotional activity" (p. 21)
from which emerges our characteristically complex mental life.
Fortunately, there is another intellectual tradition in which there has not been
this absolute separation of reason and feeling, of cognition and affect, and which may
provide more appropriate ways to deal with the complexity of mental activity involved
in insight. Warren (1998) traced this tradition from Spinoza, through Hegel up to the
present time. For example, Anderson's (1962) and Langer's (1957, 1972) philosophical
positions were influenced strongly by the psychodynamic view of 'mind as feeling', that
emotion is a part of mind. An example of this would be the Freudian assertion that

there is a 'libidinal' base to creativity, that it has to be sublimated to emerge in soc
acceptable, creative products and ideas. Whatever the variants on this idea, it suffices
to say here that this assumption that 'emotional' processes may not be clearly distinct
from 'cognitive' processes informs the present work and, in particular, it will be
suggested that Spinoza's approach to emotional life contributes to our understanding of
insight. This approach is felt to be important because the heuristic benefits of
conceptually distinguishing 'cognition' and 'emotion' have not spread to the more
complex, characteristically human mental activities such as insight. Things have not
changed that much since Bannister (1977) remarked:
It is significant that it is precisely in those areas in which the distinction
[between cognition and emotion] makes least sense that psychologists
have spoken to least purpose. Invention, humour, art, religion,
meaning, infancy, art: all seem areas of particular mystery to
psychologists and it m a y be that they puzzle us because it makes no
sense to see them as clearly 'cognitive' or clearly 'affective', (p. 23)

Our investigation thus far has revealed that 'emotion' is thoroughly implicated in the
changes in construing which insight represents. The purpose of this chapter is,
therefore, to elaborate this link between 'emotional' modes of thought and insight. This
elaboration will begin by defining 'emotion' and 'affect' and by indicating that
'rationality' or 'reason' may be a broader term which can incorporate both 'cognition'

and 'affect' (in m u c h the same w a y that Kelly considered 'construing' to be an inclusive

term). The chapter is divided into three sections: firstly, it will be argued that feelin
and 'emotion' form the basis of mind. Langer's (1957, 1972) distinction between
representational and presentational thought and Rychlak's (1968. 1977) notion of
'affective assessments' will be discussed and linked to contemporary research into the
neuropsychology of emotion. The distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary'
emotion, and between various 'modes' of thought will be introduced, leading onto a
discussion of the relevance of this to our everyday decision-making and to Spinoza's
(1967) important distinction between 'active' and 'passive' emotions.
The second section introduces some developmental aspects of emotion and, in
particular, of emotional understanding. The term 'participatory knowing' is proposed
and such knowing is argued to be important in the development of the 'self. Aspects of

self-consciousness and non-selfconsciousness are discussed and linked to the capacity to

tolerate ambiguity and frustration and to the typical phenomenology of insight. The fina

section represents a 'provisional tightening' of this material. It suggests that the vie
mind as organised in terms of presentational and representational symbolic modes is
reflected in contemporary neuropsychological research into emotion. The utility of
these different modes of anticipation is discussed in terms of the capacity to develop a
type of emotional sensitivity, to develop 'active' emotions and to alternate between
tighter focused and looser defocused attentional modes. Related to this is the
development of certain emotional skills, such as the capacity to maintain a transcending

affective calm amid uncertainty, to be able to loosen, to engage in reverie and to engage
in less inhibited mental explorations. These more presentational modes of knowing are
linked to altered experiences of self— principally to knowing in a participatory way
which, as with insight, is frequently accompanied by feelings of connectedness and

integration. In passing, this more affectively-tuned contemplative stance is compared to
Heidegger's (1059) 'meditative thinking', a theme to be taken up in later chapters.

8.2 DEFINING EMOTION AND AFFECT
In trying to distinguish the terms 'emotion' and 'affect' one soon feels the disagreeable
pull of theoretical quicksand — quicksand that has claimed many intrepid theorists in
the past. This is partly so because people have searched for the 'essence' behind these

terms, but it is also so because the field uses the terms so inconsistently, and in such
variety of ways, that even a nominal definition cannot be agreed upon. Finally, LeDoux
(1998) made the pertinent observation that emotion probably does not represent one

general process, but rather that different emotions may have quite distinct characteris
and neuro-endocrine substrates (see also Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999).
The expedient to be used here is to merely stipulate the ways in which these
terms will be used in this work. In ordinary language 'emotion' is an all-encapsulating
term, covering the physical, psychological, 'cognitive' and behavioural elements of a
'feeling' experience. Mostly I will follow that broad usage. But I would also like on
occasion to maintain the distinction given by Rychlak (1977, see footnote 3, Chapter 4)
between emotion and affect, whereby " emotion, qua emotion is not a mental
phenomenon; it is physical" (p. 318). Affect, on the other hand, is always a type of
judgement or sense-making that may accompany the physiological feelings associated
with an emotion. As Rychlak further clarified his view: "emotions are given meaning
by the telesponding intellect that conceptualises them and names them" (1977, p. 319).
Since most authors use the terms 'emotion' and 'affect' interchangeably,
reporting on their research can create conceptual confusion. The 'solution' applied

herein is to suggest that as long as the reader bears in mind the above distinction, the
context provided should enable the reader to distinguish the sense meant. At times I
will place the word emotion in inverted commas to indicate that affect or some
predicational awareness is required — as distinct from a relatively unconstrued

physiological reaction. In any case, the distinction to be drawn in this chapter (8.4.4)
between passive and active emotion may help in this regard. Rather than considering
there to be an absolute distinction between emotion and affect, a continuum can be
envisaged wherein 'emotion' represents a relatively unconstrued, 'passive' undergoing

of a physical response (such as the startle reflex), whereas 'affect' implies a more
'active' awareness of the meaning and value for the person of such sensations and of
events generally.

8.3 EMOTION AND REASON
A growing chorus of contemporary researchers considers emotion (incorporating both

senses) to be essential to rationality (Briggs, 1990; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Claxton
1997; Damasio, 1994; Goleman, 1995; LeDoux, 1995, 1998; Lewis, 1996; Oatley,
1990; Shanon, 1993; Zajonc, 1980). Rather than considering that there is a hard-andfast division between thought and emotion, emotion itself is increasingly being
considered as if it were also a form of thought. Indeed, emotion and propositional
reason can usefully be considered as complementary modes of rationality. More than
this, it may be that 'emotional thinking' is primary:
There is no need of looking to animals for the specialized human
functions of concept formation and symbolic expression, not even to
the apes. W h a t does distinguish the 'higher' animals is a great increase
in emotionality, which entails a corresponding increase of perceptive
functions, not necessarily by virtue of better receptor organs, but of
increasing values imposed on what anciently developed senses convey.
Without a true appreciation of the richness and completeness of life
built upon instinctive action, and of the heights to which discriminative
sensibility and emotional reaction canriseon that foundation, one
cannot recognize the critical point where an overcharged system of
mental operations breaks over into imagery and symbolic conception,
and the great shift from animal mentality to mind begins. (Langer,
1972, p. 140)
With stridently memorable turn of phrase Langer (1972) imagined the breakthrough into
human mentality. Homo sapiens, the thinking 'person', could just as well be named
homopatiens (from the Latin pad to suffer), the emotional 'person'. This

developmental order is not merely of historical interest, if it be accurate, but brings
about a re-ordering of our understanding of what it means to speak of mind. This
'overcharged system of mental operations' provides the impetus, the felt significance,

the 'increasing values' cast upon the perceived world such that the 'trick' of symbolis

becomes possible.59 Regardless of h o w this step took place, an increasing body of
evidence places emotionality and feeling at the centre of mind;60 as that upon which our
reflexive, propositional capacities depend and to which we return to replenish and reinvigorate our tighter, less flexible logic.
One effect of this shift in conceptualising emotion is a rethinking of what
constitutes reason or rationality. Oatley (1990) argued that the rationality or

irrationality of emotion can only be judged in terms of whether it has a. function or rol
in cognition. He concluded that emotions have such a function: " They are concerned in
managing cognitive organization where there are multiple goals and where our models

of the world are imperfect" (1990, p. 122). Of course the vast majority of living fits t
definition because the world is largely unknowable in any final sense, and because goals
often conflict and are incommensurable.
Much of thought is not strictly 'rational' either (in terms of valid conclusions
flowing from solid premises). By way of illustration, Oatley (1990) considered people's
difficulties with probability judgements, and people's relative (inability to generate
potentially refuting hypotheses, as evidence of the 'irrationality' of some conscious
thinking processes. He suggested that when we are thinking relatively 'unemotionally',
we can draw upon cultural experience, practised skills, and a range of mental aids
suitable for well-defined problems. But when problems are new to us, our 'emotional
thinking' seems 'irrational' because we do not have well-worn mental paths to utilise
and because such problems may well have no solutions. In Kellian (1955) terms we
become aware of the vicissitudes and implications of our construing. Generally, Oatley
(1990) argued that emotion and thought are different processes, yet both can move
towards rationality — a process of converging on solutions.
This chapter will examine the ways in which emotion and mind are, arguably,
inseparable, and the ways in which a more 'presentational' and affectively-sensitive
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m o d e of mind can help explain the ubiquitous role of emotion in insight processes.
Accordingly, the following discussion will have three foci:
1 Emotional modes of understanding as the basis of mind:- I will provide evidence and
argument that support the connection between 'emotion' and mind that I have
claimed is so fundamentally important.
2 Developmental aspects of emotion and mind:- It will be proposed that early
emotional communication, built on an innate, tacit capacity for sociality, provides the
basis for the emergence of a sense of self, and thereby of reflexive consciousness. It
has been seen that such tacit, affective ways of knowing and shifts in self-experience
are important components of the insight experience. This connection will be
elaborated.
3 Emotion and insight:- A provisional account of the relationship between emotion
and insight will be presented, gathering together the evidence and arguments put
forward thus far.

8.4 FEELING AND EMOTION AS THE BASIS OF MIND
8.4.1 Presentational And Representational Thought
Philosopher Susanne Langer (1957,1972) developed the idea of a 'presentational' mode
of thought as a collective term for a looser but more aestheticallyrichand affectively
'felt' m o d e of mental awareness. A s the extended quotation in the preceding section
suggested, such emotionally-nuanced symbolism m a y form the beginning and
continuing basis of mind. The key idea is that presentations to one's senses are
"abstractable and combinatory" (1957, p. 94), and they include the felt m o o d and
affective ambience of one's experience of events. For the person immersed in the
dynamic events of the world, the simultaneous, integral presentations to one's senses are
combined into a personal presentational symbolism. The concept of presentational
consciousness thus widens our conception of rationality:

It brings within the compass of reason m u c h that has traditionally been
relegated to 'emotion', or to that crepuscular depth of the mind where
'intuitions' are supposed to be born, without any midwifery of symbols,
without due process of thought, tofillthe gaps in the edifice of
discursive, or 'rational' judgement. (Langer, 1957, pp. 97-8)

According to Langer, intuition involves the use of a non-verbal presentational
symbolism. It is a form of thought, not the absence of thought. Presentational symbolic
thought incorporates what in common parlance we call 'emotion' and 'intuition'. It is
primary both in terms of the evolutionary development of the mind and in each person's
mental development. It is seen obviously at work, for example, in our aesthetic and

artistic activities and sensibilities. Accordingly, Langer (1957) discussed in some deta
its role in our creation, and appreciation of, music. She saw music as a type of nonverbal semantic easily recognisable in everyday life.
In addition, visual forms (indeed all sensory information) can be articulated, not
propositionally or 'representationally', but presentationally. Langer argued that this

'material mode' is abstractive, just as discursive reason is, but there are differences.
The relations determining a visual structure, for example, are grasped in one act of

vision (not in sequential linear fashion as with propositional or discursive thought). I
this way presentational understandings are multidimensional, in contrast with a more
linear, representational symbolism evidenced in language and best exemplified in
mathematics. Being multidimensional, the presentational mode of thought imparts a
rich depth of meaning. It brings about what Langer (1957) called 'aesthetic emotion',

an 'adventure in implicit understanding'. She defined it as the: "emotion that springs .
from the comprehension of an unspoken idea... overcoming obstacles of word-bound
thought and achieving insight into literally 'unspeakable realities'" (Langer, 1957, p.
260). Seen here again is the argument that one needs to suspend habitual, 'verbal'
thought, to enable one to break through to new understandings. And again, intuition and
emotion seem to go hand-in-hand in the production of insight.
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Shanon (1993) discussed the extensive empirical support for Langer's idea of a presentational mode of
thought. Apart from agreeing that emotion is primary in the development of such thought, he also
emphasised that such a presentational m o d e of understanding is absolutely necessary to deal with
everyday contextual complexity. Later on (Chapter 10) I will discuss his view that an innate capacity for
metaphorical thinking stands at the centre of mind and is necessary to cope with such complexities.

Langer considered that representational thought is secondary, both in terms of
development and in terms of its prevalence in our daily mental processes. Subsequent
research, particularly into subliminal perception, (Shanon, 1993; Zajonc, 1980) suggests

that while feeling pervades all conscious thought, the converse is not the case. That is,
affect is primary relative to cognition and is non-dependent on it (Zajonc, 1980). This
recalls the earlier James-Lange theory of emotion which also considered bodily feeling
as primary and cognition as secondary in relation to emotion. If 'representational'
(conscious propositional) thought is derived from 'presentational' symbolism, then such
emotional-presentational structures may be expected to be quite superordinate in the
person's systems of understanding. As such, although not necessarily propositional in
form, nor available to conscious verbal reflection, such affectively-toned dimensions
may well be quite abstract and thereby would subsume substantial subsystems of
thought. Once again, intuitive, non-verbal structures are considered to be highly
abstract or superordinate. And this time they are explicitly associated with affect.
Implied in Langer's work is the creative importance of the more meditative style of
thought (Heidegger, 1959) implicated in insight. Such a style of thought relinquishes
tightly controlled algorithmic, means-end-type mental processes in favour of a more
contemplative, looser and receptive attitude. In the transitions represented by new
insights a type of transcending affect, or evenly hovering equanimity, commonly
characterises the period before and during insightful breakthrough.
There is one more aspect of Langer's (1957, 1972) discussion that warrants our
attention with regard to insight. That is, in representational thought the medium of
thought tends to be irrelevant. For example, the actual words used in verbal thought or
communication are usually arbitrary symbols and whether written, spoken, or sung, for
the representational mind their meanings are unchanged. Representational
consciousness is somewhat 'removed' or separate from that which it 'depicts' or
'represents'. In contrast, in presentational symbolism the 'medium is the message'.
Thus a portrait of someone affects us differently than a photograph might, or a
biography and so on. Or again, the sound of an instrument cannot be replaced by a
description of that sound.

Within representational structures meaning is simplified and tightened in the
service of clarity and agreed-upon signification. We use representational symbolism as
a tool, frequently not noticing this fact at all as its use is habitual, even appearing
objective or neutral. Overall, it is more akin to a computational or mathematical
procedure as opposed to a personal expression. At times this is an advantage as it
allows for a liberation from the constraints of this or that medium. It has a type of
independence and 'portability' that transcends time and place. Nonetheless, it may be
the case that representational thought is always under the sway of more presentational
structures. Representational structures alone could never capture or account for the
complexity of context and medium (Shanon, 1993). Even the most analytical reason is
framed within determining purposes, moods, and feelings or 'affective assessments'
(Rychlak, 1968, 1977) and is meaningful within an assumed context. In these terms,

'detached' calculation is not an absence of emotion, but a particular affective style of
thought in the service of some overarching felt purpose or desire.
These issues of sensitivity to the media of expression and experience are directly
related to the occurrence of insight. In earlier chapters it was seen that immersion in

textures, language, sounds, emotional feels and so on of one's pursuits is predictive of
insightful breakthrough. Thus, for example, we saw how 'perceptual rehearsal'

(Ippolito & Tweney, 1995), a type of saturation in the media of one's pursuits, can side
step or short-circuit one's more habitual, representational perceptions and
understandings. This return to presentational modes of awareness is a skill that can be
practised and improved upon. This more contemplative and 'aesthetic' stance —
Langer's 1957 'aesthetic emotion' — is ubiquitous in accounts of the antecedents of
insight.
Of course thought is never exclusively representational or presentational, but
these concepts describe a continuum along which thinking may vary. Thus speech acts
include presentational components such as tone of voice, rhythm, assonance, visual
expressive movements and so on. Indeed, all thought arguably has a presentational
context and background, no matter how 'neutrally' it may be presented. In much the

same way, construing can be understood as varying in terms of tightness and looseness.
With regard to tight and loose construing, a parallel can be drawn with representational
and presentational thought, respectively. Being less amenable to verbalisation and
being more metaphoric and multidimensional, presentational awareness tends to be
'looser'. The more inflexible and controlled nature of representational thought, on the

other hand, aligns itself fairly neatly with tight construing as Kelly (1955) defined it.

8.4.2 Affective Assessments
These ideas about the infusion of feeling and affect in all thought find theoretical and
empirical support in Rychlak's (1968, 1977) 'Logical Learning Theory', in particular in
his notion of 'affective assessments'.62 I have already outlined Rychlak's notion of a
'predicational', versus purely 'mediational', view of human intelligence (see 1.1 and
4.2.1), and his telic concept of the 'telosponding' versus 'responding' person (see

3.3.3.2 and 4.2.1). In addition, Rychlak (1977) argued that all predications or construa
are based on 'affective assessments' which arise from our innate capacity to "judge the
meanings of one's concepts, premises and even telosponses characterising them as
either positive or negative in meaningfulness" (1977, p. 318). He considered that all
'implicit connotative meaningfulness' is informed by affection:
... meanings and meaningfulness 'always devolve from above' in
mental acts... the positiveness or negativeness of meanings being
affirmed in telosponsivity are themselves sequaciously determined by
the even more abstract precedents of affective assessments. (Rychlak,
1977, p. 318)

There is a logic in affection, a judgement rendered which is superordinate to the process
being judged. For Rychlak (1977) affective assessments are "the most abstract of
mental telosponsivity possible" (p. 317). Indeed, recent research seems to support this
notion of the mind being primarily an 'evaluative' system generally, and also one that
divides events into 'positive' and 'negative' valences (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999).

This exactly parallels Kelly's view of hierarchical construct systems and of'emotion' as
62
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a superordinate awareness of the implications of one's processes. It is proposed that all

experience is weighed in terms of its positive or negative value to the person. Kelly did
not, however, explicitly suggest that affective processes were this superordinate within

one's system (though as I have suggested, this is consistent with the probable affective
quality of superordinate processes such as dependency and core construing).
In terms of the origin of mind, Rychlak (1977) also believed that the early mind
is based on 'raw affective assessments'. He argued that emotions move the child (more-

or-less unidirectionally) and over time she or he learns to assess emotions and bases he
or his predications or construals on these assessments. An important capacity that

emerges in this process is the ability to think intuitively. For Rychlak (1977) intuition

or feeling that one is on the right path without being able to justify such a feeling, i

based not on emotion, but on 'affection': "... there is no literal feeling emanating from
the body" (p. 331). This tacit knowing process is analogous to the way we 'feel' our
way down a darkened corridor, not seeing the destination, but having confidence we are
heading the right way. Because affective assessments are 'the most abstract of mental

telosponsivity possible' they are often implicit, tacit, or held in the background, frami
or determining what meanings and understandings we pursue.
Rychlak (1977) summarised empirical evidence for the primacy of these
affective processes in thought and learning. For example, he showed that people learn

materials better if they liked them (versus disliking them) and that this is independent
contiguity and frequency effects. He coined the term 'reinforcement value' (RV) as an
operational definition of affective assessments, seeing such RVs as an index of what is
significant to the person's self-structure or personality. To illustrate, he showed that
people who like themselves there are positive RV effects, while for schizophrenics and

chronic clinical patients there is a reversal of this pattern — the latter learning bett
using the implications of a negative assessment. For example, the latter group learned

trigrams better if they disliked them, this effect increasing if these people were teste
week later.

Rychlak also showed the same effects for school children divided into low and
high self-esteem categories. More precisely, he pointed out that positive or negative
learning styles depend on the likeability of the task, which in turn depends on the
particular premise under affirmation. Crucially, for our concern with insight, these

effects are only shown if the person is 'put on the spot' " and brought into the situatio
as a self-identity" (Rychlak, 1977, p. 425). Otherwise, such self-evaluations do not
intrude on the meaning extension. That is, as we have seen, not 'being on the spot' or

not involving self-construing in one's endeavours, may encourage creativity and insight.
More recent findings by Amabile (1990) and Claxton (1997, 1998) reinforce
Rychlak's point. For example, Claxton (1997) summarised the evidence that anything
that makes a person try too hard in solving a problem, or involves public performance,

tends to suppress creativity and intuition. For example, people have a superior capacity

to correctly identify previously exposed nonsense hieroglyphics if they are not 'tested'
on recall, but are merely asked which ones they 'prefer'. Apparently, even asking

participants to 'guess' rather than to 'try', or to blink in response rather than to voca
increases recognition of flashed stimuli. Or again, 'perceptual defence' (Bruner &
Postman, 1947), where threatening or vulgar words take longer to recognise if flashed
tachistoscopically, reflects the relative disadvantage of negative RVs. It also implies
that there is an emotional access to such anxiety-provoking stimuli which is faster than
our more familiar representational thought. As Claxton concluded: "The more the self
is involved, the more cautious consciousness has to be, for fear of getting it wrong"
(1997, p. 120). In Kellian terms, superordinate core constructions are implicated and
one's construing becomes tighter, more predictable and stereotyped, and consequently
less insightful and creative.
It is important to point out, as Kaufmann and Vosburg (1997) did, that there is
not a simple relationship between affect, creativity and insight. Whether positive or
negative emotion impacts on insight may be contingent on the different stages and
components of the creative problem-solving. Positive affect does not always lead to
more creativity nor does negative affect always lead to less. Indeed, as we have seen,

periods of frustration and anxiety seem to be necessary to evoke the type of
transcending affective strategies I have argued help bring about insight. Perhaps most
important is the type of arousal or attention (Martindale, 1995) that is utilised, and
can be set by a superordinating calm presiding over local (subordinate) anxieties and
concerns, for example. As Kaufmann and Vosburg (1997, p. 154) conclude: "... there
may be no singular, unconditional relationship between mood and creative problem-

solving." Given that creativity requires both loose and tight construing, then shifts i
mood are probably also important. Though what may be crucial is a superordinating
sense of direction and capability.
Finally, Rychlak considered that creativity and the capacity for genuine
conceptual change (insight) is gained by people who have grasped that such things flow
from the openness of more propositional63 and loose construing. They accept a type of
superordinate openness and adopt a metacognitive confidence that new understandings
are created by pushing the boundaries of one's current outlook:
Those individuals who change more have probably already affirmed
premises which sequaciously imply that adaptation, innovation, and
creative alternatives are natural in life. This kind of individual moves
through life ready to use an analogue, draw a parallel, m a k e the
dialectical reversal from affirming what is certainly true to affirming
what is not true but might be possible, and so on. (Rychlak, 1977, p.
482).

Such people are what Claxton (1997) called 'successful intuitives' — people who are
more willing to make judgements or decisions based on inadequate information and
who are more likely to be successful in such decisions. Such people tend to be able to
live with doubts and uncertainties with less fear and anxiety. They draw on what he

called the 'undermind' or 'intelligent unconscious', the background of implicit knowing
and understanding that undergirds our conscious mental life. I will give more detail
below of Claxton's (1997) speculations and about the neuropsychology of how such a
transcending state of relaxation and calmness, a relative abeyance of self-concern, may
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Kelly (1955, p. 564) defined propositional construing as that in which " a construct... carries no
implications regarding the other realm memberships of its elements... This is uncontaminated
construction".

be reflected in certain brain states and m a y enable looser, more creative knowing
processes to occur.

8.4.3 The Neuropsychology Of Emotion
... it is apparent that emotion is carried out under the control of both
subcortical and cortical structures. .. .feelings are just as cognitive as
any other perceptual image. (Damasio, 1994, p. 158)

Neurophysiological evidence provides support for the idea that emotionality is involved
in our thinking (Bechera et al., 1997; Damasio, 1994; Goleman, 1995; LeDoux, 1995).
I have mentioned above a distinction between emotion and affect borrowed from
Rychlak's (1968, 1977) Logical Learning Theory. Essentially, this is that while
'emotion' is a general term — which m a y include more-or-less instinctive or innate
responses —

'affect' implies a psychological 'assessment'. A n affective assessment

affirms one possibility, one meaning in an event, aware at the same time that 'it could
have gone another way'. But what of pan-cultural, presumably 'wired-in' emotional
responses, the evidence for which is substantial (LeDoux, 1995; M c C o y , 1977;
Tomkins, 1962)? The fear response and its accompanying physiological changes, for
example, do not seem to depend upon personal constructions. It is unlikely w e all
happened to construct the same basic emotional patterns. Rather, it seems w e begin
with a basic sub-constructive, body-based repertoire that is endlessly elaborated and
refined. But the basis appears to be given.

8.4.3.1 Primary And Secondary Emotions And Brain Pathways
This distinction between innate and 'constructed' emotions m a y be paralleled in the
physiology of two proposed 'emotion' pathways in the brain (LeDoux, 1995).
Activation of these pathways have been observed to be 'correlates' of emotional
experience. This is not to suggest that emotion is the activation of neural pathways.
According to this view, thefirstis a very fast 'instinctive' path utilising the 'old brain'
(via a single synapse from the thalamus to the amygdala — the latter operating as a type

of emotional 'sentinel' for experience (Goleman, 1995). The second slower and more
'reflective' path (the 'standard route') runs from the thalamus via a m u c h larger
projection of nerves to the prefrontal lobes (implicated with 'working memory') and
thence to the neocortex generally (Goleman, 1995; LeDoux, 1995). In this secondary
'emotional' pathway m u c h more sensory 'information' is argued to be available and,
crucially, the prefrontal area appears to be able to enhance or inhibit the response of the
amygdala. That is, the prefrontal cortices have "links to every avenue of motor and
chemical response available to the brain" (Damasio, 1994, p. 181). In short, secondary
affective constructions are proposed to have a certain capacity to inhibit and activate
innately-provided, 'primary' emotional pathways and are likely to significantly involve
the prefrontal cortices.
Most of the brain's activity is concerned with intra-brain 'communication'.
Arguably, the psychological correlate of this is that memories and thoughts can also
stimulate activity in the amygdala and the 'limbic system', engendering affective
experience independently of sensory 'input'. In this w a y the basic emotional range is
hypothetically added to, refined, expanded exponentially and thoroughly interlaced with
thought. This leads some to draw a distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary'
emotions (Damasio, 1994; Goleman, 1995) whereby constructed, emotionally-coded
'pathways' are thought to be 'hooked into' the amygdala-related emotional complex
leading to the well-documentedfindingsthat decision-making and intuitive preferences
are often 'faster than thought' (Claxton, 1997, 1998; Zajonc, 1980).
T o this extent emotions can be divided theoretically into relatively involuntary
and voluntary processes, each correlated with activation of different neurological
networks but both of which emanate from the amygdala (LeDoux, 1995). At least in
relation to fear, some fascinating implications follow from this. People demonstrate
individual differences in their capacity to have insight into their emotions. LeDoux
(1995) concluded that, for whatever reason (genetic and/or experiential), people m a y
vary in the degree to which 'lower-order' pathways or 'higher-order' pathways are
capable of triggering emotional experience. H e also argued that memories associated

with the observed processes of the amygdala appear to be indelible. This reflects the
well-known therapeutic experience that, for example, traumatic emotional memories
seem to transcend time and never seem to be completely erased. One implication of this
view is that extinction of such memories involves inhibition — 'submergence' or
'suspension' in Kelly's (1955) terms — not erasure, and "the role of therapy may be to
allow the cortex to establish more effective and efficient synaptic links with the
amygdala" (LeDoux, 1995, p. 229). This implies not only that we may be able to
inhibit indelible emotional responses, but we may also be able to modulate and utilise
emotional pathways generally — a conclusion that may help in explaining the particular
affective qualities of insight.
It is possible that very fast, non-consciously mediated emotional responses are
forms of'primitive' construing (Katz, 1984). Such ecologically-programmed survival
responses would be highly superordinate, constraining large-scale networks of

subordinate construction when they are regnant. This is possibly paralleled in the neur
pathways connecting the amygdala-'emotionaF complex to most parts of the brain and
to various central nervous system and endocrine systems of the body. These proposed
'primitive' or basic emotional processes may form the basis for an ever-expanding
affective repertoire informed by our experience and understanding. For example,
Damasio's (1994) 'somatic markers' are special feelings generated from 'secondary'
emotions. According to this theory, through constructive experience primary feelings
and emotions become connected to anticipated events, highlighting various options and
eliminating others. In these terms 'intuition' would be an example of the operation of

covert somatic markers in which there is a very fast pre-selection of options carried out
according to biologically-informed preferences or 'values'. Connected to primary

emotional systems, the 'feelings' of intuition (T feel it in my bones' etc.) are a type o

virtual emotion, one that is re-membered, re-constituted. This fast preselection is bas
on one's anticipatory successes and failures in the past. Contemporary theorists
(Claxton, 1997; Goleman, 1995; LeDoux, 1995) have suggested that such emotional
processes are 'quick and dirty' appraisals that pre-dispose us towards certain actions
decisions, and away from others.

Neuroanatomical development also seems to suggest that very early memories
may be 'emotional' ones because the networks thought to subserve declarative
conscious memories do not mature sufficiently till the second or third year (LeDoux,
1995). The development of early constructs, especially dependency constructs (those

linking other people to one's survival or 'maintenance processes), could be built on th
basis of an innate predisposition to divide experience into positive and negative
affective construals (Cacioppo and Gardner, 1999). It is not that we have direct,

'objective' access to these proposed body-based emotional patterns, or that they direct
determine our thinking. Rather, there appears to be converging evidence for the idea

that there are universal, innate, survival-related emotional processes that constrain a

abide in our constructions. They are in just as much need of construal as anything else

in the world. Indeed, being able to 'place them within a system', to tighten them up as

were, may be one of our most pressing life tasks and linked to our highest achievements
These ideas about emotions being predisposing devices, or 'quick-and-dirty'
appraisals have been given extensive treatment by Damasio (1994). His non-dualist
account of mind gives an embodied, yet non-reductionist basis to our mental processes.
At the 'heart' of his account of mind are emotional feelings and moods:
Feelings let us mind the body, attentively, as during an emotional state,
or faintly, as during a background state. They let us mind the body
'live', w h e n they give us perceptual images of the body, or by
rebroadcast, w h e n they give us recalled images of the body state
appropriate to certain circumstances, in 'as if feelings, (p. 159)
According to this account, one's world is primarily experienced through perturbations
one's body. The basis for this 'mindful body' is emotional awareness. One's primary
emotional patterns come first and form a frame of reference for the development of all
later thought, including emotional memories and 'secondary' emotions. These body
images give a quality of 'goodness' or 'badness' (note Rychlak's 'affective

assessments'), to objects, situations and experiences. All construing, he argued, is ba
on this affective template. Damasio gave powerful expression to these ideas with his
'somatic marker hypothesis'. Somatic markers are:
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emotionally pragmatic and relational way, then valid construing is a w a y of being-with,
of participating-with the world (especially others). It is not a separate, inner cognitive
act 'representing' that world 'out there', but is a w a y of being-in-the-world, a
participatory knowing.
Our growing conscious propositional (representational) understanding m a y well
operate in a parallel and similar fashion to emotional understanding. For Plato,
knowledge w a s generated by Eros. Ideally, in his view of philosophical thought, one
approaches and 'consorts' with reality in a type of participatory, loving 'knowing-with'.
But, of course, our grasp of the world is always incomplete. Yet in Plato's suggestion
lies the psychological insight that w e yearn for a sense of integration, of connectedness.
Just as the child bends all to establish emotional bonds with those around him or her, in
the h u m a n search for meaning and understanding w e m a y endure failure and
disappointment, great frustration and extended effort — especially if w e have already
had experiences of this kind of breaking through into insight. W e search for meaning
not as an intellectual exercise but as a fully-embodied, passionate effort to be 'as one'
with the world. Even if the insight is mistaken, w e initially feel the sudden coherence
and 'sense' of connectedness as emblematic of that greater coherence w e seek.
Assuming that the nature of the person is one whose being is to 'take' the world
to him or herself, to 'anticipate' it, then all understanding can be considered as an
emotionally-nuanced type of action. W e are vitally interested in others and our world,
and w h e n w e are not clouded and prodded by the urgencies of anxiety and fear (which
for most of us is m u c h of the time), w e m a y 'wait upon' the world in wide-eyed
openness. This is a venture in participation, a personal conversation with reality. W e
m a y disperse our dependency requirements more and more widely onto other people
and activities, but our dependency and our need for intimate relations is not thereby
reduced. Our survival (and our growth) is connected with our successful 'coupling'
with the 'other', by empathic understanding and by 'fitting' with our lived-world. To
do this w e must be open to the unknown, to let go of what w e know. In this sense the
word 'understanding' refers to both person and process, to both oneself and one's

relations. W h e n w e understand w e 'stand under' or 'undergo' the situation, w e open

ourselves to its influence. Implicit in this is self-abnegation, a humility or willingness
be influenced by our circumstances. This is subjectivity in the service of objectivity
(Warren, 1998).

8.5.3 Emotional Understanding And The Formation Of Self
Primary selfobject65 relatedness is the person's experience, at any age,
of a connection with a significant h u m a n other or attachment figure as
support for the establishment, development, and maintenance of
continuous, cohesive, positive self-experience. Such relatedness is
crucial for learning to recognize, differentiate, and express a range of
emotional experience. (Orange, 1995, p. 179)

It can be seen from Orange's relational self-psychology perspective that a person may
not be born with a sense of self, but develops it via ongoing, largely emotional,
communication with significant others. Indeed, it has been suggested that this sense of
self is continuously changing and developing, though perhaps its emotional

characteristics are relatively stable over the life-span. Daniel Stern (1985, discussed in
Orange, 1998) concluded that a 'self emerges in the first year of life and is based on
'affective attunements' between the child and caretaker. These attunements involve
"the infant's recognition of the other's recognition of the infant's emotional

experience" (p. 101). In this way the child is theorised to 'notice' his or her 'reflection
in the face and reactions of the other. Later on this image of self becomes stabilised
even without the presence of the other.
With optimal responsiveness our emotional relational experience can be
incorporated within a positive core of self. Given a positive, more stable sense of self,
frustration or uncertainty can be better accepted as a normal, but non-permanent, nonthreatening part of self-experience. Constant validation is not required to maintain a

stable, positive sense of self. There is an emotional security, a confidence that in time i
will be resolved. Just as securely-attached children may wander out of sight or at some
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Orange defines the term 'selfobject' as the "mirroring of a child's natural grandiosity
as an essential ingredient of healthy development" (1995, p. 179). This definition emphasises the literal
identification of self and the objects (people mostly) which afford the person a mirrored sense of self.

distance from their mothers and not immediately feel anxious or 'lost' (Bowlby, 1988),
so people in creative pursuits, solving problems, and so on, may 'forget themselves',

may engage so fully in their tasks that they are freed of self-consciousness. As noted i

earlier chapters, such a state of absorption or reverie increases the likelihood of insi
This is an emotional skill, a way of managing oneself 'as if one were so closely
connected-with, and participating-with, one's immediate circumstances such that selfreferencing thought is superfluous.
A growing child takes frequent 'risks' in the expansion of his or her capacities.
As the activities and capacities change, so does the self. Each new understanding and
new achievement is at first a loss of the old self. Over time, however, we operate more

and more out of established and stabilised constructions of self and of events generally
We construct a dynamic system of understanding that shows considerable stability over

time. This is essential as we gain more mastery and control in our lives. It is also why
frustration and impasse may threaten us. Our hard-won gains may be in question.
Genuine new insight, involving as it does the undoing of certain constructions, is akin

a loss of parts of oneself. To invite new insight we must risk our organising principles
If we are not to merely repeat forever what we already know, this process of undoing
and remaking is essential.
An important point here is that Meno's Paradox, with which 1 began this work,
assumes we are isolated cognitive atoms, as if our ideas and knowing are separate from
the world and those around us. But if understanding and self begins by participating in

the world, especially with others, then the more stabilised (tight) ways we have come to
anticipate events may need to be set aside in times of impasse. We may need to return

to the participatory knowing (Barfield, 1988) that is neither internal or external, priv

or public but is created in its own act of participatory unfolding. We need to loosen ou
identification with our present understandings and venture further away from the safe
and the known. Our core construing needs to be permeable enough to take uncertainty

and frustration in its stride. The inclination is to tighten construing, to return to wh

know. But if our present understandings are to no avail, then they must be loosened if
we are to develop new ways of understanding and to better cope with our circumstances.
In Personal Construct Psychology (Kelly, 1955) a developmental theory of the
person consistent with that sketched above is present, if only implicitly, and is most
clearly seen in the concept of dependency construing.66 Such construing (connecting
important caregivers to one's needs) allows the person to develop 'roles' which reflect
the person's growing sense of themselves as a person-in-relation (Walker, 1990). This
earliest construing is designed to link the child to those around him or herself; to
encourage those people to commune with the child; for them to be willing to, and to
learn how to, meet his or her needs; to inculcate in the child a sense of connectedness
and, thereby, security. This may well be the basis of the sense of connectedness that
insight restores to the person whose failure to anticipate has separated him or her from
his or her anticipatory 'fit' with the world.
Our core construing (construing governing the our maintenance processes) may

become so intimately linked to our self-perceived ability to anticipate, that failures t
make sense of things and continued frustration in understanding may well threaten our

core meanings. That is, impasse, if it be in an area of personal importance to the person
may be experienced as literally implying comprehensive changes to, or even loss of,
self. The frequently-reported loss of self-concern and a mildly euphoric sense of self-

transcendence in insight may well reflect this shift from self-referencing frustration a
awareness of personal invalidation, to a more primary and relational participatory
knowing (Barfield, 1988; McWilliams, 1993), a return to a mode of understanding more
presentational and 'emotional' in character.
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A s indicated previously, Kelly considered calling his approach 'Role Theory'. This is important in the
present context because roles are established by the person 'in order to distribute one's dependencies'.
The preverbal processes by which the child anticipates the satisfaction of his or her dependency needs are
probably superordinate throughout life. With the advent of reflexive and propositional thought w e do not
cease to construe in preverbal and 'presentational' ways. Rather, there develops a depth to construction,
the verbal 'labels' often attached to construing processes frequently being shorthand for deeper processes
of meaning-making. Given the person's initial, empathic, wordless anticipatory capacities, the rest of
Kelly's theory provides well for an understanding of the ongoing development and growth of the person.

8.6 EMOTION AND INSIGHT: A PROVISIONAL TIGHTENING
8.6.1 A Summary
This chapter began by asserting that emotion, in the broad sense, is very m u c h a part of
reasoning and of mind. The findings in the insight literature indicated that this was so
and m y discussion of Personal Construct Psychology indicated that emotion was likely
to be pivotal in changes in the construct system such as insight m a y represent. I
outlined Langer's distinction between representational and presentational thought, the
latter containing the affective and intuitive qualities of thought that w e have seen are
related to insight. That is, presentational thought is looser, more emotional and intuitive
than more propositional, conscious thought. W e saw that a growing number of
researchers consider that emotional thought is primary both in evolution and in
individual development. I then examined various features of presentational thought,
including its relative multidimensionality, its media-sensitivity and the likelihood that it
is quite superordinate and influential in the person's system of understanding. These
ideas were then compared to Rychlak's concept of'affective assessments' as the source
of, or abstracting base for, our constructive and anticipatory endeavours.
This discussion w a s then echoed in m y examination of current neuropsychology
and neuroscience. In looking at the hypothesised physical substrate of 'emotional'
thinking processes, support w a s found for a distinction between a tighter
representational m o d e of thought versus a more affective, intuitive thought. These
distinctions were discussed in relation to both the ideas of active versus passive
emotions and secondary versus primary emotions. These parallels and comparisons of
disparate approaches to emotion and thought allowed us to see that there was a great
deal in c o m m o n between theorists postulating a more creative, affective and intuitive
m o d e of thought, and researchers w h o have correlated more creative and absorptive
states with distinct patterns of brain activation and pathways of activation. W e saw, for
example, h o w a m o r e meditative or relaxed state of being m a y utilise the physiology of
the brain to generate a wider more diffuse activation which has been associated with
creativity and insight experiences.

Finally, I looked at h o w emotional thought m a y form the basis of consciousness
and of a sense of self. I used the phrase 'participatory knowing' to emphasise the
relational quality of affective thought. Beginning in emotional empathy and compelled
by a desire for connectedness, such thought is preverbal and largely tacit. An
examination of how a sense of self might emerge from emotional 'mirroring' followed

and it was concluded that the more secure this sense of self, the more likely the person
was to be adventurous and experimental amid uncertainty. This challenge to be creative

requires a type of emotional skill, a way of regulating our affect so that frustration a
impasse do not cause us to tighten up our thought and retreat to what we already know.
Broadly speaking, some of the phenomenology of insight was related to these
developmental issues, for example, the sense of being at-one with the world, of
connectedness, and the relief and joy of once again being able to anticipate. It now
remains for me to suggest how this discussion has advanced us in this inquiry into
insight and to indicate the questions I still need to pursue.

8.6.2 Some Concluding Comments
Emotion is the key to whether attention is concentrated or diffuse and unpredictable.
For example, there appears to be more tension for participants doing tracking tasks if
they are offered incentives — as evidenced by their resulting loss of peripheral vision
within the task as they focus 'harder' in order to earn 'reward' (Claxton, 1997). There
also evidence that incentive-giving can cut down on creativity generally (Amabile,
1990; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). This tighter, more focused attention can lead to more
predictable mental processes and, as we have seen, in some circumstances is inimical to

insight. Claxton (1997) argued that broad diffuse attention is what is required for illdefined, non-routine problems where data is inadequate or impoverished and where
small incidental detail may provide the clue needed for insight (see also Perkins 1995

and his 'Klondike spaces'). Again, this is the type of mental style that is associated w

insightful thinking. Though, as we noted earlier, insight probably requires both a peri

of early frustration followed by some w a y of transcending the tightening effects of the
resulting anxiety.
The person's superordinating intention is what drives the style of attention and
the mental stance adopted. Given Western culture's emphasis of control and the
analytic mind, we often feel pressurised for results. We habitually engage in a tighter
'looking for' rather than a looser 'waiting upon' (Heidegger, 1959). Thereby, we limit
our contact with the 'undermind' (Claxton, 1997) and intuitive thinking. In responding
to the pressures of invalidation and impasse, extremes of loosening or tightening are
both counterproductive. To encourage insight there needs to be a particular use of
looser processes such that they do not overwhelm us, or run away in purely
associationist fashion. We must be able to contain them with 'adequate ideas'
(Spinoza's 'active emotions') and they must be subsumed by permeable superordinate
structures.
I have posited a type of transcending affect that, depending on its permeability
and degree of comprehensiveness, can modulate primary emotional processes. In this
type of construing the person can utilise some of the features of 'primary' emotions.
One such feature is the making of broad, quick-and-dirty 'appraisals', viewing multiple

possibilities very quickly, screening out many, predisposing us to others. In the face of

ill-defined problems, such a skill is essential given the vast combinatorial possibilitie
that may confront the problem-solver (Oatley, 1990; Perkins, 1997). Such a
transcending affective stance also allows for a slowing down of 'normal', highly
practised, propositional thought (Claxton, 1997). This superordinate affective stance is
a relatively loose form of construing which 'allows' subordinate discontinuities, even
absurdities (that is, from a tightly-construed vantage point).
We may also be able to modulate and utilise emotional pathways generally — a

conclusion that may help in explaining the particular affective qualities of insight. Thi
is because affective thought is considered to have a wide purview, to be

multidimensional and to operate associatively. It is not precise, but it can be creative.

A useful 'emotional' skill may be to capitalise on the brain's biochemistry and structure

Daydreaming, brainstorming, reverie and so on bring about changes to the direction,
speed, depth and patterns of neural inhibition and disinhibition allowing shifts in the
style or mode of thought. Specifically, such a transcending affective stance can make
for creativity and insight.
This makes ecological sense in that the person who feels relatively little threat or
pressing needs can experiment and create. Such a mood and approach allows for "...
widespread, low intensity activation [which arguably] incorporates into the
representation of a situation more of its personal resonances and connotations"
(Claxton, 1997, p. 155). This is experienced more as a 'felt meaning' which is
embodied and which makes more personal sense to us. For Claxton (1997), the
'undermind' is the repository of emotion and feeling. It is tapped when attention is
more diffuse and the person adopts a "contemplative perceptual stance in which the

world is allowed to speak more fully for itself (p. 165). Again, this is subjectivity in
the service of objectivity. The emerging 'felt sense' (Gendlin, 1978) is clearly a
presentational mode of knowing. It is a type of capacity for non-selfconscious
absorption, a capacity to wait and not grasp or seek for something in particular.

Essentially, the type of mindfulness Claxton discussed is one in which thinking slows to
the point where one can begin to see one's assumptions as assumptions. This is of
course the meditative thinking which Heidegger praised so highly and which I am
pursuing in this inquiry.
The neuropsychological findings distinguishing 'emotional' pathways from
other cortical processes may help us understand why strategies conducive of loosening
may work towards insight. When, for example, the fear system described by LeDoux
(1998) is not activated in the course of frustration and impasse, this leaves resources
open for experimentation. More positively, relaxation lessens mutual neural inhibition
allowing for more defocused attention, more lateral associations, and a more receptive,
playful stance. Such an affective stance may allow us to tap info meaning processes
which operate faster than representational thought. Yet the person is in no hurry to

m a k e this looser thinking coalesce into conclusions, but is content to 'mull over'
interesting possibilities.
It may well be that one's 'original' affective and presentational consciousness is
utilised to maintain ourselves in relationship with our caregivers and to develop a
sustainable sense of self. In attempting to overcome impasse and failures to anticipate,
however, we may need to use this preverbal, presentational mode of construing in the
service of a disinterested, openness to understand. This may help to explain why

insight is frequently felt as if it is 'dictated to us' or as exterior and spontaneous, a
coming from 'without'. This may occur because we are using our archetypically
interpersonal and empathic mode of understanding in relation to our impasse. This
places us in an 'I -thou' frame of mind in which self-consciousness is backgrounded and
one enters into a more participatory mode of knowing. Just as Kelly asked us to
abandon our knowing in pursuit of new understandings, to launch us into uncertainty in
the service of new anticipations, so we must create in ourselves a sense of security, of
calm and confidence precisely at those times when our attempts to anticipate are
frustrated. Just as the securely-attached child does not need to anxiously check that
'mother' is nearby, we must learn not to observe self-consciously our constructive
progress, but rather 'lose ourselves' in participatory anticipation.
It still remains, however, to explain how emotional and presentational modes of
awareness have the capacity to open up possibilities, to engender creativity and make
for quantum jumps in understanding. How can one conceptualise the complexity and
multidimensionality of thought that emotional thought can open up? We are in need of
other conceptual dimensions that can carry us further in this quest for insight into
insight. It is to Matte-Blanco's (1975, 1988) distinction between asymmetrical and
symmetrical thinking that I will next turn. I will look at how these complementary
processes may deepen our understanding of loose and tight construing. A theme I will
also pursue in the next chapter is this higher complexity and richness of tacit and
unconscious mental processes. I will attempt to link what I have been saying about the
alternation between more affectively-sensitive thought and more structured conscious

thought to Kelly's Creativity Cycle. T o do this I will compare and contrast the
contributions of Kelly and Matte-Bianco coming in the end to a more detailed
understanding of how loosening and tightening of construing works.
In relinquishing representational thought when confronted by impasse there is a
trade-off. A more presentational and affective construing may have a higher
dimensionality and so can encompass more of our system of understanding at once. We
can grab a type of aesthetic feel for things. We can garner a felt sense of whether our
anticipations gel or fit with events and whether the emerging structure coheres.
However, the price is a lack of precision and the difficulty of making such felt
convictions conscious. What is frequently needed are figurative and metaphorical
devices to 'contain' and give form to such thinking. Interpretations based on
presentational thought can and do vary — and this is due to its open-ended and
multidimensional nature. This is precisely what happens in loose construction which,

by definition, also leads to varying predictions. In the next 2 chapters I will elaborat
in turn, the structural and dimensional features of presentational thought, and in the
chapter following that, its pragmatic, embodied and metaphorical nature.

CHAPTER 9: MATTE-BLANCO, KELLY AND INSIGHT

9.1 INTRODUCTION
The above lines of inquiry into insight point to the importance of tacit and
'unconscious' mental processes. M o r e precisely, what appears to be essential for insight
to occur is an optimal alternation between tacit, looser and more presentational
awareness on the one hand, and relatively conscious,tighterrepresentational thought on
the other. While some authors (Briggs, 1990; Martindale, 1995) have m a d e direct
reference to 'primary process thinking', most others have referred more generally to
unconscious or tacit processes. In particular, Claxton (1997,1998) has emphasised the
need to maintain contact with, and to utilise, one's 'intelligent unconscious' or
'undermind'. There is a shift in thinking about the nature of unconscious processes,
moving away from the image of there being an unconscious which is a type of 'sump'
for repressed and suppressed contents, towards a view that processes outside conscious
awareness play a creative and positive role in our mental economy (Orange, 1998;
Rayner, 1995). The idea that there are theoretically distinct and complementary mental
modes has been a major theme in this present work and will be given more a thorough
treatment in this chapter.
W e have seen h o w important emotional processes are in insight. But it is not
just any emotion that aids in creative thought. Spinoza's distinction between active and
passive emotions allowed us to see that it was a transcending affective stance towards
one's impasse that operates as a type of'pivot' between looseness and tightness;
between the undoing of construct structure and the provisional tightening of structure
that then allows more conscious awareness to take place. M u c h as Freud suggested that
therapists adopt an evenly hovering attention in order to be attunedtotheir patients'
unconscious processes, so w e all have the creative capacity to adopt an accepting
openness to our o w n tacit and looser mental processes. Matte-Bianco (1975,1988; see
also Rayner, 1995), a Chilean mathematician and psychoanalyst, developed a most

informative and thought-provoking account of the system unconscious.67 There is m u c h
in what he has said that accords with our growing understanding of insight, including a
striking consonance between his twin concepts of symmetrical and asymmetrical
thought and Kelly's loose and tight construing, respectively.68
Bell (1996) was the first to see the link between Matte-Bianco and Kelly. He
argued that loose construing best matches the five main features of Freud's (1911)
unconscious and of primary process thinking. These features are (a) the absence of
mutual contradiction, (b) condensation, (c) timelessness, (d) displacement, and (e)
replacement of external by internal reality. Bell was interested in how cognitiveperceptual disorders are related to loose construing and thus turned to Matte-Blanco's
(1975, 1988) account of the system unconscious to help explicate loosening and
tightening. Bell considered that this neo-Freudian account of the unconscious was more
detailed and sophisticated than Kelly's relatively unelaborated account of loose
construing. I too consider that Matte-Blanco's account may help us, but this time to
provide an understanding of insight beyond Kelly's explanation of the creativity cycle.

So it is with the promise of this deeper understanding that I now turn to Matte-Blanco's
redescription of Freud's system unconscious.

9.2 MATTE-BLANCO AND THE SYSTEM UNCONSCIOUS
9.2.1 Asymmetrical And Symmetrical Processes
Matte-Bianco (1975, 1988) proposed that conceptualisation can be thought of in terms
of sets69 that can be related in two ways: asymmetrically and symmetrically.
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No allegiance to Freud's theory of the dynamic unconscious or to his topographical view of the mind
is implied here. W e are interested principally in the (empirically observed) features of psychic life which
led to the postulation of a system unconscious.
68
While considering concordances with theorists influential in this present work, it is significant to note
that Matte-Bianco was also strongly influenced by Susanne Langer. Indeed he adopted her formal logic
in his theorising and was clearly cognisant of her concept of two contrasting mental modes, that is,
representational and presentational thought.
69
Personal constructs can also be usefully represented as sets (Caputi, 1986; Chiari, Mancini, Nicolo &
Nuzzo, 1990) and Bell (1996) has proposed that, given this, Matte-Blanco's ideas can also be usefully
applied to personal construing.

Asymmetrical relationships are based in difference, are 'rational' and are hierarchic,
while symmetrical relationships are based on sameness, are 'irrational' and equivalent.
Applying this to the framework of P C P , as Bell (1996) did, asymmetrical relationships
function as do ordinal relationships between constructs, as set out in the Organization
Corollary. That is, they operate in terms of transitive 'If... Then' implications allowing
for prediction of the following kind:
If A , ... then B. If B,... then C.

Given A , ... therefore C

It follows that the converse of an asymmetrical relation is not equivalent. Thus
'John is taller than Mary' does not equal 'Mary is taller than John'. If 'Mary is taller
than Anne', it also follows that 'John is taller than Anne', and so on. Symmetrical
relationships, on the other hand, demonstrate relations of sameness and of reversibility.
This appears quite illogical to highly conscious asymmetrical thinking. According to
Matte-Bianco (1988), for example, 'Mary is taller than John' can, under deep
'symmetrisation' of thought, be held to be loosely equivalent to 'John is taller than
Mary'! Such 'illogicality' and reversibility isfrequentlyencountered in dreams.
Matte-Bianco (1975, 1988) suggested that symmetrical thought shares some of
the properties of infinite sets. A (mathematical) property of infinite sets is that each
element can stand in one-to-one relation with a part or subset of its set. A n example of
this is given in Rayner & Tuckett (1988) concerning the relationship between the set of
natural numbers and a subset, the set of even numbers. It appears there will be twice as
m a n y natural numbers as even numbers. But since every natural number is exactly one
half of its corresponding even number, then each element (natural number) can be
related to a subset of its elements (even numbers). A subset can, in some loose fashion,
be identified or equated with the whole set.
Set of Natural Numbers:

{1, 2, 3,4, 5, ...}

Set of Even Numbers :

{2,4,6,8,10,...}

Although notions of size and equality are problematic within infinite sets, it is
clear that the 'normal' rules and comparisons of sets break d o w n under the appearance
of infinity. Matte-Bianco believed that conceptualisation in the unconscious operates in

analogous, symmetrical fashion. Thus, symmetrical thought flouts classical laws of
(asymmetrical) logic and elements can be identified with the whole set and thereby, in
deeper levels of symmetry, to all the elements within the set. Thus the features of
primary process thinking, as summarised above, are all expressions of symmetrical
thought in which distinctions in time, space and relations are broken down. Moreover,
Matte-Bianco (1988) considered the 'indivisible mode' (symmetry) to be the ground or
basis of all consciousness.70 He also argued that symmetrical thought, where only
sameness is recognised, is pervasive in the unconscious and influential in emotional
states.
According to Matte-Bianco (1988) emotionality largely gives us the framework
within which to analyse and think. Rayner (1995) summarised Matte-Blanco's view of
emotional states as:
instantaneous awareness and integration of vast networks of perceptible
relations [which] are vital since they enable the location and evaluation
of the significance of internal and external objects and conditions. This
is the function of emotionality, (p. 20)
Matte-Bianco (1988) considered emotion as an instantaneous appraisal and evaluation
of internal events (physical and psychological) and of the external world. Visceral
feelings, the relation of self to others and to the world, anticipations, memories and
exteroceptions are all combined in one gestalt as " a wholistic experience of
multiplicity" (Rayner, 1995, p. 18). This clearly parallels much of the research into

emotion discussed in the previous chapter. This multiplicity of emotionality leads to t
related question of the dimensionality of symmetrical and asymmetrical thought.

9.2.2 Dimensions Of Awareness
Matte-Bianco (1975, 1988) also argued that asymmetrical and symmetrical thought
differed in terms of their 'dimensionality'. Asymmetrical thought is confined to the
three spatial dimensions plus time, while symmetrical thought (including emotion)
70

The echoes of Langer's (1957) view — that presentational consciousness was the basis of human
mentality — are strong here.

operates within a higher dimensionality. It is this characteristic of symmetrical thought
that keeps it relatively 'unconscious', only entering full consciousness (in less
dimensions) indirectly by way of figurative, metaphorical and non-verbal expression.
Matte-Bianco (1988) compared the types of mathematical distortions that occur
when we try to represent something of higher dimension in terms of fewer dimensions
with attempts to translate unconscious contents into conscious thoughts. Typically,
distortions appear where elements are repeated. For example, in dreams a single

element can stand for one thing, then another, then back to the first again. I may dream

that a person is say, my brother, then I become that figure, then I realise the figure i
both brother and myself, and so on. The more the dimensional reduction, the greater the
repetitions and distortions (see Bell, 1996, and Rayner, 1995 for discussions). Such
(consciously recognised) distortions and contradictions are ideally 'contained' within
asymmetrical thought flexible enough to accommodate the 'contradictories'. This
would be an example of bi-modal thought.

9.2.3 Bi-Modal Thought
Symmetry tends to reign in less conscious modes of thinking and understanding, while
asymmetry is characteristic of (though not confined to) conscious, 'rational' thought.
Matte-Bianco (1988) made it clear that optimal mental functioning involves both logics
(symmetry and asymmetry) working in harmony. In such bi-modal thought all levels of
consciousness are felt. The symmetrical aspects create a felt depth and dimensionality
to one's awareness, but do not over-ride consistent, asymmetrical inference. The
registration of sameness or symmetry is a necessary component of 'rational' thought:
... when abstraction occurs in logical thought, and identity (symmetry)
is discovered; but it is immediately circumscribed by awareness that
there are a great m a n y properties that distinguishfromeach other the
items under scrutiny. (Rayner, 1995, p. 78)
This is bi-modality. The symmetrical is bounded by asymmetry and consistent
inference is maintained. In rich and emotionally evocative imagination, the two logics

work in harmony. This is entirely consistent with the Spinozan idea of active emotions
being those feelings which are bound by adequate ideas. Insight may reflect this
harmony between symmetry and asymmetry as a bringing into awareness of a
dimensionality and a sense of infinity unavailable by asymmetrical means alone.

9.2.4 Bi-Logic
Of course not all thinking operates so ideally. It is when asymmetrical and symmetrical

processes alternate or occur simultaneously, but not in concert, that cognitive-perceptua
distortions appear. This is called bi-logical thought. Within bi-logic we may become

aware of the intransitivity and illogicalities of our awareness and this can be anxiety o
threat-provoking. Since symmetrisation is the process of ignoring asymmetrical

relationships and implications, in this state object and subject may not be discriminated
and it can be close to an experience of 'experiencing only' — where construing is so
loose that experiences are not placed securely within a system of anticipation and
understanding. Abstracted conceptions, attributes or intuitions ('loveliness', 'evil',
'niceness') float relatively free of specific elements and relations and this state
represents the intrusion of 'infinities' or boundlessness into thought.
Rayner (1995) referred to bi-logical structures as manifesting 'looseness'.
Within quite loose symmetrical awareness we may not be aware of any inconsistencies
and intransitivities — which of course parallels the suggestion made earlier that we may
loosen construing to avoid awareness of anticipatory failures and impasses. Awareness
of inconsistencies, and often negative affect, may occur upon the return to asymmetrical
thought. In a way, with excursions into the deeper levels of symmetry we are playing
with fire. If we lack a sufficiently permeable and comprehensive superordinate structure
capable of subsuming the infinities and multiplicity of symmetry, then, as Bell's (1996)
work indicated, quite serious anticipatory problems, such as hallucinations, schizoid
thought disturbances, and so on, can emerge.

9.2.5

Levels Of Consciousness

Matte-Bianco outlined five levels or strata of consciousness. At the fifth level
symmetrisation reaches a logical limit where everything is identified with everything
else. In contrast, at thefirststratum analytical, rational distinction-making
(asymmetrical thought) reigns. Within the 'lower' (third tofifth)strata, anxiety and
threat m a y not be experienced since there is little access to invalidation in the form of a
more asymmetrical awareness of contradictions and inconsistencies. T h e unconscious is
unconscious because its higher dimensionality cannot be grasped within conscious
thought. For example, emotion (which is found in relatively asymmetrical form at the
second stratum and in more 'unconscious' symmetrical form in the third stratum) is
characterised by " a greater number of dimensions than that which our self-awareness is
capable of dealing" (Matte-Bianco, 1988, p. 91).

9.3 MATTE-BLANCO, PCP AND INSIGHT: SOME
IMPLICATIONS
9.3.1 Tight And Loose Construing And Bi-Polarity
Bi-modal thought can be seen as 'textbook' or ideal bi-polar construing where a
construct is defined as a simultaneous awareness of sameness-yet-difference relations.
Take, for example, the following definition of bi-modal thought:
W h e n classification works with a two-valued logicality, different
members of a class remain distinct individuals but are seen as similar
though different; they have some class-defining quality or attribute in
c o m m o n . (Rayner, 1995, p. 47)

Kelly's contribution was to specify that the way in which members (elements) were
different w a s also important. That is, elements are contrasted to others not in every
respect, but in s o m e particular aspect: the bi-polar construct was defined by relevant
contrast.

Take, for example, a construct labelled 'happiness'. The contrast it expresses
m a y be 'happy—moody', with 'happy' being its emergent pole. The elements
identified with 'moody' are not merely, for this person, equivalent to 'non-happy'.
Further, let us say, that this construct is used loosely, that the distinction between
'happy' and 'moody' is blurred and that polar membership of its elements is unstable.
In order to use such a construct productively it must be subsumed by a less loose
superordinate construct, say 'satisfaction—despair', which is nonetheless permeable and
comprehensive enough to allow, for example, that one m a y be 'satisfied' w h e n one is
m o o d y as well as w h e n one is happy — in the special sense that one is not despairing.
In this w a y asymmetrical inference is still intact, but it is enriched by the
subtlety required to subsume a construct which expresses the type of ill-defined
complexity and non-simple contrast that is so necessary to cope with our ill-defined,
complex and non-simple world. In short, bi-modality reveals the w a y in which bipolarity in personal construct terms is not only a function of an act of construing in
isolation, but also of the w a y in which such bi-polarity works within a system of
meanings. W h e n loose construing cannot be fitted into a system, w e have what MatteBianco (1988) called bi-logic. Just as I have asserted that it is not just any emotion that
is conducive of insight, looseness per se is not in itself 'creative' (or 'non-creative'). A s
Kelly's (1955) Creativity Cycle reveals, it is the skilled alternations between looser and
tighter m o d e s of construing that leads to creativity.
Tight construing tends towards asymmetry as it is characterised by both
consistency of inference and is based on making clear distinctions between contrasting
elements. Loose construing is akin to symmetry or sameness where the basis for the bipolar distinction of the elements within a constructs range begins to dissolve and
contradictories (to the tightly-construing mind) can be held in mind simultaneously.
Loosening reveals that construct membership m a y at times be fuzzy. That is, elements
m a y no longer clearly belong at one pole or another, or even inside or outside the
constructs range of convenience. This is contrary to a strict interpretation of Kelly's

(1955) Dichotomy Corollary and Range corollaries whereby elements are viewed as
either at one pole or another of a construct (or not within the construct at all).
Bell (1996) has in fact shown that m a n y construct relations are symmetrical.
About 2 0 % of construct relations in standard grids and 3 0 % in implications grids are
mutually implicative, rather than ordered hierarchically. A s such, they stand outside the
formal assumptive structure of the theory (the Organization and Modulation Corollaries,
for example). In similar fashion, Butt (1995) has found that construct hierarchies often
loop back again. Interestingly, this symmetricality helps to illustrate one of Kelly's
(1955) corollaries, the Fragmentation Corollary, which allows for inferential
incompatibility (intransitivity) between constructs. That is, some of the relations
between constructs are more strongly based on similarities or sameness rather than on
ordinal differences and so one m a y find oneself endorsing seemingly 'incompatible'
beliefs or outlooks.

9.3.2 Symbolisation And Ordinal Relations
Kelly (1955, pp. 297-299) gave an example of symbolisation where 'mother' can be
both an element in a construct (sets of elements arranged in sameness-difference
relations) and m a y also, for the construing person, stand as the n a m e or symbol for the
entire construct. This opens the possibility for the identification of 'mother' with all
elements in the construct — including the elements of the contrast pole! This is directly
analogous to the relations observable in infinite sets where elements of subsets can
c o m e to stand for the whole set (a symmetrical relationship). This 'raising' of an
element to a symbolic status opens up unusual implicative possibilities, especially with
other constructs sharing a number of similar elements. Specifically, this can help us
account for the 'lateral' (associative or based on sameness) shifting to other trains of
implications so ubiquitous in accounts of insight. It begins with an abstractive m o v e
'up' the ordinal ladder as it were, but progresses by a 'descent' utilising other 'nonrelated' or 'illogical' trains of implication. That is, there is a distinct symmetrical logic

that alternates with asymmetrical construing. The former makes what appears (to one's
'conscious', asymmetrical awareness) to be 'quantum jumps' in understanding.
This of course has implications for Kelly's Organization Corollary. I propose

that in loose construing shifts between ordinal levels can occur 'illogically' or 'latera

(not in terms of superordinate and subordinate relationships). This is so because various
constructs sharing similar elements can be activated simultaneously, thus mutually
implying one-another. This multidimensionality, or simultaneous activation of multiple

trains of implication, could reflect the massively parallel nature of brain activation, m
of which does not reach consciousness. Perhaps loosening construing allows for a more
widely spread, simultaneous, activation of multiple constructs containing similar
elements — making for more fluctuating, 'fuzzy' anticipations. This may reflect the

relative reduction in neural inhibition I discussed in the last chapter (brought about by

relaxed, diffuse attention or reverie). In such a state the normal bi-polarities of thoug
maybe suspended allowing for 'omnivalence' (Briggs, 1990), where 'contradictories'
can be held in mind together.
Martindale's (1995) connectionist theory of insight suggests just this. In
'normal' focused attention only the most practised neural networks would be
sufficiently activated to push them above the threshold for consciousness. Such a 'steep
association gradient' leads to fewer, more stereotypical responses. In a defocused
'symmetrical' mode, however, the activation is spread widely, activating many more
networks — a 'shallow association gradient' which maximises the possibility for remote
associates and creative analogies. In this regard, as we saw earlier, EEG measures

indicate that 'creatives' show the same increases in cortical activation in solving welldefined problems as 'normals'. In contrast to 'normals', however, they show less than
their baseline cortical activation when involved in ill-defined creative tasks
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), thus suggesting an empirical measure for focused and
defocused attention, and perhaps asymmetrical and symmetrical thought.

9.3.3

Emotion: A Pivot To Insight

Emotion is the mother of all invention. (Matte-Bianco, 1988, p. 98)

Again the central role of emotion in creative insight is highlighted. Matte-Bianco felt
emotion occupied a kind of creative hinterland between symmetry and asymmetry and
here I find echoes of Kelly's (1955, p. 866) claim that 'schizoid' thinking, or the
loosening of construing, is always present in 'creative productions'. In this regard,
Rayner (1995, p. 123) described "... a level of optimal emotionality that will allow
infinite and finite to meet for those mysterious and fruitful moments of a quantum
leap". This represents an optimal balance between looseness and tightness playing the
'edges' of emotionality. Too little asymmetry and loosening may run away with itself
into distortions of thinking and perception. Too much asymmetry and our thinking is

shallow and brittle, without recognition of generalisations or regularities, and vulnerab
to new experience. Here I find further grounds for a useful cross-fertilisation between
Matte-Bianco and Kelly.
Emotional awareness, as defined by Kelly, can be seen as belonging mostly to
Matte-Blanco's second stratum or level of consciousness — where emotional

experience is still accessible to consciousness and where there are still distinguishabl
and separate elements within a class or 'construct'. This more-or-less corresponds to

Kelly's definition of loose construing in that there is still identifiable structure wit

(weakened) bi-polarity. That is, although there is a tendency to operate in terms of the
similarities between elements, there is still an awareness that these 'contrasting'
elements are not identical.
Why should emotional construing be akin to looser construing? Recall the
recent research into emotion. Emotions are described frequently as 'quick and dirty',
holistic appraisals of inner and outer reality in the service of one's maintenance
processes. Emotional awareness may operate in terms of organismically-based values:
does this impede my coupling with my world or enhance it? Such an awareness has
system-wide access both neurologically and psychologically. When we appraise

emotionally, we are not interested in small detail or fine distinctions. We take a globa

perspective, a panoramic multidimensional view, discounting local contradictions and
incompatibilities in favour of the big picture. And our emotional appraisals are not
always consistent. They can change from day to day, even from hour to hour. In
Kellian terms, they operate as superordinate, permeable and comprehensive structures,
and they are relatively loose. Consider 'threat', the awareness of imminent
comprehensive changes to one's core construing. Such an awareness must take a
'overview' of some of the person's most superordinate and comprehensive constructive
processes.71
What characterises such transcending affective processes of awareness is that
they allow for the operation of many systems of meaning at the same time. Rather than
narrowing (tightening) awareness to develop one specific idea or dimension of

awareness, 'emotional' construing is interested in the 'big picture', in seeing what uni
a field or panorama of meanings. Granting this, emotions are often moves towards a
'higher' complexity of awareness because they express a grasp of multiple dimensions
at once. This makes them more difficult to capture in consciousness and frequently

quite difficult to articulate. Using Martindale's (1995) metaphor of defocused attentio
and shallow association gradients again (see above), 'emotional' thought can be

regarded as a style of construing that activates many concepts and meaning structures i
parallel. And this perfectly matches Matte-Blanco's definitions of symmetrical thought,
involving high dimensionality and many simultaneous chains of implication that can be
expressed often only symbolically and figuratively (presentationally).
Finally, a comparison can be made between presentational symbolisms and

looser, symmetrical thought. Presentational thought is more metaphorical and figurative
because the complexity of the context and media (its multidimensionality) cannot be

'translated' into representational structures without distortion. At best they can have
multivalent reference of symbols and metaphor, hinting at a complex unity standing
above or behind the words or images used to symbolise them.
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But such multidimensional, 'negative' emotional appraisals m a y lead to quite tight, predictable
construing as the person anxiously tries to ward off the perceived 'threat'.

In support of Matte-Blanco's thinking about the relative multidimensionality of
emotional awareness (as against asymmetrical thought), there is emerging evidence
(Gilhooly, Keane, Logie & Erdos, 1990) that 'representational' concepts and 'emotional
schema' tend to be 'processed' differently. This is not to say that 'emotion' and
'cognition' are entirely different or opposed entities. Rather, it is to say that they
represent different styles of reason, different modes of thought.
For example, there is a reported lack of 'differentiation' in the processing of
phobic stimuli in favour of the fast activation of highly cohesive prototypes (Watts,

1990). This means that 'phobic' reasoning tends to be 'associative', working 'laterally',
not being interested in differences and fine distinctions (as would tighter, more
conscious reasoning processes). This is a more 'passive' emotional awareness (Spinoza,

1967) where clusters of implications are rapidly 'pre-empted' as the person tends not to
distinguish or differentiate the elements at hand, but instead makes a quick global
assessment. The judgement might be 'This looks like something dangerous' and
clusters of relatively cohesive associations are 'set off simultaneously. The 'passions'
take over as, in this case, superordinate systems 'defend' the person against perceived
danger. The construing that results from this rapid multidimensional activation may
tighten up and become quite rigid and stereotypical as the person tries to predict and
control events. But the initial 'emotional' appraisal is rapid and multidimensional. In
this case, being a 'passive' awareness (not being contained by adequate ideas, as
Spinoza would have put it), it is an example of construing which works more in terms of
similarity judgements or resemblances (symmetry) binding together a cohesive
clustering of concepts, as against a hierarchy of concepts built on distinctions and
ordinal judgements of difference (asymmetry).
More speculatively, loose construing generally may also function as a type of
prototypical clustering. Elements may 'cluster' around a personally idiosyncratic
exemplar or prototype rather than be ordered in terms of superordinate determinations
and implications. In 'figure-ground' terms, the prototype or 'symbol' for the construing

is the 'figure', while the clusters of elements, some quite close to the exemplar, others

trailing a w a y to the horizon of awareness, represent the 'ground'. In these terms there is
a less-defined contrast function to the prototype or exemplar. In such a w a y of
understanding loose or symmetrical construing, those construing processes (constructs)
sharing elements m a y be related to each other 'laterally'. That is, constructs sharing a
number of elements m a y be considered to be 'the same' given their closenesstothe
'exemplar'. This would constitute a symmetrical or non-ordinal logic —'lateral
thinking'. Element membership in constructs, and relationships between constructs, in
this w a y of thinking about loose construing, would be fuzzy.
Such an approach is also compatible with a Parallel Distributed Processing view
of multiple, simultaneous activation of conceptual pathways. Meaning and
understanding always arise within networks of related meanings and this multidimensionality sits easily with what w e k n o w about the experience of insight and with
connectionist conceptions of thought as being massively parallel. It m a y be that this
multidimensionality underlies a good deal of thinking, but that in this looser
contemplative style of attention w e can become aware of this depth and complexity of
our thought. B y slowing d o w n the tendency to tighten awareness into representational,
conscious structures, w e do not always slow d o w n thought itself (Claxton, 1997).
Rather, w e shift to a flow of wider proportions, sometimesfilledwith rushes of
implications, at other times experienced as a broad panorama, and only very rarely as an
emptiness or void. W h a t does slow d o w n is the urgent tendency to close off this radical
openness, to revert to habitual understandings. Perhaps, by utilising a calm and
contemplative stance, this mental shift is brought about by the removal of lateral
inhibition with a concomitant reduction in excitatory, 'vertical' connections between
neural groups, a process which Martindale (1995) proposed as a mechanism underlying
insight.

9.3.4 Bi-Logic, Negative Emotion And Invalidation
If negative emotion occurs following unsuccessful anticipation, usually the construct
system will tighten up. The person will constrict his or her perceptualfieldand m a y

construe in 'hostile' fashion and become angry or defensive if challenged. Or if this no
longer seems possible, he or she m a y continue loosening, moving into more and more
symmetrical realms, avoiding provisional tightening and the testing of anticipations.
Distortions of perception and cognition can result. The person m a y re-enter
asymmetrical or tighter construing and thereby experience very strong negative
emotion, becoming aware of the expanding intransitivities and illogicalities in his or her
thinking. This is the experience of bi-logic.
In Spinozan terms, such a person is in the grip of passive emotion, where one's
ideas cannot 'capture' or 'channel' one's experience, where one's psychic processes are
not in the service of one's 'conatus'. One's anticipatory capacity is in tatters. In
deepening symmetrisation, each time one tries to tighten construction, everything is seen
as outside one's capacity to construe because symmetrical logic works in terms of
infinities. This w a s Kelly's (1955) concern about over-zealous therapists w h o were
impatient for their clients to realise h o w widespread their 'hostilities' were. Such
clients can end up in a psychotic state as they do not have sufficiently permeable and
comprehensive superordinate structures to accommodate the burgeoning implications
and fragmentations of their 'insight' into themselves.

9.3.5 Positive Emotion And Bi-Modal Thought
Positive emotion is the likely concomitant of bi-modal thought — where symmetrical
awareness is in harmony with one's asymmetrical awareness. Being in a more
meditative or defocussed state of attention, such as that induced by dream reporting,
relaxation, word association, uncritical acceptance and meditation, m a y encourage one
to stay within looser construing long enough for non-habitual patterns of inference to be
explored. In a w a y it is using one's innate emotional capacities voluntarily, deliberately
(active emotion). Herein lies the possibility for n e w insight. O n e has to learn to trust
one's intuitions and feelings w h e n tighter construing fails and this is a superordinating
affective stance.

Within the Creativity Cycle provisional tightening is the crucial moment, the
affective pivot on which insight may turn. The person remains in an optimal level of
looseness or symmetricality, and does not tighten too much. One may undergo gentle
modulations between associative then discriminative processes, rocking back and forth
between symmetry and asymmetry until something looks promising. This is a
transcending affective state in which there is a balance between open possibility and
structured distinction-making. This ongoing (affective) appraisal of the anticipatory
implications of the now-tightening construct may be what is meant by the word

'intuition'. It is a type of 'feeling' sensitivity to our viability or anticipatory fit i
world. Incipient invalidation 'feels bad' and is avoided. Incipient validation is felt
before it is consciously understood.

9.3.6 A Different Sense Of Self
One of the intriguing findings in the insight literature is the oft-reported experience

one's sense of self is altered within the process of insight. People report a loss of th
sense of time and of place, as well as of the distinction between self and others, self
world. They frequently sense that the insight is flowing spontaneously but not being
directed by themselves (Epel, 1993). The positive emotion intrinsic to insight casts
everything in its hues. All is united and connected within this positive symmetrical
experience,72 and this sets the person at peace allowing for sustained defocussed
attention and mental playfulness. Matte-Bianco (1988) has suggested that in deeper
levels of symmetrical thought the distinction between the subject and object blurs. In
positive symmetrisation this would be experienced as a transpersonal state of oneness,
or non-separateness. This accords perfectly with a substantial number of reported

insight experiences where the feeling is not so much of the self, or of non-self, but of

type of merging of self with the world, including others. In contrast, self-consciousness
performance anxiety or even just offering people rewards (Amabile, 1990) can inhibit
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In negative symmetrical experiences (where the experience cannot be subsumed in sufficiently
permeable and comprehensive superordinate structures) this could be a terrifying, perhaps leading to
delusional or psychotic experiences (Bell, 1996).

creativity and insight. The distinction of 'self (as distinct and separate) is a

characteristically asymmetrical conceptualisation and, by itself, this self-orientation i
inimical to spontaneity and creativity generally.
In the terminology of the last chapter, this altered experience of self is also a
return to the primacy of an empathic 'I-thou' mode of emotional understanding. But

now it is a transcending use of it, a presentational awareness in service of an openness
whatever comes. It is also a mode of awareness where we get to 'watch' some of the

unfolding of aspects of consciousness normally veiled. The person experiences that it is
not 'me' who is directing the thinking: it is a dynamic unfolding, more akin to a
sportsperson non-selfconsciously participating in a game, who finds herself taking the
right action moment-by-moment. This is participatory knowing (Barfield, 1988) where
there is no separate 'me' observing what happens 'out there', but rather a mutual,
dynamic coupling. Certainly the elements and structures of understanding may have
been consciously, painstakingly built up by the person, but the 'conversation' that
unfolds, like any worthwhile conversation, cannot be known in advance, cannot be
known without undergoing it.
This is reminiscent of Heidegger's (1959) 'meditative thought' which 'waits
upon' rather than 'waits for' something. Martindale's (1995) notion of shallow
association gradients suggests that there may be many trains of thought and implication
operating simultaneously, all somewhat evenly activated. In states of superordinate
emotional calm and security, the normally highly superordinate and self-oriented,
survival-based construing may be in relative quiescence. The 'self is normally a focus

for much of our psychic life and consciousness is intimately tied to self-consciousness.

The world is filtered through our affective assessments: is this good or bad for mel But
when we feel safe and secure the self may move out of the focus of attention and one
may entertain less censored processes. The system's resources are freed up. There is

little distraction, little background static, and an evenly hovering, receptive attention

allow first one train of implication then another to gently rise into conscious awarenes

(provisional tightening). And just as gently this awareness can allow that discrimination

to fade until the next comes of its o w n accord. This would correspond to a profoundly
different sense of self in which the characteristic superordinancy of self-oriented

anticipation is in relative abeyance. It may also account for the overall lower than usu
levels of cortical activation found when thinking creatively (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990;
Martindale, 1995).
Implicit here is a distinction between prediction and anticipation which is
important (see Chapter 5). Prediction has more a connotation of 'looking-for'
something, where one knows roughly what one is looking for. Anticipation, however,

particularly in its tacit dimensions, represents more of an openness to 'wait upon' what
arrives, for what, one knows not. It recalls Warren's (1994, 1998) 'objective attitude';
an attitude which allows the world to be as it is, not how we want or even expect it to
be. Such meditative thought and 'releasement' allows for a sense of space and
openness, a slowing down of the grasping mind (Claxton, 1998, Varela et al., 1996). If
tightening is kept in abeyance long enough a type of psychic 'vacuum' is created which
attracts a flurry of new possibilities. If 'nature abhors a vacuum', then it seems the
asymmetric mind 'abhors openness'.
It is usually retrospectively that people realise their insight experiences were
enjoyable. That is, upon tightening or a return to asymmetry, self-awareness returns.
This is possibly so because during insight we are less concerned about maintenance and
core processes and the anticipatory fortunes of our construing. We are 'lost' in our
thoughts. This seems to be a qualitatively different state of being, symmetrically
infused and shepherded in by looser, abstract superordinate structures of greater
flexibility and permeability.
This is not irrelevant to the terrors of the mystic who, it seems, must pass
through the 'dark night of the soul', must 'lose' himself or herself first, in order to
experience one-ness with existence — a sense of indivisibility and unity redolent of
Matte-Blanco's (1988) deeper levels of the unconscious. There are common themes
here of connectedness and non-self-consciousness. Somewhat paradoxically, when
one's core or identity-related anticipatory structures are validated, McCoy's (1977)

definition of iove', one becomes less self-conscious. In the deeper transpersonal and
altered states of consciousness, such experiences of absorption and being one with the
universe are ubiquitous (Hunt, 1995). Ironically, the freedom from self-consciousness
flows from comprehensive validation of one's self.
This paradoxical experience of exteriority yet unity and onenessfitswell with
Matte-Blanco's understanding of emotion as a multidimensional 'gestalt'
simultaneously relating one's physical feelings, thoughts, anticipations, and
exteroperceptions. It is a fully embodied experience, a type of participatory knowing
(Barfield, 1988) which can only occur by one being immersed in active anticipation. A
presentational 'being-in-the-world', I will return to it in the next chapter's discussion of
pragmatism and embodiment.

9.3.7 Bi-Modal Thought And Metaphor
Although I will also discuss metaphor in more detail in the following chapter, it is
relevant here to indicate h o w the idea of metaphorical thinkingfitsinto Matte-Blanco's
ideas. For Matte-Bianco bi-modal thought was an ideal to aspire to, an optimal balance
between looseness and tightness. A s w e have seen, it represented the use of symmetry
for asymmetrical purposes. Just as w e saw that Langer (1957) considered presentational
and emotional awareness to be intrinsically metaphorical, so Matte-Bianco thought
primary process thinking and emotionality was morefigurativeand metaphorical.
W h y ? Because it represents the intrusion of symmetricality into our thinking processes.
Metaphor works by seeing sameness where before ('logically' or asymmetrically) there
was only difference. It is in fact a creative harmony between asymmetrical and
symmetrical modes of thought. Bi-modal thought, then, is likely to be somewhat
metaphorical.
M o r e radically, given the overlap of bi-modality with Kelly's definitions of bipolarity, construing itself m a y be considered to be fundamentally metaphorical.73 It is
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Though, see Mair's (1976) comments in this regard in the next chapter.

the w a y in which w e see 'things' as being simultaneously the same yet, obviously,
different. Perhaps w h e n thought becomes tighter, more habitual, the awareness of the
metaphorical 'freshness' wanes. Perhaps w h e n w e say that a style of thought is more
'metaphorical' w e are talking about n e w or 'unusual' similarity-difference judgements
being expressed. The point of metaphor is to break up an habitual understanding by
proposing a 'sameness' which is 'not the same'; to invite the hearer or reader to
simultaneously consider two elements 'as if they are the same with respect to some
quality, yet clearly are not the same overall. Figurative language generally is a w a y of
loosening thought and, as Langer and Matte-Bianco agreed, is the prime verbal means ,
of communicating affective meaning.

9.4 A SUMMARY AND SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS
I have described Matte-Blanco's account of the system unconscious, in particular his
twin principles of asymmetrical and symmetrical consciousness. This was done because
w e have seen that 'unconscious' and tacit levels of awareness were clearly implicated in
insight. In Matte-Blanco's account consciousness-unconsciousness is arranged in strata
according to the relative balance of these two principles. W e have seen that one w a y of
understanding the difference between symmetrical and unconscious processes is in
terms of some of the properties of infinite sets and in terms of a higher dimensionality in
more symmetrical, unconscious thought than is the case in more conscious
asymmetrical thought.
Most important in Matte-Blanco's account is the relationship and relative
balance between asymmetrical and symmetrical thought. If they merely alternate, or are
not in harmony, then bi-logic, and its attendant distortions and disturbances of thought,
results. In contrast, in bi-modal thought there is a more optimal, harmonious balance
wherein symmetry is in the service of asymmetry. In this marriage of mental modes the
properties of the infinite are contained within ordinal, asymmetrical relations. The finite
certainties of asymmetrical logic are thereby enriched. In Spinozan terms, this is the
equivalent of active emotion. In Kellian terms, this describes the creativity cycle.

A n explanation was given for the 'lateral' associations and apparent 'quantum
jumps' in understanding associated with insight. An important part of this explanation
was the multidimensional operation of 'same-level' or symmetrically equivalent
constructs. Such multidimensionality was also related to emotionality, but, to be of any
use, this looser, emotional mode of thought must be held within adequately permeable
and comprehensive structures. This capacity for unusual associations was also argued

to be at the heart of the metaphorical nature of this style of thought. The parallels with
presentational thought were highlighted.
Within this type of creative thought, there is an awareness of openness, of wider
possibilities. This was related to the altered sense of self seen repeatedly in relation
insight. As the distinction of 'self is an asymmetrical awareness, the lack of such a
sense of self was related directly to symmetrical thought in which subject-object
distinctions may blur. Furthermore, because this more affective T-thou' mode of
thought was conceived by Matte-Bianco as simultaneously incorporating inner and

outer perceptions, feelings, anticipations and thoughts within one 'gestalt', there is le
of a separate 'me' and more of a participatory 'we' emergent in one's being-in-theworld.
This last comment anticipates the next chapter in which I will present a more
explicitly phenomenological-pragmatic account of insight. I will characterise
understanding as a type of embodied intentionality, a coupling with the 'environing
other'. Rather than considering construing as mainly internal conscious thoughts, 1

consider them as largely tacit, intuitive, 'lived equivalence-difference patterns' (Radle
1977). The main themes to be picked up include how our embodiment is tied into
insight, how this allows us to understand construing as 'enactment' and how this helps
us understand the ubiquity of metaphor in accounts of new insights.

CHAPTER 10: EMBODIMENT, ENACTMENT AND
METAPHOR — PATHS TO INSIGHT
The person with understanding does not know and judge as one who
stands apart and unaffected; but rather, as one united by a specific bond
with the other, he thinks with the other and undergoes the situation with
him. (Gadamer, 1991, p. 288).

10.1 INTRODUCTION
Only in passing have I broached the subject of a more enactive and embodied view of
understanding and knowing. In addition I have, here and there, stressed the important
role of metaphorical thinking within insight processes. I also earlier rendered a
pragmatist reading of Personal Construct Psychology (PCP). This pragmatist approach
underlies the framework for understanding insight which I a m building. It is n o w time
to draw these strands together into a more detailed, converging description of a
pragmatist-phenomenological account which will help capture the tacit, embodied,
enactive and metaphorical aspects of insight. This will culminate in a discussion of
what Heidegger (1959) called 'meditative thinking'.
I earlier drew a social-relational sketch of the beginnings of emotional
understanding and consciousness which is consistent with Gadamer's relational view
given in the quotation above. In this chapter I will extend this idea of understanding as
'being-with' another person to, more generally, the experience of insight as a type of
'being-with-the-world'. In this latter case it will be suggested that w e do indeed 'think
with the other', but here the 'other' includes our coupling with our world, our sense of
connectedness and of the merging of the knower with the known.
This inquiry has repeatedly revealed that at the heart of insight lies an experience
which, in the terms I have outlined, is presentational rather than representational.
M u c h of the process of insight is 'lived-through' rather than 'thought-through'. It is
intuitive, an emergent process which involves a shift in self-experience such that one
feels that one 'participates-with' or 'knows-with' the known. The developmental

achievement of a separate, cognisant self is backgrounded and insight reveals a 'return'
to what, in Merleau-Ponty's (1964) existential phenomenology, w a s called the 'bodysubject'. T h e latter term emphasises the pre-reflective, experiential dimensions of our
embodiment, particularly in relation to the 'primacy of perception' in all our 'higher'
mental processes. It is in terms of a return to such primary experiencing that I will
attempt to understand thefrequentlyreported importance of the body and of feeling in
insight, and more particularly of h o w this informs the phenomenology and metaphorical
nature of the insight experience. Along the way, the account given earlier of P C P as a
pragmatic constructivism will be argued to be compatible with this existentialphenomenology, particularly with respect to an interpretation of construing as
'enactment'. I will conclude that a type of meditative thought, a radically observational
attitude, reveals and thereby undoes our habitually instrumental engagement with the
world. A n d , if the preparation, situation and timing areright,n e w insights m a y emerge.

10.2 EMBODIMENT, ENACTMENT AND KNOWING-WITH
10.2.1 The Embodied Mind
A pivotal concept in Merleau-Ponty's (1964) philosophy was the centrality of the body
subject in anticipating or negotiating life. The body subject is the 'phenomenal body' as
experienced by the person — as distinct from the 'objective body' considered as
physiology from an external perspective. Essentially, it is the person's experienced
world which is active before reflexive consciousness is born and which is the vehicle for
all our object-directed experiences. In Radley's (1977) terms it is the 'from which' that
characterises anticipation and which tacitly forms the basis for later, more predictive
m o d e s of understanding. Anticipation, in these terms, is one's bodily stance towards
one's world: "one's attitude to it which embodies silent questions and the sort of
answers one is open to" (Butt, 1998a, p. 108). This notion is essentially a relational one
in which one is a body-subject enmeshed in activity and context, not a separate subject
w h o happens to be in a body.

It is through such experiential interactions with others and our world that our self
and our knowing are born. This experienced world is what Merleau-Ponty (1962) called
the lived-through world. Such lived phenomenological experience is multi-dimensional
and implicit, infused with intentionality (the meaning our conduct is informed by). We

can easily observe this mode of understanding, for example, in a (good) game of cricket,
say when a batsman is facing a bowler. In such a situation there is not enough time to

consciously think and predict. We act first and reflect later. Such actions are, however
anticipatory and therefore rational. We always choose in terms of what we are capable

of 'seeing' in the situation, in terms of how we 'fit'. Such actions are always a produc

of the context, in particular a product of the 'affordances' (Gibson, 1979) real-ised by
the person in any given situation (Noble, 1993). Our whole perceiving body 'decides'
to go on the front foot, to attempt a drive, and so on, as the context unfolds. This
reflects the primary way meaning is reached through co-existing with the world, as
distinct from intellectual meaning via analysis. In this way we see with the world, and
think with the world, in exactly the way an artist thinks with his or her materials
(Haworth, 1990).
Translated into PCP terms, construing can be considered as mostly an embodied,
tacit and enactive process as opposed to highly conscious, predictive thinking.
Knowing in this enactive view is always partial and is largely defined in terms of
viability, as 'coupling' with one's world. Most knowing then is 'knowing from' and a
'participatory knowing' (McWilliams, 1993). It is a bodily stance in iterative cycles of
social, participatory experience. This presentational mode of consciousness implies a
relational, immersed knowing. (Harre, 1983). It emerges especially when attention is
diffused and "the state of the viscera and musculature, any bodily emotions, needs or

threats, are incorporated within the representation as a whole" (Claxton, 1997, p. 155).
Such a bodily mode of knowing is evidenced in the way, for example, that physical acts
are tied into remembering, the way we mouth words to aid recall, or the way a smell
may flood the mind with a vivid memory. It is a holistic, experiential dimension
incorporating gesture, posture and mood. Memory is frequently a re-enactment and,
likewise, thought is a simulated conversation in a simulated internal domain.

10.2.2

Enactment

Merleau-Ponty's idea of the body-subject dovetails with a m o d e of knowing that is
doing or enacting as against some imputed, inner 'cognitive' process standing behind
and prior to action. Again, returning to Radley's distinction between prediction and
anticipation:
Prediction is the specification of particulars which we know (attend
towards) through actions channelized by the ways in which w e
anticipate events. These two ways of approaching the future are,
indeed, different, but inter-dependent. (1977, p. 227)
In terms of problem-solving and insight, we are always attending to the problem
through tacit ways of organising it. We anticipate via actions which enshrine this
particular 'knowing-from' and, upon invalidation, a 'new' problem emerges from our
adjusted outlook. We work in iterative fashion gradually reformulating our tacit
assumptions — which nonetheless usually remain unspecified — and eventually,

hopefully, insight arrives. But crucial to this process is that it is action which gives
'feedback' which enable us to question our 'already-knowing'.
Another useful concept Merleau-Ponty (1962) proposed was that of
sedimentation. This refers to the strong tendency to maintain one's self-definition and
tacit assumptive structures rather than change them. Just as sediments laid down in a
river become hardened (may even turn into rock), one's assumptions resist
contradiction. This is because things become murky and upsetting when sediments are
disturbed. In this regard, Merleau-Ponty was less optimistic than Kelly about our
imputed capacity to identify with our tacit, superordinating system and thereby
overcome sedimentation (Butt, 1998b). Nonetheless, Merleau-Ponty (1962) argued that
the way to overcome sedimentation is to create new projects. As Butt (1998b) put it:
"we 'find' that we have changed in the living of a new project" (p. 278). We change
superordinating structures primarily by doing, not by intellectualising (even in

'intellectual' pursuits!). Frequently, the existential project precedes the conscious one

Therefore, reconstruction follows the path of behavioural changes. In Kellian terms,
this can be seen in the dynamic and more active approach to problem solving
emphasised in Vol. 2 (1955), especially in terms of enactment procedures, fixed role
therapy, and of course the experience cycle.
It has been suggested that the later Kelly was moving towards an understanding
of construing as predominantly a more embodied, tacit and enactive process. But this
tendency was, arguably, there from the beginning in Kelly's (1955) vision of the person
as a 'form of motion'. Moreover, for Kelly (1955), "Knowing things is a way of
allowing them to happen to us" (p. 171). Construing was never separated from doing
for Kelly, and thus enactment is construing. Further, enactment is an expression of the
embodiment of construing.
For this reason, Radley, making reference to a later Kellian paper (1966c), could

include in his definition of construing 'living visual and postural schema'. In additio

construing, for Radley, described a means of inquiry, only aspects of which are at a hi
level of reflexive awareness. Knowing in this sense is a part of one's bodily stance to
the world. More emphatically, construing is a person's way of being, of living: "He
lives in anticipation; we mean this literally; he lives in anticipation" (Kelly, 1958,
italics in original). Such embodied, enactive construing develops within cycles of
experience, not the least of which are our formative social and empathic experiences.
Even so-called 'inner' and 'private' mental processes can be considered as a type of
derived enactive, ecologically-immersed skill. In summary, we 'know' or 'think' about
the world mostly by acting in it. Afterwards we may learn how to re-present it to
ourselves, but usually not while we are being within it. Indeed, verbalising tends to
destroy the process — as we saw in relation to insight. As we have seen, this sense of
non-self-conscious engagement is highly characteristic of the insight experience.
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10.2.3 The Primacy Of Context-Dependent Knowing
'Enactment' implies a world, a situation or context in which we act and understand. To

continue my cricket example, playing a good shot is best understood in terms of the ful
context of the game being played, and is much less well understood, for example, in
terms of biological and kinaesthetic analyses. That is, the most complete meaning and
understanding of the shot is only possible within a full, lived context. Explicitly
drawing on the work of Langer (1957, 1972), Shanon (1991, 1993) outlined a theory of
mind in which enactment and a more presentational consciousness are fundamental to
understanding. Again, thinking was here conceived as action within one's world, where

meaning is found in our relationship with the world, not manufactured exclusively in th
privacy of one's mind.
... the principles of operation underlying paradigmatic cognitive
activities — language, memory, perception, reasoning and problemsolving — are akin to those met in executing action in the external
world, in moving about the world, in the manipulation of objects, and
in interaction with other h u m a n beings. (Shanon, 1993, p. 268)
Shanon believed that meaning and understanding in our early years is holistic and
affectively charged, a global, relatively unanalysed unity.74 In elaborating Searle's
(1995) notion of the 'background'75 — Shanon (1993) argued that what stands behind

and supports human consciousness is context, the world itself. Presentational awareness

draws directly on this ever-present, multidimensional substrate for mind. This substrat
Shanon defined as the sum total of the meeting of internal and external bodies. This

includes the physical and social environment, the histories of one's coupling with that
environment and one's systems of beliefs, all in a dynamic flux. This fits with his
general interpretation of Gibsonian (1979) 'affordances' (patterns of action made
possible by the coupling of an organism with its environment) as providing evidence

that "higher order relations are psychologically more basic than things" (Shanon, 1993,

p. 82). In particular, he drew attention to the assertion in Gibson's work that we find
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In Matte-Blanco's (1988) terms it is a largely symmetrical mode of being.
"... the set of non-representational mental capacities that enable representing to take place"
(Shanon, 1993, p. 43).
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meaning, not from stimulation from individual static 'things', but by finding complex
patterns of invariance across time. This of course recalls the primary nature of

symmetrical consciousness which is also defined in terms of its higher dimensionality. I
will return to this idea in my later discussion of the metaphorical mind.
Representational thought, when it does develop, can also be used
presentationally. As such, a pervasive aspect of reflexive awareness is the playing
through of scenes in one's mind: a type of 'inner', contextualised enactment. Imagined
scripts, narratives, scenes and social interactions are modelled on lived interactions.
further recursion can make such representational forms themselves the object of thought
via a sensitivity to the medium of thought itself:
In reflecting upon itself, the mind can turn forms in which mentation is
expressed into objects of thought in their o w n right. With this, any
formal characteristic of cognition can itself become a content that one
entertains, so the m e d i u m too m a y become relevant. (1993, p. 76)

By this type of recursion on the 'presentations' and 'representations' of consciousness,
the person creates thoughts which are object-like, which, like objects, can be
manipulated. And Shanon (1993) said that in even the most high level reasoning the
best way to perform in abstract is to make one's thought meaningful and concrete: "to
embed it in a context and endow it with a medium" (p. 77). In this sense writers play
with the look and sounds of words, they hear characters speaking and see them
embedded in scenes (Epel, 1993). This is a type of aesthetic or feeling intelligence
which responds to the open-ended nature of context and medium and reminds us of the
importance of 'perceptual rehearsal' (Ippolito and Tweney, 1995) in insight.
Context and media are not, however, structure-less or chaotic. Indeed, without
the world's environing constraints, Shanon (1993) argued that the mind will run its
purely associative course, being no longer fixated or 'fixed' by the world. He suggested
dreams and hallucinations are examples of such loose mental processes relatively
unconstrained by perceptual engagement with the world. Herein, of course, there is
scope both for creativity and chaos — depending, as we have seen, on the
superordinating framework within which such loose processes occur. The great

advantage of representational thought lies in its relative autonomy with respect to time
and space, with respect to context. Objects can be created which are not present in the
environment and which can be operated on in the 'workbench' of the mind. But such
propositional thought lacks the multidimensional richness and openness of context and
medium. Shanon believed that attending to the medium of thought provides " a richness
of non-fixed, sensory-like characteristics which allows flexibility of use and
interpretation" (1993, p. 299) beyond the formal logic of representational thought.
Such a view is echoed in the work of Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1996) who

set out to integrate an understanding of the experiential level of mind with contempora
cognitive science accounts of the representational mind. In so doing they attempted to
rehabilitate the common sense view that consciousness is important in the operations of
mind generally and argued that any account of mind which excludes it (such as many

traditional representationist and computational accounts) is impoverished. They did thi
by drawing parallels between the Buddhist Madhyamika or 'Middle Way' philosophy

and findings in the contemporary cognitive science accounts. In particular, Vipassina o
insight meditation was presented as a thoroughgoing method for exploring moment-tomoment experience. Again a pivotal contrast is between a relatively removed
representational mode of thought and a more immediate lived-understanding, a felt
sense pervading our day-to-day existence:
... if we wish to recover common sense, then we must invert the
representationist attitude by treating context-dependent know-how not
as a residual artefact that can be progressively eliminated by the
discovery of more sophisticated rules but as, in fact, the very essence of
creative cognition. (Varela et al. 1996, p. 148)
Seen once again here is an assertion of the indissoluble link between mind and context.

It is a return to the world, an 'objective attitude' based in one's subjective openness
the authors went on to say: "... knower and known, mind and world, stand in relation to
each other through mutual specification or dependent coorigination" (Varela et al.,
1996, p. 150). Just as for Gibson (1979), environment and organism are here seen to be

mutually defining and dependent on each 'other' for their existence. At a physical level
the line between 'inputs' and 'outputs' blurs considerably when dealing with a highly

co-operative, self-organising system such as the brain — where feedforward
mechanisms are at least as important as feedback processes (Geschwind, 1983). In like
fashion, a 'neutral', completely open view of the world is continually precluded by our
habitual, and pragmatically necessary, pre-judgements and 'projections'. Yet it is by
loosening this automaticised process, by a committed recursion on the process itself,
that other 'affordances' of the wider context may be enacted and a more direct
experience of our connection with the world becomes possible.

10.2.4 Participatory Knowing
We are normally not aware of the degree to which we 'participate' in the known. Not

only do we 'interact' (a word which nonetheless suggests two separate entities) with the

world, but there is a sense revealed in insight experiences that we can be more directly
aware of our participation in the known, that boundaries between self and non-self may

blur and there is an experience of being a part of something larger than self. There is
seemingly paradoxical experience that people becomes more 'themselves' or come to
more appreciate their own individuality by opening to that which includes, yet
transcends them (Heidegger, 1978).
Merleau-Ponty's (1962, 1964) 'existential phenomenology' refuted the
dichotomy of naive realism—idealism. It is not ideas (idealism) or the mere event
(naive realism) which is primary, but a larger process incorporating both. Our body

synthesises perception via its interests and, principally, this is an interpersonal ven
Merleau-Ponty assumed we begin with the interconnectedness of human behaviour. We
do not have to learn it, or infer it. We directly perceive the other's intentions in

behaviour. We do not see inside someone to see their consciousness: it is there in their
actions. We feel others' feelings because we live in their expression. As Butt (1998a)
put it: "lama participant in it; it involves me" (p. 111). Butt (1988a) further
considered that two people together are not 'interacting' but act as an "indivisible
system" where "the relationship between them in some sense precedes their individual
psychologies" (p. 115). This sense of participatory knowing is what Shotter (1995)

called 'joint action'. In this sense, the dialogue between self and other is bigger than
either participant — it includes them. Participants are both responsive and creative
simultaneously. They are influenced by the other and by the situation into which they
act. The intentionality or meaningfulness both includes them and transcends them.
This participatory knowing recalls the relational self psychology of Orange (see

8.3.1) discussed earlier. It involves a type of knowledge born in conversation that goe
beyond what we can do individually. This implies something more than a separate,
individual self. It suggests that change and flexibility are derived from this type of
dialogistic immersion. This is the 'objective attitude' that Warren (1988) argued
underlies Kellian theory. That is, an openness to the 'other', to the unexpected (as
distinct from predicting certain replications). This stance allows the world (including

the other) to 'say' something different to us and is consistent with an interpretation o

'affordances' as a relational function that specifies 'joint action' of person and world
is the polar opposite of hostility and pre-emption, in Kelly's (1955) terms. It is a
deliberate loosening of construing encouraging both permeability and propositionality

as the person lets go and trusts in the situation. For Gadamer, it is best exemplified in
'genuine' conversation:
We say we 'conduct' a conversation, but the more genuine a
conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either partner.
Thus a genuine conversation is never the one w e wanted to conduct.
Rather, it is generally more correct to say that w e fall into conversation,
or even that w e become involved in it. The w a y one word follows
another, with the conversation faking its o w n twists and reaching its
o w n conclusion, m a y well be conducted in some way, but the partners
conversing are far less leaders of it than led. N o one knows in advance
what will 'come out' of a conversation. Understanding or its failure is
like an event that happens to us. (Gadamer, 1991, p. 383)
Insight too reveals this type of 'participatory epistemology' (Efran and Heffher, 1998)
in action, one not confined to the social sphere, but incorporating one's ecological
immersion. What this leads to is the notion that how one feels and acts and thinks
becomes the property of the relationship rather than 'mine' alone. One's environment
generally (as distinct from a presumed, pre-human 'world') takes shape as we live it.
Thus, Noble and Davidson (1991) can say that "objects are collapsed acts" (p. 215).

They take form as a part of our capacity to construe them. In genuine insight, as in
Gadamer's genuine conversation, the self and the world are altered by the interaction.
A s w e saw repeatedly, insight arrives with a certain event-like quality. It is seemingly
external and spontaneous, like a conversation, yet w e hold an important personal
responsibility for its existence.
The image of the person this makes possible is as a type of enabling space in
which the life around it is transfigured and displayed. A person is like a 'magic lantern'
in holographic motion, giving the world voice, light, smell, taste and feel. The person,
as Merleau-Ponty (1964) said, is a project of the world just as, at the same time, the
world is a project of the person. T h e body-subject is simultaneously a physical structure
and an experiential structure, biological and phenomenological. In searching for an
understanding of insight I a m also searching for evidence of this indissoluble nexus, this
mixing of self and world that seems to be so m u c h a part of the phenomenology of
insight. O n e of the principal characteristics of the insight experience is that it also
appears to the person to be unitary or whole. A s was seen earlier, it seems that w e grasp
the whole thingfirst,and only later can w e analyse it and break it d o w n into parts. In
contemporary research there appears to be support for this, which not only reflects these
ideas about enactment and embodiment, but which also m a y indicate w h y metaphor and
figurative thinking seem to be so important in insight.

10.3 METAPHORIC MIND: THE WHOLE PRECEDES THE
PARTS
But the greatest thing, by far, is to be master of metaphor. It is the one
thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius
since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of similarity of
dissimilars. Through resemblance, metaphor makes things clearer.
(Aristotle, Poetics)16
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Cited in Kittay (1997, p. 399).

10.3.1

Metaphor And Mind

It was proposed (see Chapter 8) that emotional thinking is characterised by a 'quick an

dirty appraisal' of one's situation that is prior to a representational or propositional
awareness. Presentational consciousness works in this way generally. It tends to take

things in broad perspective by uniting things in a type of holistic, tacit grasp. That i

whole, unitary experience is always prior to its abstraction into parts (Mills, 1996). Th
fast, intuitive 'undermind' (Claxton, 1997) appears not to work via any atomistic
process where a 'picture' is built up by combining many smaller parts. Rather, we form

a type of 'gestalt' whole which may or may not later be reflected upon at a higher leve
of conscious awareness.
Hunt (1995) summarised the extensive evidence for this type of cognitive
unconscious. For example, he described the research of cognitive psychologist,
Anthony Marcel (1983a, 1983b) in which people tend to pick semantically-related
words to tachistoscope flashes of words presented too fast for conscious recognition.

Such a holistic semantic synthesis seems to precede a recognition of constituent parts.

For example, if the flashed word was 'acquaintance', subjects are more likely to choose
'friend' than the much more graphically similar 'acquiescence'. This
'protoconsciousness' or immediately sensed consciousness "first provides us with the
maximally intuitive synthesis and sensed meaning of our situation at its most abstract
level" (Hunt, 1995, p. 31). The role of consciousness, Hunt concluded, maybe to
organise and direct" largely unconscious parallel processes through successive moments
of'figurative unity'" (p. 30).
This figurative unity Hunt saw as the basis of symbolic consciousness. Without

going into too much detail here, Hunt (1995) outlined a theory of the origin of mind in
cross-modal synesthesia whereby the various perceptual modalities are combined and
fused in one, unified presentational awareness. He considered this to be a fundamental
analogical or metaphorical77 capacity whereby we 'turn around' on basic perceptual
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We will follow Johnson's (1987) definition of metaphor as a "process by which we understand and
structure one domain of experience in terms of another domain of a different kind' (p. 14).

schemata, thereby making this type of symbolic awareness qualitative, embodied and
medium-sensitive.
Hunt's (1995) argument was that all symbolic cognition is based on the ability
for cross-modal translation between different perceptual modalities (Geschwind, 1965).
He referred to accounts, for example, by Mead (1934) and Winnicott (1971) which
suggested that reflexive consciousness is grounded in the early mirroring games, for
example, between a neonate and its mother. This is where we see, for example, a crossmodal translation between visual and kinaesthetic modes: where the child sees with
delight that the mother responds with her facial expressions to the child's felt
movements of his or her own face. The child sees (reflected in mother's face) what a
smile looks like. Smiling becomes a kinaesthetic/visual phenomenon for the child.

Thus a non-linguistic dialogue is established and reflexive consciousness, including th

emergence of a sense of self, arguably begins in this sociality. Here is a pre-linguist
'metaphor' where the attributes of one domain (i.e., the kinesthetic of a smile) are
mapped onto another (the visual appearance of a responding face) and are
simultaneously seen as the same, yet distinct.
This is then linked to Lakoff s (1987) and Johnson's (1987) metaphoric'imagistic' theories of symbolic cognition whereby image schema provide the templates
allowing for propositional thought via metaphorical extension. This implies an
openness and source of novelty in symbolic expressions because perceptual structures,
characterised by openness and flow, cannot be reduced to basic components or

propositions. In this way all knowledge is, at root, argued to be metaphoric: it is alw

a 'seeing as' because one situation is always 'seen' through, and by means of, another.
Such a position is mirrored in Kelly's (1955) assertion that we can only construe
something new in terms of our current constructs. Metaphor is here used in a 'weak',

non-iiteral' sense (Shanon, 1993). That is, rather than metaphor relying on a projectio

of meaning through the lens or vehicle of a literal or well-defined domain onto another
less-known domain, the original domain or 'vehicle' is treated as if it were literally
known. As Hunt (1995) said,"... when we say 'man is a wolf or 'anger is explosive',

it is absolutely not the case that w e really k n o w more about wolves or explosives" (p.
176). The trick of metaphor is to remain aware that it is not a literal comparison, but
open-ended invitation to pursue possible meanings and comparisons. In this way
metaphorical thinking is a way of exploring new situations (Mair, 1976). In terms that
Kelly (1964) used, this is an expression of the 'invitational mood' as against the
indicative mood (see also McWilliams, 1993).
As the dominant characteristics of our immediate environment are the non-linear
flow dynamics of air and wafer, Hunt (1995) concluded that some metaphoric products

of presentational transformations are privileged: specifically, that a sense of a tempo
flowing from an unknown source, of luminosity or glow and of horizontal openness are
direct reflections of the ambient array (Gibson, 1979). Hunt (1995) believed that such

transformations are highly suggestive of reports of advanced meditative states (see als
Varela et al., 1996), and also of reports of the experience of insight. Such reports of
openness and of flow, of a forward-looking anticipation, of the play of mental imagery

with a reportedly spontaneous and seemingly 'external' perceptual character, are, as we
have seen, commonplace in the insight literature.
As we will see in the next section on categories and mind, other researchers have
argued for certain privileged metaphorical extensions based on human embodiment and
perception (Gibbs, 1997; Johnson, 1987; Kittay, 1997; Lakoff, 1987; Varela et al.,
1996). All these theorists have in common the placing of our embodiment and enactive
immersion in a dynamic environment at the centre of mind. I find here mounting
evidence for the importance of metaphorical thinking for the development of mind.
For example, Shanon (1993) argued cogently that metaphor is primary and
ubiquitous in language and in thought. The meaning of the metaphor, for Shanon, is

always created on the spot by the particular contextual array of elements constructed b
the person (not by mapping onto a stable, literal 'vehicle'). As with Hunt (1995), he
argued that the non-verbal phenomenon akin to metaphor is "cross-modal perception
and association" (1993, p. 63). Thus people may 'see' colours in their mind's eye when

listening to music, or may kinaesthetically 'feel' the textures of a painting . Although

such dramatic cross-modal perceptions are relatively rare, appreciating them is not.
Most people, Shanon pointed out, would say a sneeze is 'brighter' than a cough, for
example. He also suggested that infants seem to experience this type of non-verbal
metaphor more readily and gives as evidence that babies prefer to attend to a dotted
rather than a continuous line after they hear a pulsing tone. Presumably this reflects a
cross-modal translation from the intermittent sound to the intermittent dots.
Or again, Shanon (1993) summarised the evidence that metaphors take no extra

time to be classified or processed for meaning relative to literal statements — provided
the context is given. In similar fashion, he presented research showing that very young
children produce and comprehend metaphor. In fact, the metaphorical, fuzzy aspects of
meaning may well be appreciated before the literal fixed meaning, just as the overall

affective and evaluative characteristics of stimuli are perceived before the recognition
the stimuli itself (Zajonc, 1980). With respect to language, Shanon (1991, 1993) argued
convincingly that the 'representational computational view of mind' (RCVM) cannot
account for the meaning of words largely because a set of given terms or definitions
could never keep up with contextual variations including polysemy, mis-usages, context

and translation. All this suggests that not only is metaphor not derived from the litera
but that it may be primary:
... patterns of synaesfhesia ... suggest that the association between two
domains which the observer m a y deem distinct is a basic feature of the
h u m a n cognitive system. Thus, the association is not by virtue of the
detection of similarity or resemblance between two given entities,
aspects or features, but rather the manifestation of a functional
equivalence which defines some basic qualities of human
phenomenological experience. In other words, the cognitive system is
so built as to m a k e us experience sensory information from different
modalities as similar or equivalent. Thus the association is more basic
than the entities between which it seems to be defined. (Shanon, 1993,
p. 63)

For Shanon, therefore, a fundamental given is this propensity, in the language of MatteBianco (1988), to find 'symmetrical relationships' in the world. Symmetry and
presentational awareness is considered primary. Following Langer (1957,1972), Hunt
called such spontaneous transformations of consciousness 'presentational states'. In

these presentational states the basic principles of perception are re-used as the abstract
structures of symbolic cognition and they underlay, and form the basis for,
representational symbolism. Generally speaking, Hunt (1995) considered that the
incipient portents of presentational consciousness are moving towards being more
conscious, representational thought (in much the same way that Matte-Bianco saw bimodal thought as ideal: symmetry in the service of asymmetry). Insight, too, is
involved in such a progression from a felt meaning within presentational awareness (a
looser construction), to a consciously held representational or propositional meaning (a

tightening construction at a higher level of awareness). Rather than seeing the reports o
creative/insightful people as exceptional, one can see them as providing a clue to the
dimensions (usually not experienced as such) of symbolic thought.
An example of synesthetic metaphor leading to conscious insight may be of
assistance in clarifying these ideas. Briggs (1994) described how inventor Nikola
Tesla's idea for the self-starting motor came as he was reciting a poem by Goethe while
watching a sunset. He imagined a magnetic field rapidly rotating inside a circle of
electromagnets, apparently suggested by the disk of the sun and the pulse of rotation by
the poetic rhythm. A type of synesthetic merging, or cross-modal synthesis, is evident
here where the presentational awareness of rhythm and the visual image of the sun
merge within the highly representational thought structures involved in his
understanding of the theories of electromagnetics. In PCP terms, we see here a
loosening process where various constructs sharing certain elements are allowed to
coalesce and merge, a symmetrical and metaphorical process which allows formerly
remote modes of knowing to be held together in a presentational (aesthetic and nonverbal) state long enough for new insight to emerge.
It was suggested earlier (see Chapter 7) that personal construing in many ways
resembles metaphorical thinking. The most detailed discussion of this is in Mair (1976)
who also pointed out similarities between the two processes. For example, he indicated
that both Kelly's notion of construing and metaphorical thought ideally take an
'invitational' approach to meaning and reality, they are both 'hypothetical' approaches

to our world, they both include feeling, desire and thought in one process, and they both
represent channels or avenues of thought which provide both freedom and constraints to
understanding. Accordingly, Mair concluded that no sharp contrasts can be drawn
between the two concepts.
O n the other hand, Mair (1976) did not consider they were the same thing. For
example, metaphor w a s seen as " sort-crossings" rather than " sortings" (p. 260), the
latter being more applicable to constructs. That is, sortings (construing) m a y be
understood as the w a y w e try to form dimensions by which w e can establish
conventions or some stability of understanding. Thus w e find stable ways in which two
things are similar while being different to a third. Sort-crossings (metaphorical
understanding), however, are aimed at breaking conventions, of making such a
distinction or difference invalid. Furthermore, Mair felt that constructs were " a more
abstracted notion than metaphor" being more clearly delineated than metaphor which is
"more multifaceted, less directional, and more ambiguous" (p. 260).
While in general agreement with Mair's discussion, particularly with his
concluding suggestion (1976, p. 261) that "It could almost be argued that personal
construct psychology is a psychology of m a n as a maker and user of metaphor.", 1 also
believe that the earlier discussion of loosening and tightening can contribute to this train
of thought. Specifically, looser construing seems to embody most, if not all, of the
characteristics of metaphorical thought that Mair outlined. In contrast, w h e n metaphor
fades, w h e n the similarity function is treated literally (perhaps w h e n the contrast pole is
submerged or remains implicit), then w e find the person is construing tightly. So,
construing m a y vary in its modes from 'metaphorical' to 'literal' and, what m a y be
required for insight to occur m a y be an optimal balance between these two modes.

10.3.2 Categories Of Mind And Figurative Thought
The field of cognitive linguistics has developed a significant body of evidence
supporting the centrality of embodiment in our mental structures. The basic categories

of thought are argued to reflect this embodied immersion in action-in-the-world and

their rise to representational thought is argued to be via metaphorical extension (Gibbs
1997; Lakoff, 1987; Johnson, 1987). These researchers have proposed that reason is
inherently imaginative, particularly evidenced in its use of metaphor, metonymy and
imagery. This leads to a different view of mental categories, rejecting the traditional
objectivist view that categories are independent of the bodily nature of the beings
holding those categories.
Traditional concepts were, in some way, considered to be transcendent or 'out

there', waiting to be discovered. In contrast, Lakoff (1987) considered that, apart from

more traditional, propositional categories, there are also 'basic level' categories whic
are 'image schematic', metaphorical, and metonymical. These basic level categories
reflect the bodily nature of people and depend on gestalt perception and molar
movements. One such category Lakoff has called 'radial' in that many models or
concepts are organised around a centre. These models are related to each other by
similarity or symmetry, but non-central or peripheral models while 'motivated' by the
centre, are not predictable from there. There are strong echoes here of my earlier

discussion of prototypes and loose (symmetrical) construing, and of possible inferential
incompatibility arising from such construction.
In related fashion, Johnson (1987) considered very general kinaesthetic image

schema (e.g., the 'part-whole' or 'source-path-goal' schema) to be basic level categorie
which provide commonality and structure to otherwise richly creative and figurative
extensions of the basic model. Varela et al (1996, pp. 177-8) gave as an example the
'container' schema which includes such elements as 'interior', 'boundary' and

'exterior'. Its metaphorical projections help structure our thought about the visual wor
(things go in and out of sight), about personal relationships (one gets in and out of a
relationship), and the logic of sets (sets contain and exclude elements).
Thus, image schema begin in bodily experience, can be defined in structural
units, embody a type of logic and can be projected to other domains. Johnson's (1987)
close attention to such basic level concepts enabled him to assert that image schema

emerge from basic sensorimotor activities and thereby provide a preconceptual structure

to our experience. Concepts which arise on this basis are not arbitrary but are based on
metaphoric and metonymical 'mapping procedures'. For example, emotional concepts,
such as the metaphorical association of anger with heat or pressure, are related to the
preconceptual physiological experience of anger.
To say that image schemata 'constrain' our meaning and understanding
and that metaphorical systems 'constrain' our reasoning is to say that
they establish a range of possible patterns of understanding and
reasoning. They are like channels in which something can m o v e with a
certain, limited freedom. S o m e movements (inferences) are not
possible at all. They are ruled out by the image schemata and
metaphors. But within these limits, there is a measure of freedom or
variability that is heavily context-dependent. (Johnson, 1987, p. 137)
Johnson sees understanding as a way we create our 'lived-world', involving our whole
being, body, culture, history and so on. It is not so much that image schematic
metaphors are grounded in an embodiment that is universally understood and
objectively available. Rather, they represent an embodiment that takes on myriad

cultural, psychological and situational interpretations. Further, Kittay (1997) caution
us against taking body-based image schema too far, reducing all imagination and

creative thought to them. It is enough to say, as she does, that they are very important
and that what is basic, and essential, is the irreducible human capacity to make
analogical leaps across domains, as well as the 'normal' inference processes of
induction and deduction. Again, I see the need for both loose and tight construing, for
both symmetry and asymmetry to adequately encompass human understanding. This
view, consistent with Shanon's (1993) contextual view, is that metaphor creates ad hoc
categories:
... the sort of stretching and warping of our conceptual schemes that
metaphor engenders, a happy 'de-forming' of fixed modes of thought
that allow us to think n e w thoughts, devise n e w articulations, and find
n e w concepts by which to understand the world. (Kittay, 1997, p. 400).

The parallels to Kelly's creativity cycle, of alternating loose and then provisional
tightenings of construing, are evident in the above. The creative process of
metaphorical thinking is also akin to the perception-like phenomenology of insight

experiences. Metaphorical awareness seems to have sensory-like, imaginative qualities
with thefreshnessof perception (Shanon, 1993). N e w metaphors create n e w contexts
with a plurality and openness of meaning which is more like the world itself, which is
always dynamically changing, always open to multiple interpretation. Frequently
people, in reporting insight experience, suggest it is as if they are watching a scene
unfold, or hearing a musical composition unfold, or observing characters engaging in a
dialogue, and so on. Shanon (1993) thought this style of thought, being close to the
basic operations of the psyche, is particularly well-suited to affective expression, but
also that such " expressions are not committing: they invoke various interpretations but
do notfixany of them as the single and correct one" (1993, p. 91, italics in original).
Metaphorical thought is highly dimensional, being difficult to articulate and to grasp,
and containing within its o w n economy of expression,richrepositories of meaning. The
question to be addressed next is 'how to w e encourage and access such processes?'

10.4 MEDITATIVE THOUGHT
10.4.1 Valuing Experience
In order to harness these metaphoric, embodied and enactive features of mind in the
service of insight, a crucial step is to value one's psychic experience for its o w n sake
and in its o w n terms. The phobic avoidance of personal experience and consciousness
in a psychology obsessed with an outdated version of scientific respectability seems
increasingly, thankfully, to be a thing of the past (Harre, 1983). And, with Varela,
T h o m p s o n and Rosch (1996), I believe that it is a pressing task in contemporary
psychology to integrate our day-to-day, even moment-to-moment, phenomenological
experience with what w e are learning from the mainstream sciences of mind.
Psychology needs to be able to shed light on personal experience and be open to its
potential for transformation. In like fashion, the person needs to be able to shed light
and be open to his or her o w n experiential processes, including their transformation.
Thus, what is important is:

... that conscious awareness can be progressively developed beyond its
everyday form.. .[and] that such development can be used to provide
direct insight into the structure and the constitution of experience.
(Varela et al., 1996, p. 54)

We have seen that a playful, relaxed and experimental attitude is almost always

implicated in creative and insightful experiences. This represents a type of seeing 'wi

one's eyes half closed' (Ravenette, 1996). A crucial part of one's experiential world i
one's own, ongoing processes. A contemplative attitude, or transcending affective
openness, may allow one to see one's own perceptual assumptions or interpretations as
assumptions or interpretations. All methods enabling this seem to involve the slowing
down of automatic mental activity and focusing broadly on the world of sensations,
allowing interpretations, feelings and emotions to come and go. This brings about a
development, an altered mode of being or meditative thought. Such indwelling thought
is affectively and aesthetically sensitive and 'waits upon' what will come.
Meditative thinking is a type of 'personal knowing' which Mair (1980)
considered is intimately involved with feeling: "Feeling is a fundamental means of
knowing in the realm of the personal" (p. 113). Whether personally knowing someone
else or oneself, this type of knowing is one in which human experiencing is valued for
its own sake:
To invite someone else to be personal is to ask them to take their own
experience seriously. It is to encourage them to trust and be m o v e d by
what they feel as a vehicle of articulated knowing. T o be personal
means not only taking your o w n and other people's experiencing
seriously. It also means taking a stand and enduring. (Mair, 1980, p.
121)
One of the important things this inquiry seems to be revealing is that for insight to
one needs to be involved and committed to the matter in hand. More than that, one must

value one's own processes, have faith in one's intuitions, be willing to cast oneself i
uncertainties. To enter into a new understanding in this fully embodied, personal way
means one will change in the process, that there are not-yet-imagined dimensions and

aspects of one's own being and self that one can create. Thus, genuine new insight does
not only change what we know, or even how we know, but who we are. This inquiry

into insight, therefore, again turns to the issue of 'self, on this occasion to its nonunitary, non-essential nature.

10.4.2 Altering The Experience Of Self
An emerging theme in the contemporary science of mind, and an age-old theme in
Buddhist philosophy, is the assertion that there is no inner, stable and unitary self,
rather it is a constantly re-constructed awareness (Hinnells, 1984; Kabat-Zinn, 1990;
Miller, 1983; Varela et al., 1996). Also a commonplace in post-modern thought, the
'fragmented' or non-unified self is variously suggested to be an emergent property of

the radically distributed processes of the brain, or in cognitive terms, a subset of sc
which provide some stability and a point of reference over time, a 'society of mind'
(Minsky, 1985) or a 'community of self (Mair, 1977), and so on.
A relevant and much-used distinction drawn by William James (1890) was
between what he called 'me' or the known self, and T as the knowing self. A similar
distinction was made by Mead (1964) whereby 'self referred to a known self, and T

referred to the experiencing centre of a person, the tacit basis for action. In Kelly's
theory, 'core constructs' are those that relate to this 'known self or 'me'. But,
arguably, it is the awareness processes themselves that Kelly considered to be most

important. These represent the T, the experiencing self, the locus for construing — the
'personal' part of personal constructs. Although the contents of core construing are
extremely important in negotiating one's living, being able to alter and transform the
construing process itself is of far more importance, and is much more emphasised in
Kelly's writings. 1 agree with Mair (1995) who said:
My impression is that awareness is much more central to Kelly's
perspective than 'self. 'Self is seen as part of a strategy of
anticipating events, sometimes being helpful and sometimes becoming
a pattern of rigidity and a hindrance to understanding or change. Kelly
poked fun at people (psychologists among them) w h o claimed that they
could only 'be themselves'. This notion of an 'essential nature' was not
what he had in mind. B y acting in faith, he saw it both possible and
necessary to transcend any particular w a y of identifying 'self. (p. 18)

T o be more alive, to be more present to events, it is necessary to bring more of the 'selfas-construer' (I) into one's experience. Self-consciousness and grasping for some
desired outcome is lessened by absorption in the moment, by not 'end-gaining' (Mixon,
1999) or knowing what we seek in advance. Such an attitude leads to the spontaneity of
the unexpected.
A central feature of Mahayana Buddhism is the experience of 'emptiness',
particularly within the practice of insight meditation (Vipassina). The aim of the
various practices is to dissolve rigid views (ditthi) and to break down beliefs in the
(apparent) permanence of things (Hinnells, 1984). Apparent entities such as the 'mind'
or the 'self are proposed to be merely changing collections of evanescent events, and
meditation practices can lead to a direct insight into this, moment by moment. A

defining aspect of this is the inter-relatedness of everything. One may come to realise
one's 'self is empty, yet simultaneously that one is a part of everything else, and so

'self is also infinitely 'full'. The terrors and the excitements associated with impass
and insight may relate to the fragmentation, yet infinite expansion, of self. The aha!

experience resonates with this type of radical connectedness and I propose it constitut
an experiential refutation of dualism or separateness. It may be a relatively common
example of what the Vietnamese Zen Master, Thich Nhat Hanh, called 'interbeing'

(cited in Mair, 1995, p. 19). The latter term represents the ways in which the being of

all things is a part of the being of all other things — that all phenomena are both emp
without independent identity, being non-distinct, and yet are full, being a part of
everything else. Direct awareness of this would constitute a 'symmetrical'
consciousness 'contained' within a very comprehensive and permeable superordinate
understanding.
In this context the 'self-control necessary to come to insight takes on a new
meaning. Within meditative thought the self as construer (T), or the construing one
lives through, cannot be known without objectifying it, without changing the T into a

'me', a static content. It is not a matter of controlling self, or defining it more cle

'realising one's self, but rather of releasing or letting go of the various self format

This paradoxical situation is duplicated in the quest for insight. O n e cannot will oneself
to an insight or achieve it merely by working harder or by attempting to control one's

thinking. Insight rarely seems to arrive while we are trying to figure things out direc
Indeed, the concern with trying to attain the insight, or end-gaining, is
counterproductive. So a radically different mode of awareness is required, one that the
Buddhists call 'mindfulness' and which represents a progressive development of our
capacity for awareness.

10.4.4 Developing Awareness And Insight

In discussing transpersonal states, or altered states of awareness, Hunt (1995) claimed
that the path to such states of awareness — and the insights which commonly
accompany them — requires a sustained attention to the medium of one's symbolic
processes. Rather than focusing on the content or meaning of one's thoughts or
circumstances, for example, one attends to the ways in which they are experienced in
the body, in feeling and in emotion. One attends to the flow of things and continuously
lets go of interpretation and 'knowing'. One is left with the medium itself, be it the

sound of notes, the rising of thoughts or images in consciousness, the kinaesthetic feel
for a movement in dance, and so on. From such a radically observational attitude:
... meaning emerges as a result of experiential immersion in the
expressive patterns of the symbolic medium. It appears as spontaneous,
preemptory imagery and is fully developed in the expressive media of
the arts. Here, felt meanings emerge from the m e d i u m in the form of
potential semblances that are 'sensed', polysemic and open-ended, and
so unpredictable and novel. It is the receptive, observing attitude
c o m m o n to aesthetics, meditation, and classical introspection that
allows such meanings to emerge. (Hunt, 1995, p. 42)

Given a deep immersion in the domain of interest, the medium of the domain becomes a
'language' for the person which is automaticised or habitual and which seems to gain a

life of its own. Writers 'hear' their characters talking to each other, or 'see' them in
scenes, mathematicians 'see' mathematical symbols or formulas arranging and rearranging themselves, composers 'hear' music as they compose, painters 'find' the

painting they have in mind as it emerges on the canvas. Such reports are commonplace
(Epel, 1993; Gardner, 1993; Gruber, 1995).
Hunt (1995) considered that in this meditative mode of thought we may become
aware of a normally subliminal, broad synthesis of disparate modalities of perception.

But, beheld in the broad perspective of this type of unwavering yet diffused attention
is transformed:
Rather than reflecting building blocks or microgenetic stages,
contemplation of experience for its o w n sake induces a transformation
of consciousness, in another sense, its completion. (1995, p. 41, italics
in original)

Just as Matte-Bianco (1988) saw that bi-modal thought was an ideal balance
between looser, symmetrical processes emerging into consciousness within the

constraints of tighter asymmetrical understanding, so this contemplative attitude open

up the frontiers of one's capacity to understand and to generate new insight. As Claxto
(1997, 1998) suggested, this represents a slowing down of mental processes, a delay of
one's normally dominant semantic organisation long enough to allow into awareness the
expressive perceptual dimensions basic to presentational symbolisms. These
presentational states, Hunt (1995) believed, are the re-using of basic spatial and
perceptual structures and are probably the basis for image schema. What can emerge is
not self-referential awareness, but a sense of unclouded clarity and presence often
associated with long-term meditative practice and with 'peak experiences'. Hunt (1995)
pointed out that such states are correlated with unusually coherent alpha and theta
patterns across the entire cortex.
Such an awareness is enabled by a transcending affective state in which we
examine our meaning processes for their own sake. This delay in the pragmatics of
construction is likely to be what occurs within Kelly's creativity cycle (Kenny &
Delmonte, 1986; Srinivasan & Mclver, 1992). In loosening and provisional fightenings
emerging understandings take shape and fall into line with the meaning structures

formed by the person's assiduous, preparatory efforts. These efforts have, in iterative
fashion, developed the tacit, 'from-which' anticipatory 'spectacles' through which the

world takes shape for us. For this reason, insight is no accident, but neither is it
'directable' or predictable, dependent as it is on letting go and on the undoing of
previous knowings. It can be prepared for, but has to be waited-upon.
The reflexive awareness of our immediate subjective state follows from the
fundamental ability to take the role of the other towards ourselves. This allows for a
radically detached and observational attitude, a stepping back from pragmatic
involvement which both reveals and transforms awareness. The key element in this
process appears to be the capacity to inhibit habitual processes:
Meditation is based on a deliberate suspension of our more practically
oriented cognitive activity, especially verbally organized thought. This
inhibition of capacities associated with left-hemisphere predominance
would allow the potential synthesizing capacity of self-awareness more
time to complete itself to the greatest degree possible. (Hunt, 1995, p.
34)

Whether Hunt is right about the differing functions of left and right hemispheres
and their relations to differing modes of thought, the point of relevance for us here is
that the development of meditative thought is derived by the inhibition of 'normal'
thought which looks for closure, which tightens in order to predict. Discussing the
Alexander technique78 (Alexander, 1932), Mixon (1999) considered that the breaking of
habit allows for spontaneity and for 'the right thing to do itself (one of Alexander's
favourite sayings). These habits are the 'from which' by which we attend to things, the
tacit understandings that silently frame our questions. By altering their automatic
'channelling' of our anticipations, change becomes possible:
The chief means of change became stopping (inhibiting) the original
habit momentarily so that n e w directions could take effect. The ability
to be aware of something and momentarily stop it can become a skill
which can generalize to any sort of habit. (Mixon, 1999, p. 182)

Clearly, 'mental' habits can be at least as intransigent as 'physical' ones such as our
posture. In developing this capacity for change in an ongoing way the trick is to make
one's habits, including one's fixed understandings, more tentative. In order to take
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Alexander developed a system and practice of restoring bodily alignment and balance based on a
conviction of the psycho-physical unity of the person.

conscious shape, incipient understandings can be 'provisionally' tightened. B y keeping
the forms of thought relatively loose the contents of thought remain flexible. What is
important here is not what w e do, or what w e think, but how w e do it. Mills (1996)
pointed out that any genuinely n e w action 'feels wrong', or threatening. Even if the
n e w action or n e w thought is more balanced or 'appropriate', it feels alien. Indeed, it
can feel disabling:
T o even consider not doing things in our usual w a y in order to leave
ourselvesfreeto discover as yet unknown n e w ways feels like giving
up any action whatever. (Mills, 1996, p. 68)

The practice of inhibition, in the Alexander system, is an insistence on the continuing
openness to unknown alternative responses. If is a w a y of refusing the obvious. In this
process w e become aware that something that w e are not normally aware of is n o w felt
as missing, a vague state of unease. This is fertile ground for insight.

10.5 SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Following the broadening of the focus in m y discussion of emotion and mind (Chapter
8) and of the links between Matte-Bianco and Kelly (Chapter 9), the present chapter has
enabled us to see h o w the pragmatist-phenomenological approach to mind can
encompass the distinctive features and phenomenology of insight. I have attempted to
show that the feelings of connectedness, of transcending a narrow sense of self, of an
embodied and participatory knowing, and of a characteristically metaphorical m o d e of
thinking all sit comfortably within a pragmatist-phenomenological account.
This account was drawn in large part from the existential phenomenology of
Merleau-Ponty and stressed the w a y in which the 'body-subject' allowed for a relational
account of the person, one in which the person co-created the 'affordances' of his or her
world. This embodied view of mind stressed 'enactment' rather than inner, separate
thought processes. According to this account w e exist in a 'lived-through' world and
most of our knowing is tacit, a 'knowing-from' rather than a 'knowing-that. Such
knowing is highly context-dependent where the world supports and constrains our
understandings. This leads to the importance of the m e d i u m of thought in creative

enterprises. B y attending to the processes and m e d i u m of thought itself it was argued

that a distinctly metaphorical and transcending stance is possible wherein the habits of
understanding can be slowed or inhibited. This inhibition then allows something new to
emerge on the basis of one's preparations and immersion in the domain in question.
Evidence of the embodied and metaphorical nature of mind was presented and
discussed, including its connection to insight. The transcending affective awareness
characteristic of meditative thought was then linked to the distinct experiences of
'connectedness' and of 'self which are so frequently commented on in the literature. It
was concluded that a capacity for insight is something that one can prepare for and get
better at, but that coming to insight itself cannot be hurried nor predicted.
Insight is not easy to come to because it always represents an undoing of what
we already know, of what we depend on in order to negotiate our world. Preparation is
crucial, as is the invalidation of what we know already. This process can be threatening
unless we have in place a superordinate structure that is capable of containing our
attempts at loosening and opening-up our construing. Insightful thinking is about a
different style or mode of thought in which we derail predictive or representational
thought in favour of a more diffuse, anticipatory 'waiting-upon'. In this mode people

undertake behavioural experiments: writers write; scientists experiment, either in reali
or in imagination; musicians extemporise, and so on. It is in such 'projects' that new
ways of being and insights emerge. We do not merely 'think' an insight; it is personally

endured. We set the conditions for its occurrence and we enact it, we experience it as it
happens. We see or feel the answer as if it comes from 'outside' because we relinquish

a controlling, predictive structure and open up to the world in a receptive, anticipator
mode based on the openness of perceptual-like, presentational images. Insight
represents a 'personal knowing', a knowing made possible by intimate involvement and
commitment and, somewhat paradoxically, by the letting go of the urgency to know.
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SECTION 4.
VIEWING INSIGHT AS A WHOLE

CHAPTER 11: A THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING
OF INSIGHT
11.1 THE INQUIRY INTO INSIGHT THUS FAR
11.1.1 Introduction

It is now time to integrate the various themes and elements of this inquiry and to presen
a theoretical description of insight (see Figure 1, Chapter 1 for an overview of this entire
work). The approach taken has had as its focus the psychology of insight, as against, for
example, the philosophy of insight. The importance of this distinction was highlighted
by Meno's paradox which, it was argued, relies on an objectivist, philosophical
assumptions for its unsettling conclusion that inquiry into n e w knowledge is futile. This
led to m y focus on the psycho-logic, as distinct from the logic, of insight. Such a
psycho-logic is based on personal understanding and meaning rather than on certainty
and objective access to Truth.79 Compatible with this focus was a non-essentialist,
'nominal' definition of insight which has allowed us to assemble an understanding of
this multifaceted phenomenon by discussing examples, descriptions and theories of
insight. The aim has beentodevelop an expanding acquaintance with insight such that
w e might learn more, not only about insight itself, but also of the nature of the person
capable of such creative feats.
The above aim implies that the study of insight is important for a number of
reasons. Obviously, history demonstrates the contributions and benefits of significant
creative insights. Accordingly, any contribution this inquiry can m a k e to an
understanding of h o w such insights occur would be worthwhile. A n y means of
avoiding the 'oversight' of insights w e m a y wish to have would be similarly welcome.
It has also been suggested that not all insights m a y be beneficial, and that awareness of
79

Although 'psycho-logic' (Warren, 1998) works at the idiographic or individual level, I also intend a
more nomothetic understanding of this term. That is, it is assumed that all people utilise their o w n
personal systems of judgement and understanding, their psycho-logic, in furtherance of their anticipatory
ventures. In terms of insight, I a m saying is that there are generalisations that can be m a d e (one is that
people use psycho-logic) about h o w people c o m e to insight.

the implications of insights must be prepared for carefully. In wider terms, a deeper
understanding of insight may lead to a richer understanding of mental life and human
beings in general.
With these reminders of our objectives and style of approach in place, it may be
useful to summarise what we have achieved thus far, presented in broad terms. I began
by describing insight and found that the language of early gestalt-inspired research has
been largely maintained in contemporary research. Thus, for example, it was found that

the four stages of insight — preparation, impasse-incubation, the insight experience, and
verification-elaboration — are viewed as still adequately covering the phenomenology
of this complex process. Having reviewed the mostly-cognitive research literature, four
reliable and consistently-present features of insight were found. These were the use of
high levels of abstraction, the alternation between tacit and explicit mental processes,
the role of emotion in insight and the social and pragmatic dimensions of insight.
It was argued that the cognitive literature, in attempting to be true to the full
phenomenology of insight, showed a definite trend towards psychological
constructivism and it was further argued that an explicit constructivist account would
make good some of the explanatory deficits in the traditional approaches. In particular,
a problem found within many of the cognitive accounts of insight was that in attempting
to base insight on non-intentional, associative processes, the 'insightful' person only
entered the theoretical picture when the solution 'popped' into his or her consciousness.
That is, much of the work of novelty and creativity was achieved by mindless,
presumably neural, processes, leaving the person more a receptacle for insight, rather
than its agent. The trouble is, however, that 'mindless' spreading networks of
'semantic' activation are thereby quietly endowed with many of the insightful properties
we have been trying to account for. In any case, such accounts explicitly require the
person to recognise that such and such is an insight — which is really much of the point
in insight, to see that something is a breakthrough. It was argued, therefore, that one
must assume from the outset that people are insightful, meaning-generating creatures,

and our task is to understand the ways in which this is manifested, rather than to search
for the hidden (ultimately neural) essence of insight.
Subsequently, a pragmatist reading of PCP was given and then Kelly's treatment
of insight was outlined and critiqued. Although PCP was found to be an excellent
theoretical framework within which to discuss insight, it was also suggested that there
were areas identified in the literature which Kelly had either missed or had dealt with

too little detail. In addition, it was felt that the reported phenomenology of insight, a
the various explanations applied to it, were pointing to a broader conception of mind. A
recurring and integrative idea which emerged in these discussions has been Langer's

distinction between presentational and representational thought. Bearing this distinctio
in mind, an elaboration of the relationship of emotion and mind, of symmetrical and
asymmetrical consciousness and Kelly's creativity cycle, and of the embodied, enactive
and metaphorical features of mind were given. This led to a discussion of a more
'personal knowing' or 'meditative thinking' in which the person does not stand apart
and judge from a distance, but participates in the known. This latter discussion was
illuminated, in part, by parallels with Buddhist thought.

11.1.2 Elements And Features Of Insight

Before outlining my theoretical understanding of insight it will be helpful to bring bac
to mind the diverse elements and features of insight we have encountered in our inquiry.
One way of usefully uniting many of these elements and features is to think of them in
terms of two modes of thought. That is, insight reveals an alternation and harmony
between 'normal', reasoning consciousness and another less verbal, more tacit and
affective mode of understanding. If we consider human understanding in terms of
Langer's (1957, 1972) two modes of mental awareness, representational and
presentational symbolisms (see Table 1), then we find family resemblances amongst the
conceptualisations we have examined.

Table 1.

Contrasts between presentational and representational thinking.
variously conceived.

Presentational Thinking

Representational Thinking

symmetrical awareness

asymmetrical awareness

primary process thinking

secondary process thinking

m e d i u m sensitivity

m e d i u m insensitivity

loose construing

tight construing

figurative/metaphorical thinking

literal thinking

participatory/personal knowing

knowing 'that'

intuitive/tacit knowing

conscious reasoning

meditative thinking

calculative thinking

enactment

'inner' conscious reasoning

multidimensional thinking

linear thinking

The various theorists I have discussed do seem all to be pointing in a similar
direction. For example, Kelly's contrast between loose and tight construing shares
m a n y of the contrasting features of presentational and representational thinking,
respectively. Therefore, loose construing tends to share features with 'symmetrical'
awareness, tends to be more multidimensional and figurative, and so on. This is not to
say that these conceptualisations are all the same on every dimension, but it is to suggest
that this presentational—representational continuum of mental life is a useful
conceptual division. W h a t emerges is the convergent validity of the idea that an
adequate understanding of h u m a n mentality in general, and of optimal mental
functioning in particular, must include the harmonious interplay of these complementary
styles of anticipation.
A key skill seems to involve the capacity to utilise presentational modes of
mental symbolism in the service of our more articulate, consciously-held projects; to be
able to harness the unpredictable, fertile and changeable openness of our looser modes

of anticipation. Dwelling in and managing this alternative m o d e of thought requires
particular strategies and a certain superordinating attitude which I have characterised as
a transcending affective calm or security which can tolerate, even welcome, uncertainty.
The person typically is immersed deeply in an ongoing project, 'living' the question as
it were (for example, creating 'failure indices'), paying attention to the m e d i u m of
interest ('perceptual rehearsal') and being sensitive to highly abstract, affectively
nuanced images relevant to the problem at hand (such as 'themata' or 'inceptions').
Features of this looser, more protean state include the experience of 'flow', a lessening
of self-awareness and self-concern, a loosening-up of the habits and 'fixations' of
thought, and the capacity to entertain absurdity and contradictories (the capacity for
'omnivalence' or one's 'negative capability').

11.2 WAITING UPON INSIGHT: BRINGING THE ELEMENTS
TOGETHER
M y theoretical understanding of insight will be presented in the context of answers to
several questions. Firstly, in answering 'What might enable a person to have an
insight?', the factors that seem to be correlated with, and conducive of, insight will be
summarised. In responding to 'What might happen within the insight process?', I will
propose an account of the 'logic' of insightful thinking and also of the experience itself.
That is, I will try to account for the 'quantum jump' of insight and w h y it is personally
experienced in the ways people report it to be. These explanations will lead to further
questions: 'What does insight tell us about the nature of mental life generally, of the
nature of the person having the insight, and of the relationship of that person with his or
her world?'. In responding to such complex questions, the larger-scale speculations and
theoretical images that have characterised the middle two sections of this work will be
brought together. T h e intention is to present a theoretical picture which is plausible,
coherent and suggestive of a larger unity that integrates the diverse findings presented.

11.2.1.

What Might Enable A Person To Have An Insight?

By definition, for one to come to insight one must be committed to some project or
problem and must have come to some impasse or frustration in relation to it. Whether

this be a large or small matter, an artistic endeavour, an intellectual labour, or a stru
for personal meaning and satisfaction in one's life, for insight to occur there must be

something at stake for the person. In these terms, insight is thoroughly intensional,80 or
saturated with personal meaning. One must care about the matter at hand and be

genuinely stymied in one's attempts to understand. It may be that the 'problem' itself is
difficult to articulate, even fleeting, but there must be a personally-held sense that
something needs to change within one's understanding, that something is wrong,
causing one to feel unease or disquiet.
Under such circumstances a person will normally apply her or his energies,

current understandings and trusted strategies to solve the problem (or to circumvent it).
This is appropriate since adequate preparation appears to be essential for insight to
occur. The person must have the materials at hand to work with, the elements that may

later be joined creatively in new patterns that constitute the insight. But if the person
perseveres with approaches and understandings that keep leading to failure, eventually
the person might renounce such determined 'hostility' (in Kelly's sense) in favour of
reconstrual. Whether the person leaves the problem aside, or deliberately adopts a
radically different approach and attitude to the problem, what seems necessary is an
indeterminate period of 'incubation'. The duration of this renunciation cannot be
known in advance. One must wait-upon insight. It may take only seconds, or it may
take years, or one may never experience a resolution of that particular lack of
understanding.
But it should not be assumed that the person is thereby powerless or entirely
passive in the matter. What we have seen in the insight literature, and at the heart of
Kelly's creativity cycle, is that we can deliberately adopt a different mode of
understanding and thinking which increases the likelihood of genuinely new insight.
80

Again, intensional — with an V — is used to include the usual philosophical meaning of intentional
(with a 't'), but to add a sense of the inherent meaningfulness of our mental processes.

W h a t seems to be required is the setting aside or altering of some of our previous ways
of understanding the issues at hand. Whether described in terms of restructuring the
problem, or overcoming fixation, some habits of thought need somehow to be altered.
An apparent paradox emerges here in that we can only make sense of events using our
structures of understanding, yet we must set them aside if we are to come to new
understanding. This seeming paradox is overcome, however, because we do not
dismantle all our ways of anticipating and understanding all at once. We can never set

aside all our prejudices (literally, pre-judgements), nor should we desire to, as they h
provided us with our anticipatory gains thus far. Thus we loosen up only those parts of
our thinking related to the problem at hand. Of course, we do not usually know exactly
where we are going wrong, so a general loosening in this particular 'problem' domain
may be required. What is needed is a stepping-back to gain a new perspective.
Sometimes just a break from the efforts to solve something is enough. This may

involve going for a walk, taking a vacation and so on. Indeed, creative people generally
emphasise the importance of idle time interspersed with periods of sustained work.
Taking time to relax, to exercise and to talk to friends and colleagues is frequently
deemed to be an essential part of creativity. In addition, there are more intentional,
proactive means people can utilise in order to transcend the obvious. Primarily, these
involve the person's willingness to surrender what she or he knows already, not
begrudgingly or in anxious fashion, but as an acknowledged part of the process of
creativity. Impasse is taken not so much as evidence of one's incapacity, but as an

invitation to discovery. This positive evaluation of the letting go of knowing is cruci

as it allows the person to experiment, to play with ideas, to entertain the absurd and t
seemingly contradictory.
In this latter regard we have seen that various activities have been linked to
insight. Frequently people will simply immerse themselves in the medium of their
inquiry. They may experiment with words, images, sounds and so on. This represents a
return to basics, a type of'perceptual rehearsal' and is an act of anticipation via a
presentational mode of awareness. This is a more open, receptive and 'objective' stance

to the world in which one is willing for the world to speak relatively un-tainted by our
preconceptions. This creates the subjective experience of loosening where certainties
and hard-edged distinctions are relaxed allowing the person to play with ideas, images,
and feelings.
Since one way of understanding 'emotion' is in terms of an awareness of the
subtly shifting implications of our construing, frequently emotion is the key to what is
tacit in our construing. Emotions may be considered to be talismans, to contain
revelations about our construing processes. Purposeful attention to our emotional states
themselves may, therefore, reveal the up-to-now tacit lineaments and assumptions of our

construing. As with 'inceptions', 'themata' and 'failure indices', a sensitive attunement
to our emotional 'compass' may direct us towards insight. As with the child's 'warmcold' game of hide and seek — where the invalidation of someone responding with
'cold' to our attempts to locate what is hidden can be considered informative — our
invalidated attempts towards insight, from a superordinating point of view, can be
considered not a failure, but an 'advance' which rules out one method of approach and
opens up the possibility of others.
The game metaphor is well-suited to any account of the development of insight.
In relation to the project at impasse, the person needs a type of transcending confidence
or security in his or her ability to anticipate and tolerate local inconsistencies. This
allows for a playful letting go of knowing, a general loosening. This relative lack of
self-consciousness and self concern allows for a more relaxed defocused attention, for
perceptual rehearsal, immersion in the medium, and for the characteristic
experimentation with metaphor and analogies which I have discussed earlier. When the
person develops a superordinating awareness which can accommodate such constructive
fluidity, the problem can be abstracted, pulled apart as it were, and the person can open
him or herself to feelings of knowing, inceptions, intuitions, themata and feeling tones,
to the full array of emotionally-tinged subtleties that I have argued are so important in
insight.

Ultimately, for insight to occur, what is necessary is for the person to be able to
'see' (or feel, taste, smell, and so on) a previously 'unseeable' link or connection
between various elements, images, ideas and so on. W h a t is also necessary, indeed
fundamental, is that people are inveterate meaning-makers. W e are anticipatory beings
and w e are 'designed' tofindpatterns and to anticipate events. But there are limits.
W h a t w e can see is, in combination with the constraints inherent in the events w e are
confronted by, determined by our present understandings. If w e alter our 'spectacles'
w e m a y c o m e to see n e w things in these events. But h o w might w e conceptualise what
happens in this shifting of view that constitutes the insight process? This will be the
topic of the next subsection.

11.2.2 What Might Happen Within The Insight Process?

11.2.2.1 The Logic Of Insight

Insight is frequently described as a 'quantum jump' in understanding, or as an instance
of 'lateral thinking'. This is because itfrequentlyexpresses the person's psycho-logic
(Warren, 1998), rather than a predictable, classical (deductive, inductive) logic. W e
have seen, for example, that under looser, symmetrical construing associations m a y be
m a d e 'laterally' rather than hierarchically or ordinally. The resulting process is not
illogical, it is psycho-logical. This more associative logic is h o m e tofigurativeand
metaphorical thought, to loosening and symmetry.
If w e assume that more associative, symmetrical thinking puts us in touch with
understandings of a higher dimensionality and complexity, it m a y be understood h o w
such 'inarticulate' ways of knowing grasp 'wholes', where normal rational inference
and deduction only grasp relatively limited aspects of the phenomenon at hand. Just as
w e might, in one sweep, presentationally grasp the 'ambience' of a dinner party, but
have great difficulty in verbally imparting this to another, so in loose construing w e m a y
unite m a n y things but not be immediately able to justify such linkages. Frequently,
such multidimensional grasping is centred around some highly abstract image or feeling

('inceptions', 'themata', 'failure indices') which the person then tries to articulate. In
terms of Ward's (1995) 'least resistance model', such 'imagistic' thinking occurs by
moving up one abstractive chain and down another. In PCP terms, this is where a
loosened construct comes under the regnancy of an alternative superordinate structure,
and, as I have argued, this may be via mutually-implicative constructs. This creative
subsumption of looser, symmetrical modes of understanding is what Matte-Bianco
called bi-modal thought.
The experience of insight emerges within such bi-modal thought and represents
a return to tighter implicative and asymmetrical thinking. Insight reveals a mode of
knowing and a logic which may not be easily verbalised and, therefore, needs to be

'translated' into a more representational or asymmetrical mode of thought to be grasped,

especially by others. The appropriation of an insight may lie in this, often metaphorical
transformation. However, if a person is highly skilled in presentational modes of
thought and expression the transformation may not be required for that person's full
experience of insight — because he or she has a highly elaborated and practised
presentational 'language' in which to grasp it. Nonetheless, such a 'presentational

insight' usually needs to be translated or placed within a relatively normative framewor
for others to share in it.
William Blake in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell wrote that "If the doors of
perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite" (1977, p.
188). This is the realm of symmetrical awareness. It is not that by 'cleaning' our

mental spectacles, as it were, that we see reality 'objectively', finally. Rather, by tr
to wipe them clean of pre-judgements, of what we know already, the infinite
possibilities for knowing can be glimpsed. A simultaneous awareness of the partial and
constructed nature of our outlook, and of the omnipresence and unbounded nature of the
world that 'stands over' us, that includes and transcends us, can be achieved. Our

knowing in this state, however, is not unstructured, nor purely relativist. The lenses a
never completely cleansed. They always reflect the constraints of the natural and

cultural worlds. In addition, they will always magnify and distort, include and occlude.

Nonetheless, w e can, within broad constraints, catch glimpses of the openness of reality
and grab hold of new possibilities made visible by our loosening efforts.
One way of understanding the psycho-logical processes involved in insight is in
terms of Martindale's (1995) model of insight, couched in PCP terms. The advantage of
this 'translation' of Martindale is that the PCP account is thoroughly intensional and
definitively psychological, and thereby substantially avoids the dualist difficulties to
which connectionism and spreading activation models are susceptible. It will be

recalled that for Martindale the key to insight processes lay in alterations in the focus
attention. Highly focused attention yielded tight, logical and predictable thought
processes based on a 'steep association gradient'. On the other hand, defocused
attention yielded idiosyncratic and analogical thinking based on a wider-spread,
'shallow association gradient'. The greater the attentional capacity of the person, the
greater the likelihood of creativity because more 'nodes' representing information can
be simultaneously activated. The insightful person is less fixated and can hold more
elements in mind. In some fashion, the nodes relevant to the problem remain partially
activated waiting to be pushed over the threshold of consciousness by some chance
encounter with the correct 'stimulus'. Under such conditions the solution will 'pop into
mind' (p. 261) of the suitably prepared person. The logic of this insight process is,
according to Martindale, abductive: something surprising is 'seen' and then the person
develops hypotheses to make sense of it.81
The parallels between this account of alternating stages of defocused and
focused attention and Kelly's notions of loose and tight construing are illuminating.
The Creativity Cycle can be understood as a shifting in the type of focus the person
adopts. Under loose construing perceived differences between elements are reduced and
elements may be associated with each other on a number of dimensions, none of which

are fully crystallised. I suggested earlier that the view of construing as exclusively bi
polar could be relaxed or 'loosened'. Constructs may also be considered as clusters of
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Kelly also felt that the basis of construing was an abductive process. Such a logic implies an
immersion in the world of events first, rather than abstract and inner mental processes preceding
hypothesis-making. A s such, construing is always embedded within cycles of experience.

elements with a tendency to bi-polar groupings. The tighter the construing, the more
'energy' is poured into distinguishing bi-polarity. But when the attention is spread or
defocused, then the clustering of elements may not be now neatly divided into two. As I
have suggested, a more adequate model for this looser style of understanding may be in
terms of prototypes or exemplars around which elements cluster. Loose construing
would also have the effect of simultaneously activating other 'constructs' sharing the
relevant elements. This non-specific, spread attention would mean that neat bi-

polarities are less likely to form. If the person can maintain this associative process,
extending it over time, then, as the person experiments with provisional tightenings,
new insights may take shape.
Tightly bi-polar constructs may function something like measures of central
tendency in statistics. Means, medians and modes all offer very useful, but simplified
pictures of the data under observation. Or again, a regression line drawn to simplify a

scattering of 'points' finds a 'best fit' approximation. In the process, the richness an

idiosyncratic features of the data are usually sacrificed. In similar fashion, strict bipolarity may be considered as a summary of the 'data' of experience — but one in
which we lose much of the richness and multidimensionality of that experience.82
Looser, less defined construing may retain this dimensionality at the expense of
precision and predictive power. A loose construct may be akin to clusterings of
elements which potentially embody more than one distinction as the person
provisionally groups and regroups the elements. What may occur here is an underlying
associative logic that leads to simultaneous and parallel links between elements. To be
verbalised and 'contained' such symmetrical thinking usually has to be subsequently
distinguished in terms of more clearly bi-polar 'asymmetrical' distinctions.
'Normal', asymmetrical and clearly bi-polar construing is hierarchical and
predictive, while looser, symmetrical construing tends to be more 'lateral' and
82

However, the arrangement of (bi-polar) constructs in dynamically changing hierarchic systems and
conceived of as arranged in multidimensional space (Kelly, 1955) captures some of the kaleidoscopic
complexity of our lived world. The main point here is that looser construing is necessary for the creation
and re-creation of such ordinal systems. Also, it m a y be that looser construing represents a simultaneous
multidimensional appraisal, whereas tighter, more ordinally structured construing m a y work in more
sequential fashion.
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associative. Such loose, associative thinking is 'normally' inhibited or discouraged as
being inconsistent, but in complex and ill-defined circumstances it is essential for
creativity. There is an irony here, however. In earlier chapters I argued that
associationistic and mechanistic theories of insight could not account for our
intensionality and creativity, yet here I am saying that relatively unpredictable
association stands at the heart of insight. But what we find here is a 'top-down',
predicational use of, and allowance for, an associative logic in the service of
understanding. By itself, pure associative thought represents an impossibly complex
chaos, a mindlessness with no distinctions between anything (the extremes of
symmetrical awareness). What I am alluding to is what Matte-Bianco called bi-modal
thought, or symmetrical awareness in the service of a tighter, asymmetrical
understanding.
Even so, the insight cannot be made to order. It must be waited-upon. The
person must be patient, not too hastily tightening up and testing emergent ideas. This
waiting-upon is not entirely passive either, and the person is no mere conduit for
automatic associative processes. Although the subjective experience may be that insight
'pops' into consciousness, or is a 'quantum jump', the pathways and semantic

associations have all been established by the person's preparatory efforts. The person's

intelligent, rational processes set up the semantic patterns and pathways that determine
tacit semantic awareness. As we have seen, a major problem with mechanistic models
is that they take for granted the semantic nature of these networks, but such semantic
pathways always imply a meaning-generating person who set them up in the first place.
In addition, the meditative, defocused stance is not a passive 'giving up', but can be

deliberately cultivated and people can improve in their capacity to increase this type o
attentive, yet diffuse, awareness (Hunt, 1995; Kabat-Zinn, 1990).
11.2.2.2 The Experience Of Insight
T h e creator ... has to give up holding onto himself [sic] as a thing and
begin to experience himself only in the process of creative response;
paradoxically enough, if he can experience himself in this process, he
loses himself. H e transcends the boundaries of his o w n person, and at

the very m o m e n t w h e n he feels T am' he also feels 'I a m you', I a m one
with the whole world. (Fromm, 1959, p. 51)

What happens during insight also has experiential or subjective dimensions. Since
much of the insight experience is described in the next section, I will confine this
discussion to the general phenomenology of the process. We have seen that there are
different experiences across the different stages of insight. In preparation it would be
expected that there is generally one's 'normal' sense of self and of self-consciousness,
and various fluctuations of mood that may characterise one's life generally. At impasse,
of course, there is confusion and uncertainty, with at least some sense of frustration,
ranging from mere irritation to absolute despair. Upon renunciation of the problem,
there may well be relief or at least resignation. But it is in the period surrounding the
insight itself, where one's experience becomes distinctively 'insightful'.
People who have experienced insight typically report that they were in a type of
reverie or abstracted state of mind. This experiential mode frequently includes an

altered sense of self in which self is both diminished, yet enhanced. There is both a self
forgetting and a deep sense of self-validation. The operations of one's psyche are
distinctive: ideas are 'imaged', music plays itself, characters conduct conversations
among themselves, formulas re-arrange themselves, and so on. Somehow, it is now

inadequate to say that there is a separate self or a separate creation. This state is usu

described as playful and more 'childlike', characterised as it is by openness to the worl

to the unexpected. It represents a relinquishing of control or 'knowing', a relinquishing
that must be done with a sense of trust. One looks as if through half-closed eyes. It is

exploratory, guided by intuitive feelings of knowing, by the emotional sensitivities that
have described in the previous section.
Above all, this type of knowing is a personal knowing, a 'knowing-with', or
'participatory knowing'. It involves the whole person and is an emotionally-charged
experience. I have argued that it represents an expanded way of being that is ushered in
by a transcending affective state. It hinges on the relationship between unconscious and
conscious mental modes. As Claxton (1997, p. 80) put it:

H o w mental gestation turns out depends on the ability to turn on to the
borderlands between consciousness and the unconscious a kind of
awareness that is welcoming without being predatory, and perceptive
without being blinding.

This awareness does not grasp the first idea to emerge, or immediately attempt to fix
things into words. It provisionally tightens and is content to wait-upon something

important. Clearly, this is the meditative thinking that Heidegger urged and celebrated

and about which more will be said later. But for now, I will try to give a sense of thes
processes and experiences of insight by using an extended metaphor: that of the
'domino room of the mind'.

11.2.2.3 The Domino Room Of The Mind
As a child I attended the Royal Easter Show, an agricultural show held each year over

several weeks around Easter in Sydney. On this particular visit to one of the pavilions
there was an exhibit that I remember vividly. Thousands upon thousands of dominoes

had been stood on end, lined up, and built into a very large sculpture. It was a landsca
with geometric shapes, roads, castles and bridges. A single stream of dominoes would
divide into multiple streams, perhaps coalescing again into a single chain. Structures
stood precariously balanced, testament to painstaking, time-consuming and probably

frustrating preparation. A time was set for the domino room to be 'set off. All it would
take would be to tip just one special domino and the whole sculpture would come alive.
When it was set off a cavalcade of multiple chains of dominoes began falling
and cascading in all directions. It went off with a type of drumming sound like heavy

rain on a metal roof. At times it roared as larger structures rippled and crashed, at o
times only a few linking dominoes would trip over each other with a light rhythmic
sound. What struck me most about it was that it seemed to have a life of its own. Once
the first domino fell, there was no stopping it. It lasted barely a minute but made a
lasting impression on me.
In many ways this domino room phenomenon captures many of the features
involved in the production and experience of insight, but there are some caveats.
Firstly, the people setting up this room had a clear end-state in mind. Their sculpture

was carefully planned in advance. In contrast, insight is somewhat like doing a jigsaw
without the finished image to go by, or even very clearly imagined. Worse, we do not
know how many pieces we need nor the shapes they need to be. So if we can imagine

that preparing for insight is like setting up the domino room — without a clearly defi
end product established — then how would we go about it?
We would have some very general ideas about the shape of a solution. Culture,
experience, personal capacities, immersion in one's field and assiduous preparation
would provide 'pieces of the puzzle' of various types. We would spend ages walking
around placing dominoes, here and there, moving some, seeing local patterns and
building on that. Next day we would start again. Maybe we will work on another local
pattern and occasionally we might bump up against another sub-pattern and we would
work our way towards combining them. Importantly we would periodically step back,
perhaps overseeing the emerging structure from a viewing platform above the
assembled array. Like gazing absent-mindedly at clouds, we would look for patterns in
the dominoes.
Occasionally sub-patterns are accidentally bumped and 'set off, but this
premature 'insight' does not manage to engage the domino room of the mind as a
whole. In fact, this may happen many times. Such false starts may happen by accident
or by design as we might believe a coherent system has been achieved. We see

something interesting, a larger pattern, and enter the fray again guided by that cohere
and so on. This process goes on and on, iteratively, developing a mixture of local and
global coherences, until the patterns are so intermingled and inter-associated that it
becomes only a matter of time before we have built a thoroughly interconnected system.
Either by accident, or by a 'seeing' of the last gap in the pattern, the 'final' piece

is placed and let fall. Even here there may be the frustration when only half the room i
set off and has to be re-built! It was not the complete system we thought. But the
person keeps up this process until everything comes together. The domino room mind

'does' an insight, it becomes one. It runs off by itself, a simultaneous multi-expressi

of the 'prepared mind'. It seems to be spontaneous and exterior, but only to an observer

watching the proceedings from a distance. The reality of this 'domino-room' insight is
that it is a process, a happening which comes into being and we open ourselves to it.
After the fact we may recall the event as spontaneous and 'external', but at the
time we were 'in' the insight, down among the dominoes as it were. To take an
observational attitude at this time would mean to change the room-mind and thereby
stop the cavalcade of dominoes. How upsetting in mid-flight! So we cannot be
working as a part of the room and be watching it at the same time. We lose selfawareness when we are playing around with the dominoes and we become self-aware
when we reflect on the growing sculpture from 'above' as it were. The experience of
the dynamic whole is always retrospective. We 'wake up', so to speak, after the event.
It seems the absorption required, or defocused attention, does not allow for verbal
reflection (at a high level of cognitive awareness). We are too busy doing or being the
insight, enacting it. We are the location or space in which insights occur.
Although this metaphor (as with any metaphor) does not capture all the elements

characteristic of insight, it does reveal many of them. These include: the suddenness of
insight set off by the critical 'clue', the multidimensionality and complexity of the
structures necessary for insight, the necessity for immersing oneself within the medium

of one's project, the sensitivity to subtle patterns and local coherences, the profligac
insight with a high probability of 'false starts', the need to alternate between loose
construction and tighter conceptualisations, the need to back off occasionally and
'abstract' the problem, and the alternation between being 'in' the project and being a
separate observer.
Analogies can also be drawn between this domino room phenomenon and the
subjective experience of insight. These include: the careful and often tedious and

unrewarding preparation, the intuitive, feeling intelligence required for sustained work

'in the dark', the (aptly) ambiguous subjective sense whether one's self is in the insig
or separate and observing it (the seeming exteriority and spontaneity of the insight
itself), and the sense of drama and excitement as it unfolds. The metaphor may not
capture, however, the social, emotional and embodied aspects of insight as well as it

might. However, I can imagine that the team of workers w h o created this domino
sculpture would have felt m u c h as a person experiencing insight would as they watched
their creation spontaneously express itself and 'communicate' with the spellbound
audience.

11.2.3 What Does Insight Tell Us About Mind, About
Persons And About Our Relationship With The
World?
11.2.3.1 Insight and Mind
M i n d or consciousness comes into existence w h e n an intelligent
organism has its ongoing activity interrupted by a problem. It is a
special kind of instrument for the intelligent organism to deal with its
problem and find the appropriate solution in order to resume its
ongoing activity. (Mead, 1964, p. xviii)

In the last three chapters I took a step back from insight, as it were, to examine wide
and more fundamental questions such as the nature of emotion and mind, of the possible
structure of unconscious processes and their relation to insight, and of the embodied,
enactive and metaphorical nature of mind. I proposed that our predicational, meaninggenerating capacity is irreducible in discussions of mind. Without predication there
would be no meaning or assertion, no 'for-the-sake-of-which', underlying our acts of
anticipation. In short, there would be no mind. In Mead's terms above, there would be
no awareness of any 'problem' for the sake of which mind would be needed. What
emerges from this view of mental life is that mind is inherently relational in that it is a
term describing h o w humans manifest, andfitin with, their world. In particular, insight,
as the subjective experience of overcoming some problem or inability to anticipate or fit
in with one's world, can be understood as a defining feature of the relational mind.
Each time w e understand something in a w a y that suddenly dawns upon us, w e
re-create the relationship, the conversational engagement of us and our world. The
phenomenology of insight reveals the nature of this relationship, and thereby something
of the being of h u m a n beings. T o understand w e must, in some way, submit to the

world. W e must 'under-stand' or stand under it, open to it, merge with it. This
experience does not speak of a separate knower and known, or of an uninvolved,

intellectual observation. The nature of mind, in this way, is relational. It is a mind th
marks people as embodied and situated. Such a mind stands as the ways in which
people relate to their world.
An essential, perhaps primary characteristic of such a relational mind is its
presentational quality. I have discussed mind as a continuum, as a dynamic balance
between representational and presentational processes. Not only is presentational
awareness a necessary complement to our traditional view of the mind as a conscious,
rational process, we have also seen that a diverse range of researchers have considered
the basis of human mentality to be located in a looser, medium-sensitive, affective mode
of awareness, that is, in presentational consciousness (Damasio, 1994; Goleman, 1995;
Katz, 1984; Langer, 1957, 1972; Matte-Bianco, 1988; Orange, 1995; Rychlak, 1977;
Shanon, 1993). The insight literature reveals not only the alternation between these two
modes of mind, but also considerable detail about the presentational features of mind.
When our more familiar, conscious reasoning and understanding
(representational awareness) finds itself at impasse, the processes that reportedly lead
insightful breakthrough typically are, in the terms I have been using, more loose,
affective, metaphorical and 'imagistic', intuitive and tacit, medium-sensitive, embodied
and enactive. Insight processes are not exclusively presentational, however. But they
do represent the escape from an excessive reliance on either automatic, habitual
understandings or deliberate, conscious reasoning. I think what stamps the experience
of insight as distinctive and difficult to achieve (perhaps especially so in technologydriven Western cultures) is the required renunciation of prediction and control and the
concomitant openness to unpredictable, looser ways of being and understanding.
Nonetheless, the processes of insight exemplify the complex, complementary
nature of mind. That is, the conceptual division of the mind into representational and
presentational modes of understanding reveals that the mind typically alternates between
different modes or styles of thought. Kelly described this is terms of the creativity

cycle,83 as skilled alternations between loose and tighter construing. It seems to m e ,
however, that standing above such creative cycles, and displayed in insightful
construing, is a superordinating stance and style of operation which reveals a third
mental mode. This is the creative use of both representational and presentational
thinking, a meditative mode in which conscious awareness and tacit, non-verbal modes
are allowed to experimentally interact. This is a transcending affective stance and
points to the fundamentally 'emotional' nature of mind. This third mode of mode will
be discussed further under the heading 'Meditative Thinking and Waiting Upon
Insight'.
This expanded view of mind can be understood using Claxton's (1997)
terminology. Claxton gave the name 'undermind' to the automatic, tacit and habitual
ways in which we anticipate our world. This undermind forms the basis for intuition
and is the basis for the embodied and enactive view of anticipation discussed in the
previous chapter. Thus mind emerges within action, it does not precede or underlie
behaviour. These automatic,84 embodied processes include the taken-for-granted, tacit
assumptions which are potentially revealed when the person strikes problems or reaches
impasse. Such tacit assumptions are usually only noticed when something is wrong,
when we do not effortlessly fit with, or anticipate, the events around us. This is where
Claxton argued that 'deliberative thinking' or the 'd-mode' (what I have been calling
representational thinking) is called upon to try to solve the problem, quickly scanning

the situation, focusing attention on it, implementing its repertoire of likely 'solutions
This is a tighter, asymmetrical awareness, slower than the undermind and it is
presumably what Mead meant by 'mind'. When this does not work Claxton claimed
that what is required is a slower, contemplative process of mind.
This third process of mind for Claxton was the 'tortoise mind', the
'contemplative' slowing down of thought which is akin to meditative thinking in which
distinctions are eased apart and there is more play and reverie, less precision. But the
83

Kelly also described various styles of construing: propositional versus pre-emptive, constricted versus
dilated (narrow versus broadened 'perceptual field'), permeable versus impermeable, as well as the C P C
and Experience Cycles.
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Both 'automatic' in terms of instinctive response patterns and as 'automaticised' or habitual practices.

key to insight is to transcend the tacit, automaticised processes, to restructure the
habitual mind, the undermind. Deliberative thought is backgrounded and the undermind

is let run, but now in wider channels, as it were, under a wider, more diffuse attention o
awareness. The criteria for thinking is looser, less strict. Slowly, iteratively, the
undermind is 'rejigged' and occasionally it runs off very fast, multidimensionally, like
the 'domino room of the mind' I discussed earlier. This is not chaos, however, as the
multiple channels of thought are, for example, structured metaphorically, or in terms of
highly abstract imagery, allowing for novelty and unusual associations. Under such
figurative constraints, ideas and elements can be related by aspects of the medium of
expression. They may, for example, be linked by sound, feel, smell, rhyme and so on,
rather than by logical or direct semantic similarities.
Such contemplative and meditative thinking is preparing the general ground or
space within which the openness of loose construing can be 'contained'. For Kelly, this
meant provisionally tightening and submitting the results to the world of experience.
For Matte-Bianco, this meant creative 'bi-modality', a type of 'contained' openness.
Provisional tightening is necessary to keep things within pragmatic bounds. It is a
balancing act between experiencing sameness and difference, between symmetry and
asymmetry. Cutting up the world in terms of tight distinctions is enormously powerful.
It is the basis of predictable, applied science, for example. Validated, tight
constructions are repeatable and verifiable and we mostly 'see' what we always 'see'.
We normally only abandon such constructs when they fail us repeatedly. But new
aspects of the world are potentially revealed in these failures. At this point, loosening
our thinking facilitates the entry of new elements and nascent understandings. In
momentarily doing 'nothing' (holding off predication) at the point of suspending
habitual thought, to paraphrase Alexander, 'the right thing may do itself (Mixon, 1999).
This 'right thing' is not an objectivist (capital R) Reality revealing itself to us, but
of spontaneity instantly recognisable in a person in unselfconscious flow. Such
spontaneity is, of course, characteristic, of insight.

A major feature of mind, I have argued, is its metaphorical nature. Possibly
emergent from cross-modal synesthesias (Hunt, 1995; Shanon, 1993), analogical and
metaphorical thinking is also highly characteristic of insight experiences. Instances of
insight are often reported as a return to this type of medium-sensitive, frequently
affective awareness. Almost universally, creative people report that insight flowed from
some central analogy or metaphor often inspired by immersion in some physical or
perceptual activity. Metaphor, while open-ended, is not unstructured. As with
presentational thought generally, a metaphor cannot be translated into new medium
without substantial loss of meaning and coherence. And this may be why people may
struggle for quite some time to articulate and elaborate their insights.
Another very important conceptual issue relevant to the nature of mind, and one
to be discussed more in the following sections, is the distinction between T and 'Me'.
As we have seen, in experiencing insight people report changing perceptions of self and

shifts in self-awareness. These alterations in the experience of self can be understood i
terms of this distinction between different aspects of self. In short, when people are in
the midst of insight or in flow, or in a meditative state, there is more of 'I', as an
undistracted awareness, and less of 'Me', as a self-conscious deliberative process. In
the looser, more symmetrical stages of insight there is frequently a loss of a sense of
time and of space that accompanies the loss of self-consciousness. This removal of selfconcern and self-referencing seems to facilitate a defocused, yet undistracted awareness
that precedes and leads to insightful breakthrough. Upon tightening, self-perception
returns, and along with it awareness of time and surroundings. This marks a return to
asymmetrical awareness where such distinctions prevail. Again, mind or consciousness
appears to be complex, being at times concerned with self, with self-reference as an
important component of its content. At other times this self-consciousness recedes to
reveal an underlying and ever-present awareness that allows for this self-consciousness
in the first place.

11.2.3.2

Insight A n d S o m e Characteristics O f People A n d Their
Relationships With Their W o r l d

The type of mind I have described above, naturally enough, is a reflection of the whole
person and of his or her relationship with the world. 'Mind', in the w a y I a m using the
term, describes the intelligent ways a person relates to, or 'couples' with, his or her
world. I have suggested that underlying all mind is the T , the subjective ground of
awareness, of experiencing. This awareness is embodied, impassioned, and is
'interested' in the sense that its province is the person's 'conatus'(Spinoza, 1967), the
drive to self-maintenance, to self-definition and to self-transcendence. W h a t insight
reveals is a fundamental irony of the living, developing person: if the basis of mind and
of the h u m a n being is this interested, self-referencing orientation, then a high expression
of that mind in insight is one that forgets self, in order to develop self, that merges with
the k n o w n yet brings forth the uniqueness of the person.
Kelly (1955) scoffed at the idea that one could realise one's potential or could
become 'self-actualised'— as if there were somehow an inner,finalmodel of the person
waiting to be manifested, to be completed. Rather he saw development as open-ended,
as open to who-knows-what, as largely bounded by one's imagination and creativity.
Insight, as w e have seen, not only changes the w a y w e understand things, h o w w e
anticipate, it also changes w h o w e are. I have also suggested that insight is a 'primary'
or defining characteristic of h u m a n beings. The processes of insight are, therefore,
suggestive of the nature and development of the person. The particular phenomenology
of insight — its enactive qualities, the emotional modulations, the varying experience of
self, the metaphorical nature of thought — implies a distinctive type of creature. I will,
therefore, put forward an account of the type of person w h o is capable of such
experiences and the ways such a person m a y be related to his or her world. The image
is certainly not of an homunculus waiting to be realised, but of a person w h o comes into
being within ongoing projects in the world.
I suggested earlier (7.2.2.1) that dependency construing is probably crucial in
developing a sense of self (a central aspect of core construing) as w e learn to
differentiate our needs and differentiate the people and resources capable of (and willing

to) meet those needs. A sense of interpersonal connectedness seems to be primary and
defining of human beings. If we cannot 'couple-with' or empathise with others (and our

world), we would not survive. Failures of anticipation in this regard would be likely to

be experienced as threatening, while the eventual return to empathic anticipation would
likely then be experienced as pleasurable. In addition, within a subjective sense that
one's needs are currently being met and that one is safe and secure, it is more likely
a non-selfconscious mode of construing would prevail. We have seen that such a mode
of awareness en-courages insight and this leads us to the complex relationship between
core construing, insight and this sense of connectedness.
'Core constructs' (Kelly, 1955) are "those by which [a person] maintains his
identity and existence" (p. 482). They include the ways in which we distinguish
ourselves as separate people, as the same in some respects, yet different from others.
When we say we are 'self-conscious', we refer to an awareness of our 'core'('me' in
Mead's terms). Kelly did not really discuss how or when this sense of personal identity

originally develops, though it is clear that core construing is usually quite superordi
and subsumes multiple chains of implications. They are also, ideally, comprehensive

structures which allow "the person to see a wide variety of events as consistent with h
own personality" (p. 482). We have already suggested in passing that this sense of a
separate self may have developed from a prior and more fundamentally social and
empathic constructive process (Mead, 1956; Vygotsky, 1978; Winnicott, 1971). It may
be that from a basic empathic 'resonance' or 'sympathy' with others (Mixon, 1999) we
eventually derive a sense of self such that we can even empathise with ourselves, as it
were, as an object or person to ourselves (Orange, 1995).
This confers on human beings an enormous adaptive advantage because we can

carry this sense of self around with a relative independence of our surrounds and of our
social context. This in turn allows for the development of imagination and of a
probably uniquely human 'theatre in the mind', which may be conceived of as a type of
symbolic workbench on which, at times, we can experiment, play and create in a virtual
mental world (Shanon, 1993). Thus, the reflexive or conscious reasoning mind may be

derived from an essentially interpersonal, affectively-toned m o d e of construing linked to
our self-maintenance. In this way a relatively 'private' mind has pragmaticallyimmersed, social origins.
But when our practised, reflexive processes of thought are frustrated we are
inclined to feel 'cut off from our world, as separate and anxious. We may need to once
again loosen our anticipatory processes and to search in more inchoate fashion for a felt
resonance with our social and physical environs. The 'trick' of reflexive consciousness,
where we may notice we are 'out of synch' with our world, may also have given birth to

the possibility of dualist thinking and, as Damasio (1995) put it, the resulting 'Cartesi
anxiety' — the sense of separation of mind and body, person and world. The
experience of insight, however, with its powerful sense of oneness and connectedness, is
perhaps dualism's best rebuttal. This experience of 'anomie' or separation calls out for
a less self-mediated, more fully present awareness, one which brings more of T into
one's anticipations.
Where our basic need to anticipate is blocked we have to 'remember' a state of
being in which we non-selfconsciously empathise with and open ourselves to our

environment. It is a return to a 'childlike' form of construing, an open-eyed stance ofte

explicitly referred to by creative people (Gardner, 1993). It represents a relinquishing o
prediction and control, of knowing, and it must be done with a sense of trust, like a
securely attached child who is willing to explore and transcend the boundaries of his or
her world (Bowlby, 1988).
A way of understanding this type of wordless, empathic 'being-with' or
'participatory knowing', is in terms of Gibson's (1979) notion of an 'affordance'.
According to Gibson, the basic idea of an affordance is that we 'fit' with the world in
terms of the mutually-defined structures and properties of the organism and its
environment. Thus a tree may be realised (made real for that organism) by interactions
with it as 'climbable', or an apple may be realised as edible.85 Gibson said that
'environment', in these terms, was a 'relational term', being the sum total of such
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Note the enactive nature of the knowing implied by this understanding of affordances.

affording relationships. It is important to note here that, despite his relational definition
of affordances, Gibson located affordances solidly in the external environment as
objective facts which the organism discovers. It should be evident that I am not using
affordances in this objectivist way, but see them as co-creations, as arising between
person and environment and as distinct from unconstrued 'things' and 'world' which
may be argued to logically pre-exist the person.
Relevant here in this discussion of affordances is a typically human,
transcendent activity. When we move to the (human) world of symbolic or reflexive
consciousness we begin to move to a transcendent world of humanly-created
affordances. Thus Noble (1993) talked about the socially-mediated affordances of a
post box which could never be derived directly from an 'ambient array' (Gibson, 1979)
stimulating our nervous systems. For example, while a post box might be argued to

have 'natural' affordances of'containership' and 'solidity' and so on, its fully socially
prescribed function in terms of a system of communication, of institutional organisation
and so on mark it as a linguistically and discursively created affordance.
In a similar way, we symbolically invest all sorts of ecologically 'neutral' events
with life-sustaining significance (money, occupation, our memories of past
performance). Even our assessments of our own capacity to anticipate become
associated with survival — our view of ourselves can be considered a type of
affordance. Thus, for example, negative self-efficacy may become a self-fulfilling

prophecy as we tend to only utilise the 'affordances' inherent in this core construal. Bu
when we can suspend such limited and limiting affective self-assessments, and utilise

the radical capacity to open to the wider possibilities inherent in the complexifies of t
events we are perplexed by, then new 'affordances' may be found. Insight is a process
in which just this sort of realisation of new affordances occurs.
This is directly analogous to the creature that moves around in its environment
gathering more and more 'information' about some ambiguous situation at hand. At
first, for example, we may react in fright at some unexpected sudden movement above
us and then as we focus on the moving object, look at it from different angles seeing it

as a colourful bird, listen to its bird song and so on, the 'affordance' m a y change from
'fight or flight' to aesthetic pleasure. To overcome impasse we need to return to the
world again and again by loosening our construing, by adopting an 'objective attitude'.
That is, we may open ourselves to realise affordances we have been blind to, which we
have not made possible by our tightly construed predictive outlook. By 'standing
under' the world in this way we may come to 'under-stand' it in a new way.
This is strange language so I'll try to express it in more everyday terms. As a
very young child one's needs for sustenance, warmth and body contact are construed in
relation to our care-givers. We cry when hungry and a parent meets our need. The
appearance of the parent may in itself calm us since we come to construe he or she as
related to our self-maintenance. Indeed, it seems that very young babies do not

distinguish ourselves very clearly from their primary caregivers (a separate 'me' is not

clearly construed), or indeed from features of their environment generally. Nonetheless,
over time we learn to relate our own anticipatory capacities to our self-maintenance.

Most likely, the better we have anticipated people and events in the past, the better our
fortunes and the more positive our self assessments (self efficacy).
The assessment that events are beyond our capacities to anticipate is likely to be
an anxious experience. We feel 'disconnected' or 'alone', not fit for the world. We try

out our formerly successful strategies and solutions to whatever our problem is, but the
do not help us. Their 'affordances' (what they allow us to do) do not fit the current
circumstances. We may keep 'tightly' to what we already 'know' (and avoid negative
self-assessments this way). Or, we may loosen our approach. We may consider we
have been uncertain or anxious in the past and have come up with some pretty good

solutions. Maybe this is an opportunity for even more facilitative solutions. Maybe this

invalidation is not saying something bad about my anticipatory capacity after all? These
types of 'metacognitions' or affective assessments themselves have behavioural
implications and possibilities (affordances). Maybe the experience of confusion and
impasse can be given profound meaning. Given an awareness that our self-maintenance
generally is in hand, perhaps we can experiment and play, we can loosen and create. In

this way, such a transcending affective awareness is a type of created affordance, one
which finds in circumstances previously discovered to be 'bad', possibilities which are
decidedly 'good'.
Our relationship with our world is analogous to participating in a conversation.
Frequently, understandings emerge in the 'doing' of it and cannot be predicted in
advance. Conversations are awkward and stilted if we think about them too much, or
try to predict too much in the midst of them. In spontaneous, insightful 'conversations'
with our world we anticipate with our whole being. Just as we transform the air we

breathe in the act of breathing it, insight processes are transformative acts, transformi
both knower and known. Even 'pure' thought — the sort of thought experiments and
playing with mental imagery so frequently reported in the insight literature — is
performed in an ecologically-framed way, 'as if it were being enacted in a possible
world. And, as Kelly and the neopragmatic constructivist approach I endorse suggest,
'pure insight' in itself is insufficient. Its true worth is realised within completed

experience cycles. In any case, 'virtual' action in the shape of 'inner' mental processes
is a derived capacity and it gathers its unique, creative power from its relative remove
from the constraints of our physical surround. Nonetheless, all those who have
examined insight have commented on its profligate nature and on the crucial role of
elaboration and verification.
My main interest here is that in the process of insight our 'normal' selfreferential consciousness may, at important stages, give way to this more empathic
'being-with' mode of awareness — a mode of awareness that may have been 'designed'
for circumstances of uncertainty and ill-definition, such as confronts the young child
before reflexive consciousness, language and memory aid in making the world more
predictable. As I have suggested, this primary 'sympathetic' mode of construing would
allow for the development of a more reflexive consciousness, one which in turn allows
for the building up of knowledge of the world and for making the world more
manageable, less uncertain, more predictable — an enormous ecological advantage.

But w h e n such trusted knowing fails us, or leads to impasse, w e need to return to

this primary, less tightly structured and more 'radical' knowing (in the sense of 'at roo
— from the Latin 'radix'). This original wordless sociality may be considered as if it
were the nourishing source of our growing 'tree' of knowing. This idea is consistent
with the argument that 'presentational' modes of consciousness form the foundations on
which reason and propositional thought are based. This latter style of construing is
typically preverbal and difficult, if not impossible, to capture in words. Part of the
appeal of this idea is that this would also be a fundamentally 'emotional' or 'feeling'
awareness. This, of course fits the peculiar phenomenology of insight that we are trying
to capture theoretically. The feeling of connectedness would then be a feature of a nonselfconscious mode of construing. This sense of connectedness perhaps can even be
extended to apply in an 'ecological' sense to one's world in general. This would be a
transpersonal sense of one-ness or symmetry characterised by a lack of selfconsciousness and of self-concern.
What I am describing is a transcending, affective ability to be able to suspend
anxiety and self-concern even though one is at impasse. Whereas the incapacity to
anticipate would often invoke core construing86 — especially when there is a high level
of commitment to the project at hand — what is required for insight is a transcendent
use of this capacity for 'sympathy' or 'empathy', a way of being perfectly designed for
the clue-poor 'Klondike' world into which we are thrust, but from which 'gold' may be
gathered. Thus we may at times use this 'primitive' mode of construing in a way that

transcends, in the sense of taking it to another level, the meeting of personal needs and
concerns for self-maintenance. This is a way of being that inspired Kelly to encourage
us to 'transcend the obvious', to dare to alter even our fundamental assumptions.
Significantly, this requires pragmatic commitment, daring and courage, not an
intellectual detachment from the world.

86

Not all cases of impasse would be expected to invoke core construing or significant self-concern. We
m a y be stuck on matters which are relatively non-core ('peripheral' in Kelly's terms), or which are quite
incidental to our concerns. But for important impasses, especially in domains which the person values,
w e frequently 'identify' with our efforts to anticipate. The incapacity to understand in areas important to
us can be a threatening experience. In this sense, 'maintenance processes' are frequently just as m u c h a
matter of 'psychological survival' as actual physical survival.

11.3 WAITING U P O N INSIGHT
11.3.1

Meditative Thinking

I began with Meno's paradox about the difficulty of inquiry into that which we do not
yet know. And now I have come full circle and produced a new paradox. I have
rejected the unwarranted certainties of objectivist worldviews, based as they are on
naive correspondence views of truth which drastically underspecify the role of the

knower in the knowing. Yet the world has a voice in our constructions of its nature, i
interrupts our soliloquy, it constrains what we think and do with its demand for the
coherence and viability of our constructions. And what is to be done when our
understanding is confounded, frustrated at every turn and confronted with the
contradictory implications of our own patterns of meaning and understanding? The
answer I have given is that we must adopt an 'objective outlook'. We must give up
knowing in order to know.
We are left with the undoing of thought and, if we are 'en-couraged' enough, are
immersed in a higher activity of mind. Our customary predicational outlook — our
'looking-for' based on the fundamental intensionality of our being — is temporarily
abandoned. To use Heidegger's (1959) distinction between 'waiting for' and 'waiting
upon', we wait upon we know not what, but adopt an openness to what may come. In

this we relinquish our driving subjectivity and open ourselves to objectivity. We catch

ourselves in the act of constructing meaning, of construing objects and events, and in s
doing we discern the horizons or range of convenience of our constructions. We attend

now to the process, as against the content of construing itself, to the implicit affecti
preferences which determine our conceptualisations. Now our assertions of meaning are

seen as assertions and are thereby undercut as unipolar designations of the way things
are. There emerges an opening of meaning possibilities.
So to gain new insight, new understanding, we must give up some
understanding, especially the desire to immediately understand. Paradoxically, this

renunciation must be contained within our abiding resolve for truth. Truth, in this sense,
is something that happens always and everywhere, but, for us, is necessarily clothed in
our psycho-logic, our subjectivity. This 'inner' movement of releasing or relinquishing
represents a willingness to embrace the finitude of our understanding in relation to the
infinity and the totality of the world that includes, yet transcends, us. It requires an
epistemic humility.
This also corresponds to the movement from asymmetrical-to-symmetrical-to bimodal thought that I have compared to Kelly's Creativity Cycle. Some experience of
the fragmentation of one's thought is necessary in this process. The implicative
incompatibility of one's efforts at understanding must be experienced, accepted and
reconstituted within a higher reconciliation or synthesis. This is where our transcending
affective awareness allows the openness of symmetrical thinking to merge with the
asymmetrical, to inform it, to enrich if, to lend it depth and to allow for the multidimensionality that 'logical' (asymmetrical) thought by itself cannot reach. In this way
feeling is " a vehicle for articulate knowing", as Mair (1980, p. 121) put it. When we
become aware of our emotional processes, we can become aware of our state of our
construing which may give us a measure of transcendence of our outlook. This allows
us to see our construing as construction and thereby presents the possibility for
loosening it up.
This equanimous awareness is a type of affective stance of principled nongrasping; of affectionate curiosity and receptivity that transcends objectivism and our
subjectivity because it neither cares for certainty nor is willing to impose its own
structures on what is given. Rather, it relinquishes judgement and releases expectation
for some thing in particular, content to wait upon whatever comes. It is neither active
nor passive because it reveals the inferpenetration of person and world for which willing
or not-willing is less relevant. As Heidegger put it: "Man's true nature may relate

directly to what transcends him" [sic] (1959, p. 23). This is entirely consistent with the
sense of exteriority and spontaneity so typical of insight experiences. On the other
hand, Heidegger's contrast to meditative thinking, 'calculative thinking', deals with

things in our terms, for our more immediate advantage, representing what is already
known of things. This is tight construing which is primarily concerned with prediction
and control. When such calculative processes are inhibited, creativity and insight
become possible.

11.3.2 Beyond Self As Content To Self As Process
As we have seen, a very special dimension of the insight experience is a shift in our
sense of self. I have argued that such a shift away from self-concern enables a creative
or productive loosening of construing. Exactly the same process occurs within
meditative thinking. By 'meditative thinking', Heidegger was not thinking about formal

meditational practices or some exotic, rarely achieved state. Such a (relative) liberation
from self-concern does not have to involve a formal practice or even intent. In our
everyday lives we may have this experience of spontaneity and self-forgetting in the
context of our social engagements. In fact, the experience of a non-unified self (Gergen,
1991) can be a common, liberating experience. Take for instance some research
relevant to this by Butt, Burr and Bell (1997) where participants were asked to complete
'social self grids':
It was found that while subjects all recognized a dispersion of
themselves through various relationships, they also m a d e spontaneous
use of a 'being myself construct. This ... was not identified with
occupying particular construct poles, but with allowing themselves to
be drawn pre-reflectively into social contexts, (p. 12)
As the authors noted, these findings do not mark the death of the 'self or diminish its
importance. There is still a "personal constructor" (p. 12), as they put it, even though
self is dispersed and fragmentary. What was crucial for participants in this research was

not that a particular self, or content was validated, but that one felt free to 'be mysel
in whatever spontaneous or pre-reflective form that took. What needed to be validated
was the person as process, not so much any particular results of that process. In this

way, 'self is a process with a pre-reflective T as the author and the 'me' as its context-

specific production. It is important that w e go on producing selves, as the world
changes, as we face different circumstances.
Coming to insight provides an interesting twist to this. In our role of taking the
position of the 'other' towards ourselves, we must learn to apply to ourselves the
unconditional acceptance and trust that we appreciate so much from other people. This
is a part of the meditative, affective, welcoming openness to oneself that enables
constructive freedom. The more we loosen our construing, the more we may come into
touch with ourselves as process. As I said in the last chapter, changing awareness
processes themselves is arguably more important in Kellian theory than the particular
contents of core construing. Being able to alter one's construing process is liberating
and validating. Thereby we can come to transcend any particular way of identifying
self. Such a conclusion is consistent with the findings of Butt, Burr and Bell (1997)
who described this easy sense of acceptance:
There was a consensus that being oneself referred to the absence of
self-consciousness and the relaxing of self-monitoring. Being oneself
meant allowing oneselftobe carried along in a social flow
unreflectively and without exercising effort, (p. 25)

These ideas fit well the experience of insight. The reverie, loosening and meditative
thought bring about a freedom to be whoever, and to think whatever, comes along.
Critical self-judgement is relaxed even though attention may be directed, broadly, at
one's self processes. A feature of meditative thinking is that one cannot will, push or
extort insight. One must value one's experience, outlooks and intuitions, but in a nongrasping way. What is required is an affectionate, patient curiosity about one's
anticipatory processes. John Anderson's introduction to Heidegger's (1959) Discourse
on Thinking captured this well:
There is a sense in which we wait without knowing for what we wait.
W e m a y wait, in this sense, without waiting for anything; for anything,
that is, which could be grasped and expressed in subjective h u m a n
terms. In this sense w e simply wait, and waiting m a y c o m e to have a
reference beyond ourselves. (1959, p. 57)

This 'reference beyond ourselves' recalls the 'interbeing' that Thich Nhat H a n h (cited in
Mair, 1995, p. 19) described. It is very much an aspect of a symmetrical awareness
wherein distinctions between 'self and other begin to blur. This helps explain the
frequent reports that, within insight experiences, it was not 'me' that was solely
responsible for the insight; that rather T flowed with the insight as much as T directed

it. Again, this constitutes an experiential refutation of dualism and represents a type o

knowing that can be considered more 'objective' in the sense that it is less 'subjective'
The 'price' one has to pay, however, is that such an insight into that which transcends
our present understandings is not predictable and may indeed not be 'translatable'. One
may have to struggle to express it, to give it some communicable form within the
confines of a metaphor or image which captures some of its dimensions, leaving others
inarticulate.

11.4 SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In summary, reflexive representational consciousness is important and necessary within
one's mental economy, it is one of the things that gives us our distinct ecological
advantage. But perhaps an even more distinctive human capacity is our meditative,
contemplative consciousness, the 'third' mode of mind which returns to our tacit
presentational 'knowing from', but this time to observe it, to allow it to unfold (Hunt,
1995; Varela et al., 1996). First the assumptions of deliberative thought are put aside.
Then one's 'automatic' or very fast affective assessments and habits of thought may
themselves come into view. In deep levels of reverie we reach the symmetricality so
richly and eloquently discussed in Matte-Bianco. But now this symmetrical awareness
is not in a context of pathology, of the unwilling distortion and lack of control over
conscious thought (bi-logic). Now it is via a transcending affective awareness which is
calm and broadly attentive.
The ways to this are many: meditation, relaxing, perceptual rehearsal, flowing
associative activity, alternation between intense periods of work and idle time, and so
on. Rather than symmetricality itself being the objective, there is a movement into bi-

modality, a style of thought which has the emotional and aesthetic layers of thought,
with their attendant multidimensionality, held within a permeable and comprehensive
superordinate understanding. This movement into a tighter structure of understanding
constitutes the immediate experience of insight. The path to such a state seems always
to involve a letting-go, a renunciation of prediction and control. It represents the
deliberate holding off from validational 'testing', from tightening up structures in order
to commit to involvement. This is a deliberate cultivation of nonvalidation within
cycles of loosening and tightening.

CHAPTER 12: INTERVIEWING FICTION WRITERS
ABOUT INSIGHT
The idea of going straight to the essence of things is an inconsistent idea
if one thinks about it. W h a t is given is a route, an experience which
gradually clarifies itself, which gradually rectifies itself and proceeds by
dialogue with itself and with others. (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 21)

12.1 THE INSIGHTS OF WRITERS: SOME EXPECTATIONS
12.1.1 Introduction

It is now time to see if the theoretical understanding of the processes of insight outline
in the previous chapter can enable us to anticipate the insight experiences of Australian
fiction writers. Throughout the pages and chapters of this work I have tried, as
Merleau-Ponty suggests above, to not go directly to the 'essence' of insight, but to
develop a gradually clarifying route, an inquiry converging on insight. Having
completed the main task of this thesis, developing a theoretical understanding of insight
processes, it is n o w time to expose that understanding to others, to discover in dialogue
with the writers whether this understanding is promising, and whether it can be further
clarified and expanded. This empirical engagement represents only afirststep in
validating the theoretical structure developed thus far.
T h e specific features of writer insights that I expect to find (see below) have all
been drawn from the theoretical understanding developed in the preceding chapters. For
heuristic purposes they have been grouped, with s o m e overlap, into five factors. Again,
these factors have all been prominent in the theoretical understanding I have been
developing. N o t all writers are expected to mention all features, but all are expected to
describe s o m e features belonging to each 'factor'. There is no sequence or order of
importance implied in the setting out of these factors. In addition, and m o r e generally,
the interviews are expected to reveal that the writers' insights reflect the classic stages
given in the literature. Overall, it is also predicted that the writers will evidence a
general 'constructivist' approach to their art-form.

12.1.2

Five Factors Expected To Relate To Writers' Insights

12.1.2.1 Metaphoric And 'Imagistic' Awareness
This factor picks up a number of major themes in this work. Clearly metaphorical and
'imagistic' processes have been implicated in insight. In Kellian terms w e have seen
that metaphorical extensions of current ways of understanding m a y work by linking
previously unassociated subsystems of construing. This is likely to occur during
Creativity Cycles (loosening and then tightening) which potentially open up flurries of
n e w meanings. Such processes are comparable to Matte-Blanco's notion of bi-modal
thought (wherein looser associative processes are 'contained' within tighter judgements
of distinction or difference). Perception-like imagery associated with insight m a y
indicate a more presentational m o d e of thought — a special form of which m a y be
cross-modal synesthesia. S o m e specific expectations which flow from these general
observations are that:
• Writers should shift into more metaphorical and 'imagistic' modes of thinking
leading up to their insightful breakthroughs.
• There should be evidence of a central metaphor or image which seems to 'inform'
their work.
• Writers should report a flurry of ideas united by some image or metaphor and this
experience m a y exhibit a world-like contextual 'wholeness'.
• This latter feature should be consistent with the idea of accessing alternative
superordinate structures and thereby multiple systems of implications and meaning.
• Writers should report playing through scenes in the mind. This m a y take the form of
a presentational imagery or symbolism and result in imagery with sensory-like
qualities and something of the 'freshness' of perception.
• There m a y be evidence of cross-modal synesthesia leading to conscious insight.

12.1.2.2

Two Modes Of Awareness

Throughout this work a central theme has been the connection between alternating
m o d e s of awareness and insight — whether expressed in terms of representational
versus presentational symbolism, tight versus loose construing, asymmetrical versus
symmetrical logic, focused versus defocused attention, or fast means-end thinking
versus slower contemplative thought. A crucial part of all the 'looser' modes of thought
(to the tighter 'representational' w a y of thinking) is a playful tolerance of uncertainty or
absurdity.
• Writers should report that deliberate, focused attention gives w a y to periods
characterised by a looser, defocused attention.
• Writers should describe purposeful alternations between loose (more symmetrical)
and tight (more asymmetrical) construing processes (Creativity Cycles) which are
embedded in larger Experience Cycles. These cycles should be characterised by
looser associative processes being provisionally tightened then loosened again.
• These alternations should also represent what Matte-Bianco called 'bi-modal'
iMnking — the harmonious experience of both symmetrical and asymmetrical
awareness.
• A c o m m o n feature is expected to be the reported capacity to tolerate playfully, even
encourage, ambiguity, uncertainties, even contradictories in thinking. This 'negative
capability' will alternate with periods of anxiety and frustration.
• A n identifying feature of writer experiences should be the recurring capacity to give
up the immediate desire to understand, to wait-upon insight rather than to look-for a
predictable solution.
• Writers should report alternations between a type of 'slower' meditative thinking and
a faster, means-end thinking.

12.1.2.3 Emotional Thinking And Embodiment
Earlier chapters were dedicated to the links between 'emotion', embodiment and insight.
Instead of a hard-and-fast distinction between thought and feeling it has been argued
that understanding and anticipation are always 'emotional' in that thought is imbued

with affective themes and qualities. In particular, it was proposed that 'emotional'
construing is implicated in changes in understanding such as insight represents. A
distinction w a s drawn between more active and more passive emotional styles of
anticipation. A s a part of this active feeling intelligence, mental life is considered to be
a fully physical, embodied phenomenon. The type of knowing that would represent
such embodied anticipation would be personal and participatory. Such a style of
knowing is, in periods of insight, expected to engender feelings of 'connectedness' with
one's work and one's world generally.
• Writers are expected to describe their processes surrounding insights as 'emotional'
or affectively nuanced and they should be adept at using their affective sensitivities
to insightful advantage. That is, their emotional awareness will be more 'active' than
'passive'.
• Affective self-management: I would expect that writers utilise a number of 'tricks'
and strategies to avoid self invalidation and anxiety; that they keep going despite
impasse and that they can delay the pragmatics of construction and can lessen the
immediate desire to know.
• Affective 'feelings of knowing' should represent quite superordinate structures with
multiple chains of implication imbuing one's construing with a sense of direction and
purpose. This transcending 'aesthetic' emotion should mark the subjective
experience of an active 'feeling' intelligence moving towards insight.
• Writers are expected to report insight as an embodied and physical experience, as
well as a 'purely intellectual' one.
• Insight processes are expected to be enactive. Writers should 'perceptually rehearse',
immersing themselves in the m e d i u m of their work for its o w n sake. This is
expected to be experienced at times as 'concrete' images with a perception-like
phenomenology. For example, writers are expected to play with words in
presentational ways: being sensitive to tone, rhyme, assonance, alliteration, context,
imagining scenes, hearing voices and so on.
• Writers should talk about insights emerging within an overarching context of
purpose, commitment and impassioned involvement in a project. This should lead to

personal or participatory knowing, an indicator of which m a y be strong feelings of
'connectedness' and integration.

12.1.2.4 Intuitive Awareness
A s w e have seen, there is a considerable amount of research implicating intuitive
understanding within insight. Looser, more associative mental modes of thinking have
been found to precede important insights,frequentlywithin periods of reverie and
absorption. It has been suggested that such states reflect a type of what Heidegger
called 'meditative thinking' in which the person receptively, but not passively, waits
upon insight rather than 'end-gaining' or pre-empting what is to come. Such states of
anticipation are quite often accompanied by a sense that the insight is being 'dictated' to
the person and that the person is thereby being 'guided' by intuitive or 'unconscious'
structures of understanding.
• Generally speaking, writers are expected to describe tacit and 'unconscious' knowing
processes as being crucial to their insights.
• Such intuitive processes are expected to be relatively loose and to be characterised by
associative thinking and by periods of absorption, fantasy and reverie.
• Writers' accounts should include descriptions of 'meditative thinking' characterised
by a personal or participatory knowing — a sense of knowing with the 'other', of
participating with the known. This is expected to be a slower style of thinking which
does not try to j u m p to solutions or 'end-gain'.
• Reports of a type of a steady defocussed attention should be c o m m o n , as should
reports of solutions suddenly 'popping' into awareness following a period of loose,
intuitive contemplation. This would coincide with the tightening up loosened
construing and accessing alternative superordinate structures of implication.
• I expect writers to mention unconscious or tacit mental processes as 'guiding' and
'providing' them with their insights. They should describe themselves as 'recipients'
of insights, the latter manifesting a type of exteriority and spontaneity.
• Overall it is expected that writers will report 'feelings of knowing' which they m a y
not be able to justify or articulate. That is, they are expected to spend a good deal of

their 'creative' time in a state of conscious 'not-knowing', yet have an overarching
feeling that they are heading 'somewhere'.

12.1.2.5 Experience Of Self And Social Factors
If the pragmatist-phenomenological elements of m y account of insight are appropriate,
then the writers' accounts of their insights should include descriptions of shifts in selfexperience as well as an awareness of the social/ecological 'embeddedness' of their
insight processes. For example, w e have seen that emotional self-management enables a
release from self-consciousness and self-concern. Such a state seems to be predictive of
insight. There are more positive aspects to this shift in self-experience, however.
Relevant here is the already-mentioned expectation of a deep sense of 'connectedness'
and integration in relation to insight. Such an experience is expected to be deeply selfvalidating and to give the person a sense of his or her place within a social and
'ecological', even perhaps 'cosmic', context. The participatory knowing involves more
of the self-as-construer (the T ) and less of the self-as-construed (the 'me'), and there is
likely to be the sense in which the experience transcends, yet includes, the person. In
related fashion, w e have seen that insight is often reported as an intensely personal
experience, which nonetheless has an 'exterior', event-like character.
• T h e writers should report shifts in their experience of self, especially a periodic
releasefromfrustration,self-concern and self-absorption.
• Writers m a y describe a deep sense of integration and validation of their selves amid
significant (for them) insight processes.
• Writers m a y report that they experience more of the T as construer and less of the
'me' as self-consciousness. The joy of insight m a y be tied to experiencing more of
'self-as-process' in this way. It m a y also be revealed as a type of trust and faith in
oneself, a type of transcending self-confidence and security.
• T h e accounts should include experiences of a fully embodied immersion and
connectedness, a type of 'resonance' with their world and a sense of being a part of
the material and spiritual world that transcends them. Again, this participatory

knowing m a y be distinguished by a blurring of the distinctions between inner and
outer, self and world.
• T h e writers are expected to describe insight experiences as socially-inscribed
processes, as very m u c h a part of a larger socially-imbued 'conversation'. They are
expected to be aware of the discursive, normative constraints which inform their
work, which nonetheless they are trying to transcend.
• In the interviews there should be evident a reported sense of the 'event-like' quality
of insight for which the writers nonetheless feel peculiarly responsible and proud.
There m a y also be a sense that the insight transcends them, that it is 'wiser' than
them.

12.1.3 Expected General Features: The Classic Stages Of
Insight And A Constructivist Outlook
In addition to the specific features suggested above, I would also expect that writers'
reports will, overall, reflect the classic stages of insight as well as a general
constructivist outlook in relation to their work. Firstly, writers will be expected to
describe processes of preparation, incubation, insight, and elaboration. Furthermore, it
should be the case that writers will eschew objectivist views of knowing and
understanding. Rather, it is expected that they will endorse a more constructivist
approach to meaning and understanding processes. That is, they are expected to
describe a more participatory and hypothetical approach to the world in which meaning
is created by immersion and action in the world.
Such an outlook is expected to be predicational, teleological and (forward
looking but not necessarily predictive) and purposive. It would be non-rationalist in the
sense that 'mind' is characterised as m u c h by affective awareness, by tacit feel and by
looser associative processes as it is by conscious logical inference and deduction. A
constructivist view of mind emphasises meaning and understanding (not just 'knowing
that') and conceptualises this in the context of the person's pragmatic engagement with
the world and in terms of perturbations to this engagement. One's understanding is

characterised in terms of its viability and coherence rather than by any direct
correspondence with a presumed extra-conceptual reality.

12.2 METHOD AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Participants

12.2.1

Seven highly successful Australian fiction writers,87 of both sexes (four female, three
male) and all over forty years of age, were chosen for interview. Other target groups
could have been used (academics, scientists, and so on), but well-known and wellpublished fiction writers were chosen because it w a s felt that:
1. It w a s reasonable to assume that they had experienced significant insights in the
course of their creative lives.
2. Creative writersfrequentlythink and write about creativity and often teach creative
writing. It w a s felt, therefore, that they should have well-developed theories of
insight (being a crucial part of creativity). With their facility with words writers
should also be able to articulate their experiences and theories well.

12.2.2 Materials
Writers signed consent forms (Appendix 1) which guaranteed the confidentiality and
anonymity of the interview protocols. They were also supplied with an information
form (Appendix 2) which specified the three main areas of interest to be covered in the
interview as:
1. A discussion of significant experiences of insight related to your
work as a writer.
2. A discussion of the ways in which you organise your creative life,
both on a day-to-day basis, and in terms of longer time-frames.
3. Y o u r o w n views on the nature and genesis of creative insight.

The interviewer had a checklist of thematic areas which he consulted from time to time
to m a k e sure the main areas of interest were covered. These themes basically reflected
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Several of the participants are also well-published non-fiction writers.

the expected features to emerge in writer interviews given above. Interviews were taperecorded for transcription purposes.

12.2.3 Procedure
Writer confidentiality was assured because it was felt this would allow the writers to
speak more freely about their personal experiences which were expected to be quite
emotional and at times intimate or personal. In all but one case interviews were
conducted in the writers' homes or workplaces. The interviews were lengthy, ranging
from forty-five minutes to one and a half hours. The first interview was the longest, and
was used as a pilot. At the conclusion of the formal interview feedback from the writer
confirmed that the content, format and procedure used were meaningful and appropriate.
Subsequent interviews were carried out with an unchanged format. In all, seven
interviews were completed. With only one exception, all writers approached consented
to be interviewed — the one exception being for personal reasons. Indeed, the writers

were enthusiastic about the project and, in particular, were keen to discuss their creative
processes — as against the meaning and content of their work (which they normally are
asked about). All writers are well published and in productive stages of their careers.
Most participants write novels, though one participant writes primarily for the stage, and
another largely, though not exclusively, a type of 'creative' non-fiction.

12.2.4 The Interview Process
Because of the elusive, emotional and complexly rich nature of insight experiences, the
mode of inquiry most suited to exploring such a subtle and nuanced phenomenon was
considered to be qualitative88 (Neimeyer, 1993; Viney, 1988). Such an approach is
consistent with Kelly's (1955) idiographic, non-questionnaire focus (Oades, 1999;
Viney, 1988) and with his later emphasis on personal involvement and attending to
88

I do not intend to suggest an absolute distinction between qualitative and quantitative a
Clearly the transcripts could be coded and turned into quantitative data of many kinds. But in this work
the emphasis will be on the overall qualitative meaningfulness of the interview accounts and
conversations as given.

process (Butt, 1996). A relatively unstructured and conversational interview was used

in order to get as close as possible to the writers' fully contextualised experiences and
enable them to re-experience imaginatively their important insights as fully as possible
(Smith, J. A., 1995). Such a mode of inquiry is, arguably, more likely to get closer to

the processes of a person's construing, as against structure or content (Butt, 1996; Mair,
1989; Oades, 1999; Oades & Viney, 1999) and this accords with the theoretical
emphasis I have been proposing.
Gathering narrative accounts in the context of a semi-structured interview was
considered appropriate to this end because the main task was to understand how these
writers operate in an as fully holistic and contextualised fashion as possible (Brenner,
1985; Mishler, 1995; Smith, J. A., 1995). In addition, the data can then be integrated
into subsequent, more quantitative research (Jick, 1979; Lamiell, 1995). One function
of the interviews was to test the hypotheses or expectations outlined above. As
suggested earlier in this work, however, the interviews were also expected to reveal the
unexpected and so were also exploratory in nature. Generally speaking, the approach to
interviewing and analysis followed the procedures for semi-structured interviews as
given in Smith (Smith, J. A., 1995).
The structure of the interviews were as follows. All writers were first asked how
they organised their creative lives (from hour-to-hour up to project-length time frames).
Typically, they were then asked to recall and describe significant insights in their

creative, working lives. The writers had little trouble with these phases of the interview

speaking fluently and lucidly. Writers were then asked for their own theories of insight.
Finally, the researcher shared something of his emerging views of insight in response to
issues arising from what the interviewee had said and a more free-flowing dialogue was
entered into with each writer.
It was hoped that conversational interviewing, with its flexibility and sensitivity
to nuance, would provide both depth and complexity (Mair, 1979; Miles & Huberman,
1994). Four procedural priorities within semi-structured interviewing (Smith, J. A.,
1995, p. 12) were followed: 1) rapport with interviewees was of prime importance; 2)

the order of questions w a s secondary to maintaining such rapport; 3) the interviewer
posed interesting questions as they arose in response to interviewee suggestions; 4) if
interviewees spontaneously 'jumped ahead' in the interview schedule, then the
interviewer followed the writer's lead, as long as the main areas of inquiry were covered
throughout the interviews. This is in keeping with an 'objective attitude' (Warren,
1998) which allows for events to occur in unanticipated ways.
As it turned out, writers typically did pre-empt the order of the interview. The
researcher had a checklist of major themes which were consulted from time to time in
order to ensure coverage of the main thematic areas proposed in the previous chapter.

Broadly speaking, in the first half to two thirds of the interviews the researcher took c

to not reveal his own views and tended to be non-directive, while the latter stages of the
interviews tended to be more interactive. This latter 'mutual orientation' (Viney, 1987)
is consistent with the constructivist contention and acknowledgement that both parties
are participants in, and are affected by, the research process (see also Reason & Heron,
1995, for their similar notion of 'Co-operative Inquiry').
Another type of 'objectivity' is preserved in such a qualitative approach. That
is, a type of 'ecological validity' was retained by encouraging writers to describe in
detail their insight experiences in terms of their original contexts. Accounts of their
insights were always in the context of their writing, and each writer was assisted to
reconstruct imaginatively the experience by describing it in detail: when it was, where
they were exactly, who they were with, what the bodily experience was, what they said
or did (if anything) and so on. Such 'thick', highly contextualised description led some
of the writers (for example, writers 1, 2, 5 and 7) to become quite animated and to
comment on re-feeling something of how they felt during the original experience.
While not quite a role re-enactment, this approach is consonant with a constructivist
approach to research as 'dynamic interaction'(Yardley, 1995).
An important consideration was that the participants themselves would find the
procedure illuminating, enjoyable and beneficial (Viney & Bousfield, 1991).
Considering I wanted them to re-visit moments of insight, the tone of the interviews was

to be comfortable and enjoyable, to enable the writers to relax and to occasionally
engage in looser, 'presentational' thinking. Therefore, interviews were to be conducted

in surroundings they felt 'at home' in. There is also an ethical and theoretical point here
that flows from a general constructivist orientation. The writers were considered to be

the 'experts' in this situation and our relationship was to be as co-inquirers, rather than
as 'experimenter and subjects'. Given the assumed dialectical nature of construing
(Viney & Bousfield, 1991), a dialogue was considered appropriate to develop
understanding beyond our individual, prior understandings. This is entirely consistent
with the growing contemporary view of self as constructed and constantly reconstructed over time (Guidano, 1991; Harre & Gillett, 1994).
Another important distinction here is between the 'telling' and the 'told'. The
interviews were not expected to produce 'objective' reports of essentially 'retrievable'
past events, but to enable present approximations to past events, reconstructions of
experiences. They were considered to be as much exploration as recounting, enabling
participants to place order on the often subtle and elusive experiences of insights. In
many respects writers may express understandings of their insights that they have not
expressed or thought of before. In this way, the interview was to be an enabling space
in which new understandings can emerge in dialogue. This may, however, raise the
question of the independence of the data and it is important to respond to this question.
By way of response, it is acknowledged that there is no doubt that interviewers
influence interviewee accounts — if only by the selection of topic areas to be covered,
by the format of the interview and so on. Yet, in most psychological research there are

these issues of the reliability and validity of the data due to 'subject' expectancies, and
confounding 'variables' — usually unwittingly introduced by 'experimenters'. Further,
in deciding on research approach there is often a trade-off between qualitative richness
and meaningfulness (closeness to people's idiographic experience) and control and
quantitative 'purity' of the data (by standardising questions and procedures or working
more 'nomothetically'). In this work, as I have suggested, the decision was to opt for
maximum meaningfulness and closeness to participant experiences. Thus, interviewer-

interviewee influences are here acknowledged 'up-front'. Given this acknowledgement,
however, attempts were m a d e to limit the possibilities of leading or biasing the
participants' responses.
Specifically, the writers were assured that there was no particular answer being
looked for, and that what was really wanted was their views, their understandings and
the uniqueness of their experiences. It w a s m a d e clear that I was interested in
differences between writers as well as similarities. A s mentioned earlier, in attempting
to maintain the 'ecological validity' of their accounts, all efforts were m a d e to let the
writers tell their o w n stories, particularly in thefirsthalf of the interviews, with
interruptions only to clarify meaning or to assist the writer if stuck or to m o v e things
along if themes were sufficiently covered.

12.2.5 The Thematic Analysis
The primary contribution of this thesis has been the development of a constructivist
theoretical account of insight. It is here augmented by a qualitative empirical study
undertaken to enable a judgement as to whether this constructivist account of insight
appears to be useful. The expected features, and the factors under which they nestle,
have been drawn directly from the insight literature and from the framework developed
in the present work. The transcripts (see Appendix 3) will be analysed for the features
and the m o r e general factors they represent.
There are obvious shortcomings to this approach and, accordingly, the data
needs to be treated with caution, the analysis done with appropriate tentativeness.
Principally, there is the problem of researcher subjectivity in determining whether writer
statements conform to the expected features outlined above. Attempts to overcome this
potential bias will take several forms. Firstly, following the procedure used by Warren
and Rees (1975) and k n o w n as the 66/33 or 'opinion poll rationale', each writer's
account will be judged to have validated a factor only if the writer has clearly implicated
two thirds or more of that factor's features. This has been adopted because a simple

5 0 % of features m a y not be rigorous enough, especially considering the dynamic or
interactive nature of the interviews.
Secondly, page and paragraph references will be given for specific excerpts from
each transcript judged to represent each feature. The reader will then be abletojudge
for himself or herself, in full context, the proposed match between the narrative excerpts
and the expected features — giving a provisional type of inter-rater reliability. Given
m y primarily theory-building focus here, it is beyond the scope of this current work to
engage in a thoroughgoing empirical analysis.
It m a y also be that the form of data gathering used here is inherently
'conservative' in that it relies mostly on the participants volunteering the concepts and
features of their experiences in which the researcher m a y be interested. That is, it m a y
lead to underestimating the relevance of the features to the writers' insight experiences.
The mere fact that a writer does not describe an expected feature of the experience of
insight does not m e a n s/he does not endorse it. Finally, if the interviewer had in the
course of the interview explicitly prompted the writer in terms of a feature, only the
most emphatic agreement or endorsement by the writer was counted in the thematic
analysis.
It would undoubtedly be more rigorous to have several judges undertake the
thematic analysis and, using a measure of inter-rater reliability, thereby determine with
more confidence the relevance of the suggested features within writers' accounts of their
insights (Perreault & Leigh, 1989; Viney, 1988). Indeed, in a future empirical study
with more thoroughgoing aims, such an approach would be warranted. In the present
circumstances, however, such an approach is not required.
This thesis has been dedicated primarily to developing a theoretical position in
relation to insight. This constructivist account is n e w and its subject matter is complex
and elusive. In order to understand the type of multidimensional account of insight I
have been building, it is arguably necessary to have worked through this text, gradually
developing an understanding of the factors I a m expecting will be reflected in writers'
accounts. Consequently, the number of features predicted and the above-mentioned

complexity would m a k e the training of judges and the negotiation of mutual
understanding a too-lengthy process for current purposes.
In any case, before such a tightening process took place, it might be better to
return to the writers with the preliminary analyses (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln &
Guba, 1985) to validate the coding process. At this stage what would suffice is a

general indication that the writers' accounts reflect the main emphases of the theoretical
framework put forward. The approach is, as far as possible, to 'find' the proposed

features of insight in their accounts of their creative processing, rather than to 'impose
them on those accounts; a Galileian rather than an Aristotelian approach (Warren,
1990). In the final chapter, more detailed suggestions will be made concerning future
empirical investigations.

CHAPTER 13: INSIGHT IN ACTION:- WHAT THE
WRITERS HAD TO SAY
13.1 THE RESULTS IN GENERAL TERMS
The writers' accounts of their insights were highly concordant with the theoretical
understanding developed in the Chapter 11. In broad terms, these accounts confirmed
the five factors given in the preceding chapter with allfivefactors being implicated by a
majority of writers (see Table 3 for a summary). Each transcript was coded for the
presence of the anticipated features. If a writer's transcript included examples of two
thirds of a factor's features, then that writer was said to have endorsed that factor
(Warren and Rees, 1975).
Table 2. Presence of expected factors within writer accounts of insight
processes.

5 FACTORS
METAPHORIC &
'IMAGISTIC
AWARENESS
T W O MODES OF
THINKING
EMOTIONAL
THINKING &
EMBODIMENT
INTUITIVE
AWARENESS
EXPERIENCE OF
SELF & SOCIAL
FACTORS

WRITER INTERVIEWS
wi

W2

W3

W4

W5

W6

W7

Total 11

Yes*

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

5/7

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

4/7

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

6/7

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

6/7

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

5/7

* 'Yes' represents at least 6 6 % of each factor's features being expressed
within an interview.
A thematic analysis of the expected features will be given in the next section
(see Table 4), but it suffices to say here that all these features were given expression by
at least one writer. Overall, the accounts reflected the classic stages of insight as given

in the insight literature and there is strong evidence that the writers approach their artform in a constructivist fashion. Finally, there were un-anticipated findings as well, but
none of these directly contradicted the understanding of insight I have been developing.
First s o m e caveats are in order about the nature of the 'data' gathered. There is a
tendency in retrospective reporting for participants to 'telescope' events (events that
occurred over an extended period being seen as simpler and as occurring closer together
than w a s originally the case). Respondents also tend to build a causal story from
patterns of events which only happened to be arranged in a temporal sequence (Miles &
Huberman, 1994). There is often a tendency to m a k e the processes described more
integrated and cohesive than they m a y in fact have been.
In defence of the validity of the interview data in these respects, however, all the
writers were insistent on the complexity and relative lack of order they observed in their
o w n processes. They explicitly rejected notions that their insights and creative
processes were simply logical, ordered processes and were, as a rule, happy enough to
admit they did not fully understand h o w they came to insight. In general, the writers
were not backward in disagreeing with m e w h e n they felt I had misrepresented their
meaning or missed the point. Another general characteristic of the writers' accounts —
which reduces possible concerns about the writers being led or trying to please the
interviewer — w a s their emphatic, often impassioned, nature. The writers were at times
fervently insistent about their views and there was a high degree of consistency across
their accounts.

13.2 ILLUSTRATING THE EXPECTED FEATURES OF WRITER
INSIGHTS
13.2.1 Introduction
Illustrative excerpts will now be given for the specific features predicted in Chapter 12
to be involved in writer insight experiences. All seven writer interview transcripts are
contained in Appendix 3 with paragraphs numbered consecutively. Specific paragraph
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references will be given for each writer w h o says something relevant about each feature.
Overall, the expected features were well-represented in writer accounts (see Table 4 for
a summary).
Table 3.

Presence of expected features within writer accounts of insight
processes.

Metaphoric
and
Imagistic
Awareness

T w o Modes
of Thinking

Emotional
Thinking
and
Embodiment

Intuitive
Awareness

Experience
of Self and
Social
Factors

FEATURE

FEATURE

FEATURE

FEATURE

FEATURE

& no. of writers & no. of writers & no. of writers & no. of writers & no. of writers
w h o described it w h o described it w h o described it who described it who described it
Metaphoric
& Imagistic
as crucial
Central
image or
metaphor

6

5

Flurry of
ideas
7
contextual
wholeness
Alternative
structures. 4
Multi
dimensions
Scenes in
5
mind.
Sensory-like
Crossmodal
synesthesia
& insight

2

Tight
focused vs.
defocused
attention
Loose vs.
Tight.
Creativity
Cycle
Symmetry
&

Asymmetry
Negative
capability.
Play with
absurd
Give up
knowing.
Wait-upon
Slower
meditative
vs. faster
means-end

4

Insight &
emotional
sensitivity

7

6

Affective
selfmanaging

6

Transcend3 ing aesthetic
emotion

5

Insight as
physical &
embodied

3

5

Enactive,
4 immersed, 7
participatory
knowing
Feeling
3 connected. 5
Strong
purpose

Tacit & unconscious
processes as
crucial
Reverie,
associative,
absorption,
fantasy
Meditative
thought.
Waitingupon
Defocused
& 'pop'into
awareness
Intuitive
'guiding'.
Exterior
spontaneity
Feeling of
knowing.
Can't
articulate

5

7

4

0

7

6

Less selfconscious.
Less selfconcern
Deep
integration
& selfvalidation
M o r e of T
as process.
Joy
Inner &
outer blur.
Embodied
immersion
Socially
inscribed.
Discursive
constraints
Insight
transcends,
is wiser &
event-like

A s can be seen above, the large majority of expected features were expressed by the
writers. Onlyfiveof the thirty features were included in three or less of the interview

7

5

4

5

5

6

accounts. Only one received no support. These data give us cause for optimism that the
theoretical framework from which they were drawn was predictive. As mentioned in
the previous chapter, however, these data are provisional. Further work needs to be
carried out, for example, to check the inter-item correlations as it seems intuitively
plausible that there may be overlap between the meanings of various features for
writers. But for the purposes of this present inquiry, rather than collapsing several
features into one (thereby losing some of the distinctness of each feature), a larger
number of slightly different features will do more justice to the subtlety and complexity
of insight experiences.
Even when no-one specifically described a processes — for instance, 'defocused
attention being followed by insight popping into mind' — it would be hasty to conclude
such processes are not involved in writer insights. In this case, for example, both looser
defocused attention and the sudden intrusion of insight as a 'gift' from without (a
common motif) have been found in separate statements from the writers — but not
linked in one statement. It may simply be that they did not happen to volunteer this
information. Suggestions for further research in the next chapter will include
'triangulation' (Guba & Lincoln, 1985; Jick, 1979) — returning to the writers and
checking findings and conclusions with them as an intermediary step in theory
development. In this case, writers could be asked directly if they could describe any
experiences they have had in their work of defocused attention being suddenly displaced
by insight popping into mind.
Nonetheless, for our purposes, the interviews provide solid support for the
theoretical framework developed in this work. It is now time, therefore, to see how the
features of insight were expressed and how they can be given expanded meaning in
terms of the pragmatic constructivist understanding of insight I have proposed. The
selection of excerpts given below have, therefore, been chosen in terms of their capacity
to illuminate and clarify this theoretical perspective.

13.2.2

Metaphoric And 'Imagistic' Awareness

• Writers should shift into more metaphorical and 'imagistic' modes
of thinking leading up to their insightful breakthroughs.
Writer 1, when asked what role metaphor, analogy, figurative thinking and imagery
played in her insightful breakthroughs, replied:
WI: Oh huge! And the impact of a metaphor is something that is very
hard to spell out. It's ah, I really enjoy the sensation of a metaphor
rather than actually figuring out what it means. (188) 89

There is more than a hint of a presentational, affective and non-literal awareness in pla

here. Note she points out that such a process is hard to articulate or 'spell out' and th
she purposely keeps her figurative understanding provisional. She does not tighten it

up, or close it off. She went on to say that "I saw the metaphor as that [the title of the
book] constantly. If was like it helped write the book" (190). This latter observation

illustrates the potential multidimensionality, the openness of the meaning of a metaphor.
By keeping the metaphor open she has allowed it to inform the complex
multidimensional structure of her novel. Most writers suggested emphatically that
metaphor and mental imagery were central to their insights with six out of seven writers
including this feature in their accounts (188; 342; 518, 520; 608; 816; 902-903).

• Writers should report a flurry of ideas united by some image or
metaphor and this experience may exhibit a world-like contextual
wholeness.
All the writers spoke about the way images and metaphors come as contextually-defined
wholes. For example, Writer 1 spoke about images and insight coming as a gift and she
expressed the richness and contextual wholeness in this fashion: "It's more coherent

than me and there's a feeling that it's already attached to itself. It's pre-formed" (54)
And further:
I was on the bus and it's as if it flew in the window, the very first line
of the novel, and I wrote it d o w n on a bit of paper from m y handbag.
8989 AJI quotations are referenced according to interview paragraph number. For example, '220' in
parentheses (220) will represent paragraph 220 in Appendix 3.

The sense was that everything in m y mind was lining up behind that
sentence as if it was the leader in a procession, but I wasn't consciously
thinking of any of those bits. (54)

This strange sense that an important image or metaphor is whole, coherent and rich in
meaning reflects the multidimensionality of metaphor discussed in Chapter 10 and is
consistent with the accounts of symmetry, presentational consciousness and loose
construing presented in this work. One way of understanding this is to imagine having
to describe thoroughly a scene in a room. The full ambience that one may grasp may in
fact take a 'novel' to adequately express. It may be symbolised in some image or

metaphor, but takes the fully-developed context of a narrative, play, or novel to give i
full multi-dimensional expression:
W2: So, all the way through, and I can give you many examples
throughout the play, and it just startled m e h o w everything I thought of
had this kind of resonance without m y realising it. ... and n o w looking
at it there isn't a wasted image. Every image in the play, and I didn't
do it consciously, feeds the whole theme. A n d whether the audience
knows it or not, I don't know, but I think it must subliminally work to
pull, to unify the themes of the play. (364)
This sense of flurries of ideas contextually united by a metaphor was an ubiquitous

feature of the interviews with all seven writers including it in their accounts of insi
(54; 128, 364; 528; 620; 836; 906; 1062).

•

There should be evidence of a central metaphor or image which
seems to 'inform' the writers' work.

Closely related to this idea of contextual richness and fecundity is the idea that an
or metaphor may form some sort of centre or structural inspiration for a whole work.

With this idea is the feeling that the metaphor 'writes' the writer. Writer 2 gave a go
example of this, describing a birthing metaphor in which a person engaged in 'caving'
(a 'speliologist') emerged from a narrow cave:
W2: ... he emerged from the cave and I found myself watching him
c o m e up. 'Cos a cave, I used to think, was just like a big opening and
you walk in. A n d in fact it can be a little hole in the ground and you
just lower yourself into it in a grassy hill orfieldor hillside. A n d .. .so
I had him coming out, his hair coming out through the grass.. .so only,

his face coming up into the light. A n d only afterwards did I actually
see it as a very powerful birth metaphor [image]. Yes, image. N o w that
kind of symbolism you just can't think of intellectually. It has to
emerge from the work. A n d the work then speaks back to you and if
you can pick it up. (352)

This writer went on to explain how this birthing metaphor informed the whole work.
We can see other features of insight here. Clearly her writing process evidences a tacit,
intuitive guidedness and the writer may not be fully aware of the meaning being
developed. In this case the writer claimed that she did not see it until after the book
published. Again, she understood 'presentationally' that this was a powerful scene, and

only much later did she grasp its wider significance 'representationally'. Writer 7 also
talked about discovering an idea or image that was at the very centre of her work
without her realising it.
W7: And suddenly, seemingly out of the blue was the idea that one of
her husbands had committed suicide, in a very horrible way. A n d that
this... and she feels responsible, basically. N o w I don't k n o w where
that came from. So it was that same sense of... and as soon as I
thought of it, it was C L E A R L Y right, and, this was the thing about it, if
was as if it had always been there. It was as if for four years I had been
working knowing that, writing about it. A n d I hadn't just actually
bothered to put it info the text. It had that sense about it. I don't k n o w
what that means. (1088)

Realising this particular meaning constituted a sudden insight for her and she spent the
next four days 'painting' in the details to her book now that she understood the deep

structure of the book. Five out of seven writers included this feature in their accounts
insight (192; 352; 628, 900; 1088).

•

This notion of a central image or metaphor producing flurries of
ideas should be consistent with the idea of accessing alternative
superordinate structures and thereby multiple systems of
implications and meaning.

The flurries of images and ideas following insight is probably made possible by a

shifting of construct hierarchies allowing access to alternative networks of implication
This looser multidimensionality can be handled, even enjoyed, because of the thorough,
often prolonged preparation that writers undertake. Writer 7 described how she works

through more than twenty drafts of her novels,frequentlynot seeing the significance of

the early material until the very last drafts. In her current novel, for example, she had

just about 'finished' the book before she saw how it fitted together. This was the insigh
that she described above (1088) and she then spent a few days integrating it into the
novel. Often the unifying insight is so implicit, perhaps so superordinate, that it is
difficult to grasp. Or it may be full of implications, not all of them necessarily
welcome:
W7: Now I've forgotten what great writer said this. But some great
writer said 'every novel is written in order to conceal one sentence in
it', or words to that effect. A n d as soon as I read that I thought 'Yes'.
'That's absolutely true'. A n d maybe that's why, it's like, you, it's such
a concealed thought that you can't let yourself, for whatever reason,
you can't allow yourself to think it and yet the whole work has to be
written to try to understand it. (1090)

This sense of a whole work being needed to express and communicate one idea is
reminiscent of the insight literature's emphasis on elaboration. An insight unifies and
connects domains of understanding and can therefore require much detail to
communicate it. This superordinate connection between domains may be very hard to

grasp and it takes the multidimensionality of the whole novel to reveal it, to elaborate
The structures are patiently constructed for the central insight to be contained by, to
anchored in. The insight is then 'set off, as I have suggested, like a complex structure
built of dominoes. Or in Martindale's (1995) terms, we 'fill' the mind with knowledge
and provide it with a problem it cannot solve. By keeping one's attention open to the
problem, not clutching prematurely for an answer, and by letting our thoughts wander to
ever wider connections, there is more chance that some remote associate or some clue
from the world will push such 'activated' 'lateral' ideas over the threshold of
consciousness and the resulting connections will pop into the mind as an insight. The
key is to find metaphorical and analogical links with other meaning structures:
W6: ... it's got to find partners or it's got to become a link in a chain
s o m e h o w or other to acquire it's full meaning, or a n e w meaning... I've
taken it in as a gripping image, but I want to reinforce and s o m e h o w
alter and amplify that meaning. A n d I have to do it with other
connectives, other associated images. But I've got tofindthose and

I've got to give it a n e w life s o m e h o w or other. It's a n e w and an
enhanced life if you think of it in those terms. (913)

Such experiential processes seem to reveal the highly superordinate, implicit structures
of mind. The writers do not experience normal, conscious, reflexive 'control' over their
writing processes, and it is largely their tacit knowing (Polanyi, 1967) that guides and
allows them to 'know more than they can say'. In the case of the writers interviewed,
they discover 'more than they can say' in the words they write, in the act of writing.
Generally the writers expressed the need to 'transform' an image or metaphor such that

it can carry this multidimensionally 'enhanced life'; so that if can express something of

their original inspiration. Four out of seven writers explicitly included this feature i
their accounts of insight (555; 632; 907, 913; 1088,1094)

• Writers should report playing through scenes in the mind. This may
take the form of a presentational imagery or symbolism and result in
imagery with sensory-like qualities and something of the freshness'
of perception.
It is commonplace in the insight literature that vividly experienced imagery often
precedes and/or constitutes insightful breakthroughs. In this experience there develops
a type of freedom and autonomy of the imagery itself. The imagery is frequently
'concrete' where the recipient hears voices, smells odours, sees people and so on. Being
predominantly within a looser, presentational mode, there can be a blurring of the
'reality-imagination' distinction. It becomes a metaphorical thought with an embodied,
perceptual-like phenomenology:
W7: Driving along... and I suddenly felt this weight lift off my
shoulders as it suddenly occurred to m e : T don't have to write this
book'. T can write something else'. A n d it was like somebody coming
along and saying 'you don't have to do that exam. It's O K , I'll give
you a degree anyway.' A n d it was such a relief! It was a glorious
feeling, and I immediately started to think about some other projects
that I might do, and the world looked different. I m e a n I looked around
at Rozelle and it just, it w a s alive, it was, there was full colour in
everything. I [had been] crowded by this terrible anxiety. So I turned
into the park at Callan Park [psychiatric hospital] and sat on one of
those seats... A n d as I w a s sitting there a voice came to m e , not quite
like Joan of Arc, but it was very vivid. A n d it said to m e 'You don't
have to understand. Y o u only have to write it. Y o u don't have to

understand it'. It was that phrase 'You don't have to understand'. A n d
it really w a s like a voice. I could virtually hear a h u m a n voice saying
it. (1035)

This is a classic example of insight in many ways, especially its suddenness and
joyfulness following a very long period of frustration, assiduous preparation and
eventually a resolve to renounce the project entirely. There was much work required

after the insight whereby, ironically in this case, some understanding of the instigating
problem did develop. This is also a clear example of what Lonergan (1978) called an
'inverse' insight — the realisation that there is no value in the question, or possibly

there is no answer to it; where the point is there is no point. In this case she realised
she did not need to understand in order to progress and to write, as it turns out, a very
successful novel. It reveals a clear presentational quality where there is a blurring of
imagination and perception. This imagery seemed to develop autonomously and the
writer felt she had been given permission not to understand. Note also the strange
ambiguity wherein it was as if she was being visited by a higher power, where the

insight came from 'without', yet she still had some sense that it was only 'virtually' th
she heard a human voice.
The vivid, almost physical quality of this mental imagery is well captured by
most of the writers. For example, Writer 5, in talking about a good idea or sudden

insight, reported that it... " sort of stands out as an idea or a thought or something I'v
just seen ... and then things quickly, um, it sort of absorbs all the air around it and
things come into it" (815). Or again, Writer 6 captures well the sense of images having
a sort of autonomy and playing themselves out in one's mind — in this case linking
two 'distant' associates creating a new insight:
W6: But I think the image had enough... it played on my imagination
long enough to kind of resonate there for a while and probably, yes,
setting some sort of resonances which [clicked fingers] brought the
other back to mind as well. (911)

Overall, five out of seven writers specifically mentioned this feature in their accounts
insight (233; 344; 815; 911; 1035)
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•

There may be evidence of cross-modal synesthesia leading to conscious insight.

In keeping with the above findings of a type of 'sensate' experience of imagery and
insight, it was expected that there may be a type of sensate, almost physically
experienced, 'metaphor': where one idea or image is experienced in terms of another
mode of experience. Clear experiences of such cross-modal synesthesia are relatively

rare, but given the creative nature of writers' practices, it was felt they may be presen
their experience. In this regard only two authors linked experiences akin to cross-modal
synesthesia to their insights (107-112; 1082). Writer 7 reported a type of cross modal
'vision' where insights come as if written in the sky for her:
W7: It was also as if written. I've had that experience several times, as
if written. I say in interviews you know, 'written on the sky in letters
offire'.The title of one of m y books came in like that. (1082)

Or more specifically, Writer 1 experiences some of her insights, not as an intellectual

understanding or as a solution to some puzzle, but as a physical experience with a crossmodal nature. When asked how her sudden insight felt physically, she answered:
WI: Oh it's a rush! It's a rush. It's almost a coloured rush.
C S : Yes. W h e r e does it strike you?
W I : A h here [places hand on chest].
C S : Y e s because your hand immediately went to your chest didn't it?
W I : Y e s it's sort of gold [laughs]. (107-112)
Hunt (1995) and Shanon (1993) locate the beginnings of reflexive consciousness in this

distinctively creative and metaphorical ability to reconstitute one mode of experience in
terms of another. Whether or not their theories of the origins of mind are correct, we

can at least say here that this type of 'primitive' metaphorical transfer is found in som
degree in the creative insights of our writers.

13.2.3 Two Modes Of Awareness
• Writers should report that deliberate, focused attention gives way
to periods characterised by a looser, defocused attention.

It w a s expected that writers would describe looser, more dreamlike states which would
alternate with more focused deliberative attention in their creative work. In general
terms, writers did talk about the importance of daydreaming and of reverie and of looser
modes of construing. Indeed, it seems to be a sort of assumed background state for
them, implicit in their descriptions of how they work. They did not, however, tend to
talk about how focused or defocused their attention was. In hindsight, this feature may

well overlap with the next feature (alternating loose and tight construing) as well as wi
the first feature under "Intuitive Awareness" — a slower style of thinking characterised
by free association and reverie, and so on (see 13.2.5). Nonetheless, four writers
explicitly mentioned this type of defocused attention in contrast to more deliberative
thinking (164, 180; 373; 602; 759). Writer 1 expresses it most clearly:
WI: It's very personal and there are no rules. Um, no-one is expecting
anything of you, and you can just let the mind wander. A n d I guess I
feel that u m m , it's very precious to be able to have times like that in
adult life. A n d a lot of people aren't given that gift too. They really
must keep on top of things. It's anti getting things done and it means
that you are sort of unsafe. I've got to be very careful not to go into
those states. It's one of the reasons I can't drive a car — because I get
into those states without realising it very easily. (170)
Implicit here is that the writer is in a tighter more focused frame of mind when not in
this looser defocused state (as would be the case with people generally). There was also
evidence in the interviews that writers were aware of the value of such a defocused

state. Writer 5 suggested that certain hangovers bring about this alternative attentional
posture (759), or more mundanely, Writer 4 has found that first thing in the morning
before fully waking up, is a particularly creative time:
W4: Except this is kind of pushed up to another plane... and some of
our best work has been done here over this table — breakfast meetings
where the consciousness is still very open... . (602)

•

Writers should describe purposeful alternations between loose
(more symmetrical) and tight (more asymmetrical) construing
processes (Creativity Cycles) embedded in larger Experience
Cycles. This should be characterised by looser associative
processes being provisionally tightened and then loosened again.

This feature w a s repeatedly represented in all but one of the writers' accounts of insight
(62, 68; 371; 631; 807; 984 , 1105) and was one of the features most emphasised by the
writers. As Writer 1 put it: "I keep on explaining to people this when I teach them. I
say you can't both invent the clay and mould it at the same time. It's too much to ask"

(68). This reveals that looser processes are necessary to invent the 'clay' which tighte

processes can then 'mould'. It also parallels my earlier discussion of Kelly's Creativit
Cycle in which new constructs are allowed to take shape under loose construing and are

then, ideally, threaded into the existing implicatory networks of the person's construing

The loose parts of the process may operate at a low level of cognitive awareness, but the
writer is aware that something important (frequently joyous and scary) is happening:
WI: But I didn't see the significance of it. And I maybe even threw it
aside. But w h e n I get to that point where I see what it is, then it seems
as if there's a clamp happens. It stops. Thefree-flowingnature stops.
A n d that's quite a grieving process for m e , a grievous process, because
that wonderful but terrifying fluidity has to stop. A n d at that stage I
will start to control it. Little things still come and 1 start to see
connections more and more. (66)
What is clear in the above is that, as the construing tightens, the person begins to
consciously see the connection that the looser processes have 'invented'. Writer 1

clarified this distinction between two styles of awareness: "One is this exploration, th
meandering exploration. And at a very much later stage I start controlling it. There's a
point at which I know what it is about" (62). The recognition of two modes of
awareness was common in the interviews. Writer 2 put it this way:
W2:1 think that's what you learn, and I'm sure everyone, all writers
speak about the difference between the composer and the editor; the
composer and the shaper. Nabokov calls it rapture and recapture,
which is nice. It's a little, it's quite grandiose. But yes, he can say that.
The rapture is, I guess, the composing and all that; so that dichotomy
and h o w you learn to handle both because you can't just have one or
the other. (371)
When I suggested that the 'tightening' allows one to see the connections one has been
establishing tacitly, Writer 1 revealed another important aspect of moving towards

insight. That is, preventing oneself from tightening prematurely: "And part of the trick
is to delay that. If you saw it immediately then a lot of fluidity would stop" (78).

Writer 2 also suggested (before our formal interview) that the trick is akin to walking
down a corridor with many doors. One looks through the doors to see what is there, but
takes pains to not close them, to leave them all open as long as possible. These writers
are giving expression to Kelly's (1955) concern that people should not try to
prematurely grasp for insight. It seems to me that the crucial stage in the creativity
cycle is what Kelly called 'provisional tightening', where one is able to look through
newly opened doors, but one does not enter that new room fully, closing the door behind

oneself, and therefore to other possibilities taking shape. Writer 7 suggested that such
premature tightening slows down one's creative progress overall:
W7:1 allow myself to start, start structuring it at about, well... I
suppose by the end of thefirstdraft. Somewhere half-way through the
first draft I'll have some idea. A n d then I'll start something that's
called draft two because I'll then have a sort of structure. The danger,
though, and that's been particularly so with this last book, is that I will
try to arrive at that structure too quickly. N o w that I k n o w that's h o w it
works, I a m impatient to get onto that bit of the process. A n d of course
the lack of time is another thing that distorts the process because the
quicker you can get it structured, and that's a real problem because it, it
just takes twice as long, basically... if you truncate those, that
exploratory part of the process. (986)

•

These alternations should also represent what Matte-Bianco called
'bi-modal thinking': the harmonious experience of both
symmetrical and asymmetrical awareness.

It was expected that writers would describe symmetrical experiences as well as a more
day-to-day asymmetrical awareness. That is, it was felt they would have experienced
states in which they felt distinctions between things were breaking down, which were
quite 'emotional' and felt somewhat anarchic or 'loose'. In the case of Writer 5, this

state was set off by what he referred to as the 'nervous breakdown' of a person close to
him:
W5: .. .so there's a general freeing up process in all sorts of ways I
think at this time. And, I guess in speaking I haven't actually tried to
link the two, but someone close to m e had a breakdown just before then
and, all of a sudden, there was chaos. W h a t had been previously serene
was chaos. I m e a n it w a s a general fugue state that flowed over
everyone else. A n d then that ended. A n d then this heightened

sensitivity and creativity period occurred. Just looking at it I would
imagine that would have had a great deal to do with it. (807)

Yet, such symmetrical experiences would also somehow be 'unifying' and coherent for
the person in ways which are perhaps impossible to fully articulate. Symmetrical states
can be scary, but also exciting:
W2: Well yes. It's.. .unifying in that way. .. .1 think it's very different
from, it's not therapy. It's very different. A n d it's not. I don't k n o w if
it's on a continuum with schizophrenia. But w h e n I've seen, read
books you know, of art works that schizophrenics ... that seems quite
different to m e . It's not transformed or... although you can get [it's not
contained within meaning structures I think]. Yeah, m m m . A n d it's
not... it doesn't work to heal. (441)
I have already alluded to the various ways of reaching very loose symmetrical
understandings, and again, Writer 2 spoke of writers "resisting the excitement" (336) of

such relatively formless and unpredictable states. Once the writer opens herself to such
openness, however, there is the equally important task of transforming or moulding the
'clay':
W7:.. .the generating of it in the first place, is somehow just opening
the channel to the unconscious and letting it out. But, there's a thing
about... altering it. (1112)
What follows these excursions into symmetrical realms are the long struggles to contain
and structure, to transform that openness into something new, a new coherence, a deep
communication that somehow conveys something of the feeling as well as the 'thought'.
Writers 6 and 2 mentioned this specifically in terms of 'transforming' the original

image. Overall, three of the seven writers described processes explicitly identifiable a
bi-modal (441; 807, 811; 1112).

• A common feature is expected to be the reported capacity to
playfully tolerate, even encourage, ambiguity, uncertainties and
contradictories in thinking. This 'negative capability' will alternate
with periods of anxiety and frustration.
W7: Keats talked about negative capability, and I'm sure that's exactly
what he meant. The greatest experience I had with that was writing,
was w h e n I was writing [name of novel] which is... a book about an
incestuous father. A n d the problem that I set myself was, well, W h y ?

W h y did he do it? Not what did he do, but what's going through these
men's minds w h e n they do this?.. .Or anything like that? A n d I had
been writing it for about three years and I kept coming up against this
barrier that I couldn't work out w h y they do it. Really and truly I just
couldn't understand it. A n d I decided to give it up, basically. I decided
to abandon the book. In fact I didn't decide to, I did abandon the book.
(1033)

The interesting point here about Writer 7 was that this was the turning point. In this
case, her insight was that she did not need to understand 'why' in order to write about
this incestuous man. By abandoning this desire to understand she had the breakthrough

(see above, 1035) and it turned out to be a very successful novel.. It was a very defini

letting go of the need to know, of allowing seeming contradictories to exist side-by-sid
She had come to actually manifest the 'negative capability' she had so admired for some
time.
The same sort of tolerance of ambiguity and of uncertainty is encouraged by
Writer 4 who, as a dramaturg, asks his client, the playwright, to:
W4: .. .in a way abandon the standard technical and classical
techniques and ways of naming the script, to kind of flurry around in
the m u d of their creative thought... See what else is there to draw on it,
constantly. A n d then worry about the kind of structural things a bit
later once they've fleshed out the vision more. (636)

It is not as if, however, successful fiction writers are a different species who do not

experience anxiety in the midst of uncertainty and the inability to understand. But they
do seem to learn that if they give up the immediate desire to know then, paradoxically,
they are more likely to come to know. This is well-expressed by Writer 5:
W5: There's always a degree of anxiety and it's not that it becomes
easier, but you just k n o w that you've done it before and you felt like
that then, and so it will happen again. So there's a sort of confidence in
yourself, really. The process doesn't become, you don't become any
more facile, or, you know, there's no sort of easy w a y through just
because you have done it. The only thing is I think the increased
confidence really. (769)

Writers must learn patience and develop a certain overarching faith, not only in
themselves, but in the process wherein opening up ambiguities and contradictories is in

itself a potentially enlightening thing to do. Five writers referred to this 'negative
capability' in the interviews (281; 394-395; 636; 769, 811, 813; 1033).

• An identifying feature of writer experiences should be the recurring
capacity to give up the immediate desire to understand, to 'waitupon' insight rather than to 'look-far' a predictable solution.
Associated with the negative capability discussed above is a more general capacity to
hold off knowing. Here the emphasis is not so much on dealing with contradictories

and ambiguities, but in inhibiting the tendency to tighten construing, of 'waiting-upon'

rather than 'waiting-for' understanding, as Heidegger put it. Indeed, writers frequently
expressed the need to simply wait, rather than to look for something important:
W7: Flannery O'Connor had this theory that you just bored yourself
into writing. She set herself, she, I m e a n she had another restriction
because she was ill, but she had to sit at her desk, say for three hours
every day, and it didn't matter what she did there but she wasn't
allowed to do anything else. A n d out of sheer boredom she's start to
write and I sometimes find that quite useful — not to allow yourself. I
never read or research or anything like that in that incredibly precious
working time. (971)

The inhibition of the desire to understand tends to go against the culturally-endorsed
expectation that one must move in the direction of ever-increasing certainty:
W2:1 think we are also taught to think that you start with something
disorganised and chaotic and you progressively m o v e toward order...
and I'm saying that it's not that at all. You're actually moving toward
more and more uncertainty from that first draft, that first whatever.
You're actually getting bigger and more unknown and more...
complex. So you are not going from here to thefinalproduct, you are
really going from here [motioning outwards/expanding] and ending up
with something that stands. (403)

This picks up on the earlier discussion of the multidimensionality that seems to spread
from a central image or metaphor. As we will see below, the writers frequently
expressed their conviction that the growing book is much larger, much smarter, than
them. As with the 'Domino Room' metaphor I proposed in an earlier chapter, the whole

is built largely by 'feel', down amongst the pieces, as it were. Attempts to step back to
much and understand the whole actually takes the person away from where the whole is

being built up. Four of the seven writers directly addressed this issue (66; 377, 403;
895; 971, 984).

•

Writers should report alternations between a 'slower' meditative
thinking and a faster' means-end thinking.

Most writers reported a speeding up of their work near the very end of their projects

it all came together'. But for most of the time, it seems, they must discipline themsel
to allow the process to emerge slowly. This is not to say they would not like it to go
faster (W5: 852). The important thing here is not jumping into solutions, but being
willing to take one's time. Asked whether she thinks in longer time-scales, in terms of
outcomes, Writer 1 responded:
W I : N o . It's very present moment. A n d I say no adamantly because
that also seems a betrayal. For example, on a very practical matter, I
would never sign up for a book ... by a date. That would m e a n A , that
I was betraying it, saying 'I'm going to go public with it whether you
want m e to or not' to it; and B, it would m e a n that I'd start to figure
out, I'd jump the very complex and intricate process of getting this
slowly.
C S : You'd feel like it had become a type of means-ends operation
[ m m ] rather than one that has its o w n sort of pace and authenticity?
W I : O h Absolutely! I must go with it; I must not try to direct it. It
has it's o w n life. It's like trying to speedup a flower growing. I must
let it go with its o w n pace and take... It leads me. I don't lead it. (5658)

This intricate process of getting it slowly allows for the multidimensional complexity
the work to 'grow' from the intuitive centre of the work. What seems to be crucial to
this is a more meditative style of thinking which does not seek for an end, but opens
itself to what may come:
W7:1 know that my work suffers from a lack of daydreaming time.
Because I have a restricted period of time I feel I should be actually
writing during that time. A n d I think that's actually a big problem.
Because I think the most important part of writing probably happens
w h e n you are not actually writing ... U m so that has that unfortunate
effect that you want to rush in and you feel 'oh panic. I've only got two
hours. I must put something d o w n on paper'. A n d I think that that's
very counterproductive for creativity. (965)

Three writers directly described this feature in their accounts (56-58; 565; 965-6).

13.2.4

Emotional Thinking And Embodiment

• Writers are expected to describe their processes surrounding
insights as 'emotional' or affectively nuanced and they should be
adept at using their emotional sensitivities to insightful advantage.
That is, their emotional awareness will be more 'active' than
'passive'.

This feature refers to the overall affective nature of the processes around insight. Thes
are certainly not neutral, intellectual labours, but are usually quite emotional:
WI: Yes . It's very emotional, a very emotional time. Yes the sense,
the felt experience is that it's coming into existence and to be revealed
only to m e . So if I go blabbing about it, you see I'm choosing again
emotional words, that it m a y not c o m e again.(40)
We have already seen Writer l's comments about losing the flow as a 'grieving process'
(p. 332, [66]). Here we see her concern about keeping in touch with the 'felt
experience' of it. This emotional sensitivity is a skill which (at least these) writers

possess to be able to tune into subtle affective processes. Writer 3 calls it 'intuition'
identifies it immediately with being in touch with one's feelings:
W3: Well when you say gut feeling, that's exactly what I think it is. I
m e a n I think that's the intuition. People w h o are in touch with their
intuition are generally reasonably in touch with their feelings, I think,
and u m , intuition is not thinking. A n d it's very hard to describe what it
is, but it's not logic and it's not thinking and it's not going in a straight
line. (563)
What is also necessary is a type of superordinate emotional security, a confidence that
even when things are not going well, that one can remain optimistic.
W5:1 have, I have got a general faith. Even when I'm, even when I'm
at a low point I do have a general faith that I'll overcome it. N o w
having said that I also feel that the initial, the initial idea I have is never
quite fulfilled. T h e book is never quite as good as I thought it w a s
going to be. It's different, and interestingly different, it's always a bit
different. But the general idea that gave m e the huge sort of burst of
enthusiasm and excitement is never quite fulfilled. (709)

The process began with a huge burst of positive emotion. Moreover, the successful
writer had 'adequate ideas', as Spinoza might have put it, to frame and contain the

initial flurry of possibilities that the person glimpsed. All writers reported somethin
akin to the definitively emotional nature of insight (40, 66; 336; 563; 609; 709; 888;
1076).

• Affective self-management: I would expect that writers utilise a
number of tricks & strategies to avoid self invalidation and anxiety;
that they keep going despite impasse and that they can delay the
pragmatics of construction and can lessen the immediate desire to
know.
Given the writer unanimity that the processes surrounding their insights are

characterised by 'emotion', skills at managing one's affective states would appear to b

requisite for success. As it turned out, six out of the seven writers confirmed this (12
30-32; 445; 578; 672; 713; 979-980). There was general agreement that one needed to
have a number of tricks, strategies or 'ruses' (Writer 5) in order to manage one's
emotional equilibrium through the difficult passage of a manuscript. A common theme
was the pretence that what one was writing would never be viewed by anyone. To the
suggestion that this was merely a sleight of hand, Writer 7 seven replied:
W7: I've called it exactly that. I call it that to my students. You have
to invent a sleight of hand that works for you, that what you are writing
will never be read by anybody but you. A n d you yourself m a y never
read it again. It's just for here and now, and whatever trick works. The
fountain pen... exercise books work very well for m e — the smaller the
better actually, the 'squidgier' the better [chuckling], because it's u m ,
it's like you are just taking notes, it doesn't matter. It's got that feel
about it. (979-980)

This is one way the writers 'keep loose', or keep the doors of inspiration open. There i
a purposeful delaying of the pragmatics of construction. In particular, there is the
backgrounding or suppressing of the knowledge that people will in fact some day read
and make judgements about one's work. Writer 1 also pretends to herself that she will
never show anyone and she does "various things to make the paper my confidant" (30).
In particular she promises herself that:

W I : I will never show anyone. I promise myself I won't publish, and
.. .1 promise myself that it will be a long time. I have this luxury of
time. I think it is actually one of the joys of writing a novel. Y o u can
actually m a k e that happen. Y o u don't have to show, you don't have to
c o m e clean about it. A n d I try not to talk about it to anybody. (32)
At later stages in the work, of course, writers feel more confident that their work is
holding together, or that they have 'covered their tracks' somewhat in 'concealing'

reflections of themselves in their work (Writer 7). There is also the question of write
keeping themselves going, keeping their spirits up:
W5:1 have to tell myself that I know what I'm doing even when it is
patently obvious to all, to m e more than anyone, that I mightn't yet, that
I don't k n o w what it is yet. So I set out sort of headings and chapter
headings, and you k n o w I might pin things up on the wall, index cards
or whatever. I mean, I sort of tell myself I'm busy and I k n o w what
I'm doing. Even though I don't. With ... the latest novel, I put up all
these, a whole wall full of index cards of what was going to happen at
every stage like a story board, like a film story board. A n d then never
looked at any of them! (713)

What seems to be important is that writers do not generally ask people for opinions or
show their work to people too early. It makes them feel anxious — and with these
writers there is the extra pressure that people expect great things of them. So they
protect themselves from a too close examination, by themselves or by others, of their
lack of understanding and sense of control over what they are doing.

•

Affective feelings of knowing' should represent quite superordinate
structures with multiple chains of implication imbuing one's
construing with a sense of direction and purpose. This
transcending 'aesthetic' emotion should mark the subjective
experience of an active feeling' intelligence moving towards
insight.

Three writers (643, 698; 709; 890) gave direct expression to this sense of a transcendi
aesthetic emotion. We have already seen that moments of insight can set off chains of

implications and possibilities for writers. For example, after Writer 7's insight (1035
— about the non-necessity that she understand her character before she writes about him
— there was a flood of creative possibilities that came to her mind (see 13.2.2 above).

Butfirstc a m e an indistinct sense that something had changed. This seems to be what
allows for the writer to move into 'flow' in his or her work:
CS: So there's an overarching sense of progress that allows you to deal
with the emerging problems with more of a sense of confidence or
something like that?
W 6 : Yes. Yes exactly. I m e a n it's both going together. It's because
I'm, I'm actually writing, the words are going down. I'm quite pleased
with what I'm getting d o w n and at the same time I a m seeing the
problems as I go, but because there is a sort of surge, I a m confident
about the ultimate outcome. I a m pleased in fact that the problems are
arising because I k n o w that that's the book is getting more complex and
interesting and more a challenge both to m e and for the eventual reader.
Yeah, yes all those sorts of things. (879- 890)

We can see here evidence of a superordinate sense of direction and confidence. But it is
marked by a complex balance of certainty and uncertainty at different levels. 'Local'
problems and uncertainties are welcomed within an overarching feeling of
understanding, or at least of direction and confidence. I have already quoted Writer 5
(p. 338, paragraph 709 above) who considers he always has an overall sense of

optimism or faith that his writing will work out well in the end. So, frequently insight
characterised by a transcending aesthetic emotion, a type of superordinating, affective
awareness that one is heading in an exciting or promising direction:
W4: So I think the important thing about it is the moment, is the buzz
of the moment. W h e n everything, you are suddenly in tune, everything
is vibrating. It's a physical and intellectual experience all at once
because you have to recognise it. So not off with the fairies.. .uhh.. .it's
difficult. Even with visual artists I think they k n o w it's happening. It's
a knowledge, conscious knowledge it's happening. (698)

We can see in the description above that when insight arrives it is marked by a strong
affective experience of which the writer is aware. This same writer gives good
expression to the probable superordinancies involved with multiple chains of
implication seemingly coming of their own accord:
W4: It's like you are on a roll. I know that myself sitting there writing
and thinking: 'Yes! this is it!... keep going, keep that, the next
sentence is already in your head, keep it going.' A n d it's terrible thing
if you are interrupted or something to get it d o w n in the moment. (669)

•

Writers are expected to report insight as an embodied and physical
experience, as well as a 'purely intellectual' one.

Insight was reported to be experienced in physical ways by five of the seven writers
interviewed (108, 202-204; 439; 530; 698; 1035, 1045). The point to be made here is

not so much that insight causes a physical response but, as I argued in Chapter 10, that
reveals the embodied nature of our mental life. First hand accounts of the experience
are unequivocal. It is worth repeating what some of writers said in this regard:
WI: Oh it's a rush! It's a rush. It's almost a coloured rush.
C S : Yes. W h e r e does it strike you?
W I A h here [places hand on chest]. (108-110)
Again, as we saw above, Writer 4 described insight as " a physical and intellectual
experience all at once" (698). This should not be too surprising since all the writers
considered insight to be an emotional process — one in which feeling and thinking are

inseparable. It is noteworthy that, far from the intellectual understanding preceding th
physical awareness of an insight, that frequently it is the physical awareness that
presages a later conscious and reflexive understanding:
W7: ... when the thing struck. Well it was like a physical, yeah.
That's w h y I turned off the road. Because it was like a physical u m
Tightness' is the only word — I felt as if I w a s actually in danger of
floating off the car seat! I was aware that I was actually not driving
very well. It's like... it w a s elation. It was ah, almost like a druginduced, u m , euphoria. (1045)

It was after this dramatic physical awareness that the writer settled herself on a park
bench to 'receive' the 'intellectual' components of her insight. There seems to be
something very physically involving about this state — recall that Writer 1 does not
drive because she frequently enters this mode of being (p. 331, paragraph 170). Or
Writer 2 (p. 346, paragraph 383) tells how she is often 'spinning' after being inspired

insight, often being really energised by the experience, while for Writer 3, the situati
is often reversed:
W3: It's not bad when you're in it but it's really, for me anyway, it's
really intense. I always feels afterwards almost as if I've had a vein
drained. I m e a n that's almost h o w I think of it: like there's this vein in

m e and itfillsup and it gets drained. A n d at the end of it that's h o w I
feel. (530)

• Insight processes are expected to be enactive and writers should
'perceptually rehearse', immersing themselves in the medium of
their work for its own sake. This is expected to be experienced at
times as 'concrete' images with a perception-like phenomenology.
For example, writers are expected to use words in presentational
ways: being sensitive to tone, rhyme, assonance, alliteration,
context, imagining scenes, hearing voices and so on.

There is plenty of evidence within all the writers' accounts that their insights stem f
enactive, presentational modes of working (46; 339-340, 330-332; 536; 657; 707; 925,
943; 1010). Their own words best express this claim. Firstly, most writers described
their immersion in the medium of their work. For example:
W7: Basically I think that that [time] restriction has forced on me a
stream of consciousness thing where I just m a k e myself just start
writing u m and in a w a y I suppose I a m trying to daydream as I write...
by that stream of consciousness thing. So a lot of m y first drafts have
no punctuation. It just goes on, page after page of stuff. A n d in the
course of doing that I generally, eventually,findthe thing that I want to
follow. (966)
Moreover, Writer 1 described how she takes books off her shelf at random or opens the
pages of a thesaurus until something sparks her imagination. Writer 5 experimented

with sonnets, some of them quite 'surreal', for one of his books as a loosening exercise
Writer 7 flipped through Shakespeare for one of her novels:
W7:1 used to flip through Shakespeare till I got to a phrase that I liked.
A n d w h e n I just got to a phrase that caught m y eye, without asking
myself why, I would just start writing. A n d sometimes I'd have several
goes at the same phrase, and nearly always, I m e a n they are all in the
book. (1010)

All these practices indicate how important a presentational sensitivity to tone, rhyme,

assonance, alliteration and the craft of other writers is to help generate writers' insi

It was Writer 6 who explicitly identified his insights as enactive: "And it only happens

at least to me, in the course of writing it" (943). There is another aspect to this enac
approach. And that is that writers strive not to merely transcribe some experience but
set the conditions for the reader to share in it. Just as we described the enactive,

relational nature of genuine conversation, creative writers try to develop the context

within which the reader may participate in the type of feeling that inspired the writer
W6: What you are trying to do is to get that other human soul, your
reader and the rest of it, tofindhim, herself in all these other forms, all
the time, experiencing reality in it, you know. It's a protean thing. Get
them into this new, n e w form, n e w w a y of being in the world, n e w w a y
of living. (925)

The other aspect this quotation reveals is the perception-like phenomenology often
involved in insight. It is not about a representational understanding, but developing a
way of being, of experiencing. We have already seen that Writer 7 'heard' the voice of
a woman telling her she need not understand, and that she 'saw' the title of one of her
books written in the sky. Insight, for these writers, involves 'concrete' images and
understandings which are fully embodied.

• Writers should talk about insights emerging within an overarching
context of purpose, commitment and impassioned involvement in a
project. This should lead to personal or participatory knowing, an
indicator of which may be strong feelings of 'connectedness' and
integration.
Five writers clearly described processes akin to 'participatory knowing' during their
insights (148; 435, 498; 700; 795; 1049). Writer 7 was quite explicit:
W7: ... instead of saying, instead of identifying myself as a woman
w h o is writing a book about an incestuous father, and that had become
a role I could no longer do, instead of that I was n o w just part of this
world, and it was all open to m e . If I never wanted to write again I
didn't have to. It was a sense that, instead of being off in this awful
little ghetto, the 'writer' writing about this thing, I was a part of the
world and I could choose to be part of it in whatever w a y I wanted.
(1049)

This profound sense of connectedness and integration was echoed by Writer 1: "Yes.
It's a wonderful feeling. The way of seeing it suddenly you feel like you're looking at
the way the universe is put together. You could get very carried away by your own
powers" (148). Here we see very clearly this sense of complete immersion, not only in
one's project, but in one's world. This capacity for merging also applies to other
people. In this regard, Writer 2 was emphatic: "Yes, you do merge into other people"

(498). She earlier clarified this deep sense of connectedness. Note also the strange w a y

in which characters gather a life of their own to which the writer is witness and in whi
she can participate:
W2: So once they get going on their own, they can do what they like.
So, it doesn't, it's not like writing from life... yes. Y o u become them
rather than they are you. (435)

13.2.5 Intuitive Awareness
• Generally speaking, writers are expected to describe tacit and
'unconscious' knowing processes as being crucial to their insights.

Most writers explicitly referred to intuitive and 'unconscious' processes in relation t

their work and their insights. All, it could be argued, implicated such processes in th
overall accounts. All spoke about the ways in which their emerging manuscripts would
have a form and layers of meaning of which they were only vaguely aware — often only
'discovering' the pattern and meaning of it much later. As we saw above (p. 333),

Writer 2 referred to the process as being akin keeping the 'doors' of perception open fo
as long as possible. Generally the writers recognised that not knowing where they are

going was a 'normal' part of the creative writing process. Writers 6 and 7, for example,

purposely hold off reading their early drafts so as not to pre-empt this creative proce

The crucial role of these tacit understandings within creative writing was well express
by Writer 7:
W7: It's almost as if there's a protective mechanism .. .that your
unconscious is sending up these messages, but your unconscious doesn't
want them to be hijacked too quickly, because they won't do you any
good. It's got to be not fully understood for it to produce change...
having had the experience of having a few dreams that were totally lifechanging without m e understanding them... their therapeutic aspect...
is not compatible with them being understood. (1004)
Kelly (1955) would have been happy with Writer 7's suggestion that one should not
grasp after insight; that insight must be patiently woven info one's system of
understanding even though one does not fully understand it. Only in this way can it
'produce change'. This fits well with the theoretical proposition that insights are

multidimensional; they have implications that are often too m u c h to grasp in one go —
and that too early closure or 'understanding' 'won't do you any good'. In short, they
must be incorporated with full cycles of experience. This aspect of slowness or the
gradual implicit development of an insight was captured by Writer 6:
W6: It's as though I don't recognise the insight for some time after I
have had it. O r it has eased itself out rather than c o m e in this sudden
flash w a y that quite reflexively I notice happening at the time... It's a
double pleasure of having the insight and realising you have the insight.
It's not like that w h e n I'm writing. (895)

For Kelly the test of a 'genuine' therapeutic insight was in the in day-to-day advantages
that accrued from it. There is something quite similar occurring here for the writers.
They often did not fully realise an insight had occurred — beyond an emotional
'feeling' of lightness or the attraction to some image or metaphor. It is not until they

have reaped the rewards of it in subsequent writing that they fully 'realise' (make real)
the insight. Five of the seven writers made specific mention of tacit and unconscious
processes in their accounts (64; 358; 512; 895; 1004).

• Such intuitive processes are expected to be relatively loose and to be
characterised by associative thinking and by periods of absorption,
fantasy and reverie.

All writers directly implicated intuitive, 'loose' construing characterised by associativ
thought, absorption, fantasy and reverie in their insights (14; 383; 550; 651; 755; 882;

966). For example, Writer 1 reported regularly getting info trance-like states in order t
write: "I have to get into a trance and that trance can be so profound that when the
phone goes I wonder what the object is that's making the noise" (14). The state of often

excited, loosely associative thinking and reverie intrudes on the writers' lives generall
and begins to affect their day-to-day awareness.
W2: .. .you can certainly get it and you have to find ways to come
down. I m e a n I can c o m e out from writing really spinning and hyper
and I'm ready to... Sometimes I don't want to see anyone, and
sometimes, sometimes I want to spin around talking and uhh... 'cos
I've still got a lot of energy. (383)

In this regard most writers talked about the w a y they would carry this 'heightened state
of awareness' into their everyday encounters. Writers frequently described how
ordinary day-to-day experiences are transformed while in this state — walking about in

public spaces, driving, travelling in buses, picking up the mail, arriving at work and so

on. It is as if everything becomes relevant and 'designed' for their current book. Write
5 described (as did Writer 2, paragraph 339) how it even intruded on his dreams:
W5: I'm getting more absorbed into it and I'm getting close to
deadlines. But I k n o w there is a state w h e n I'm totally absorbed in it
and it's usually about two thirds in, w h e n I start to dream, w h e n I
dream of the characters as if they are real people. (755)

•

Writers' accounts should include descriptions of 'meditative
thinking' characterised by a personal or participatory knowing — a
sense of knowing with the 'other', of participating with the known.
This is expected to be a slower style of thinking which does not try to
jump to solutions or 'end-gain'.

Four of the seven writers reported states akin to meditative thinking (58, 180; 512; 641;
1000) as being directly involved in their creative work. Writer 1 captures this sense of
slowing down and waiting-upon, rather than trying to figure out what to do:
WI: I guess I think there's a sifting process that takes place. On a very
profound level you're... doing something like the sifting process that
happens in dreams I suppose. The feeling is not of utter stillness. The
feeling is of a sort of very gentle turbulence... I m e a n sometimes I say
to people 'Look. Most of the time I'm like a dog asleep infrontof the
fire.' But I don't think that that is quite true. (180)

Consistent with Kelly's idea of 'provisional tightening', this writer recognises that th

is a type of 'sifting' that is going on, a type of calm waiting. The person is not 'off w

the fairies' as Writer 5 put it (698), but is feeling his or her way through the possibili
as they arise. This activity is often accompanied by a type of 'knowing-with', a curious

sense that writers (for example, Writers 1 and 5) described of being true to their creat
as if it were an other person:
W7: It's a longing because it's almost as if the book is, 1 mean this is a
bit corny, but it's almost as if it is a living creature, and you are
frightened of doing the wrong thing by it. (1000)

A n important aspect of this approach to insight is that the person tries to inhibit the
normal desire to find the answer, to 'end-gain' as Alexander (1932) put it. As we have
seen, writers are very aware that trying to reactivate the more common means-end
thinking is destructive of creative insight.

• Reports of a type of a steady defocused attention should be common,
as should reports of solutions suddenly 'popping' into awareness
following a period of loose, intuitive contemplation. This would
coincide with the tightening up of loosened construing and accessing
alternative superordinate structures of implication.
None of the writers specifically described periods of defocused attention being
interrupted by the sudden intrusion of insight 'popping' into mind. As has been already
said, writers mentioned these two elements often enough separately, but not clearly in
conjunction. The failure of anyone to describe this feature may be because it is not

relevant, or it may be that they simply did not happen to mention it. Two of the insight
described above, however, may have been instances which embodied this feature.

Writer 1 (where the insight 'flew in the window of a bus) and Writer 7 (where the writer
was driving and needed to pull over to 'receive' the insight) both reported being prone
to this type of defocused attention and daydreaming. Although they did not say so,
these dramatic insights were likely to have been preceded by periods of defocused
attention.

• I expect writers to mention unconscious or tacit mental processes as
'guiding' and 'providing' them with their insights. They should
describe themselves as 'recipients' of insights, the latter manifesting
a type of exteriority and spontaneity.
Every writer described this feature, usually on multiple occasions (37-38, 58, 60; 339,
344; 552; 651; 757; 945, 948; 996, 1088). Their words speaks for themselves:
W7: And suddenly, seemingly out of the blue was the idea that one of
her husbands had committed suicide, in a very horrible way. A n d that
this... and she feels responsible, basically. N o w I don't k n o w where
that came from. So it was that same sense of... and as soon as I
thought of it, it was clearlyright,(1088)

This already-quoted excerpt expresses nicely the sense of spontaneity and 'lightness' of

the insight. She goes on to describe how it is as if she has been guided by this insigh

all along and had merely forgotten to actually write it into her text. Two more example

will suffice to capture this sense of being given insights. Writer 2 makes it clear tha
she receives her insights like 'gifts' from outside:
W2: But I think even when you are not, you are at work. All the time.
A n d I can cite instances of this.. .just ah, things just come into your
presence that you need. Little newspaper articles, something someone
says. They are like little gifts. They're coming at you all the time,
especially w h e n you are working on something. N o w , so you say
'Yes'! I can use that. Or of course!' Yes. It comes. (339)

Writer 3 is even more explicit about being a recipient of insight, of being intuitively
guided and she emphasises strongly the exterior nature of the insight process:
W3: When I feel that I'm doing my very very best writing I feel it's
being beamed into m e . A n d these days that there's almost, again
perhaps because I have to say T must work, I must work now', that
there's almost no pause. It's like 'chhooo' [guttural noise] and it's
straight out. A n d if I stop and I listen I can hear it. The words come
and I type. (552)

• Overall it is expected that writers will report feelings of knowing'
which they may not be able to justify or articulate. That is, they are
expected to spend a good deal of their 'creative' time in a state of
conscious 'not-knowing', yet have an overarching feeling that they
are heading 'somewhere'.
Writer 1 described an insight to her partner. She explained to me that it was not

important for him to understand her insight at that time, and that was not why she told
him. What was important for her was to communicate that it held significance for her
— yet she herself did not know what that significance was or where it was heading:

CS: ... but for you it has an entirely different significance.
W I : O h absolutely, which I don't k n o w at that moment.
C S : N o ... except that you have a certainty that it does have
significance
W I : Yes Absolutely. (125-128)

W e see here clearly expressed this overarching sense that this inarticulate insight is
heading somewhere, that something important had happened, yet the 'recipient' was not

'representationally' able to communicate the significance, even to herself. It is worth
examining the continuing excerpt in full:
WI: I had no idea of how the story, what the story was. I knew that it
was about a few things, love and relationship and someone w h o was
beautiful, and there seemed to be two mathematicians — j u s t things
like that. A hell of a lot of material, a hell of a lot of thinking. I was on
the bus and it's as if it flew in the window the veryfirstline of the
novel and I wrote it d o w n on a bit of paper from m y handbag. The
sense was that everything in m y mind was lining up behind that
sentence as if it was the leader in a procession, but I wasn't consciously
thinking of any of those bits. In fact, at that stage I didn't really, I think
I might have, yes I had typed out all those bits, those fourteen kilos [of
manuscript], but I didn't have any idea h o w theyfittedtogether. A n d I
didn't really have a good idea of what they were about.
CS: But did you have a sense in which you had a sort of, at some level a
confidence that they were connected?
Wl:No. I was desperately terrified they weren't. It was purely on spec.
In fact after that sentence w e got to Greece I got out this huge pile of
paper and I started colour-coding in six or eight categories that I knew —
the ones I just mentioned — to try and find if I knew h o w I could put it
all together, or what the story was, or w h o it was about, or anything.
CS: But this sentence came in as a sort of key.
WI: Yes, before that. (128-132)
This extended excerpt brings out the complexity and paradoxical nature of this type of
'insight'. The chronology is important here. She typed up all the elements without
knowing how or whether they fitted together. The emotions experienced were mixed.
For a good deal of time she was anxious (in Kelly's sense of not being able to
anticipate), 'terrified' that they would not fit together, in a profound state of 'not
knowing' where she was going. As she put it, 'it was purely on spec'. Immediately

after the insight in the bus she was excited and inspired. Everything seemed to be lini
up behind the sentence she 'received'. And even in Greece after the insight it was

imperative for her to attempt to elaborate and verify the breakthrough, to test for her

whether her feeling of direction and purpose were warranted. This profound sense of
knowing yet not knowing was c o m m o n among the writers:
W7: ... because I know that it could become something. I know that in
there there is some kind of interesting thing going on, and I have a
vague sense that it's about the idea of perfection which in fact I'm
thinking of calling the book. Whether w e have to be perfect or whether
it's enough to just simply be human. But what I'mfrightenedof is that
I will miss the opportunity. Right n o w I have a chance to change it, but
you know, two months d o w n the track will be too late. A n d what 1 fear
is that I will see it too late. (998)
Again, we can see here a strong 'feeling of knowing' which keeps the writer going, but

which nonetheless leaves her 'in the dark' or clutching at indistinct ideas. Yet she fe
there is an 'essential' insight which has been guiding her writing which she must
patiently pursue or otherwise risk missing. In all, six of the seven writers referred to
this type of process in relation to their insights (125-128; 352; 520; 647; 895; 998).

13.2.6 Experience Of Self And Social Factors
• The writers should report shifts in their experience of self, especially
aperiodic release from frustration and self-concern.

It was not expected that the writers would be always calm, anxiety-free, nor paragons of
patience and self-control. What was expected was, given their deep immersion in

uncertainty within a project (sometimes for years), that they would need to have ways of

dealing with the inevitable frustrations and anxieties that such extensive, often perso
doubts would occasion. As we just saw with Writer 1 in the previous section, there is

expected to be both frustration and release, both a sense of being trapped by, and freed
of, self-concern. What is expected to be distinctive is that these people in coming to
insight have found ways to transcend such invalidations and to allow themselves a
looser, freer, non-censored sense of self and being in the context of which not-knowing
can be backgrounded. It is also expected that such a way of being would be much
sought-after, much enjoyed:
WI: It's like a childhood thinking. It's, it's allowing yourself in a way to
be a child, those lovely states in childhood where you didn't have
anything to do, u m , there was no pressure, uhh, no-one cared a d a m n

what you did because they were busy doing whatever they were doing.
A n d so you could just poke a leaf through the floorboards. (164)

To remain in such a state of self-forgetting and 'childlikeness' the writer must not al
himself or herself to overly dwell on getting the project done, or on questions of how
well it is going and so on.
CS: It's a very delicate process in terms of self-validation and selfconcern.
W5: Oh absolutely! Yeah. This is one of the ruses and um generally
sort of bullshitting yourself that you k n o w what you are doing and
you'll do it. (865-866)

Writer 5 described his 'ruse' of putting cards in the form of a storyline on a noticeboa
(which he then never consulted). What was important for him was to have some loose
sense, not to be immediately tested, that he was going somewhere definite. This device
of nonvalidation — avoiding in/validational evidence for the time being (Walker,
Oades, Caputi, Stevens & Crittenden, 1999) — allows the writer to develop a different
state of mind: exploratory, loose, not testing out. As with Kelly's (1955) loose

construer who avoids invalidation by saying 'that is practically what I said', this wri
can say T really do know what I am doing'. Importantly here, as this writer pointed out

earlier, this is within a superordinating confidence and faith in his capacity to bring
together eventually.
In the somewhat different process of collaborative work a dramaturg (Writer 4)
acts as guide and mentor, and he recognises the most important thing is to 'keep the
writer's sense of self coherent'. That is, playwrights frequently experience a loss of
a negative emotional experience of fragmentation and disorientation. An emergent
theme, somewhat unexpected, is this tendency towards the (post-modern) loss of a
unitary self (Colapietro, 1990; Gergen, 1991; Shotter, 1995): the dividing of self into
multiplicity of selves or a 'community of selves' (Mair, 1977). This will be taken up
further in 13.4 below. Writer 4 emphasises this self-belief and attempt to hold self
together:
W4: Or if I'm working with a writer as dramaturg, I mean, there is every
month some times w h e n things are really hot and heading towards

production three or four times a week. Yeah so it's intensely social.
W h a t you have to do is keep the writer's sense of self coherent. A n d in
the big collaborative processes for ourselves, you have to really believe
in what you are doing. (680)

Another theme that emerged with the writers was the capacity not to self-censor. Again,

there is a strong sense that different aspects of self are given permission to come into
being — often 'dark' sides of self. The writer must find a way not to be concerned

about what is socially acceptable or what aspects of his or her self are being revealed:
W7: It's more like you are allowing a self to speak that is normally
censored. That's what it feels like to m e . Which is w h y the more
conscious you are of the audience, of course the more disastrous it is.
So it's very like, I m e a n w h e n I was in analysis, w h e n that worked it
felt exactly the same as w h e n writing was working. A n d w h e n it
wasn't working it felt the same... self-conscious, watching myself.
But above all, policing in case something slipped out, that I didn't want
to slip out. (1014)

This is a clear statement about the necessity of relinquishing self-consciousness and

self-concern if the writer is to break through creatively in her work. All the writers g

expression to this feature of their insights (164, 170; 352; 578; 646-647, 680; 865-866;
890; 1014).

• Writers may describe a deep sense of integration and validation of
their selves amid significant (for them) insight processes.

There is also a more 'positive' side to this altered experience of 'self. Asked what her
insights feel like Writer 2 responded enthusiastically:
W2: Oh it's great. It's neat. Yes ! That's great! It's a wonderful feeling
to see it working there. A n d quite humbling in a w a y because it's as if
you didn't do it [chuckles]. It's been given to you. A n d yet I k n o w that
it is m y intelligence [that] is presiding over the whole thing. It's, it's...
I'm not just a blank medium. (421)

Inherent in this statement is an important distinction about self-validation: about what
who is being validated. There is one sense in which it is not one's self at all that is
responsible, yet paradoxically it is the writer who is responsible. This can be

understood in terms of the distinction we have stressed between self as content or belie

about self ('me'), and self as process ( T ) . What is being primarily validated is the
person as process, the person as non-selfconscious creator freed to be non-reflexively

and spontaneously responsive to circumstances as they arise (Butt et al., 1997). There i
a growth in self as old aspects of the 'me' can be relinquished and replaced by a

broader sense of the self as one who can be a type of conduit, a way of being that allow
the world to speak. This may represent a higher form of the 'objective outlook' that I
have suggested is conducive of insight. This represents one's capacity to flow with the
insight, to be as one with the world. Writer 2 elaborated this experience:
W2: It's humbling and... what's the word, validating, yes. It's both.
But they are not necessarily um... in opposition are they? Because
humbling doesn't m e a n that you don't take pride in your work. Y o u
claim it as your own. Y o u can't just say 'Oh shucks, I don't k n o w h o w
this happened!' [laughs]. Because I m a d e it happen. (433)
What seems to be important is that the writer is 'humbled' in the sense that she feels

the insight transcends her in some way (a feature we will discuss below). So it is not a

particular aspect of self, or self-belief, but something about the relationship between
person and the world about which they write. That is, there can be a profound sense of
integration both 'within' the writer and 'between' the writer and her world:
W7: It was as if I had been dissociated and just, suddenly things were
integrated. That's w h y the world suddenly looked as if it were in full
colour [it was vibrant]. Yeah. Things were in three dimensions. That
w a s a house. That was a fence, you know. That kind of slightly 'trippy'
clarity of things where you feel the sense of cohesion and integration.
(1047)

Seen here is a succinct description of the deep integration and validation of self poss
amidst important insights. Five of the seven writers made clear mention of this feature
of their insights (305; 421,432-433; 661; 791; 1047).

• Writers may report that they experience more of the T as construer
and less of the 'me' as self-consciousness. The joy of insight may be
tied to experiencing more of 'self-as-process' in this way. It may
also be revealed as a type of trust and faith in oneself, a type of
transcending self-confidence and security.

Intimately connected to the sense of integration and validation is the joyful experience
of the self more as T than as 'me', more as active, flowing 'construer' rather than as
deliberative, self-aware planner. This is of course linked to the absorbed, meditative

thinking we have already discussed in which the 'normal', tighter representational mode
of anticipation is held in abeyance:
WI: He, [her father] ah, taught me when I was a very, very little child to,
to silence m y mind. So that a rose w e were looking at in the evening
with a particular curl of petals would ah, take up all the space in m y
mind. U m , so I guess I was lucky in having that influence and I suppose
I think that other people haven't had such a lucky influence and maybe
their lives/minds are full of, you know, arrangements and bus timetables.
(160)
The carefree childlikeness is crucial. There is here a powerful sense of being in the
moment, not straining after some result. Such a state can lead to a wonderful sense of
connectedness, of optimism. Writer 7 talked about the transcending sense of faith and
confidence that can emerge from such an experience. No longer did this writer feel cut
off and incapacitated. Following her insight she felt free to be many different selves:
W7: ... instead of saying, instead of identifying myself as a woman who
is writing a book about an incestuous father, and that had become a role I
could no longer do, instead of that I was n o w just part of this world, and
it w a s all open to m e . If I never wanted to write again I didn't have to. It
was a sense that, instead of being off in this awful little ghetto, the
'writer' writing about this thing, I was a part of the world and I could
choose to be part of it in whatever w a y I wanted. (1049)

We will see in the discussion of the next feature the way in which the joy of more
spontaneous being brings about this sense of 'being 'a part of the world'. I wouldn't
want to exaggerate the case however. Writers move in and out of this experience within
their creative 'cycle':
W4: But it is, it is 1 think for me, it's an in-and-out state at once. 1
don't go into a total type of [exclaims] whooo! It is definitely, it's
dialectical. Y o u spin in and out of it. Y o u lose it for a little while, or
you relax and then it goes back in. Y o u think 'I'm going to finish this
thing'. Y o u k n o w it's quite a state. (669)

Apart from the alternations between looser and tighter construing evident here, there is
also a strong sense of the writer moving in and out of more directly experiencing his
as T (self as process). This seems to be inherently enjoyable and is experienced as a
state of heightened awareness. Four of the seven writers reported this experience in
relation to their insights (160-164; 669; 807; 1049).

• The accounts should include experiences of a fully embodied
immersion and connectedness, a type of 'resonance' with the social
world and a sense of being a part of that which transcends them.
Again, this participatory knowing may be distinguished by a
blurring of the distinctions between inner and outer, self and world.
As suggested above, along with a deep sense of integration and of more of the sense of
self as T, there should be evidence the writers are aware of a blurring of boundaries

between self and others. Indeed five of the seven writers suggested just that (84; 344,
435; 789, 803; 980; 1006). This is quite evident in the following:
W2:1 sometimes think I let the characters borrow my clothes and my
apartment in N e w York, like you are a scout for a film set.... Y o u say
'oh look I've got this apartment, I'll let them live in that one [laughs].
They can have that room, and that view and that position', and then
they take it over. So once they get going on their own, they can do
what they like. So, it doesn't, it's not like writing from life... yes. Y o u
become them rather than they are you. (435)

The writer begins to embody the book. Everyday life becomes populated by the writer's

characters and there is a deep immersion in the ongoing project. It 'invades' the write
psyche:
W5: Well the book becomes real to the extent that I am sort of in it. I
a m on the same journey, if you like. Momentarily, or the characters are
on, you know, in m y , whatever I'm doing. Walking d o w n Pitt Street or
something — they've joined m e in doing that. Y o u know, buying a
loaf of bread or something mundane, as most of m y dreams tend to be.
(789)

What emerges is a deep sense of connectedness and immersion in the textures and feel
of everyday life and everyday things. Insight processes, in this sense, are embodied
phenomena. In this case, the writer became fascinated by the physical textures of
gravel, rocks, ants and so on. There is a strong 'aesthetic emotion' in play here:

W 5 : It's also, it's very pantheistic, I mean in m y case, I feel like I'm
exceptionally connected and that book was a breakthrough in that w a y
too. A n d I was writing it, I wrote a lot of it up on the Central Coast in a
bushy sort of atmosphere and I noticed things. A s I was putting myself
in his situation, or putting him in m y situation, I was looking at things,
I mean, I looked and examined and wrote about philosophically, gravel!
[laughs]. I m e a n I'll getrightd o w n to, you know,rightd o w n to it.
A n d I found gravel, this shows you h o w nutty I was about it, I m e a n I
got to like different sorts of gravel and rocks and ants and, you know, I
did think 'let's get right d o w n to Australian-ness'. Y o u k n o wrightat
its literal level. (803)

Insights may occasionally come from 'pure' thought experiments, but mostly the writers
seemed to experience them, and describe them, as being quite physically embedded
processes. It is more accurate to say that insights were 'enacted' than they were
'thought'. Writer 7 put this succinctly:
W7: It is something about being actually embedded in it though [yeah].
Y o u are enacting a problem in some way... you are not outside looking
in. (1006)

• The writers are expected to describe insight experiences as sociallyinscribed processes, as very much apart of a larger socially-imbued
'conversation'. They are expected to be aware of the discursive,
normative constraints which inform their work, which nonetheless
they are trying to transcend.

Five of the seven writers spoke about the social and discursive constraints within whi
they write (26; 385; 595; 771; 970, 980). Overall, the writers presented a complex

picture in which they both avoided yet sought social influences. Novelists are reputed
to be solitary types of people and this seemed to be borne out in the interviews.
Nonetheless, they were aware of their social immersion and their social function. For
example, Writer 7 writes in a room in a university English department and finds this a
helpful balance of isolation and social interaction:
W7: If 1 feel the need for a distraction I have only to walk outside or go
to the mailroom or up to get a coffee and I almost certainly b u m p into
someone I know, so it's actually perfect. 'The breathing heart, the
living heart, the beating heart at the end of the corridor'. I don't k n o w
w h o coined that phrase, but some writer coined it for exactly that thing.
Y o u want to be alone but you also want to k n o w that people are

available w h e n you need them, basically. Bit of a ruthless attitude.
Um... so no, it's a great feeling. (970)

This need to be alone speaks loudly of the influences of normal social discourse on
creative processes. All the writers mentioned that they do not like telling people about

their work, that this seems to stultify the process. It is as if they are trying to escape

discursive (moral, intellectual) constraints and that by talking to people they will pull
back into normative patterns of understanding, into habitual narrative structures. One
aspect of this would be that they do not wish to tighten prematurely their understandings
by attempting to communicate them. The writers were also aware that they themselves

internalise these social constraints, but that by patiently, laboriously pulling them apa
they may transcend their habits of thought and feeling.
W2: ... perhaps there is a censor at work that stops you, that stops you
w h e n you are actuallyfillingthat blank page. The censor can stop you.
It's always there. W e have always got the voice of our culture sitting
on our shoulders all the time. So that's not... I don't think of [the
initial stages of writing] as necessarily thefree-eststage at all. I think
that there can be inhibitions there. But once you've got something
d o w n you are thenfree.(385)

Of course the material that writers explore is definitively social. They write about, and
seek to shed new light upon, the human condition, on relationships and on important
issues of the day. To do this, however, they need a certain remove, where the normal
interpersonal constraints are relaxed. They strive to make their characters live and
breathe as if they are real. In many respects they are trying to re-capture moments of
profound social interaction and experience. Writer 5, for example, described several
personally-experienced incidents from his life which found their way into his books — a
young immigrant boy on a city street with a beatific smile upon receiving cheap
runners; the bizarre, mutated inhabitants of a crocodile park in the same bay that
Darwin's Beagle dropped anchor. And this reinvigoration, this 'transformation' of
socially experienced events was commonplace among the writers.

Finally, it was somewhat surprising tofindthat almost all the writers were quite
self-consciously 'outsiders' in the sense that they deliberately avoided thinking about
their writing as an act of communication. Writer 1 put it most stridently:
WI: ... it's in fact anti-audience. I have no sense of writing as
communicating . U m I only have a sense of writing as speaking to
myself. In fact if I thought there was going to be an audience I wouldn't
begin. ... So in fact m y w a y of working is anti-audience, and I try to
trigger, trigger a w a y of writing which I consider quite dangerous.
C S : Dangerous for w h o m ?
W I : U m , for m e . Dangerous in that it voices things that I scarcely dare
not say.
C S : Ahh. I see. Yes it would therefore be a payoff, it would be very
helpful, to not be thinking in terms of other people immediately reading
it.
W I : O h absolutely. I have to do various things to m a k e the paper m y
confidant. (26-30)
Rather than being evidence for the lack of social 'inscription' in writers' works,
however, we can see here that writers are very much aware of the social constraints
within which they work. The writers try to establish special psychological conditions
for themselves in order to give themselves permission to express things in ways that
normally they would feel ashamed of, embarrassed by, threatened by and so on. This
unexpected 'anti-social' feature will be discussed more below.

• In the interviews there should be evident a reported sense of the
'event-like' quality of insight for which the writers nonetheless feel
peculiarly responsible and proud. There may also be a sense that
the insight transcends them, that it is 'wiser' than them.

Once again, the words of the writers themselves best evoke this sense of the event-like
character of their insights. Take for example the already-quoted insight of Writer 7
who, when driving, was overcome by a 'glorious feeling' (1035) and had to stop, sit
down and 'receive' the insight. As she put it:
W7: And it really was like a voice. I could virtually hear a human
voice saying it.
C S : W a s it the voice of the character?

W 7 : N o . It was not the voice of the character. At the time I wasn't in
analysis, but it was a bit actually like m y analyst's voice. It was a
woman's voice. A n older w o m a n . Very tolerant and you know, wise.
Un-judgmental. Understood w h y it was so difficult. But just:'It's all
right. Y o u don't have to understand. 1 k n o w you don't understand. I
understand that'. (1035-1037)

This sense of the 'external' reality of the insight was quite common. The writers did n
seem perturbed by this, but often felt it was a profoundly enriching experience. There
also a sort of glee or sense of luck in being included in such moments:
W6: But um.. .yeah guided is true. Something that has always struck
m e . I've always an overwhelming feeling of.. .um... T didn't realise I
had that idea in m e anywhere'. 'It's amazing where that came from',
and that kind of thing. The whole notion of inspiration and the rest of it
as something that is pumped into you. But sort of surprise, a kind of
genuine surprise after the event that that was there. (948)

It was quite common for the writers to describe their insights as transcending them.
That, relative to their insights, they were small, insignificant, or less intelligent.
2 was quite unambiguous about this:
W2: We are much punier. I mean I see the writer as about this big
[motions about 2 c m s and laughs]. Quite puny or ... yes I quite like
that word. Compared with the world that the writer has access to.
CS: Yes and it seems to me it's almost it's, if not personified, it's,
there's a certain vitality to the world that informs you, rather than vice
versa.
W2: Yes absolutely. You don't preside over it in any way . It comes
and you're small. That's w h y you have to leave these doors open
because if you don't you just get this small... (354-356)

There is no doubt writers endorsed this feature of their insights. Not only did six of
seven writers describe it (54, 233; 354-356; 552; 791; 948; 1035), but they referred to
in quite emotive and emphatic terms.

13.3 WRITERS AS CONSTRUCTIVISTS
Do the writers express or demonstrate 'constructive alternativism' (Kelly, 1955) — the

view that all present constructions are open to revision and replacement — in relation

their art-form? The interviews provide strong evidence that they do. But what is meant
by this? I have earlier defined psychological constructivism (see 5.1 and 5.2.1) as an
approach which takes knowing to be hypothetical, multi-valent and uncertain, as
pertaining to personal meaning rather than to objective access to 'facts'. Just as
fundamentally, psychological constructivism avoids hard-and-fast distinctions between
emotion and thinking, and between mind and body, preferring to see such distinctions as
constructions — not 'God's eye' descriptions of an extra-conceptual reality. As such, a
constructivist outlook is anti-objectivist, anti-foundationalist and views our

understandings in terms of viability, allowing for the possibility of multiple, constructe
'realities', for a degree of pragmatic relativity. These knowing processes are held to
often be unpredictable, tacit, fluid, and self-organising — telling us as much about the
knower as the known. The image is very much of people being immersed in their
world, enacting their understanding as much as 'thinking' them. Further, constructivism
does not assume a unified, 'essential' self, but rather views people in the light of
ongoing 'ontological' development as the person continuously elaborates new aspects of
self.
Signs of a constructivist outlook would include a more playful and experimental
approach, marked by an openness to reconstrual. Such an outlook is evident in all the
writers interviewed. Again there would be evidence that the person opens him or
herself to tacit, unpredictable knowing processes and is skilled at alternating between
looser exploratory states and tighter elaborations of meaning. It is fairly obvious that
the writers interviewed embody this type of flexibility and fluidity in construing. The
outlooks of the writers could also be characterised as non-rationalist in the sense that
their creative thought is marked by a type of 'crooked logic', by tacit feel and looser
associative processes. Their knowing is as much affectively-guided as it is by 'logical'
inference and deduction. They also report feeling themselves to be, not separate
'cognisers', but 'participants' who are fundamentally connected to the 'known'. This
accords with the view of knowing processes as representing the viability of construing,
the 'fit' between person and world. Finally, the writers explicitly recognised that their

experience of self was not unitary, thatfrequentlythey were confronted with the
'constructed', changing nature of self, and drew creative inspiration from this.
Overall, the ways in which the expected features of insight captured the writers'
experiences of their creative life lends strength to the claim that they display
constructivist outlooks. This view of successful fiction writers as constructivists
accords with the argument put forward by Botella and Gallifa (1995). Drawing on
Pepper's (1942) taxonomy of world hypotheses, they proposed that as people become
more 'expert' in their specialist domain, their thinking becomes more complex and,
thereby, they tend to move away from positivist assumptions towards more
constructivist ones; away from more mechanistic to more contextualist and organicist
worldviews. Indeed, at times the writers directly confronted these type of
epistemological issues:
W2: And you have to be able to turn, ... I think some... so there are
writers w h o don't transform, w h o are just transcribing exactly what
happened to them, and I've heard people say 'It really happened like
this'. Well the truth is no excuse [laughter] is what I think Ellery Queen
said that... 'The truth is no excuse'... and it isn't. W e are dealing in a
different kind of truth. (451)

This recognition of a 'different kind of truth' explicitly positions this writer as bein
opposed to naive realist views of truth and knowing. She recognised that she is not
merely representing the world, or trying to form correspondences of it. Rather there is
recognition, across the writers, of the transformative nature of what they are doing:
W6:1 do want to insist on it's being something... that you are not just
passing on. It's something that you are creating, yeah. It's a n e w
entity. W h i c h is w h y I... I think it's a n e w element that you are
looking for, or you are adding elements together all the time so that. I
had one sort of experience with the Ross Campbell and another sort of
experience with this aerodrome.. .um. Although each of them were
images personally arresting for m e , in their o w n right, what I eventually
wanted to create was not just to transmit those two feelings, but
something n e w as well. (923)

Indeed, the writers quite often used language reminiscent of Kelly (1955). For example,
when I described Kelly's Creativity Cycle to Writer 7, in particular emphasising
provisional tightening as the possible moment of insight, she instantly agreed: "Yep.

That's just the word I use to m y students: 'provisional'" (1106). Furthermore, in terms
remarkably close to Kellian theory, she then described the creative writing process in
terms of a scientist metaphor: "To me it's like a scientist saying 'Oh. OK. Let us
hypothesise that this is the way it works'. As if. 'We'll go on and we'll see what
happens'" (1110). Walker (1992) has proposed that Kelly's 'person as scientist'
metaphor is best understood as a prescription for how we should approach the world,
rather than as a description of how all people do actually approach reality. From the
evidence we have reviewed above, it may also be proposed that to be a successful,
creative fiction writer a constructivist, 'as if (Vaihinger, 1924, Mahoney, 1988)
worldview may not be a bad starting point.

13.4 UN-ANTICIPATED FINDINGS
As indicated in the beginning of this chapter, there were a number of un-anticipated
findings in the interviews with the writers, but they do not contradict the theoretical
understanding of insight proposed in Chapter 11. These can be summarised as follows:
1) the prevalence of quasi-mystical and 'religious' experiences in writer insight
experiences; 2) the sense in which writers worked 'from' an instigating insight —

frequently not even being sure if they have had an insight at all; 3) that creative writ
(mostly novelists) may be a special group in that they are extremely guarded about

sharing their work-in-progress with others, even respected peers; 4) that writer insight

often involve an awareness and sharing of the writer's multiplicity of selves; and 5) th
the joy of insight may not only be found in the moment of realisation, the 'aha!'
experience, but may also be linked to the preceding, looser symmetrical awareness.
These can now be taken in turn.

• The prevalence of quasi-mystical and 'religious' experiences in
writer insight experiences.

It was expected that writers might experience the blurring of the 'self-other' distincti
but there was no specific anticipation of quasi-mystical and religious type experiences

connected to their insight experiences. These accounts were non-doctrinaire and based
in felt experience. For Writer 3 they were commonplace:
W3: Well I don't mind saying what I feel connected to. I believe in
angels and fairies and u m , devils and god and the universe and the
creative spirit and spirits, and um. Y o u k n o w Ifrequentlyhave
conversations with dead people you know. It's not u n c o m m o n for m e
at all. I speak to them as if they were alive. (587)

While not mentioned by the majority of writers, this sense of the mystical and the
religious was endorsed (as we have seen) in more limited fashion in terms of a mystery
that transcended yet included the writer. As Writer 7 pointed out, she sensed a
commonality between her insight experiences, deeper states of meditation, psychedelic
drug experience and her religious experiences. She described it in this way:
I mean I had a classic religious experience walking along a beach which
w a s very like that. A physical, physical sense of you know, G o d being
right there beside m e . ... A n d w h e n walking along the beach I can still
see it so vividly. A n d I just knew that Jesus w a srightthere beside m e .
I m e a n I couldn't actually see him, but that was irrelevant. It was the
physical presence. It was, yeah, very, very strong. A n d very like, very
like being on acid. I m e a n there is a similarity across all those things.
A n d the few times I've meditated successfully, u m , it's a similar kind
of feeling, but it's very difficult, isn't it, to actually describe exactly
what it is. (1070)

• The sense in which writers worked from' an instigating insight —
frequently not even being sure if they have had an insight at all.

The classic accounts of insight leave the 'recipient' in no doubt that he or she had jus

had an insight. The predominantly cognitive insight literature also largely uses 'insig
problems which have clearly 'correct' solutions. A very common theme among the

writers was a strange sense that the writing itself revealed things to them which they
not realise at the time of the 'insight'. For example, Writer 2's central 'birthing'

metaphor was not evident to the author till after the work was published. It may be that

the initial insight was only partial, but it seems that frequently writers contact taci
knowing and write 'it' down without much in the way of a conscious grasp of their

'insight'.

W 6 : So that although in retrospect w h e n I'm writing I — particularly in
retrospect I think — I say 'Yes'. I had a certain insight there. U m , ...
It's as though I don't recognise the insight to some time after I have had
it. O r it has eased itself out rather than c o m e in this sudden flash w a y
that quite reflexively I notice happening at the time... It's a double
pleasure of having the insight and realising you have the insight. It's
not like that w h e n I'm writing. (895)

There is also a frequently reported sense that the work does not quite live up to
the insight. If Schopenhauer can say that 'Thoughts die the moment they are embodied

in words' (or words to that effect), then writers are often aware that they are not quite
capturing their insightful 'thoughts' (see Writer 3, 528; Writer 5, 709). We see here a
type of instigating insight which the novel or story is an attempt to 'capture'. Thus
writers seem not to so much work towards a well-grasped insight as to work from an
insight. Writer 2 brings this idea out well:
W2: Yeah. I think it's a very important point because from the outside
you might think oh thatfirststage is all, you know, you're floating up
there and you are creating this and that... and then you get very
methodical as you, as you rework it. But it's almost the opposite. A n d
it's real important thatfirststage — it's just the beginning of
something... and all its possibilities c o m e over the months and all those
wonderful insights and additions and whatever paths to go d o w n c o m e
out of that. (397)
Insights may differ in complexity and type according to domain. Generally writer
insights are not answers to well-defined puzzles. Therefore, it may be the case that one
can be working 'from' an insight without fully realising it. This would be a more

'feeling', perhaps 'presentational' insight. In fact, frequently writers expressed the n
to not so much 'explain' something to their readers, but to evoke in their readers a
response, a presentational understanding perhaps akin to that which moved or inspired
the writer in the first place.

• That creative writers (mostly novelists) may be a special group in
that they are extremely guarded about sharing their work-inprogress with others, even respected peers.
The writers interviewed tended not to show or share their work socially, even to
respected peers and friends. This was a bit surprising, but on reflection it fits the

theoretical framework I have proposed quite well. This is for two reasons. Firstly such
fear and anxiety about other's opinions and ideas about their work reveals a type of
'inverse' social influence. They were certainly not indifferent to social influences.
Nonetheless, although writers reported being very aware of the social constraints and
discursive influences within which they write, it was not expected that the writers would
be so careful and emphatic about distancing themselves from others with respect to their
work. With the wisdom of hindsight this makes a good deal of sense within the

theoretical position I have put forward. Just as the writer is trying to escape the tight
habitual and more predictable structures of his or her own thought, he or she needs to
create a social 'vacuum', to not be drawn into conventional discursive channels which
may inhibit the novelty of what is being reached after.
The second point is that this disinclination to share may reveal how personal and
'private' the task of writing fiction is. This would stand in contrast to other fields in
which insight has been studied, science or business for example, in which the insights
may not be so personally revealing. As Writer 7 said, perhaps writers have to

assiduously disguise or 'conceal' their autobiographical or personal relation to the text

thus holding off till they feel relatively secure about this. It is significant, however,
at some (usually quite late) point, all writers have special people whose opinion about
their work is highly valued.

• That writer insights often involve an awareness and sharing of the
writer's multiplicity of selves,
A common feature in psychological constructivism, but one not much encountered in
the insight literature, is the non-unitary nature of self. The writers were expected to
describe processes where their sense of self was altered, where there was a 'decentering'
of self (Colapietro, 1990). This expectation was met in the writers' accounts, but there
was a consistent, added dimension to this. Writers seemed to be aware of the
multiplicity of selves within themselves and in their writing. As writer 4 expressed it:
W4: ... you can't afford, in my line of work, you can't afford to have a
single notion of consciousness or of absolute privacy. Y o u have to

have a notion that one's psyche is m a d e up of parallel and conflicting
elements. That's not madness. It's a healthy w a y of being. (680)

In Kellian vein he discussed the way in which creative fiction plays around with various

aspects of the author's self: "Of course it's a distillation, of course it's been censore
These are what //versions of ourselves" (613). Again, this concern with the
'community of self may be an artefact of the fact that creative fiction is often
principally about core aspects of self. They may be concealed (Writer 7) but as Writer 2
emphasised (352,421), most novel writing is at base autobiographical. The writers
appeared to find something inherently liberating about it, some sense of freedom and
experimentation to 'be themselves' in new ways in their works without selfconsciousness and inhibition (see Butt et al., 1997 for a similar conclusion).

• That the joy of insight may not only be found in the moment of
realisation, the 'aha!' experience, but may also be linked to the
preceding, looser symmetrical awareness.
A feature found clearly in the interview with Writer 1 was that there was a profound
enjoyment of the looser states of reverie and absorption, as a positive experience in
itself. She expressed it this way:
WI: But when I get to that point where I see what it is, then it seems as if
there's a clamp happens. It stops. Thefree-flowingnature stops. A n d
that's quite a grieving process for m e , a grievous process, because that
wonderful but terrifying fluidity has to stop. A n d at that stage I will start
to control it. Little things still c o m e and I start to see connections more
and more. (66)
It was expected that the moment of insight, when the writer began to see what
the unifying meaning of her explorations was, would be experienced as joyful. Instead
it is here described as 'grievous'. It should be noted, however, that she also describes

the looser fluidity as 'terrifying'. This is in keeping with Writer 2's expectation that
other writers would have mentioned 'resisting the excitement' of this looser stage:
"Resistance to the excitement... a pulling back. Have you heard, has anyone spoken to
you about pulling back from the excitement?" (336). There appears to be a paradoxical
state here where the writers both want and fear to be in this non-directable,

unpredictable state of being. Perhaps, as in a s w i m m e r procrastinating before diving

into water, once one has plunged into the 'water' it is fine, and one does not want to get
out again. In any case, both these writers also spoke about great moments of joy in the

tightening stages of insight. I suspect that the types of enjoyment at these various stag
may differ, a speculation that could be tested in a future investigation.

CHAPTER 14: CONCLUSIONS AND BEGINNINGS
Learning... is not something that happens to a person on occasion, it is
what makes him a person in the first place. (Kelly, 1955, p. 75)

14.1 THE PROPOSED THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING
14.1.1 Introduction
This inquiry into insight began with a problem. That was the problem of inquiry into
n e w knowledge. Plato discussed Meno's paradox which asserted that w e could not even
begin such an inquiry because w e would not know what to look for. In addition, if w e
did c o m e across something new, w e would not recognise it: if w e did, then it cannot be
n e w to us. The same problem can be phrased in personal construct terms. If w e can
only m a k e sense of things within our existing construct system, then to create something
n e w is problematic. W e cannot imagine something outside our present system of
construing, and, if n e w elements of experience were to come along, w e could only see
them as 'the same', in some way, as those which w e already know.
The existence of insight, however, refutes this paradox. It reveals that this
intriguing problem is based on particular objectivist assumptions, principally that
knowing is a phenomenon with clear-cut boundaries and is mostly experienced at a high
level of reflexive awareness (whereby w e either k n o w things or w e do not). But a
constructivist view of knowing assumes that our attempts at knowing are always
approximations of reality, are always partial. It assumes that when w e grasp something,
w e grasp only aspects of it. There is always something more to be discovered in events
and whatfrequentlystops us exploring such possibilities are the ways in which w e
currently 'know' things to be. In this w a y the existence of insight reveals the
importance of a constructivist outlook. Conversely, a constructivist outlook m a y be
argued to be conducive of insight.
A s with Kelly's view of learning given at the opening of this chapter, the
capacity to m a k e n e w meaning and to k n o w in genuinely n e w ways I have taken to be a

defining feature of h u m a n beings. The 'newness' of insight has been linked to two
constructive processes: the capacity to open oneself to, and to integrate, new 'elements'
which may be relevant to one's impasse; and the capacity to link seemingly unrelated
subsystems of constructs, for example, as metaphoric thinking enables. These abilities
are argued to be primary and to reveal a broader view of mind, one linked to our
physical and social embodiment and expressed within our pragmatic engagement in the

projects we live through. The study of insight is important in its own right, but it is h
asserted to be doubly important as it reveals not only the richness of human knowing
processes, but also the relational nature of the being that is the locus for such
experiences. Insight defines not just some isolated computational procedure, locked
within individual heads, but reveals instead the participatory 'dance' between person
and world defined not as separate and interacting entities, but as somehow united within
a larger unity.

14.1.2 Features Of Insight Proposed In This Thesis
The theoretical understanding of insight proposed in Chapter 11 was anticipatory with

respect to the interviews with Australian fiction writers. It will be useful here to brin
back to mind the main features of insight contained within that understanding. Firstly,

the review of the insight literature consistently revealed four broad features of insight
the importance of high levels of abstraction; the role of both tacit and conscious mental
processes; the ubiquity of emotion within insight; and the social and pragmatic
dimensions of insight.
These features were argued to be relatively non-integrated within contemporary
accounts of insight. I suggested that what was missing in these accounts was a
theoretical framework in which these features could be cohesively and systematically
understood. It was further argued that the reported phenomenology of insight demanded

a theoretical orientation which tried to break down the strict duality of self versus wo
of thought versus emotion, of physical versus mental experience, and of conscious
versus unconscious mental processes. A thoroughgoing account of insight also needed

to accommodate the oft-reported shifts in the experience of self. Insight was

characterised as a deeply intensional and 'predicational' activity, representative of th
person's involvement and commitment to some project. It was affective, embodied and
enactive in nature. It also represented a strange undoing of thought which expressed
itself in metaphor, in imagery and emerged within ongoing immersion in one's field of
endeavour.
It was proposed that Personal Construct Psychology (PCP) not only offered its

own understanding of insight, but was also set at a sufficiently high level of abstracti

to subsume the broad features identified in the literature. Kelly's theoretical position
was shown to be well-suited to explaining the phenomenology of insight, and his
Creativity and Experience Cycles in particular provided a means of integrating many of
the specific features of insight identified thus far. Nonetheless, Kelly's theory, as it
stood, was shown to be deficient in parts and required elaboration and extension in
others. To this end, the next three chapters were dedicated to a broader view of mind
such that insight seemed to demand.
Contemporary research into emotion was summarised and linked to the
emotional features of insight. The strong distinction between emotion and reason was
abandoned and Langer's distinction between representational and presentational thought
was presented as a unifying theme of the thesis. 'Primary' versus 'secondary' emotion
was distinguished and this led to a revival of Spinoza's concepts of passive and active
emotions. These emotive styles were argued to be related to the different modes of
thought characteristic of insight processes. The development of emotional
understanding was also discussed and speculatively related to the formation of 'self.
All this was then 'provisionally tightened' and an account was given of how a
superordinate affective stance can enable the person to enter into a more contemplative
style of knowing which I called 'participatory knowing'. Such a style of knowing is
fully embodied, multidimensional and intuitive — all central features of the
phenomenology of insight.

Matte-Blanco's distinction between asymmetrical and symmetrical modes of
thought was introduced in Chapter 9. This was mapped directly onto Kelly's distinction
between tight and loose construing respectively. In these terms, loose construing is
more concerned with sameness relations and with multidimensional appraisals, as
against tighter and more linear distinction-making. Matte-Blanco's detailed account of
the workings of various levels of consciousness was related to tight and loose

construing, to bi-polarity and to the hierarchical relations between constructs. In this
comparative process some of the corollaries of Kelly's fundamental postulate were
'loosened' (for example, the dichotomy and organisation corollaries). The combination
between Matte-Blanco's ideas and Kelly's, particularly the way in which suitably
permeable and comprehensive superordinate structures can 'contain' loose

(symmetrical) subordinate systems, enabled an account of the 'lateral' logic of insight.
It was argued that 'bi-modal' thought was an affectively-nuanced from of construing
which was theoretically consistent with accounts of'connectedness' and of non self-

concern amid the processes of insight. It was considered likely that such an anticipator
style would be metaphorical in nature.
Chapter 10 elaborated the phenomenological, enactive, embodied and
metaphorical features of insight. Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology was
utilised to put forward an account of mind as embodied and enactive. Such a view

supported the type of 'participatory' knowing I have argued characterises the experienc
of insight. In such a style of knowing, context-specific immersion in the medium of
one's project allows for a less self-conscious, looser and more spontaneous mode of
anticipation. This is a presentational awareness which tends to be tacit, enactive and

'felt' as much as consciously 'thought'. It leads to an experience of 'knowing-with' and
constitutes a more 'objective attitude' in which there is a flexible openness to new
'affordances' in one's world. This constitutes a dialogue or 'conversation' with the
world in which the person adopts a more 'meditative' stance. Such a stance emerges
when the person values his or her ongoing experience and relinquishes somewhat the
driving subjectivity which attempts to control and predict events.

In place of this latter attitude is a patient 'waiting-upon', a receptive, looser style
of anticipation which modulates between provisional tightenings of construing and
looser, playful explorations. The predominance of metaphorical and imagistic thinking
characterises such anticipatory processes and allows for the 'quantum jumps' to
alternative systems of understanding that are so important in insight. As the person
becomes immersed in this style of thought and experience, there can be a progressive
development of awareness such that one may become aware of one's interpretations or
constructions as interpretations or as constructions. In similar fashion, one may also
become aware of the non-unitary nature of 'self in favour of a more spontaneous

presence to oneself as construer, as an T at the centre of one's anticipatory endeavours
Such an awareness may enable the person to suspend the 'normal' pragmatic
engagement with the world, to suspend the habits of thought, to hold off knowing for
long enough for new possibilities to emerge.
Nothing in these broader discussions of mind was inconsistent with the Personal
Construct Psychology (PCP) perspective presented earlier. Indeed, these diverse
approaches of mental life were drawn together largely in personal construct terms into
comprehensive account of insight in Chapter 11. Three main questions concerning
insight were proposed. These were: 'What might enable a person to have an insight?';
'What might happen within the insight process?'; and 'What does insight tell us about
mind, about persons and about our relationship with the world?'. For insight to occur
the person must be committed to some problem or project. Despite sustained efforts and

'preparation', the person reaches impasse, his or her usual heuristics and solutions be
to no avail. At some point there must be a renunciation of the problem, some letting-go
of the desire to immediately know. This may take the form of abandoning the problem,
taking a break, or may include deliberate strategies of loosening one's construing. The
latter approach enables the person, under the sway of a transcending affective calm or

sense of self-security, to experiment and to be playful. Within such conditions, insigh
becomes more likely, but still it must be waited-upon, not actively sought-for.

The response to the second of these questions took the form of discussions of the
logic and experience of insight, and included an extended 'Domino Room' metaphor to
illustrate the understanding being developed. The experience of insight is one

characterised by fluctuations and alternations in styles of thought (loose versus tight
and corresponding shifts in affective experience. To allow oneself to dwell within
uncertainty is not easy. The person must 'stand under' the flux of events in order to
personally 'understand' them. This 'third mode', the use of looser symmetrical
processes within the constraining structures of asymmetrical thought, allows us to
transcend our habitual, automaticised understandings, to transcend the obvious. By
suspending our immediate desire to know, the horizons of our understanding may
themselves come into view. The assumptions we take for granted may be revealed to us
as such, and the haste to jump to a ready interpretation may be inhibited.
The more multidimensional and open-ended nature of loose construing was
frequently experienced by the writers as a spontaneity and lack of self-concern, as an
experience of freedom accompanied by a strong sense of connectedness. This pervasive

feature of the experience of insight prompted a characterisation of people as relationa
beings. I extended Gibson's idea of (physical) affordances to one's wider
'conversation' with one's phenomenological world. New possibilities are 'real-ised' or

made real by a type of open engagement with the 'other'. The joy of insight is a type of
reunion with one's sense of anticipatory 'fit' or 'coupling' with one's world. Within
such meditative thinking, it is 'self-as process' that predominates and allows one to
relinquish one's habitual 'looking-for' an answer, and to instead be content to 'waitupon' insight.
This theoretical understanding of insight, it was contended, provided an

integrative and coherent account. It was then conceptualised in terms of thirty predicte
features, grouped into five main factors, concerning writer accounts of their insight
experiences. A large majority of these predictions were confirmed — lending empirical
support to the framework proposed. Not all the features were endorsed, however, and
there were some unanticipated findings. Having summarised my theoretical account

and the ideas developed in this thesis, it is n o w time to draw some conclusions
stemming from them and from the empirical support provided by the writers' accounts
of their processes.

14.2 SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT INSIGHT
14.2.1 General Conclusions
Insight, representing as it does the human capacity for the creative transcendence of
impasse, is inherently important as afieldof study. It is complex, however, and the
development of a coherent and comprehensive theoretical framework that can
encompass its full phenomenology, and m a k e sense of the diversefindingsregarding it,
represents the main task, and hopefully, contribution of this thesis. I have argued that
m y constructivist approach to insight has been both explanatory and predictive. P C P ,
moreover, has m u c h to say about insight in therapy, but is also flexible and theoretically
comprehensive enough to extend to the wider findings presented.
O n e conclusion stemming from this theoretical approach is that attempts to
reduce insight to imputed, inner, ultimately neural, processes should be avoided. Insight
will remain intractable as a theoretical 'object' of study as long as attempts are m a d e to
reduce it to something else, especially something else that is not insightful. This is not
to say that it does not have, for example, a neural substrate, or that cognitive
architectures are not useful heuristics in understanding the mechanisms by which insight
operates. Indeed, I have endeavoured to show that the account given is consistent with
contemporary research in these regards. It is to say that there are different levels of
explanation and I have tried in this work to give an account of insight which maintains
the inherently teleological meaningfulness (intensionality) of the experience. Insight
has to do with anticipatory understanding, and it is at this level of meaning that it is best
understood.
A majorfinding,reinforced by the writers interviewed, is the priority of
presentational m o d e s of awareness in coming to insightful understandings. Such a

m o d e of awareness tends to be non-verbal and tacit, personal and metaphorical. It is
more multidimensional and holistic, not drawing a hard distinction between values and
facts, between art and logic. It is a part of broader view of mind that emphasises the
experiential and immediate subjective quality of understanding. Such a mode of
awareness is more affectively attuned and 'looser' in its implications. It is 'felt' as
much as 'thought' (indeed such distinctions break down under its sway) and it is very
much an embodied and contextually-immersed phenomenon.
For example, a somewhat unanticipated, but not incompatible finding, is the

prevalence for the writers of what I will call 'instigating' insights. Such insights we
often 'felt' by writers well before they were consciously understood. They had to be
're-cognised', often over extended time-frames. Such powerfully tacit breakthroughs
then determine subsequent 'representational' chains of implication. These are examples
of 'aesthetic emotion': "... emotion that springs from the comprehension of an
unspoken idea.. .[enabling the person to] overcome obstacles of word-bound thought
and achieve insight into literally unspeakable realities (Langer, 1957, p. 260). Such

'inarticulate' insights recall Gendlin's (1978) concepts of a 'felt sense' and of a 'bod
shift' which were experienced within his therapeutic 'focusing' technique. Although the

boundary blurs somewhat here between intuition and insight as previously differentiated

(see 1.6), it still appears to be an insight we are talking about, as the writers reporte
feeling a strong sense of breakthrough even though they could not articulate it.
Another major theme, and one of great importance in relation to the broader
image of mind that I have been emphasising, is the infusion of thought with affective
qualities (and vice versa). This is in keeping with Kelly's (1955) view of construing as
including affective, cognitive and conative processes. The return to Spinoza's ideas of
active and passive emotions, conceptualised as styles of thought, was important in this
regard. Consistent with much contemporary research, emotion is not now considered to
be necessarily antagonistic to reason, but is very much a part of the mental processes
which either enable a person to anticipate well (active emotion as containing 'adequate
ideas'), or of mental processes which are not so flexible and effective (passive emotion

characterised by 'inadequate ideas'). In particular, I have highlighted a certain

'transcending affective state' which enables the person to think experimentally, to be i
the presence of uncertainty without undue discomfort. An implication of this is that
creative thought is to be encouraged, not by adopting a type of 'cold' or 'neutral'
intellectualism, but by developing an emotional sensitivity which can 'pick up' the
subtle implications of construct change.
It was expected that a constructivist framework would help us anticipate the
insight experiences of the writers interviewed. It seems, in addition, that at least in
relation to their writing, these writers adopt a constructivist outlook. All of them
viewed their knowing and understanding processes as hypothetical and as open to
revision. They knew they were interested in a 'different kind of truth'. For them,

insight is a transformation of images and ideas, not just their representation ('The tru
is no excuse', as Writer 2 put it). This leads to the conclusion that adopting a
constructivist outlook may be related to the capacity for insight. Just as the PCP

approach to therapy could be considered as the concerted effort to empower the client to
complete full Creativity and Experience cycles and thus to embody the ideals of

'constructive alternativism' (Kelly, 1955; see 5.2.1), so creative insights generally ma
be related to the assumptions and views typical of constructivism.
An overall analogy can be drawn between one's path to insight and one's path
through life. Life may be conceived of as a passage from innocence, through experience
and, ideally, to some kind of higher level synthesis in which both innocence and
experience may be 'married'. In parallel terms, in approaching a problem in life we
may embody a certain childish innocence or 'naivete' that our current understandings
are the Truth and constitute the solution to our impasse. Then there is frustration and
disillusionment that our habitual understandings cannot help us. We fall from 'grace'.
To be able to reconcile innocence and experience, we require faith in ourselves and
commitment to the task at hand. New experience must not be denied. It must be
accommodated if a higher level synthesis is to be achieved. This is the experience of
insight.

The nineteenth century poet William Blake in his Songs of Innocence and
Experience, struggled with just this conundrum: how do we maintain the wide-eyed,
playful wonder of childhood given the 'realistic' outlook of experience? How do we
remain open and accepting given the ongoing invalidations of life and the suffering and
frustrations of impasse? The answer I have tried to give is to adopt a 'third mode' of
awareness, a 'bi-modal' and meditative thought in which not-knowing, a playful and
experimental attitude, a tolerance of absurdity, and a willingness to be guided by
intuitive feeling is contained within an overarching, permeable awareness that such an

approach is, in the long run, the best way out of our predicament. These latter processe
represent the 'crooked' paths to insight.
Heidegger (1959) thought that meditative thinking was centrally important for
humankind. There appears to be something inherently 'good' about entering this mode,
yet it is not immediately useful, it is not an 'answer'. Heidegger thought "Man's true
nature may relate directly to what transcends him" [sic] (1959, p. 23). and insight is
often experienced 'as if we are its recipients, yet somehow are included in a larger

reality that it points to. Insight highlights the value to the person of spontaneity and
self-forgetting, of absorption in the present moment and of the concomitant absence of
self-concern and self-consciousness so frequently mentioned by those who have

experienced insight. Again, this freedom and spontaneity seems to be a constitutive part
of anticipatory processes centred in 'self-as-process, as T, rather than in 'self-ascontent, or 'me'.
This style of awareness is the opposite of 'calculative' or means-end thinking.
The writers interviewed emphasised that trying to find solutions too quickly slowed
down the whole process of coming to insight. A major implication of this is that as

teachers, therapists, employers and so on, we must respect the idiosyncrasies of people'

processes if we are to encourage creativity and insight. Such processes, as with Blake's
'roads', are 'crooked' and we must respect this in ourselves and in others. While there
is no substitute for hard work and adequate 'preparation', there comes a point where we
must have faith (in ourselves and in others) and must patiently wait-upon whatever may

come. This m a y , for example, help creative writing teachers understand more clearly
what they are doing with their students and m a y validate and help structure their
approach. This approach is, of course, diametrically opposed to the ruling Zeitgeist of
economic rationalism — the 'logical' extension of the calculative thinking of the
technological age in which w e live. In order to think our w a y out of the global
problems that beset us, there was never any greater need for genuine insight.
At the personal level, this involves giving oneself permission to be 'indulgent',
to play and to entertain absurdity. All the writers interviewed employed various
strategies aimed at emotional self-management and at maintaining 'looseness'. Finding
ways to allay anxiety somewhat, to let go, to try to remain open, to even confront
unwelcome aspects of self, were pivotal in their creative lives. O n e w a y is not to betray
the 'confidence' of one's 'muse' or, in this case, one's characters. Another was to
disguise aspects of one's self and to enjoy a type of 'vicarious spontaneity' — living in
the experience of one's characters. This seemed to allow for experimentation, for an
expansion of self and for deep feelings of integration and connectedness.
A n interesting finding was that the writers considered their books to be 'wiser'
than them. N o doubt this is linked to the felt 'externality' and spontaneity of their
insights. There m a y be a tendency for writers to misattribute the sources of their
insights and to miss the actual real clues and antecedents of their breakthroughs (Miles
and Huberman, 1994). Nonetheless, their reports should be taken seriously. The
experienced flow of narrative and the occurrence of 'life-like' imagery and scenes such
as they reported does suggest the enactive character of consciousness (Hunt, 1995;
Shanon, 1993) and is also wholly consistent with the social constructionist hypothesis
(Gergen, 1991; Shorter, 1995) that m u c h 'thought' is internalised social discourse.

14.2.2 Conclusions Related To Personal Construct
Psychology
Apart from the more general conclusions drawn from this thesis, there are implications
and conclusions that can be more specifically discussed in terms of P C P . It seems, for

instance, that writers deliberately play around with validation and nonvalidation.90 In
the terms developed in this thesis, validation or invalidation is difficult within loose
construing. The writers appear to play within looseness, only provisionally tightening
and trying to stay as much as possible within an exploratory and 'open' mode of
anticipation. That is, rather than expose themselves too early in the piece to the
(imagined) possibility of invalidation, or even to the 'positive', but possibly normative
and constraining effects of validation, the writers tell themselves that no-one will read
their work. In addition, they tend not to show others their work-in-progress, even to
respected peers. They thereby avoid both potential validation and invalidation,
preferring the 'openness' of nonvalidation, of holding off premature tightening. When
the writers pretend that no-one would read their work, they are quite conscious that this
is highly unlikely, or straightforwardly untrue. It seems to be deliberate utilisation of

nonvalidation, an intentional side-stepping of cultural and social constraints. It probab
represents a subtle move within the creativity cycle allowing them to wait-upon insight
in a fashion relatively free of pre-judgements. In these terms, knowing when not to
know, and being able to sustain it, is something that may be a master skill in coming to
insight.
Another finding emerging from this research into insight is that not all
construing may be neatly bi-polar. For example, I have suggested that loose construing
can be conceptualised as construing less dominated by bi-polar contrast and as more
characterised by 'sameness' judgements. In similar fashion, the relationships between
constructs under loose construing may be less strictly hierarchical, more 'lateral', thus
relaxing the demands of the Organisation Corollary (Kelly, 1955). In sum, constructs
and their relations can be fuzzy.
There are practical implications stemming from these suggestions. Using the

familiar repertory grids in personal construct therapy to assist dialogue and elaboration
for example, may have the effect of prematurely tightening people's construing, making
it more 'bi-polar' in the process. One wonders what it means, for example, when

90

See Walker, Oades, Caputi, Stevens & Crittenden (1999) for a more detailed discussion of these term

constructs are elicited for grids but the underlying construing is loose? Does the person
form a tighter, bi-polar construct, on the spot, as it were, in response to the request
contrasts (Canter, Brown & Groat, 1985)? Do the constructs thereby elicited truly
represent an underlying structure or do they merely reflect the mode of elicitation?
Such speculations about the problems associated with eliciting contrasts for

repertory grids are not new (see Mair, 1967). Nor are questions about the essentially bi
polar nature of construct (Bell, 1999; Bonarius, 1988; Riemann, 1996. See also Millis
& Neimeyer, 1990, for a reply). There have been two views about the nature of non-bipolar construing. One sees it as mono-polar, where it is constructs, not poles within a
construct, which are contrasted (Bonarius, 1988; Reimann; 1996). Another approach is

to view it as multi-polar, where multiple contrast can exist within one 'act' of constr
(Canter, 1985; Cantor, Brown and Groat, 1985). Some research possibilities flowing
from these issues will be pursued in the next section.
The analysis of loosening and tightening in terms of Matte-Blanco's ideas
introduced the notion of a looser, more associative and multidimensional style of

thought which can, ideally, operate in tandem with tighter ordinal construing. Availabl
to us is the possibility of entering into a more adventurous mode of construing — the
awareness of which may help us understand and value our more tacit or unconscious
anticipatory processes. Kelly's (1955) own high valuation of preverbal construing and
of the art of loose and tight construing needs to be taken more seriously than perhaps
has been the case in practice among users of PCP. It is unlikely, for example, that
practitioners not mindful of these processes within themselves will be able to help
clients orchestrate them productively within therapy and beyond.
Another implication related to loosening and tightening concerns the
'metaphoric' nature of construing. Tighter construing appears to be less 'metaphorical'

and more 'literal' in nature. On the other hand, looser construing, held within suitably
comprehensive and permeable superordinate structures, seems to embody most, if not

all, of the characteristics of metaphorical thought that Mair (1976) outlined. It is al

akin to holding ideas lightly — treating some temporarily 'as if they were true in order

to see others 'through them' or in contrast to them. In contrast, w h e n metaphor fades,
w h e n the similarity function is treated literally (perhaps w h e n the contrast pole is
submerged or remains implicit), then w e find the person is construing tightly. So,
construing m a y vary in its modes from 'metaphorical' to 'literal' and, what m a y be
required for insight to occur m a y be an optimal balance between these two modes.
A more specific parallel can be drawn between Gendlin's (1978)
psychotherapeutic 'focusing' technique and Kelly's Creativity Cycle. The various
'movements' within 'focusing' rely on alterations between processes which are
identifiable as looser and tighter modes of construing. I have already mentioned that
Gendlin's concepts of a 'felt sense' and of a 'body shift' m a k e sense in terms of the
'instigating' insights described by the writers. This is so because they reflect the
presentational and embodied view of construing that I have put forward. Kelly's (1955)
Creativity Cycle can help us to understand h o w focusing works and P C P generally
provides a theoretical framework that can encompass this type of implicit, 'emotional'
knowing.
M o r e generally, as w e have seen, the writers revealed themselves as
'constructivists' in relation to their art-form. W h e n one's anticipatory process embody
'constructive alternativism' (see 5.2.1), this m a y be a equivalent to opening oneself to
insight. A n important caveat here is that one m a y be a 'constructivist' in one or a
number of domains, yet quite tightly 'objectivist', 'hostile' or impermeable in others.
W e all have areas of experience in which w e hold onto 'certainties' beyond the
(invalidating) evidence and beyond the viability of our present construing, where w e
avoid evidence generally. This again raises the issue of nonvalidation, but this time as a
'defense' mechanism, as an attempt to suppress, or avoid invalidation. But within bimodal thought, or the 'third m o d e ' of construing I have described, there m a y be a quite
different processes shepherded in by an overarching sense of purpose and faith.
The constructivist outlooks expressed by the writers recall the research findings
by Botella and Gallifa (1995) discussed earlier (13.3). That is, there is a discernible
m o v e a w a y from a nai've realist, mechanistic outlook towards more constructivist,

organicist and contextualist assumptions. Related findings were summarised by
Kramer, Kahlbaugh and Goldston (1992) who concluded that there is a general path of
cognitive development in adulthood. Typically in young adulthood thinking is
hypothesised to be more 'absolutist'. As thought matures it becomes 'relativistic' and

as it becomes more integrative and further differentiated it becomes more 'dialectical'.
In terms of these worldviews, absolutist thought views the world as stable and
fixed and tends to be dualist and dogmatic. Relativistic thought is described as
'contextualist' where change and novelty rule, where there is deep fragmentation and

often an inability to act. The person is confronted by the subjectivity and relativism of

ideas and values. Dialectical thought represents the capacity to integrate continuity an
discontinuity, to incorporate change and relativism within a dialectical whole.
Contradictions are seen as part of a greater whole and there is an emphasis on growth
and emergence, on the process of dialectical unity.
Both of these streams of research may be reflected in my findings concerning the
development of a 'third mode' of anticipation — whether phrased in terms of bi-modal
thought, of meditative thinking or of creativity cycles. A very important point here is
that although there may be a general developmental path across the lifespan, it may also
be domain and context specific. It may even be state specific. Thus, for example,
writers may be more constructivist in their approach to their writing than in other
aspects of their life. Or their day-to-day anticipatory postures may be influenced by
changing contextual and personal conditions. When under threat, thinking may become
more rigid, more stereotypical. These last observations highlight the value of an
approach such as that provided by PCP which can focus on both the nomothetic and
idiographic levels. That is, while we can make generalisations using the terminology of
PCP about insight, or about constructivist outlooks, it makes just as much sense, using
the same terminology, to discuss the ways individuals do not fit these generalisations.
Finally, the writers interviewed exemplified the type of anticipatory, 'scientific'
attitude that Kelly (1955) proposed as a model for the person. A not new observation,

but one worth emphasising, is that the (ideal) scientist is a creative person passionate

immersed in his or her projects. This is counter to a c o m m o n view of the scientist as a
coolly calculating, neutral and 'objective' inquirer (Fransella, 1980,1983). Kelly's
prescription (not description) for the 'scientist' is to be a person w h o becomes deeply
committed and w h o takes the presence of some degree of absurdity or fragmentation as
evidence for creative potential, w h o allows himself or herself to luxuriate in the textures
and sounds of the object of study, and w h o feels she or he ought to be open to the world
(Walker, 1992). Such a person engages in what M c Williams (1993) called
'postobjective participation': dwelling within one's constructive processes, accepting
responsibility for one's outlook and engaging in a moment-to-moment sense of
participation with one's world. A s such this prescription expresses a nomothetic, moral
imperative that this is an inherently good (adaptive, useful, healthy etc.) w a y to be.

14.3 BEGINNINGS: FUTURE RESEARCH
This thesis has provided a theoretical account of insight which is suggestive of future
research not only in relation to insight, but also in relation to P C P itself. The purpose of
the thematic analyses of the writer interviews was to see whether the theoretical
understanding was coherent and suggestive. Given the encouraging findings in this
regard, it is n o w time to suggest some specific future research directions. The analyses
presented thus far have not exhausted the rich interview data. The five factors predicted
of insight experiences, and the features comprising them, have been provisionally
validated by the thematic analysis. In order to further this validational process,
however, there are a number of research possibilities.
Perhaps thefirststep would be to code the features more systematically using an
iterative coding approach (Smith, J. A., 1995). For the thematic analysis used, for
example, only one or two examples of each feature was typically coded. But it m a y
help to illustrate h o w strongly each feature is endorsed, not just by what the writers say,
but h o w m a n y times they say it (though, clearly, frequency is secondary in importance
to the emphasis and the meaning intended by the writer). Each 'sweep' through the
transcripts could fine-tune the analysis and provide features more consistently and

reliably representative of the writers' experiences. In similar fashion, a finer-grained
content analysis based on a 'dynamic approach' to the transcripts might be used to build
a model of insight (Mostyn, 1985). Such information can be turned into quantitative
data allowing for easier comparison between various populations — something to be
taken up below. In order to do this, independent judges would need to be trained to

code the themes and features, thereby allowing for checks of inter-rater reliability. F
example, a written protocol could be devised including examples of inclusion and
exclusion in each feature to provide a guide for the independent raters (Cohen, 1960;
Perreault & Leigh, 1989).
In many respects the best judges, of course, would be the writers interviewed.

As befits this type of qualitative inquiry, these provisional results should be taken b

to the participants (the 'co-inquirers'). This is a part of the process of 'triangulatio
(Jick, 1979; Lincoln and Guba, 1985) as an intermediary or second step towards the
formulation of a theoretical model of insight. This would take the form of showing the
writers the factors and features proposed and seeing if they think they fit their
understanding of their insight processes. A number of ways of doing this comes to
mind.
One way would be to show them the factors and features, including the
exemplars I have drawn from their transcripts, to see if they agree on the features, and
on the codings. The writers could then choose a subsample of features that they most
strongly endorse. Of course writers may wish to add features they think I have missed.
These could then serve as elements in a repertory grid. Constructs would then be
elicited from each writer and the emerging factors from each grid, and from the
combined grids, could be compared to the factors I have abstracted from these features.
An interesting comparison arising from this would be the various subsets of
elements chosen by the writers. It may be that each writer has an idiosyncratic way of
conceptualising his or her insight processes. On the other hand, common patterns across
writers could be revealed. In this way the thematic analysis could not only be validated,
but could be represented 'idiographically' and 'nomothetically' in terms of factor

loadings and spatial diagrams (Adams-Webber, 1994; Bell, 1990; S h a w & Gaines,
1981) for both individual and combined grids. Using multidimensional scaling
techniques, a visual representation of each writer's psychological space representing
insight could be produced. Or again, the data could be collected as a group to show
shared patterns of understanding insight processes. Perhaps with a larger sample of
creators and 'insightful' people, core elements and patterns of relationships between
them would emerge. Such a set of features could then be used to develop an 'insight
scale' for the purposes of future research. A constructivist model for this type of
research process is Viney's (1987) 'mutual orientation' approach whereby one takes

findings and interpretations back to participants to confirm, disconfirm or elaborate. A
important element of such a research process is to enrich the writers' own
understandings of their insight processes.
Another question arising from the present research concerns the issue of

nonvalidation. That is, it seems that the writers have learned it is useful to stay in a
of 'not-knowing', to not prematurely tighten-up their construing. They seem to have an
overarching confidence that allows them to keep their exploratory processes 'open' or
'nonvalidated' — not allowing them to come into contact with (in)validational
evidence. Within an overall superordinating confidence does the person know that she
or he is deliberately not attending to validational evidence? In keeping with Kelly's
(1955) dictum that if we do not know something about clients, we should ask them,
participants could be asked to comment on this particular finding. If they are
deliberately entering into periods of relative nonvalidation, as I suspect, how do they
know this is needed? When is it needed? Have they always been able to do it? Such a
finding promises to provide a deeper understanding not only of insight processes, but of
the particular moves within the creativity cycle. Perhaps it is a part of 'provisional
tightening' which prevents the premature closing off of exploration and
experimentation.
An obvious next study would look at creative insight in other fields, with

varying ages of participants (all participants in the current research were over 40), a

perhaps cross culturally, to see where there are generalities and where there are unique
features. The present results may be confined to exceptional people or to this particular
domain of fiction writing and may not tell us about the insight processes of mind
generally. It may help to involve other participants from various fields, not necessarily
'exceptional' people (as it is assumed that all people have insights). Armed with the
expected features of insight and perhaps a scale derived from these, potential problems
in people articulating these subtle and often implicit processes may be reduced.
Features of insight experience that may be specific to the population represented

in this thesis include the quite conscious 'anti-social' strategies employed by the write

and their reports of the 'multiplicity of self. It may be that both of these are artefacts
the craft they are involved in — whereby writers try to 'get outside' social processes in
order to comment on them and create multiple characters to embody their narratives. In

the first case, future research could attempt to verify or validate this 'anti-social' st
by measures of, for example, 'conformity', or of 'inner' or 'outer' locus of control. In
terms of the 'multiplicity' of self, comparisons to the insight experiences of non-writer
populations would help to reveal whether this finding is specific to creative writers. In

relation to culture, it may also be, for example, that Western society tends to reward and
encourage a more representational and calculative thought, a style of rationality with a
high value on prediction and control. Cross-cultural studies could help to clarify this.
Another issue emerging from this work is the finding that a constructivist
outlook may be correlated with insight. Perhaps, for example, by comparing a sample
of acclaimed creative writers with first-time participants in writing courses, some
differences in outlook in relation to insight could be discovered. There may be a shift
from novices having a more mechanistic or 'naive realist' outlook while 'experts' may
be more constructivist. Botella's and Gallifa's (1995) research on cognitive complexity
and expertise would suggest this, and, using similar grid methodology, results could be
correlated with participants' views on their insight experiences.
In any such study a complicating factor might be that the capacity for insight is
influenced by developmental considerations. Therefore age would have to be controlled

as a variable. Perhaps more directly, a scale on paradigm beliefs (Kramer et al., 1992)

could indicate whether, generally, participants hold a more 'constructivist ('dialectic

outlook and whether this is reflected in their areas of expertise. It is likely that nov
and younger participants would not have had sufficient immersion in the domain to
develop the background knowledge, complexity and differentiation of construing to
enable such dialectical processes relative to more experienced and older practitioners.
It was concluded earlier that there were implications stemming from this thesis
concerning some fundamental theoretical issues in PCP itself. In particular, the
universality of bi-polarity was questioned, as was the strict hierarchical organisation
construing. It was argued that construing can be fuzzy and it may be that this reflects
multiple contrasts within a given set of elements. The question is, how can this be

tested? It may be possible to address both questions at once. That is, it may be possible
to develop a methodology which is both more appropriate to the complexity and
multidimensionality of insight processes and which may help us clarify these
fundamental theoretical matters.
For example, I have concluded that important stages in the movement towards
insight are characterised by construing which is frequently loose, multidimensional and
somewhat 'fuzzy'. It may be that such construing represents a tendency away from bipolar contrasts towards multiple contrasts. This may enable a reconciliation between
those theorists who question the universality of bi-polarity (Bonarius, 1988; Reiman,
1990,1996) and those who maintain it (Millis & Neimeyer, 1990). Future research
could, for example, utilise the methodology employed by Mair (1967) and Reimann
(1990) which typically reports only about 22-24% of constructs showing perfect
dichotomy, although about two thirds of constructs did show a substantial negative

correlation between construct poles. But this time, crucially, analyses of the bi-polari
of construing could be made under contrasting conditions of loose and tight construing.
For example, some of Kelly's detailed instructions for promoting tight and loose
construing could be followed and grids administered immediately. It would be expected

that 'loose construing' grids would show significantly less bi-polarity than 'tight
construing' grids.
Another strategy would be to have, for example, the writers complete 'standard'
grids based on the features of insight I have found, given as supplied elements. T o see
whether these same elements fall into bi-polar groupings the multiple sorting
methodology of Canter and colleagues (Canter, 1985; Canter et al., 1985) could be used
on the same elements — perhaps with 'counterbalanced' presentation to remove task
order effects. The resulting 'sorts' could then be compared with the repertory grid
findings — perhaps returning to the participants tofindwhich represents the 'best fit'
for them. It could be argued that such 'multidimensional' sortings are more appropriate
to the reported complexity and multidimensionality of insight processes, especially as a
confounding factor in repertory grid research m a y indeed be that the triadic elicitation
process itself is a tightening procedure thus leading to artificially high contrasts between
poles (Canter et al., 1985). In addition, using non-metric multidimensional scaling
techniques Canter and colleagues can derive visual representations of the construing
presented by participants. Such research m a y enable us to determine "... the conditions
under which people use [bi-polar] constructs as opposed to multi-polar category
schemes and the possibility of converting one system of classification into the other"
(Canter et al, 1985, p. 109). Given the finding that insights m a y be related to just such
alternations in construing processes, such knowledge would indeed be valuable.

14.4 SOME FINAL COMMENTS
It has been hoped in this work that insight might be understood as a relational process in
which mere subjectivity is overcome and issues in a higher-level synthesis. If it were
not for insight w e might all suffer endemically from 'epistemological loneliness'
(Kramer et al, 1992): a despairing sense, not u n c o m m o n in our post-modern age, that
all is relative, that one cannot escape one's subjectivity. Yet, in m o m e n t s of n e w
understanding, w e are re-united with the 'other', with an objective reality that includes
our subjectivity:

In reading a text, in wishing to understand it, what w e always expect is
that it will inform us of something. A consciousness formed by the
authentic hermeneutical attitude will be receptive to the origins and
entirely foreign features of that which comes to it from outside its
horizons. Yet this receptivity is not acquired with an objectivist
'neutrality': it is neither possible, necessary, nor desirable that w e put
ourselves within brackets. The hermeneutical attitude supposes only
that w e self-consciously designate our opinions and prejudices and
qualify them as such, and in so doing strip them of their extreme
character. In keeping to this attitude w e grant the text the opportunity
to appear as an authentically different being and to manifest its o w n
truth, over and against our o w n preconceived notions. (Gadamer, 1979,
italics in original)

In this inquiry the 'text' I have been attempting to understand has been the experience o

insight. Insight is not a final answer, a once-and-for-all solution. But in the terms of
'problem' as we have posed it, insight releases us from impasse, from anticipatory
isolation. The hermeneutical attitude that Gadamer endorses is one of involvement and
openness. This is an ongoing stance, a mode of being which enables one, as Kelly
(1955) put it, to develop 'successive approximations' to reality. This thesis has been,
these terms, an ongoing commitment to 'wait-upon' insight into insight.
PCP is a reflexive theory: it can account for its own origins in its own theoretical
terms. In this spirit, I kept a journal for much of my journey towards insight into
insight. As with the writers interviewed, on re-reading early speculations and ideas it
remarkable how hunches and feelings with little or no obvious evidence or reading to
support them at that time have indeed flowed through the whole work and have been
endorsed both theoretically and empirically. Throughout the process, most of the

interesting ideas (to me) occurred not at the computer, but in showers, on walks, driving
the car, lying in bed, during domestic chores and so on. At least in my own experience,
I have felt there to be a 'gradient of deepening coherence' as the work has progressed —
one in which underlying themes, perhaps 'instigating insights', have been progressively
fleshed out and given form.
In struggling with frustration and lack of understanding I have, on the other
hand, been constantly aware of how far short I have fallen of the ideals and findings

regarding 'meditative thinking' and of the capacity to loosen and to 'wait-upon' insight

Painfully aware of deadlines, and of a presumed audience, I have pushed for results,

tightened prematurely, frequently pretending and kidding myself that this is how to do a

piece of work at this level. It was at those times that I had to back off, to remind mys

that there is time, that everything will be all right in the end. At other times, I trus
intuitions and to more expressive, perhaps less 'academic' expression. It has been an

'emotional' process in the terms developed in this thesis. Frustration has alternated wi
flow. Not frequently enough, for one or two hours in an eight hour working day, I
managed to quieten down, to write without too much thought, to watch the words
appear on the screen, as it were. It seems to me that such passages and sections

represent the more 'insightful' portions of the above and were certainly those I enjoyed
more and 'participated with'. At these times metaphors, images and analogies were
most prevalent. Of course the reader can only guess at which passages these are!
Nonetheless, in producing this work I have partly verified, at least within my own
experience, many of the assertions and speculations above. It is hoped that others have
also recognised themselves and their insights processes herein.
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APPENDIX 1: WRITER CONSENT FORM

UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG
CONSENT FORM

The Nature and Experience of Insight (Chris Stevens)

This project is being conducted as part of a Ph.D. by Research and is being supervise
by Assoc. Prof. Beverly Walker in the Department of Psychology at the University of

Wollongong. The aim of this research project is to develop a theoretical framework fo

understanding insight. Your participation in this research is voluntary: you are free
to refuse to participate and you are free to withdraw from the research at any time.
Please feel welcome to discuss this research further with me or with my supervisor:
Chris Stevens: 02 96641519
Dr. Beverly Walker: 02 42213653
If you have any inquiries regarding the conduct of the research, please contact the
University of Wollongong Human Research Ethics Committee on (042) 214457.

I, consent to participate in the research

conducted by Chris Stevens as it has been described to me in the information sheet. I

understand that the interview data collected will be used for the purposes of his Ph.
thesis in psychology and I consent for the data to be used in that manner.
Signed Date
/ /
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APPENDIX 2: WRITER INFORMATION SHEETS.

UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG

INFORMATION FORM

The Nature and Experience of Insight

Chris Stevens (02) 96641519

Supervisor:

Assoc. Prof. Beverly Walker

Department: Psychology
Degree being undertaken: Ph.D. Psychology

The aim of this research project is to develop a theoretical framework for understanding

insight. I am interested in the full phenomenology of the insight experience, inclu
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its cognitive, emotional, motivational, social and behavioural aspects. I want to know
what conditions and personal states are conducive of the occurrence of insight, what its
patterns of occurrence are, and h o w it is experienced.

To this end, the interviews with Australian fiction writers will be pivotal. The format

will be qualitative with a semi-structured interview. It is expected that interviews will
last for 45-60 minutes. Interviews will be audio-taped for transcription purposes. The
three main areas of interest will be:
1. A discussion of significant experiences of insight related to your
work as a writer.
2. A discussion of the ways in which you organise your creative life,
both on a day-to-day basis, and in terms of longer time-frames.
3. Your o w n views on the nature and genesis of creative insight.

Individual participants will not be identified with any transcripts appearing in the Ph.
thesis and all efforts will be made to protect participant anonymity. Tapes and
transcripts of the interviews will be stored at the university and will only be accessed by
the principal researcher, the principal researcher's supervisor and possibly a research
assistant (who will be bound by an agreement to the confidentiality of the material).

You are free to discontinue your participation at any time and should you have any
inquiries about the conduct of the research please contact the University of Wollongong,
Human Research Ethics Committee on (02) 42214457
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APPENDIX 3: WRITER INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS
The seven writers will be identified as WI, W2 and so on, up to W7. The use of
brackets [ ] has several functions: to indicate a simultaneous utterance by the listener
while the other person is speaking, or quick interchanges while a person is 'holding the
floor'. Occasionally they also contain m y direct authorial comments and directions for
the reader. The expression ' m m m ' should be taken as agreement or assent to what has
just been said. N a m e s of close friends and relatives and titles of works have been
removed.

Writer 1
1. C S : .. .how you manage your creative life generally. I'm interested in the day-to-day
stuff, but also h o w you think about longer terms, the week, the month, the project, or
even the decade. But I'll leave it up to you h o w you describe that sort of
management. I'm interested in h o w you consciously prepare yourself consciously
for insight or creative breakthroughs.
2. W I : I'd like to talk about h o w I should manage m y creative life. At the m o m e n t
things are a bit of a muddle because a lot if things are happening, overseas. Which
has to do with non-creative things like publishers.. .but at best when I'm really sort of
working and totally focused, what I do is write, work, sit at m y desk, deliberately sit
d o w n at a standard time every day and don't leave it until I have to go and get m y
child.. .so I have bookends as I call them [bookends! They are things you do before
and after?]. I sit d o w n at 8.30 and I get up at two o'clock.
3. C S : Right. Is that literally? I mean basically you don't move?
4. W I : I c o m e d o w n for lunch [yeah, O K ] and if I feel that making a pot of tea will
shift something I'll do that.
5. C S : W h y do you do that?
6. W I : D o that very rigorous thing? [yes]. Because otherwise I would m u c k around.
I'd do the washing instead.
7. C S : A n d what happens when you are doing that and nothing happens as it were?
8. W I : It's terrible. But I believe I have to sit through it. It's seems to be working
quite well now. If I have a time away from writing it's hard to come to come back
because there will be m a n y days like this and I make myself stay there. I'll use
various strategies.
9. C S : W h a t are they?

A-5
10.WI: There's quite a few of them. O n e of them for example is to read something that
tugs at m y imagination so I have certain writers w h o I think will get that imagination
tugging and that's one I do quite a lot. A n d it's very odd the w a y that one can think
of something totally disconnected from that writer but still be triggered by that
writer.
1 l.CS: W h a t do you think is happening there?
12.W1: Well I call it a tug. I don't know. I mean I could say literary things like its
voice is somehow parallel to m y voice or has resonances with m y voice. But I don't
really know. It gives m e a sense of bravery. There are certain writers whose courage
I sense, in that they have broken d o w n a lot of conventions in order to create that
sentence and you feel it there in the sentence [yeah, you can sort of experience it as
you read it]. Yes, and I think well, if she dared to do that then I can do it too.
13.CS: It's interesting. The first thing that occurs to m e is what's happening is you're
shifting your mental mode. You're using someone else [yes]. You're slipping into a
different w a y of thinking and being on purpose, and this is just one of your strategies
for doing it.
14.W1: It is true that to write you get into, I have to get into a trance and that trance can
be so profound that when the phone goes I wonder what the object is that's making
the noise.
15.CS: I think w e will be talking about this a great deal in our one and a half hours
together, because it is certainly one of the central pillars of m y research is that w e
have to be able to look at a different m o d e of mental operation, w e have to be able to
understand it [ m m m , m m m ] . Not that it's that rare, but that w e don't normally think
of ourselves in that w a y [ m m m ] . I think it operates all the time in fact.
16.W1: Yes. A n d it actually feels as if that part of the brain is m u c h smarter.
17.CS: That's right, but in a different way.
18.W1: Yeah I m e a n I don't k n o w if I could go up and buy a lump of meat from the
butcher's from that part of the brain.
19.CS: Yes exactly. Or you wouldn't exactly be happy having an airline pilot w h o is
operating with that modus operandi. But certainly to do the sorts of things that you
want to do it would be necessary. So that's one of the strategies.. .so you're reading
people's work that you really admire, particularly in a sense ones w h o are taking
risks. I might just ask you about that n o w rather than trying to remember it later.
W h y do you think it is particularly useful that you feel they are taking risks?
20.WI: I guess I feel that I'm pretty cowardly.. .And I think 'Oh! There's a permission'.
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2l.CS: Which is interesting because, not to psychologise too much! [laughs] but what it
does it say to you — because one of the things that I'm interested in is the
relationship between notions of self and h o w that can get in the way of people
loosening themselves to insight if you like. W h a t is the fear there or what is the
concern that needs to be pushed aside and that you get inspired to push aside?
22.W1: A prohibition, taboos. O n e of the things that comes to m e is 'oh you are
allowed to say that'. It might just be a very small thing that might not be a taboo to
anybody else but I sense the taboo for that writer and perhaps I have the same taboo
or a resonating taboo myself.
23.CS: Yes. Or your o w n collection.
24.W1: Or m y o w n collection. So that's one thing that gives m e courage. The other is
that I admire boldness, artistic boldness. A n d it's wonderful to feel that somebody
has been bold before me.. .and that gives m e courage to be bold.
25.CS: I get a strong sense of a sort of audience even though it's well before...
26.W1: Yes it's funny you should say that because it's in fact anti-audience. I have no
sense of writing as communicating . U m I only have a sense of writing as speaking
to myself. In fact if I thought there was going to be an audience I wouldn't begin. I
think it is one of the reasons I can only do stage adaptations of m y work ,not actually
write a play, because as soon as you write a play you assume an audience because
you write a character's name and that has to be done by an actor and so you have
actors as an audience. So in fact m y way of working is anti-audience, and I try to
trigger, trigger a way of writing which I consider quite dangerous.
27.CS: Dangerous for w h o m ?
28.WI: U m , for m e . Dangerous in that it voices things that I scarcely dare not say.
29.CS: Ahh.. .1 see. Yes it would therefore be a payoff, it would be very helpful, to not
be thinking in terms of other people immediately reading it.
30.W1: O h absolutely. I have to do various things to make the paper m y confidant.
3l.CS: W h a t do you have to do?
32.WI: Well I promise myself I will never show anyone. I promise myself I won't
publish, and.. .1 promise myself that it will be a long time. I have this luxury of time.
I think it is actually one of the joys of writing a novel. Y o u can actually make that
happen. Y o u don't have to show, you don't have to come clean about it. A n d I try
not to talk about it to anybody.
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33.CS: Yes I think this is a very very c o m m o n theme that creative people don't
generally talk about things in progress.. .are happy enough to talk about things that
were in the past.
34.WI: 1 mean I keep making mistakes. Someone will trick m e on a radio program and
say 'what are you writing now?' and I try not to say anything and then...
35.CS: Because it's so m u c h a part of your consciousness?
36.W1: Yes, that's right, and I feel like I've betrayed it, if I speak about...There's a
sense of telling gossip about a very close friend.
37.CS: O n e of the themes that I want to visit is there seems to m e to be a strange sense
of which is paradoxical I think, a strange sense of when people m o v e into a type of
insight state, or just a looser mentality, and insight comes or just the flow of work,
that sort of immersion and absorption you were talking about earlier, it's almost like
it's separate from them, it has a life of its o w n that one listens to rather than directs,
but in the other side it seems to be very hyper-personal [yes] and spontaneous and
exterior at the same time or something like that.
38. W I : Yes absolutely!. All of those things.
39.CS: So you don't want to.. .you chose your words very carefully there about.. .the
word was 'betrayal' I think.
40.WI: Yes. It's very emotional, a very emotional time. Yes the sense, the felt
experience is that it's coming into existence and to be revealed only to m e . So if I go
blabbing about it, you see I'm choosing again emotional words, that it m a y not come
again.
4l.CS: There's a guy called Howard Gardner, he's pretty well k n o w n in psych, circles.
H e wrote multiple intelligences and things like this. But he's written a book on
creativity and he talks about — he looks at some of the great creative figures of the
time, you k n o w Picasso, Martha Graham and so on, but he says that something that is
almost universal is what he calls the creator's Faustian Bargain. It just reminds m e of
what you are saying. There's a sense in which there's a deal being m a d e and there
are big trade-offs too [ m m m ] . There are great costs in people's lives [ m m m m ] from
this w a y of operating and it is very m u c h selling their soul and then they have to keep
to the deal.
42.W1: Absolutely, absolutely. A n d it means that, e.g., [noveljtook seven years. A n d
most of the time the deal was that I didn't tell anyone. It's a long time to remain
silent about your work when you're asking people to bear with you in all sorts of
ways.
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43.CS: Yes, exactly. It's a bit like doing a Ph.D.! [laughter]. Later on I'd also like to
talk to you about this notion of infinity because it is something, perhaps in the later
stage of the interview when w e are.. .having more of a dialogue.. .But if you could
remind m e to do that.
44.WI: I m a y not remind you.
45.CS: Well if w e don't get to it, w e don't get to it! I'll run through m y checklist. So
we've got this ritual of sitting at the desk and keeping to the hours. W h a t other
strategies do you use?
46. W I : They tend to be verbal strategies. I mean I k n o w of writers w h o listen to music
and look at paintings. Sometimes I've looked at photographs of m y family. They're
very emotional m y family and therefore all sorts of stuff is in the photos that no-one
else would see but me.. .But usually it's verbal. Another time-honoured method is to
just take a book d o w n from a shelf, open it up and find a sentence.. .that u m triggers
something in m e and just keep on writing from that sentence. It's amazing h o w
m a n y sentences that are about something totally different are amazingly related to
m y mind.
47.CS: It's a bit like a Rorschach inkblot isn't it [ m m ] .
48.WI: Exactly, and even to the extent that I find a thesaurus a very useful starting off
point.
49.CS: I read a book by N a o m i Epel on writers' dreamings and a lot of writers just write
words on pages [yes, yes] and this sort of thing .. .they begin that way, and it sounds
like they are all very similar.
50.WI: Yes I've never used that. S o m e h o w getting it from other source...
5l.CS: moves you outside you o w n [yes] routines [yes] or limitations [yes].
52.WI: That's right. I think I'm a fairly obsessional sort of person and if I use m y o w n
words I wouldn't get that exteriority.
53.CS: Yes I was interested in what you said in relation to that earlier.. .you said
something like .. .if you tell other people about it you'll lose the sort of the gift of it
or the... [ m m m ] . It's almost like it's smarter than you are or more provident or...
54.WI: It's more coherent than m e [OK] and there's a feeling that it's already attached
to itself. It'spre-formed.
55.CS: O K I think you mentioned on the phone about someone was talking to you about
Plato and Platonic forms. O n e of the possibilities is that there is.. .actually there are
so m a n y things w e talk about flowing from that, but two of them that I could think of
that would be interesting: O n e is the notion of cultural discourses, the w a y in which
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they c o m e as whole units and they speak us in many respects.. .and they're infinite in
their number and their complexity. The other thing that I think flows from that is
also the notion that w e need to somehow step outside our well-worn mental [ m r n m m ]
and emotional routines and that these are limitations on us and that this is a very
important part of the process [ m m m ] . More of that later I think. D o you think in
larger time-scales as well as shorter ones?
56.W1: N o . It's very present moment. A n d I say no adamantly because that also seems
a betrayal. For example, on a very practical matter, I would never sign up for a book,
[by a date or something] by a date. That would m e a n (a) that I was betraying it,
saying 'I'm going to go public with it whether you want m e to or not' to it; and (b) it
would m e a n that I'd start to figure out, I'd jump the very complex and intricate
process of getting this slowly.
57.CS: You'd feel like it had become a type of means-ends operation [ m m ] rather than
one that has its o w n sort of pace and authenticity.
5 8 . W I : O h absolutely! I must go with it; I must not try to direct it. It has its o w n life.
It's like trying to speed up a flower growing. I must let it go with its o w n pace and
take, it leads m e . I don't lead it.
59.CS: Yeah I get a very strong sense of that with you that your creativity is not so
m u c h about you.
60.WI: N o . It feels very exterior.. .It really does feel like there is this submerged
cathedral and a bit is sticking up here and a bit is sticking up there.
6l.CS: Though presumably you have a role, but it's a later role, it's sort of...
62. W I There seems to be two parts to it. O n e is this exploration, this meandering
exploration. A n d at a very m u c h later stage I start controlling it. There's a point at
which I k n o w what it is about.
63.CS: Y o u see the patterns in it.
64.WI: I see the patterns. Quite often I'm astonished at what it has become. W h a t the
patterns are. Sometimes I go back and see that I knew the pattern all along. It was in
the veryfirstten pages.
65.CS: Yes, but you didn't see the significance of it.
66. W I : But I didn't see the significance of it. A n d I maybe even threw it aside. But
w h e n I get to that point where I see what it is, then it seems as if there's a clamp
happens. It stops. The free-flowing nature stops. A n d that's quite a grieving process
for m e , a grievous process, because that wonderful but terrifyingfluidityhas to stop.
A n d at that stage I will start to control it. Little things still c o m e and I start to see
connections more and more.

A-10
67.CS: Yes that's fascinating. In terms of what w e were talking about before about the
stages of insight, the verification and elaboration is very m u c h the end of the process.
It's not that w e can't cycle through many [yes] of the processes but at least there's a
device for breaking it up. W e have this sense in which you can't do both at the same
time.
68.W1:1 keep on explaining to people this when I teach them. I say you can't both
invent the clay and mould it at the same time [yes]. It's too m u c h to ask.
69.CS: Yes, one of the authors I'm very interested in, a psychoanalyst and
mathematician.. .And he talks about symmetrical thought which is very associative
and leads to infinity because of the notion that everything is one and unified. A n d
our more day-to-day thinking is what he called asymmetrical, which is based on
difference and distinction and which is m u c h more tied up with implications and
logicality [ m m m ] .
70.WI: A n d I guess that's the second stage.
7l.CS: But he does talk about what he calls bi-modal thought.. .by which he means use
of symmetry and associationist-type thinking in the service of more logical thinking.
72.W1: Yes. Well that comes under the second stage too.
73.CS: It does doesn't it?. Where it's like it's enriched by...
74.W1: But you couldn't have it without the first stage.
75.CS: Absolutely not. This is the fountainhead, as it were [mrnm].
76.WI: For example, in [novel], there were all sorts of things that had been discovered
in the first stage, umbrellas and sandwiches and paintings on the insides of cupboards
and things. A n d suddenly in the second stage I saw what they were about. But by
that stage I could attach a lot of other things to them that I hadn't previously thought
of.
77.CS: Yes, again it reminds m e of.. .it would seem to m e that at the m o m e n t of insight
is a sort of tightening up of our mental processes.
78.WI: Yes. A n d part of the trick is to delay that. If you saw it immediately then a lot
offluiditywould stop.
79.CS: In the words of one psychologist, you would pre-empt.
80.WI: Yes! Absolutely. A n d Jessica Anderson said to m e , oh perhaps I better not say
that because it was in confidence [yes] ...[laughter] but all I can say is that I don't
think that this is unusual.
81.CS: N o I'm sure it's not and I'm sure I a m going to encounter it m a n y times. O K .
So, you talked a little bit about managing yourself. I'm interested too because I was
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hoping that writers would do what you did. A n d that is, you didn't just talk about
concrete things. Y o u did about sitting at the desk, but largely what you've talked
about is self-management [ m m m ] . A type of emotional and social management too.
Presumably the people around you know very clearly your routine and.. .are there
rules about that...when you are writing?
82.WI: Well I guess yes. [partner] wouldn't, who's often, or who's sometimes at h o m e
when I'm doing it, wouldn't interrupt m e and he knows that. He's a writer.
[daughter] of course doesn't accept any of these rules so it's totally different.
83.CS: [daughter] is [my child] and she's? [she's eleven].
84.WI: But I try and teach her to write like this too and her writing when she does it is
very focused and amazingly mature. I was going to also add that I write by hand
[ah!]. N o w this is part of it, because it's also a promise that I won't show because ...
typing it makes it very m u c h like print, it feels public [yes]. So there's a secrecy
about writing by hand and a physicality too which seems to m e to be terribly m u c h
part of it.
85.CS: Yes, I think there's more of an individuality too isn't there in terms of.. .when
you type on a word processor the structure and layout and everything is determined
by the machine [ m m m ] . Y o u can't doodle very well on a ...
86.WI: N o . A n d handwriting, there's some wonderful wonderfully forgiving thing
about it. W h e n you type it looks like you've got to have your spelling right. With
handwriting there's a sense, particularly with some u m pens [laughter], or particular
shade of pencil, that you can just go on and on. I tell m y students to do this, to
imagine themselves, you k n o w like those posters you used to see of communist
China where you see a very strong-faced young m a n and a beautiful young mother
and happy children and the m a n would be saying O N W A R D ! That's what I feel.
Handwriting allows m e to go on, not to censor.
87.CS: Yes Because it's more like writing in a diary or a journal.. .it's more private do,
you think?
88.W1: I've never done journals or diaries, despite being determined to.. .but I think it's
privacy and again it comes into that area of being tolerated, forgiven. Y o u don't
have to stick to anybody else's rules.
89.CS: Yes. That's very interesting . Y o u do talk about 'it' a lot. Y o u use the word 'it'
[yes]. Is it like a person or is it like...
90.WI: It's a bit like a nudging, a bit like you've got a w a r m potato nudging you from
the inside.
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91.CS: Something's nudging you. It's very much like you have a relationship with...
92.W1: Oh, very much. Absolutely. I mean it's a relationship in all sorts of ways. Y o u
carry it around with you so that in ordinary everyday life there's you and 'it [yes
fascinating isn't it]. Yes and you go up the street and there'll be someone arguing
about a car and so you'll think 'oh, O w e n would be interested in this'. So you let
O w e n have, get attached to some bits and pieces of that could be interesting for
O w e n w h o is a character in 'it'. It's a bit like the way little girls carry around dolls.
I mean they are starting that process because they are saying to their doll 'look at
this' and'look at that'.
93.CS: Or indeed invisible friends...[yes, laughing] 'well Johnny doesn't like that'
[laughing]...
94.[change of direction in interview]
95.So let's talk about a time that you had, it doesn't have to be the biggest or greatest,
but a time thatfirstcomes to mind really when you had a big breakthrough. W h e n
you had been stmggling with something and you just, you were frustrated you
couldn't get it and you actually did put it aside or you did something else and then...
[clicksfingers].Can you think of one of those?
96.WI: Yes.
97.CS: A n d h o w long ago was it?
98.W1: H o w long? O h I'm thinking of this because it was quite recent... [how long?]
maybe a month a ago. [Oh O K and was it in the house here?] Where did I think of
it? I think I was in the house.. .I'm afraid I can't remember. I certainly had a sense
of.. .it was a new character that suddenly changed everything — certainly had a sense
of him in this house. Perhaps this is not a good example because I cannot even
remember what country I was in.
99.CS: Try another one, it doesn't matter which one.
100.WI: O K . All right, I've got one Yes. O K . Yes [how long ago was it?] N o w this
is for [novel] so it would have been some years back. [Great and where was it?]
Where did I have the realisation?. In a balcony in Greece... [IN a balcony in
Greece?] yes overlooking the square [what time of day was it?]. Lunchtime [It was
lunchtime. A n d were you by yourself?]. N o I was with [partner] and I was actually
telling him about the story and w e were drinking wine and having lunch and I
suddenly said: 'I know what happens'.
10l.CS: N o w can I get you to actually close your eyes and place yourself on the
balcony [ m m h m m ] so presumably I can be [partner] as it were, and were you half
way through lunch or were you all the way through it?

A-13
102.W1: I'd say half way.
103.CS: A n d you'd been telling him about the development of the story [ m m m ] . What
was [partner] saying? What style of things was he saying? W a s he...
104. W I : He's a very monosyllabic sort of person so he probably was saying m m m m
rnmmm.
105.CS: Which probably would have been perfect for you [perfect].
106.W1:1 don't need other people to say anything back but it's lovely when somebody
just listens.
107.CS: A n d you have the sense he was listening and was understanding. But, this
thing came surprisingly [ m m m absolutely]. Can you tell m e how that felt in any
way? H o w it felt physically?
108.WI: O h it's a rush! It's arash.It's almost a coloured rush.
109.CS: Yes Where does it strike you?
110.W1: A h here [places hand on chest].
11 l.CS: Yes because your hand immediately went to your chest didn't it?
112.W1 Yes its sort of gold [laughs].
113.CS: A n d were you silent when it first came or did you blurt out?
114.WI Oh, I blurted [what did you say?]. O h I would have said 'I know what it is.'.. .1
know and then I would have described it.. .1 guess in a sort of raw and embryonic
way but...
115.CS: Can you remember the style in which you were talking? W a s it, did you, a
wholeflurryof things come out?
116.WlYes. A flurry.
117.CS: A n d poor old [partner] was there being quiet I hope!
118.W1 Yes. I guess I would have said something to him when I had finished like
'What do you think, what do you think?'. And he would have said 'Well, maybe it's
good'. I've learned, because I do say these things to him occasionally, that even if he
sounds a little bit negative that actually excites me, because I think I can show them,
I can get it right. I can.. .yes, a very fundamental thing for m e — this is.. .I'm afraid
I'll have to tell you a bit of m y background — is that I was regarded as a dopey child
by m y family [ah!.. .OK]. I have a child like this myself so I can understand m y
family. A n d I always felt a bit short-changed by everybody, in the sense not so much
that people would tell m e I was stupid, but they would be very condescending and
paternalistic. Like 'you wouldn't understand this'. So I always had the sense of 'I'll
show the bastards'. So if someone like [partner] says ' m m m m . . .don't know if that
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would work', I have to say then 'Oh well! I can show the bastards' [laughs]. It's
quite confirming, 'affirming'.
119.CS: Yes, and it's interesting because there's whole gamuts from this but.. .One of
the things that strikes m e is that you, when you were talking before about not telling
people and about betraying it, and it's something between you and 'it'.. .1 just lost
m y train of thought a little bit...
120.W1 Then h o w can I say this to someone like [partner] [yes]? He's in a very special
position. Yeah. It doesn't feel like a betrayal with him.
121.CS: Because of trust is it?
122.W1 It's also that, and also he prompts a certain, by his very presence he prompts a
certain um.. .1 don't tell him what it's about. He's not asking for the big picture. I
might be saying 'look this character is a real con-man and he thinks of...' and I'm
actually thinking as I'm going and I'm not.. .it's not as if I'm on a radio program
where I would be formalising it, I guess [that's right]. I'm trying to see the concept.
123.CS: Well [partner] is in a hopeless position isn't he? [oh yes!] because he...
124.W1: He's sitting, this train is rushing towards him and, in the dark, and he's just
seeing you k n o w the front windows which are alight. He's not seeing that it is a
train.
125.CS: S o really what he's acknowledging more is your process [yes] rather than the
particular content [yes, yes]. A n d he might pick up from whatever his system of
understandings is, he must think 'I don't see h o w that's going to work', but for you it
has an entirely different significance.
126.W1: O h absolutely, which I don't k n o w at that moment.
127.CS: No.. .except that you have a certainty that it does have significance [yes].
128.W1: Yes, absolutely. Can I tell you another one time [yes!] when something like
this happened which was wonderful? A n d might actually talk about the process
better. I had been writing [noveljfor about four years and it was in, it was just before
w e left for Greece, and 1 was going to Greece to try and get the story, and there were
about fourteen kilos of separate bits and pieces [right!] u m and this was about a week
before w e left and I was on a bus. I had no idea of h o w the story, what the story was.
I k n e w that it was about a few things, love and relationship and someone w h o was
beautiful, and there seemed to be two mathematicians — j u s t things like that. A hell
of a lot of material, a hell of a lot of thinking. I was on the bus and it's as if itflewin
the window the very first line of the novel and I wrote it d o w n on a bit of paper from
m y handbag. The sense was that everything in m y mind was lining up behind that
sentence as if it was the leader in a procession, but I wasn't consciously thinking of

Aany of those bits [no, no, no]. In fact, at that stage I didn't really, I think I might
have, yes I had typed out all those bits, those fourteen kilos, but I didn't have any
idea h o w they fitted together. A n d I didn't really have a good idea of what they were
about.
129.CS: But did you have a sense in which you had a sort of, at some level a confidence
that they were connected?
130.W1: N o . I was desperately terrified they weren't. It was purely on spec. In fact
after that sentence w e got to Greece I got out this huge pile of paper and I started
colour-coding in six or eight categories that I knew — the ones I just mentioned — to
try and find if I knew h o w I could put it all together, or what the story was, or w h o it
was about, or anything.
13 l.CS: But this sentence came in as a sort of key.
132.WI: Yes, before that.
133.CS: Y o u probably are aware that in the creativity literature generally, but also very
strongly in the insight literature, most of the big insights seem to c o m e in idle
moments. Y o u k n o w [ m m m ] Archimedes in his bath; you get Poincare on a bus ..
134.W1: W a s that the one w h o stepped [stepped.. .yes] I've read this, yes.
135.CS: That's right. They were some mathematical functions he invented, discovered.
W h a t do you think it is? A n d it's a very frequent experience for people, for
academics, for all sorts of people. They work very hard on something, so incubation
doesn't have to be a long period of time, it can be, you push at something for a while.
I often say to students if you push with your essay too m u c h it's counterproductive.
G o to the fridge or walk around the block, then c o m e back to it, and often in the walk
or as they hit the desk as they sit.. .What do you think is happening there?
136. W I : Y o u get a bit of objectivity just by time. Y o u get into another time mindframe and I also think it has something to do with intuition. N o w , what that intuition
reaches to 1 don't know. The sense is that it's the thing you get is already written and
it's sort of inscribed on the air [yes]. Occasionally I've tried to see if I had any
psychic abilities and I've sat d o w n and let m y mind go just into neutral, and
something has happened that turned out to be psychic. So I'm wondering what that
connects to too.
137.CS: The possibility that there are, at the very least, modes of knowing which w e are
not very sensitive to.
138.W1: Yes. I tried to write about this in fact in [novel]. I'm just thinking about it
because I saw the play [of the novel] the other day. There's a character w h o says that
there are ways of knowing that aren't discussed.
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139.CS: It's frequently in times of extreme stress... people have these experiences. For
example, you k n o w great trauma or crisis. A n d they have a sense when people die
and so on. It seems to be fairly well documented.
140.W1: Yes, so there is a sense which I suspect is connected to that, but I have no w a y
of thinking about it.
141.CS: N o , it strikes m e that one of the things about it is that it is non-verbal, in a
strange way, even though for instance, it m a y express itself in the first sentence of a
novel or in a mathematical function. I don't think it in itself is verbal like that. I
think it seems to be more holistic [ m m m m ] and then w e clothe it as it were [ m m m ] ,
w e need to do a lot of work before w e can clothe it.
142.W1: O h yes. I m e a n this is the m a d thing that people popularly think of as
inspiration that it's, you know, you don't need to work beforehand, but it seems very
m u c h to m e that [ 9 9 % perspiration]. Yeah, and it's as if it comes as a gift.
143.CS: Yes well certainly I think we'll have a fruitful conversation when w e m o v e into
the dialogue phase because m y mind is sort of buzzing with analogies from the
psychological literature. Something I wanted to go back to which I thought was
intriguing, and I thank you for being so generous about yourself. Y o u talked about
growing up and felt patronised and so on, and it struck m e that often people don't...
there are different types of intelligence.. .and the type of intelligence that's often
valued in our culture is what Heidegger called calculative thinking.. .which is very
means-end and it's quick...[nunmm] and it's very reliable and its very predictable
and its obviously an important m o d e of thought [ m m m ] . A n d he contrasts that with
what he calls meditative thinking [ m m ] which he considers to be the essence of the
person [ m m m ] . A n d this is slower, and what he, he uses strange words, if you've
read any Heidegger you'd k n o w he uses words that he coins.. .and he calls it
'releasement'. That the person has to come to releasement [ m m m ] , a sort of listening
attitude or a receptivity, not quite a passivity but moving in that direction [ m m m ,
m m m ] and it struck m e that it's also a patience thing, about cultivating your capacity
for patience [ m m m ] . A n d it struck m e that when you were talking about that, that
what people hadn't seen was that type of intelligence in you.
144.WI: Well I guess so, thank you. I find that sort of thinking that you are talking
about is a w a y that I eventually learned to slot m y mind into but it's very
cumbersome and it's step by step...It.. .that can be very frustrating. I remember as a
child trying to do that with mathematics whereas I'd m u c h prefer to just grasp it
suddenly.
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145.CS: Though, I don't understand it, though from what I understand that when people
are very very good at mathematics they m o v e very m u c h into this sort of mind-state.
146.W1: Yes, I've been told that by mathematicians, whereas I thought it was
prohibited as a child. So I tried to do it the 'right' way.
147.CS: Yes, they talk about it in very aesthetic terms.
148.W1: Yes. It's a wonderful feeling. The way of seeing it suddenly you feel like
you're looking at the way the universe is put together. Y o u could get very carried
away by your o w n powers.
149.CS: I think so. Einstein would probably be a good example, you know. H e talks
about [its very joyful].. .muscular images is his phrase.
150. W I : I wouldn't have said muscular, but then he was a bloke. But it is full of joy.
15l.CS: Again there are a number of authors that I think of that talk about this type of
distinction. I don't know if you are familiar with the philosopher Susanne Langer
[no]. She makes the distinction between what she calls 'presentational'
consciousness and 'representational' consciousness, and the presentational is m u c h
more about what w e have been talking about.. .in terms of the medium is very
important. I was thinking that before when you were talking about writing by hand,
and the type of pen or pencil [mm]. It's the medium is the message in the
presentational mode... [ m m m ] — that w e are not just representing things. The thing
is the thing, you k n o w [yes]. The words don't just refer to or represent something
[yes], and that these two modes were always within us but our culture mostly values
the representational m o d e [yes]. A n d the presentational is m u c h more emotional,
m u c h more figurative, metaphoric [ m m m ] and certainly medium-sensitive, to tone,
[ m m m ] texture and so on [ m m m ] .
152.[We reflected on the interview so far and I explained what I'm trying to do in the
thesis]
153.1'd like to ask you n o w about your theory of insight. Y o u know, especially as I've
just said I wouldn't even call what I'm doing a theory. So just, you k n o w your
hunches or your feelings about what generates insight. H o w does it work? W h y
does it happen or w h y doesn't it happen? W h y are some people insightful and other
people not insightful? Whatever! Y o u start wherever.
154.W1: I'm a very egalitarian person. I guess I think that everybody would be
insightful if they just gave themselves half a chance.
155.CS: Yes. So do you think that often people don't give themselves half a chance?
156.W1: Yes. I think so [how come? What's going on?]. I think, I mean I was lucky in
that I was taught by m y father to do something
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157.[Turn tape over]
158.W1:1 had a father w h o was an artist and...
159.CS: A visual artist?
160.W1: Yes. In fact most of these paintings are by him. U m and ah he taught m e
when I was a very, very little child to, to silence m y mind. So that a rose w e were
looking at in the evening with a particular curl of petals would ah, take up all the
space in m y mind. U m , so I guess I was lucky in having that influence and I suppose
I think that other people haven't had such a lucky influence and maybe their
lives/minds are full of, you know, arrangements and bus timetables.
16l.CS: Yes that sort of calculative thinking that w e mentioned.
162.W1: Yes.
163.CS: U m .
164.W1: It's like a childhood thinking. It's, it's allowing yourself in a way to be a
child, those lovely states in childhood where you didn't have anything to do, um,
there was no pressure, uhh, no-one cared a damn what you did because they were
busy doing whatever they were doing. A n d so you could just poke a leaf through the
floorboards.
165.CS: M m m m . Yes that's right. I remember having a stone, I found a rock, just an
ordinary little rock about an inch long. A n d I remember looking at it in m y hand and
feeling like it had a personality, you know like it was sort of luminous [ m m m ] . U m ,
and I remember thinking at the time that I better not tell anyone about this...
[laughter].
166.W1: [laughter]
167.CS: Uhh, but I can still remember to this day the sort of.. .that sort of, u m , full
embodied type of experience it was [ m m m ] . D o you know what I mean?
168.W1: Yes.
169.CS: It was very personal.
170.W1: It's very personal and there are no rules.. .Um, no-one is expecting anything
of you, and you can just let the mind wander. A n d I guess I feel that u m m , it's very
precious to be able to have times like that in adult life. A n d a lot of people aren't
given that gift too. They really must keep on top of things. It's anti getting things
done and it means that you are sort of unsafe. I've got to be very careful not to go
into those states. It's one of the reasons I can't drive a car — because I get into those
states without realising it very easily.
171.CS: Yes, well you've been practising it for a long time.
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172.W1: I've been practising it for a long time and I haven't been practising u m , nearly
as m u c h the other way. I mean when I had a child I suddenly had to leam to be alert.
173.CS: Yes because you had that responsibility.
174.W1: Yes.. .1 had to remember I was crossing a road.
175.CS: Yes. I'm interested in the connection you see between this m o d e of operation
and the occurrence of insight.. .Um, what do you think is the connection?
176.W1: M m m . D o you mean w h y does it happen in those modes?
177.CS: Yuh, and not in the other m o d e for example.
178.W1: O h , it would never happen in the other mode!
179.CS: I probably agree, but I'm not sure h o w come.
180.WI: M m m h o w come. I guess I think there's a sifting process that takes part/place.
You're not really poking a leaf, you're not only poking a leaf through the crack in the
floorboards. U m , on a very profound level you're, ah, doing something like the
sifting process that happens in dreams I suppose. The feeling is not of utter stillness.
The feeling is of a sort of very gentle turbulence.. .um.. .like.. .yeah.. . m m m . I mean
sometimes I say to people 'Look. Most of the time I'm like a dog asleep in front of
thefire'.But I don't think that that is quite true.
18l.CS: N o because, for example, um, when you described that moment, those
moments on the balcony in Greece, I didn't get an image of a person w h o was unanimated or.. .there was like an active intelligence that S A W the possibilities [yes] in
whatever came up — not that you directed what came up. But once it came up...
182.W1: O h yes, there's very m u c h that feeling that you capture thefleetingthought.
There's...
183.CS: A n d it took you to capture it [at same time]. If someone else had
that.. .because of all the work you had done... [yes] and all the masses of information
[yes] which you've been sifting through [yes] and juggling and piecing together like
a jigsaw [yes]. U m it was only having done that that you...
184.W1: Well maybe [said at same time]...Yes.. .yes.. .yes that's probably true. I've
been in therapy and there's a time after a lot of talk where you're sitting there and
you're not saying anything and the therapist isn't saying anything and then an image
runs across your mind like a star whooshing across the dark. A n d the trick I've
found is to catch it and see what it is. A n d it looks at first as if it's absolutely nothing
at all. But it turns out to be. A n d I think that also happens with writing. I've trained
myself to catch those runaway silly images [innocuous] and see what they [same
time] signify.

A-20
185.CS: [same time] what they signify.
186.W1: Yeah.
187.CS: D o you feel as though — this probably leads to another more direct question—
do you feel as though metaphor and analogy, figurative thinking, imagery and so
on.. .what role do you see that, h o w important is that do you think in these sorts of
insight processes and creative breakthroughs?
188.W1: O h H U G E ! A n d the impact of a metaphor is something that is very hard to
spell out. It's ah, I really enjoy the sensation of a metaphor rather than actually
figuring out what it means.
189.CS: Yeah, sort of decoding it into some sort of literal meaning.
190.W1: M m m . This equals that; this equals that...
191.CS: that.. .Therefore I can see the relation.
192.W1: Yes that's.. .you lose it then. But a metaphor that allows you to.. .in fact that
seems to m e to be a part of writing. For example, the title [novel]I got quite early
and I saw the metaphor as that constantly. It was like it helped to write the book.
193.CS: Yes. Well frequently u m , I've read that that writers and other creators will talk
about an image.. .Um, I think it was Henry Handel Richardson, about a person
walking upstairs. I can't remember the details, but that this then, that everything then
seems to be fed from that.
194.W1: Attaches itself. Yes. Absolutely. A n d the really odd thing is that at the end,
for example there was an image that got m e going with [noveljof a w o m a n sitting in
a hotel room alone and she didn't know w h y she was there and she didn't care. A n d
that kept m e going for years but the image isn't in the book. I threw it away. So it's
as if you feed on it but it isn't essential in the end to the final thing.
195.CS: [laughs] I think again it was Heidegger w h o talks about ideas being
metaphysical ladders w e climb to get somewhere and then throw away.
196.W1: Yep. A writing friend of mine, Alex Miller, talks about.. .There was a method
of construction in the Middle Ages where a fake building was built outside the
building and then you built the building and take the fake building away.
197.CS: A n d the real one stands.. . [ m m m ] it's a bit like the way they build an arch.
198.W1: Yes! Yes that's right.
199.CS: It's a miracle. Y o u pull away the supports and it holds itself up. Not a bad
metaphor for doing a novel I suppose [yes!]. In the sense that it takes the last brick.
200.WI: [agreeing] Yes.
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20l.CS: N o w , what is it about figurative language do you think? Y o u said something
like you like the sensation of it [ m m m ] . Could you elaborate that a bit?
202.W1: m m m . Well it's pure pleasure! It's pleasure! It's like w e were talking about
before. W e talked about that sort of thinking, being full of joy. A metaphor that
evokes things in m e is pure joy! It's that sort of joy I get. It's ah...
203.CS: Is it something that you feel it physically?
204.WI: Yes! Y o u feel it reaching out long gentle fingers stroking things, bringing
them to life.
205.CS: Yeah. I get an image myself of somehow.. .it makes you feel connected to
things around you or something — this idea of fingers.
206.W1: [same time] A h yes. Yes stroking things. Yes connecting. Yes. That's
probably true. Certainly an awakening. I don't k n o w maybe they are possibilities.
But I'm straining to explain it.
207.CS: Well of course. Most of the things in the presentational m o d e elude language
[ W I laughs] because they are in the presentational mode, if you k n o w what I mean
[yes] and so w e need metaphor I think to translate or at least to grab some of the
sense of it.
208.WI: [laughs agreeing]. I mean I'm fascinated with metaphor particularly when I
read critical theory that says that writing is a trick, that it seems to suggest other
things some deeper underneath, subterranean thing but it's just a surface, just a trick,
bit I think well that isn't a trick. That's a silly thing to say because that's what
metaphor does and it doesn't, it isn't important that the meaning it has for the writer
is different than the meaning it has for the reader. The time w h e n writing works is
when the metaphor can resonate for the reader.
209.CS: Whatever the resonance is.
210.WI: In a different w a y than it does for the writer. A n d music does the same. I
mean nobody accuses music of being a trick. W e all k n o w that a beautiful passage...
will bring, each person will bring to it a different thing, but that seems to m e to be the
power of metaphor and if I can describe, no, if I can enter a metaphor as fully as I
can, though it m a y mean nothing to anybody else in the world, it might m e a n that
their metaphors get triggered by mine.
21 l.CS: Yes, it's something I'm struggling with theoretically. But I'm sure it has
something to do with.. .because the nature of figurative language, analogy, metaphor
and synecdoche part for whole stuff and all that.. .Um, it seems to m e that one of the
things it does is that it draws an identity between things that obviously, strictly
speaking, aren't identical [ m m , yes] and seems to help us pull apart our narrow w a y
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of seeing things. In other words w e see something as a pen, but then w e make a
metaphor that alludes to a pen, all of a sudden it has possibilities it didn't have
before.
212.W1: M m m m and that's terribly exciting. There's a great deal of emotion attached
to it.
213.CS:

[Change of Topic]

214.When you finish your books, because you talked a lot about you not communicating
them [mmm]while they are being generated, you don't want to betray the process,
betray 'it', but then you publish them and you talk to people about them. What's the
difference then?
215.W1: [long pause] I make sure that I never talk about what I meant. A n d when
people ask m e what the meaning is I say: 'this is not m y area, that's for a literary
critic. I can't tell you what the meaning is'. W h a t I can tell them since it is n o w
safely over, is the process. A n d so whenever I do an interview I usually say to
people beforehand, 'Don't ask m e about meaning, I can't say anything. Ask m e
about process.'. In fact, the very first radio interview I ever did someone just kept on
saying 'Why does this happen? W h y does that happen?. I was totally boxed because
I had no idea w h y things happen. A n d I guess I justify it. I say the novelist's job is
to tell a story. So I think that's part of it. That I'm not actually betraying it, because
I'm just recounting a historical set of circumstances.
216.CS: A n d to connect with what w e were saying before about metaphor what it means
for you, you are not betraying, because the book is going to mean different things for
every reader anyway.
217.W1: Yes. Absolutely. I believe that. For m e as a reader reading works when things
are being triggered all the time. A n d I suppose as a reader I couldn't care less what
was happening in the writer's life as they are writing it. W h a t I care is what its
triggering for m e .
218.CS: W h a t about when you have completed a novel or you are at some stage near
completion. You're away from that period when you desperately don't want to tell
anybody (I don't k n o w whether desperate is the right word but you k n o w what I
mean)...[mmm]. Are there people that it's very important for you to share with?
About, we've mentioned [partner] [partner] of course through the process, he sounds
like a perfect sounding board that doesn't distort too m u c h what you're saying, but
just listens. A n d h o w important is it to have this? Is there a social dimension as
well? Obviously solitude is important. W h a t about the other side of that?
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219.W1:1 have a couple of friends that I would really like to understand and appreciate
what I was trying to do. Not what I was trying to say, but what I was trying to do,
and if they do then I'm probably O K . With [novel]there's been a lot of affirmation
of another sort altogether in that it continues to sell extremely well and it seems to
contact people and that was a life-changing experience for m e when I first realised
that.
220.CS: H o w come? W h a t was the...?
221 . W I : Well I never expected to communicate with people . That was entirely exterior
to the whole project. A n d the thought that I might be somebody that communicates
with other people just knocked m e for six.
222.CS: But obviously in a positive way.
223.WI: In a positive way, although I was thinking about this morning. It actually
angered m e at first.
224.CS: Because?
225. W I : I don't know. I might have actually gone through a bit of a grief process of an
old identity w h o never actually got through to people and was misunderstood
[laughs].
226.CS: A n d to a certain extent had built your world of compensations in terms of your
work practice and the joys that you have in the flow of writing and so on [Yes, yes
etc.] which you hadn't really conceived of as a sharing.
227.WI: N o . well. [Have some soup].
228.[break for lunch... m y stomach was rambling!]
229.CS: N o w what I'd like to talk about — together I'd like us to talk about is more-orless an open-ended dialogue. About building on the themes w e have talked on and
using m y research as well and just to see where w e arrive. It might be useful if w e
both look at some of the themes that have come up in m y research [passing them
over to W I ] . Just glancing through them, a lot of them we've already spoken about.
I think one of the most strongly recurrent themes in the generation of insight has to
do with the role of emotionality [ m m m ] in the process [ m m m ] . If I can, I'd like to
tell you about one theorist and see h o w you react to what this theorist is saying. This
is a m a n called Matte-Bianco w h o was a psychoanalyst and mathematician and he
has developed a w a y of describing the Freudian unconscious. Nothing to do with the
contents of Freud's theory about sexual impulses, but it is a way of describing the
dynamics of the unconscious and the conscious and basically he does it in terms of
layers. The highly conscious level of awareness is dominated by what he calls
'asymmetrical' thought where things are defined in terms of differences and there are
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clear distinctions between things, and the relations between things are hierarchical
and therefore you can form chains of implication. Y o u know, if A and if B then C
[ m m ] this sort of logical thing [rnmm] and induction and deduction.
230.On the other hand he says that the unconscious is dominated by what he calls
'symmetrical' understanding. What reigns in the unconscious is sameness and nondistinction, non-difference.. .what he calls 'indivisibility'. A n d one of the primary
expressions of the unconscious is emotion. So some of the typical Freudian
components of the unconscious were things like condensation, timelessness, lack of
contradiction and all of these things can, of course, be seen in dreams. W e can be in
two places at once, can be and not be, and so on. N o w Matte-Bianco was talking in
terms of pathology, saying that when a person slips too m u c h into symmetrical
consciousness they will lose reality control and reality contact [ m m m ] . A n d indeed
can become psychotic and so on. A n d that what comprises health is what he calls
'bi-modal' thought where w e can entrain a symmetrical openness and indivisibility
within some structures, within some asymmetrical structures. It strikes m e that
insight and creativity can use this sort of scheme to help us explain what happens in
creative flow and absorption and then the movement into more asymmetrical or
tighter thought [ m m ] . I'm not sure what to say now, but it was very inspiring when I
first read this stuff. I thought 'This is saying something very important as giving us a
w a y of understanding people's felt experience' [yes]. Uhh.. .what should I say to you
n o w ? [laughs].
231.W1:1 was just thinking that w h e n I teach people, which might be useful to you
because I teach them very m u c h m y method, which is a sort of non-method, I thought
it might be relevant to you. W h a t I feel I'm doing is teaching them to push the
boundaries and they get very exhilarated by this. So I suppose in the structure that
you've just set up, they would be learning this m o d e of thinking which maybe they
would have done to some extent, but not had it encouraged or m a d e to feel
legitimate. A n d they also haven't probably allowed themselves to have done too
m u c h of it. So they are suddenly struggling up this mountain onto this beautiful vista
of plains.
232.CS: O n e of the interesting things that Matte-Bianco says is that the unconscious has
more dimensions, literally more dimensions simultaneously than the conscious, and
then w h e n w e translate something from the unconscious w e lose the dimensions and
w e distort it.
233.W1: Ah. Y o u see that's one of the wonderful things that Marion Milner says. She
talks, by the way, about wholeness and she puts it d o w n to a preconscious time when
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w e have memories of wholeness as babies. But it's a very c o m m o n feeling I think
amongst writers that the book that results is actually smarter than you are. A n d it
seems to m e that maybe one of the things that makes that happen is that when you are
writing you don't try to see the whole thing at once. Y o u see a whole lot of
fragments and eventually you put all those fragments together. A n d those fragments
of themselves m a y not be bigger than your mind, they probably aren't, but.. .or
bigger than you feel your mind to be, but by the time you get them all together it
feels like the sum of them is far smarter than your actual mind. So people think that
you're very smart.. .but you're not. It's just that you are compiling these fragments
when your mind has roved in all sorts of ways. I mean I think it is one of the
terrifying things that writers feel.. .the sense that they might be found out.
234.CS: M m m That I'm not that smart.
235.WI: That I'm not that smart [laughs] and in a way it's true.
236.CS: Yes. N o I can see that. A n d that makes perfect sense in Matte-Bianco's
scheme of things.. .that w e can't get our conscious mind to comprehend all the
dimensions of the unconscious, otherwise they wouldn't be [unconscious][mmm].
A n d being a mathematician he demonstrates it in terms of what happens when you
try to represent a triangle in a line. H e says what happens is that if you imagine
having a triangle A B C that when you unfold it you end up with a repeating of one of
the points.. .you have to have an A to a B, A B to a C, and a C to an A. [ m m m ] and
he says you get these distortions with psychotic patients where you get these
repeating of dimensions in ways that don't make any sense [ m m m ] because they are
coming from the unconscious where there is a m u c h higher dimensionality [ m m m m ] .
Where it does make sense and that people are living in that way, in that space, it
makes sense to them [ m m m m ] . It appears as totally m a d to us, just as often our
dreams often appear to us to be nonsensical or illogical. So he actually spoke about
symmetrical logic and asymmetrical logic and not just preserving the term logic for
our normal conscious awareness.
237.WI: I had a very interesting experience when I was writing [novel], and I'm having
it again with this n e w book. I'd be reading mathematics and it would act like a
metaphor and prompt all sorts of images which I would then write down. N o w I'm
reading microbiology and the same thing is happening. A n d it's as if the extreme
logicality of it, you k n o w in that conventional sense, is prompting extreme
illogicality.
238.CS: Or a different form of logic.
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239.W1: Yeah.. .but you're actually stimulating it.
240.CS: A n d this is very difficult to talk about because the only evidence w e have of
this domain is in the conscious realm. But there seems to be lots of indicators of it.
Like there's things w e need to be able to explain, like the power of metaphor, [ m m ]
or the w a y in which w e can have the felt sense of something, the w a y in which w e
can k n o w something with absolute certainty in all our being but not be able to justify
it. A h the w a y in which, for example, w e m a y love somebody, but w e can't explain
it [ m m m ] . But w e would not accept someone telling us w e are wrong.
241.W1: M m m . Yes.. .1 have friend w h o is from America, a philosopher, he's over here
studying the paranormal. There's a lot of stuff he says about the paranormal that
makes enormous sense. So it seems to m e that the paranormal by which — he's
particularly interested in Aboriginal ways of thought — it seems to m e that that's
terribly related to creativity. A n d it often makes m e think that w h y has psychology
not studied it.. .1 guess because the psychologists have not been interested in
creativity because they're traditionally people w h o are very good at the other ways of
thought.
242.CS: Yes. I think that there's lots of political [yes] and sociological considerations.
Y o u know, psychology presenting itself as a profession and being able to predict and
control [yes] and project themselves as scientists.
2 4 3 . W I . . .And it's also a gender thing I guess.
244.CS: Yep.
245.W1:1 mean, it's probably easier for m e as a w o m a n to talk about this sort of stuff
than for some of the m e n writers you'll talk to.
246.CS: Yes. It'll be interesting to see. A n d I don't k n o w the answer to that.
247.W1:1 don't k n o w either and I'm generalising hugely and writers m a y be in a
different category anyway.
248.CS: I suspect they might be 'cos they are a self-selecting group... [yes]. But there
might be styles or stylistic differences or predispositional differences.
249.WI: It also means you have to start talking about your o w n fallibility.
250.CS: Yes. This seems to m e to be something that's on the edge of m y
understanding. It has to do with — even though I feel emotions are highly
implicated, it's not just any old emotions. It's a type of rarefied emotion in a way, a
type of transcending affective way of operating wherein, if you can conceive of an
emotion as a type of stillness or calmness...[mmm]. It's certainly not a neutral — I
don't think it's possible to have a neutral emotional state anyway [ m m m ] — but you
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k n o w w h e n w e were talking before about lowered, about more spread, diffuse levels
of activation, cortical activation, it seems to m e that's correlated with your, what you
are describing as what your father taught you, you know.. .how to be still and...
251.W1: Yes. H e also taught m e something else that's very interesting. H e used to say,
he taught m e to sift, what are rippled through thoughts, he used to say: 'Don't say the
thing', — this is totally against— 'he'd say 'Don't say the thing that occurs to you
first. Put a skew on it. See what else you can c o m e up with.'. N o w that's very m u c h
against the idea of associative stuff.
252.CS: Well, not necessarily.
253.W1: It's actually directing the associations
254.CS: Sort of. W h a t it's doing is it's short-circuiting the strongest association and
allowing more remote association to c o m e in.
255.W1: Yes. It's short-circuiting the cliches isn't it?
256.CS: Yes, your habitual modes of thought.
257.W1: M m m , but normally in the idea of stream of consciousness is to go to the one
which presents itself immediately.
258.CS: Exactly, whereas the effect that has is a loosening one, eventually [yes] I think
remote associations can be brought in. So what your father is telling you to do is to
discard the habitual thoughts [ m m , m m ] which is a loosening technique.
259.WI: Yes as you say it is a short-cut.
260.CS: Short circuit.
261.W1: Yes, short circuit.
262.CS: But maybe a shortcut too.
263.WI: It often felt to m e a bit of a cheat. So I guess I was bringing moral agendas to
it. But it is still something I still do.
264.CS: A n d I like the idea of sifting. It's like the opposite to pre-empting. It's
allowing.. .Some of the cognitive psychologists talk about with artists generally, they
talk about perceptual rehearsal and that's for example, where a painter just
experiments with colour [ m m m ] , or as you were describing a reader [writer] just
reads things and they saturate their senses or their mind with the m e d i u m of what
they are working. I think this also short-circuits immediate habitual channels.
265.W1: Yes, yes. [partner] defines writing entirely as sifting.
266.CS: Yeah. But it's like you have a sensitivity to strike upon the thing that you'll
settle on. So it's not... [yes] Y o u must have some sort of.. .what's the word I'm
looking for? It's almost like a magnet, or...
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267.WI: Y E A H ! The thing that I'll settle on is got a light around it, and a light in
it.. .That's.. .1 mean, the word 'joy' keeps on coming up. A n d there's a sense of fun
about it.
268.CS: I've been working on a metaphor in m y thesis work and that is of the creative
mind as — you know when you sometimes have those public exhibitions of.. .where
they have a huge room where they set up millions, or probably thousands of
dominoes.. .have you ever seen one of those?
269.W1: No.
270.CS: A n d they fill up a whole room with dominoes all lined up standing on their
ends and they make castles and big shapes and patterns and that, and then they have a
public, all the public come in and they set it off [ m m m ] . A n d then the whole room
becomes alive as often fifty or sixty chains of this are spreading out and collapsing
and so on [ m m , m m m ] . It seems to m e that sort of what happens when a creative
person is....The preparation is intense [rnmm] and often over long duration [ m m m ] ,
and they m a y accidentally knock over a subsection [ m m m ] of their domino room and
it doesn't do the whole room and they have to rebuild it [ m m m ] . The only difference
is they don't k n o w what they are building [no]. They don't have a template to begin
with. So they have to keep going up to a viewing platform to see if they can see a
shape in it because they can't see it when they are in it, when they are doing it [mm,
m m ] . They can feel this might go with this, and this might go with that. But then
they need to back off and view it. But when they are viewing they can't do it [ m m ]
and so they have to go on back in, and so on and so on [mm, m m m ] . This process
m a y take many times. But it seems to m e to capture that, eventually when it goes
off, it has its o w n life.
271.W1: Yes, absolutely. A n d that's what you do it for. I mean it seems such a very
odd thing to do because it's so difficult, and in this country so poorly rewarded.
Even if you sell well you live as a pauper. Um.. .it's for that joy.
272.CS: Which brings m e to the question of self. It seems to m e that a different
experience of self is something that emerges in the period of insight.
273.W1: Yes, very much. It's very, it can be quite nightmarish doing these things
[because?]. Well I guess you stir up a lot of things. Y o u dream heavily, you dream
scary things.. .um.. .ah and all the time you don't know if you are doing anything
worthwhile. Y o u don't know if anything's going to work out. Y o u feel you are a bit
like invoking a chaos method where they will be a pattern but it might not be in this
lifetime. I've lost your question.
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274.CS: Well it's O K . I think what...well there's a positive side to it. Like when you
were talking before you often mentioned the word 'joy' and also you talk about being
really absorbed in it and I know that for m a n y people their most joyous times are
when in retrospect they realise they were not aware of themselves at all [ m m m ] .
Retrospectively they were completely unselfconscious.
275.W1: Yes. Time does something very strange when you are in that state. It seems to
fold. It collapses in.
276.CS: It's hard to keep track of.
277.W1: M m m , a bit like when you are sleeping and you don't k n o w you are asleep and
you awake and you say 'oh I lay d o w n for half an hour and six hours have gone by'.
It's the same sort of thing , quite often in m y 'bookends' I, it's two o'clock before
I...
278.CS: W a k e up.
279.W1: Yeah. W a k e up.
280.CS: A n d I think there's something very interesting happening here in people's
sense of self [yeah]. Y o u see what I was talking before about Theresa Amibile and
this staff about self-consciousness — and when people become self conscious they
don't perform as well [yes]. Y o u know they are checking on h o w they are going and
so o n [ m m ] , and it seems to m e that to the extent that people, what they are doing is a
reflection of themselves, they're in trouble [rnmm] because then they are always
measuring h o w they are going [ m m m ] . But it is when they can forget themselves
and just be doing the task [ m m m ] , where it is not a measure of themselves [ m m m
absolutely] that then the flow begins.
281.W1: Which is w h y you must go onward and not edit,' you are not measuring
yourself by any standard if you just go on with it.
282.CS: Yes. a type of freedom from self-concern , for example.
283.W1: Yes! I mean there's a sense in which I feel like being able to do this...that life
has given m e [ a privilege] I couldn't.. .unless I'm really struggling to pay the
mortgage, I'm thinking that I'm actually better off than any millionaire, because, yes,
you are released from petty concerns. It must be good for the body! [I'm sure it is].
I've heard that artists, painters, are among the longest survivors. I'm not sure if that
is true of writers.
284.CS: N o I think there are all sorts of other sociological and psychological factors that
c o m e into play as well. I think that very often this state of being is not frequent
enough to impact enough.. .you k n o w like it's addictive [ m m m ] because it's so
pleasant but I think a lot of writers get stuck as well.
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285.W1: Yes. W h e n it happens in a group of people its amazing. It feels like you k n o w
that the spirit is moving when it happens in a class.. .quite often I do six sessions, and
about session four, one or two, or maybe half a dozen people get it and it's almost as
if the air changes.
286.CS: It's palpable in some way.
287.W1: Yes. A n d everybody feels it and feeds off it even if they are not there
themselves.
288.CS: Frequently psychologists in the psychoanalytic and psychodynamic fields will
talk about the w a y a client's unconscious can speak directly to you and work on you
[wow] and I think they are talking about a type of capacity for empathy [right] —
that w e tend to think of ourselves as sort of being skin-bound separate creatures, but
really w e are relational creatures and in the conversations such as w e are having
there's a mingling of our beings in our conversation. A n d I think that this
symmetrical m o d e — this idea of unity and wholeness and non-judgement —

[mmm]

is a bit allergic w h e n people get it, and releases [ m m m , m m m m ] them from some of
the self-concerns.
289.WI: M m m m . Y o u k n o w a very important part of writing, of this process starting to
happen — and nearly every novelist will tell you this — is when, is getting the voice
[yes], A n d people will say 'Well what is the voice', and m y current explanation of it
is that it's a personality that you assume in order to write that particular piece. U m ,
which is connected to your personality but has things dropped out of it.
290.CS: That's right. It gives you the possibility, it's a sort of fairly evolved roleplaying in the sense that you are pretending but you are becoming something. It's
play.
291.W1: O h yes, absolutely.
292.CS: A n d what about the being absurd and tolerating absurdity? Are you conscious
at times that you allow yourself to do that? That you think if people really knew what
I was thinking they'd think I was nuts?
293.W1: O h yes! Yes I mean it's, and often you can give it to your character and so
you can have both pleasures. Y o u actually have the fun of being the character saying
the absurd thing and getting away with it and then you come out of it. In fact 1 wrote
a line for a character yesterday that I thought was so wonderful that I hurtled d o w n
the stairs because I heard [partner] d o w n here and said 'You k n o w what you just said
then!'

A-31
294.CS: Can I cut across? I k n o w you want to desperately tell m e — that's what I
meant before about the social thing. That when you get the insight you have to tell
somebody.
295.W1: Yes.. .but if I didn't have somebody around w h o was very empathefic and
didn't say something...
296.CS: Stupid.
297.W1: Stupid.
298.CS: Insensitive.
299.W1: Insensitive.. .or even something admiring would be dreadful [yes]. It has to be
someone w h o understands this process so they take it in a certain way.
300.CS: In exactly the right way.
301.WI: Yes.
302.CS: So it's not just telling anyone [no], but it's important having someone.
303.WI: N o , though a lot of people could ruin it, or actually make m e feel I was
betraying that character.
304.CS: Yes your process and the characters. Y o u k n o w it strikes m e that another
paradox that is within this all the time. A n d that is that in losing oneself somehow it
validates oneself.
305.W1: O h A B S O L U T E L Y ! There are many paradoxes and that's true. It's the.. .it's
when you are most yourself and least yourself at the same time. So those ideas that,
those ideas are totally inappropriate in a way because they are not.. .if you could
think of it another w a y it wouldn't be a contradiction.
306.CS: That's right. If w e could get to a more abstract or a higher level w e could
reconcile them. But it's the narrowness of, again it's the question of
dimensionality.. .we are looking at it with three or four dimensions when w e should
be looking at it with five or six.
307.[talked about what w e hadn't covered. A n d what time w e had left]
308.W1: I'm not sure I can talk about intuition. I'm not sure that I intuit.
309.CS: Personally I think you do. Y o u k n o w when you talk about sifting and it's
almost like...

310. WRITER 2

31 l.CS: So the first thing I'd really like you to talk about is how you organise your
writing; h o w you manage yourself? More or less consciously, the things that you do,
or even the things you find yourself doing. A n d you can start wherever you like.
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312.W2: Well there's no set routine. I always read with envy these writers w h o say 'I
get up at such and such, I walk the dog. I come back and begin writing at 9.00am,
break for lunch at 12', because I fit in whenever I can.
313.CS: Yes. [WI] calls them, she has set starting time and finishing time and she calls
them her 'bookends'.
314.W2: Really. Well, she's very lucky [laughter]. She's very lucky. O f course a lot
of it depends on whether you have to do other things, have children and so on.. .you
have to make a living also [exactly]. So it depends what stage, you know. If you've
got income from your writing, or a grant you can give more time.
315.CS: Y o u can be more structured, yes.
316.W2: W h e n you don't have that you just fit it in when you can. Certainly when I
began writing, short stories, I would do it in the evenings. I had a little baby so you
justfitin an hour or two here and there, which is very conducive to short story
writing, not to novel writing, and I think that novel writing comes from any of us
when w e have the time.. .you know longer stretches of time. At least for m e that's
certainly an element. W h e n I am.. .1 found once when I transferred to a computer
strangely enough, I would, certainly in the beginning, if I had half an hour to spare I
would run in and do it.. .I'd do something with it. It didn't seem such as big a deal as
sitting d o w n at the typewriter and starting [that's interesting]. I felt moreflexibleon
a computer.
317.CS: O n a computer rather than on a typewriter. W h y do you think that?
318.W2:1 have no idea! [laughter]. It was easier to switch on and off. It's quite an
intense experience with the computer. Y o u can get into it and out of it. It's not so
m u c h that any more, but certainly in the beginning I noticed that. M a y b e it was the
novelty of it.
319.CS: M a y b e when you type as well it's more permanent because, you k n o w it's
closer to being published.
320.W2: That's right....or it's more.. .you think more about typing because you've got
to retype. I think the computer does allow for a certain freedom in that way, you're
not getting the backstrain.
321.CS: A bit like w e were saying before that if you're using pencil you can rub it out.
322.W2: Yes I do use pencil and computer. So I do a lot of notes or some writing in
pencil with shorthand bits in it so I can go fast. That's a leftover from m y student
days when I used to do shorthand typing for m y part-time jobs. So that's been very
useful. U m , if I'm writing something I can just go; if I'm in the middle of something
I can go for a long time, you know, hours and hours and hours and hours...ah. Other
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times there seems to be a force pushing you away from your desk — a strong wind
[laughs] that's blowing you in the opposite direction. So that it's very hard to get in
to start, so I don't have a routine.
323.CS: Yes. Are there any.. .we'll talk about those times w h e n you can write for hours
and hours and hours because there'll be important things within that I think. But are
there any tricks or strategies that you use?
324.W2: Tricks and strategies? T o get myself started or to get myself going? [yes]. I
used to.. .um.. .1 found myself doing a lot of little things on the way and certainly...
running d o w n to make a cup of tea or suddenly wiping d o w n the window sill in the
bathroom which suddenly seems urgently in need of...[it needs cleaning ],yes it
needs cleaningrightnow.
325.CS: I used to find in m y student days that the inside of the refrigerator became
fascinating.
326.W2: That's very very important! [laughter]. I found myself wiping the tops of
shampoo bottles in the bathroom... [oh it really needs doing you know] [chuckling]
...so there are those little steps towards it. Once I'm sitting d o w n certainly I seem to
want to balance m y chequebook or something, do a little task.
327.CS: W h a t do you think that's about actually. Have you thought about all those
things about tidying up around the place?
328.W2: Well, it's a bit like, it seems to m e when you write, it's a bit like jumping into
the swimming pool. And, it's, you know, you are ready to go, or to get into the surf;
swimming pool is better, a better image. Once you're in it's great but it's that
transition from one state to the next [so you're putting on your suncream and], that's
right. I'll go in a minute [making sure your goggles are all right... you put your foot
in and it's a bit cold [in unison], all of that. A n d certainly with m y experience with...
so you think you are finished with something and you know, and you then k n o w that
you have to go back and do it again. It's very m u c h like you've got out and you've
got w a r m [yes]. Not that the writing's cold, 'cos it's good once you're swimming,
but you've got to get back into your wet suit [laughs]. Jump in again but once you're
in it's great. In fact, revision and reworking is something I enjoy enormously.
329.CS: W h y is that do you think? Particularly the revision and the reworking?
330.W2:1 just love it. Just love seeing the, a page like this, a white page all cleanly
printed up and then going at it with the pencil.. .and then making it a mess.
331 .CS: D o you sometimes.. .1 k n o w from m y experience when you write something
and print it out and you sort of come back to it and you think 'Oh that's not too bad'
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or there's something magical almost or surprising — the fact that it wasn't there
before and n o w it is. Is that... ?
332.W2: Well the printed page hallows the work doesn't it? [yes]. It gives it a certain
legitimacy just because it's been written and printed up. A n d with computers it looks
like a finished work long before it is and I think this is one of the big dangers with
computers. You're looking at something that looks immaculate on the page and in
fact the language is bad, you know, it's not working. But it looks good. Something I
certainly think is a danger for students. So to mess it up again.. .to really work on the
language and then to pencil the arrows to go up to here. Y o u k n o w the kinds of
deletions that you can't actually do on the screen. It's a different process. There's a
real need for a physical touch; a physical connection with your work.
333.CS: It sounds to m e that the first stage.. .your face lit up when you described the
reworking and the editing and it didn't really light up as m u c h when you...
334.W2: For the composing.. .getting into the cold swimming pool. Well it's making
that transition into that other world and can be so intense that you want to back away
from it you know? [yes but w h e n you're in there it's O K ] , but even the thought of the
intensity, and sometimes in the middle of it it's almost too much. Y o u might have to
run out of the room. It's.. .but that's not always. Y o u get.. .there are different kinds
of composing. If w e are talking about the first composing.. .ah, sometimes it's
intense and sometimes it's very plodding.. .it's not just a breeze. A n d you're
plodding and you k n o w you've got to write this scene because you need it and so on
so you plod your w a y through it and you learn h o w to make it better if it's plodding.
If it, the actual stuff you are writing feels plodding.
335.CS: So it seems to m e that one of the things you are talking about is there's a sense
of uncertainty or being in the dark, as it were.
336.W2: Resistance to the excitement [that's interesting].. .a pulling back. Have you
heard, has anyone spoken to you about pulling back from the excitement? [no, they
haven't used the phrase]...[laughing] it sounds silly [no, no. So pulling back from
the excitement?]. There's something to pull back and you also want to go forward
[so there's a sort of ambivalence]. M m m m , and sometimes it's, I mean, you could
u m , yeah you could explode sometimes with h o w it's going. But mostly it's just, just
working away isn't it? [yes, exactly].
337.CS: There's no pattern that I can see so far. But there is this alternation, of course,
between composing and then reworking. W h e n you're reworking, is it more...
338.Let m e just back up. In the insight literature they talk about stages. A n d they are
very broad stages. Y o u go through periods of preparation. N o w probably for

Awriters that means all their prior life. Y o u know all their knowledge and experiences
and things like that. A n d for an insight to occur there has to be an impasse, there has
to be frustration and and w e try all the things w e k n o w and nothing works. A n d then
w e have to find another way. A n d often it's setting it aside [that's right]. Or going
and making the tea [a detour]. Or a detour [yes] or some other thing or people
exercise or they...[absolutely yeah], and there's this moment, and often it extends
over time, where it flows and there's this sort offlurryof ideas and so on, and so on.
A n d then a very important last stage is the verification and elaboration of whatever
came [when you commit it to the page]. Yes, and I wonder if that last part
corresponds to what you're talking about in terms of...
339.W2: Yeah. Well, there's a big difference between thinking about writing and
writing [chuckling. I'm sure!]. A n d the thinking goes on around the clock,
especially w h e n you are working on something. But I think even when you are not,
you are at work. All the time. A n d I can cite instances of this... just, ah, things just
c o m e into your presence that you need. Little newspaper articles, something
someone says. They are like little gifts. They're coming at you all the time,
especially when you are working on something. N o w , so you say 'Yes! I can use
that.'. Or 'Of course!' [thank you very much], yes. It comes.
340.But thinking about it, thinking about the writing or the work is very different than
actually doing the work — a very different kind of thought process or whatever
process it is that takes place w h e n you are actually physically writing. Y o u are
thinking in a much, ah, all kinds of possibilities come up during the writing, or at
least that's what it is for me.[do you mean it's kind of organic as well?], yeah, yeah,
yeah. So things — even w h e n you are committing, say ,these ideas that you get
while you are out doing the dishes or walking in the park — when you c o m e d o w n to
putting it on the page other things start to happen. All kinds of possibilities present
themselves. So you have to actually write, and I k n o w that, that even if you don't
have an idea or feel you are blocked, it's not so m u c h going away from it, but to
actually write.. .and see what.. .It's like thought coming out through your fingers
[unison 'fingers']. A n d you've got to follow it.
341.CS: Yes, and is there a sense in that as it's 'coming out' — and you also, you said
the sense that other things c o m e from it — is that part of what you think gets you
immersed in that process when you are in it [ m m m , m m m m ] , that you have to keep
up with it almost?
342.W2: Yes...yes, you're running after it.. .a little bit like you are a reporter
sometimes... ah. With your pencil and paper just writing down. I think for most, I
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don't k n o w if it's the case for most writers, but it's extremely visual. Y o u are seeing
a lot [yes so you see images?] and so sometimes you report, you're just writing them
d o w n [yes].
343.CS: A n d do the images also come — what will happen in this interview, by the
way, is we'll keep cutting across these categories anyway [ m m m ] — when those
images c o m e do they also have a sort of, u m , m o o d attached to them frequently, or a
sort of ambience or something like that?
344.W2: Well you are in there doing it. A n example for m e is in m y novel [novel] I've
got a caving sequence where he's under the ground crawling through a cave with a
bunch of 'spelios' [what's a spelio?] speliologists [laughter]. Spelios are the ones
that go caving for fun, which 1 did as a student. So I had him going caving, but I was
actually there, so I actually recreated the experience right d o w n to the little grit when
you are on your stomach.. .the scratching on your hands and it was so easy to write. I
think it was a very good little sequence actually. I can see it's a strong sequence
when I look at it, but it was just a matter of reporting this, you know, rock on m y
shoulder. Absolutely re-envisaging the caves, but it's a different character, it's not
m e . So, I have let him borrow m y caving experience and then he takes it as his own.
But I'm experiencing it, I'm writing it down. I guess I'm at one with him. He's not
m e , I'm him.
345.CS: Yes. Well, a very important theme that has emerged in m y work, and I think
one of the most interesting, and perhaps the most important, is that in these
experiences of entering imaginatively [ m m m m ] into what some people call the flow
experience (or whatever you want to call it)... that within insight itself, and
sometimes it is an extended process over time, is a very strong sense that people have
a very different experience of themselves. Often it's qualitatively [ m m m ] different
from the day-to-day experience they have of themselves and that seems to be what
you're describing.
346.W2: Y o u feel different. I mean it's quite heady. It's just another state really.
347.CS: A n d often it's retrospective, in the sense that it's afterwards that they report
that they realise that they had lost track of time and place and surroundings [ m m m m ]
and it's almost like they 'come to' and realise retrospectively T wasrightin there.'.
But being right in there you can't be aware of that immediately at the time.
348.W2: N o , I suppose not but you also k n o w that you are doing it.
349.CS: Yes It's not 1 0 0 % but there's some sense in which.. .and I'm interested in that
in relation to where you began because you talked about the resistance to going in
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and it seems to m e there is some kind of process of surrender almost [yes, you've got
to yield, surrender. Absolutely].
350.W2: So there's a little resistance to doing that.
35l.CS: Yes. Which brings m e to something that interests m e in relation to anxiety and
threat. Or, people trying to perform, or thinking about the end product. Again, there
is a lot of evidence, and I think it is incontrovertible, that if people are writing, for
example, or really trying to achieve anything, and they are thinking about the results,
then creativity takes a nose-dive [ m m m ] . A n d it seems to m e that it relates to self,
this notion of self-concern and self-awareness [ m m m ] . A n d when that's surrendered,
it's both the attractive thing and the thing w e fear.
352.W2: Mirimm, m m m . Yes, it's wonderful to surrender, but it's quite difficult to do.
I just wanted to finish that thought about caving [of course]. I remember it then
didn't become an exact cave passage. The passage adjusted itself to what I needed,
to what the story needed. This is w h y the question: 'Is your writing autobiographical
or not?' is just meaningless to most writers [yes. Where's the boundary?]. Yes, so I
went caving, ah yes. He's going caving. I'm lending him some of that experience.
Then the cave takes shape as I need it, as he needs it, or whatever. It just takes shape
before you and he emerged from the cave and I found myself watching him c o m e up.
'Cos a cave, I used to think, was just like a big opening and you walk in. A n d in fact
it can be a little hole in the ground and you just lower yourself into it in a grassy hill
or field or hillside. A n d that's...so I had him coming out, his hair coming out
through the grass.. .so only, his face coming up into the light. A n d only afterwards
did I actually see it as a very powerful birth metaphor [image] yes image. N o w that
kind of symbolism you just can't think of intellectually, it has to emerge from the
work. A n d the work then speaks back to you and if you can pick up. So, in other
words, that was a gift to me. A n d I had to recognise it — m u c h later after writing it.
I didn't think while writing it 'Oh, birth image'. But m u c h later I saw it and I
thought 'Oh O K , maybe I can use that idea of his growth.
353.CS: Yes, often this idea has c o m e up that the process is m u c h more intelligent than
the writer.
354.W2: Y E S . W e are m u c h punier. I mean, I see the writer as about this big [motions
about 2 c m s and laughs]. Quite puny or.. .yes I quite like that word. Compared with
the world that the writer has access to.
355.CS: Yes, and it seems to m e its almost.. .it's.. .if not personified, it's.. .there's a
certain vitality to the world that informs you rather than vice versa.
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small. That's w h y you have to leave these doors open because if you don't you just
get this small...
357.CS: But you do have an important role. I mean it's a bit like as a medium. But it's
more than just a medium, a neutral medium. A s you say, you had to recognise that
metaphor[mmmm]. Which probably speaks to the preparation, which represents,
you know, your life to this point. Because not everyone would see the significance
of that head popping up through the grass.
358.W2: N o . A n d I didn't after I'd written it. I knew it was a good scene [you weren't
quite sure why]. I wasn't sure why. I knew it was very vivid. But later reading all
the drafts and bits and pieces I could see it. A n d then fiddled with it a bit. [so this is
a m o m e n t of insight of course]. Yes. Yes. Yes. A n d that's those images and
symbols and ideas that the.. .1 suppose it's the unconscious, turn up. Y o u have to
listen to it.. .you have to be [can you remember when you actually realised that this
was a metaphor, a birthing metaphor?]. Oh, m u c h later. Before.. .almost almost after
I had written the whole lot [yeah.. .do you remember where you were and all those
sorts of details?]. No...
359.CS: O K .
360. W 2 : 1 even wonder. It was at a reading and I was reading it out loud at, um,
Harold Park maybe, maybe it was about, I'm not sure... was it published then? I'm
sure it happened m u c h further along and it just helped m e jostle some of the bits,
adjust some of the structure. T o recognise that. So yes. I think that's the kind of
insight that I can talk about quite a lot.. .responding to what [well ,why don't w e talk
about that n o w then?]... [laughs].
361.Yeah. So w e talked about process. Well, you see this most recent, the play. Yeah
it was really fun. I can talk about the play m u c h more easily in a way than I can
about a novel because it's beyond me. It doesn't feel like talking about myself just
because there's a director, and actors and musicians, you know a composer. There's
so m a n y other people have made it what it is so I can talk about it with great
enthusiasm in a way that it's hard to talk about your o w n book. Also, as a writer you
always k n o w your writing has flaws in it and you're uneasy about.. .it's the best you
can do. A n y piece of work is the best you can do at the moment. 'This is as good as
I can get itrightnow'. A n d you hope that people can go for the strengths rather than
the... [and forgive] and forgive the flaws. A n d it must be flawed. A n d any writer
that doesn't know that I think is, u m ,kidding himself or herself.
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k n o w [yah]. Because, not only are there the flaws that you see , but there's the flaws
you don't see and the flaws that people see that you don't consider to be flaws.
363.W2: Yes, and they can be just plain wrong , I mean, really wrong. But you can
understand that sometimes. There's a way that, u m , you can bring up a criticism
without u m m [attacking ] demolishing [what do they say in Rugby League? 'playing
the m a n rather than the ball']. Yes, yes exactly. A lot of critics are making their
careers on that [on playing the person], yeah. However, but with the play, for
instance, so I can talk about that. I would have to keep rewriting.. .what I learned
from playwriting is that the solutions are often elegantly simple.. .um.. .just a line or
two changed and then we'd go through it and a scene wasn't working. I didn't have
to, rewrite didn't necessarily mean, oh! starting from scratch. It meant just changing
an element here and there, or a character needs more motivation, needs to reveal
more of what's going on inside him or her, ah.. .1 had to c o m e up with.. .you have to
m a k e the internal visible, external, so that the audience can see it. Y o u have to c o m e
up with things for them to say or do that reveal what they are like and I found
examples just coming to me. For instance in the play — here's a nice example I
think — yes.. .uhh.. .you don't mind h o w long this takes to tell you! [laughter and
banter].
364.1t's a play about.. .I've got twin boys of 50, twin brothers whose mother is about 70.
They think they are twin brothers . It turns, the secret of the play, the family secret is
that in fact one of them is the son of the schoolteacher w h o lived nearby and the
father had an affair and they were both had the baby, and the mother took both
babies... But they've grown up thinking they're twins . So they discover at the
end... the path of this play is that they are not... ah... so each character has to have a
story line. There are five of them. N o w the wife of one of the sons is writing her
memoirs, she's calling it, she calls it [title of play], she's remembering everything
that ever happens to her. It's a play about m e m o r y and each.. .the mother, the old
mother w h o is about 70, is losing her m e m o r y and Cath is writing d o w n everything
she remembers uhh... [and these two brothers remember] the two brothers [remember
being brothers], they go back to their school days which leads them to their
discovery. But Cath the mother is actually typing on stage. She begins every
sentence with T remember'. A n d she had to say something. A n d the instance that
came to me.. .and I'd heard an instance of this, uhh.. .there was a boy, w h e n he was
about 6, wanted to stay up till midnight, it was his birthday, and his parents said 'Yes
you may', and then suddenly it was midnight and they said 'No, go to bed'. A n d he
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only learned m u c h later that the mother had moved the hands of the clock forward
and it was really only 9 o'clock...and when I heard this story and I thought 'OH!
That's terrible'. A n d I thought 'What a terrible thing.. .it's a trick.'. This boy didn't
feel that. Anyway, I gave this m e m o r y to Cath and she says T remember I was
turning 6'.. .la la lum... 'and then I found out the next day, m y brother told m e m y
mother had tricked me...and I'd gone to bed at 9 o'clock'. N o w it's just a little
throw-away line and people laugh but the whole... I realised later that's just an
example that cropped up for m e that the whole story is about tricking; mothers
tricking their children; and also about birthdays.. .you know, who's b o m when.. .'cos
they talk about this sibling stuff, you k n o w first b o m , second b o m . This Sullaway,
Frank Sulioway study, you know, w h o rebels and w h o conforms. So, all the way
through, and I can give you m a n y examples throughout the play, and it just startled
m e h o w everything I thought of had this kind of resonance without m y realising it.
So that.. .and n o w looking at it there isn't a wasted image. Every image in the play,
and I didn't do it consciously, feeds the whole theme. A n d whether the audience
knows it or not, I don't know, but I think it must subliminally work to pull, to unify
the themes of the play.
365.CS: I think so. I think that so m a n y things spring to mind from what you've said
[that's such a small example. I mean that's just a little tiny...]. That'sright.I think
it's very apt. Because what you're talking about is the way in which something
operates metaphorically [yeah] and the interesting thing for m e about it is there are
things that can be done figuratively and with metaphor that can't be done literally
[that'sright].A n d one of the things that it can do is that it can work
multidimensionally. It operates in more than one domain simultaneously by relating
things that are ostensibly unrelated, but are.. .in a deeper sense are related [YES, yes],
and that people then resonate to that [yes] at a more feeling level [yes] have a sort of
feeling type of intelligence [yes] ...
366.W2: But we'd be lost without that. I mean, I believe w e learnt to trust those kinds
of.. .Again, they seem to just come into your hands.. .why I could've given her
any.. .1 just needed to give her a m e m o r y to show that she was remembering A n d
this was the particular one [but, which m e m o r y was absolutely crucial]. Yes, and
again only afterwards did I see h o w important that particular m e m o r y was for the
whole theme of the play and.. .many.. .there's something else.. .uhh... A n d then I
realised there's not a line in the play that doesn't, that doesn't, ah feed [yeah, doesn't
resonate with] this theme, the whole theme. She says in the, oh she's at odds with
her husband because this family has been, has got this big secret; it's affected them
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all. S o her husband has actually been preoccupied with this unknown secret, which
has affected their marriage, of course. A n d she is very irritable with him, just rote,
by automatically. A n d uhh.. .what's that she says 'men are'.. .oh, it's too complex to
explain to you this play...ah.. .Behind it all I've got the theme of // Trovatore which
is about babies getting mixed up and it's the extravagant operatic.. .1 think it gives
permission for the story to be extravagant. But other little.. .the daughter; there's a
little daughter w h o is playing out the first lines of the arias from i7 Trovatore and she
says to her mother — and they're at odds with one another —'It's rare in opera for
the villain to be given such a beautiful love song.', and the mother says 'In m y
experience villains always sing beautiful songs.'. A n d then the last scene is actually
her husband speaking a very beautiful love song to her. It's a very nice love scene
that they've arrived at, so it's been.. .and I didn't foresee the connection until later.
367.CS: See, this raises the question of.. .There are terms that are often unfortunately
used interchangeably. A n d these terms are, for example, creativity, intuition and
insight [ m m ] . A n d just to quickly.. .the w a y I distinguish them is that creativity is
the umbrella term that incorporates all of them. That this is a process, and it utilises
intuition, which eventually leads to insight. So you're working intuitively all
through the process there [ m m m m ] going with 'this feels right', 'this feels
right'[mmm], 'This is good. I'm not sure why.'.
368.[break]
369.W2: A n d certainly the insight comes after [after]. Yes [the intuitive stuff].
370.CS: So there's a certain trusting process [yes] to this sort of feeling intelligence,
this intuition.
371.W2:1 think that's what you leam, and I'm sure everyone, all writers speak about
the difference between the composer and the editor; the composer and the shaper.
Nabokov calls it rapture and recapture, which is nice [poetic isn't it]. It's a little, it's
quite grandiose.. .But yes he can say that, that the rapture is I guess the composing
and all that; so that dichotomy and h o w you leam to handle both because you can't
just have one or the other.
372.CS: A n d there's this alteration [yes] that is always there between these two modes
of thinking [yes] and they're quite distinct modes.
3 7 3 . W 2 : Yes. Y o u put one on hold; one is called the censor.. .and.. .The censor is w h e n
it comes in too early to prevent, I guess, the spilling out. A n d yet creativity is not
just the spilling out. Otherwise you've got that [formlessness] formlessness,
dustbowl empiricism whatever, just everything, and you hope it has some meaning.
So it is a very elegant dance that the two sides do and you can't function.

A374.CS: There's a psychologist I'm very keen on, George Kelly, an American. A n d he
has processes which he calls loosening. A n d loosening will largely correspond to
what you are talking about. A n d he talks about what he calls provisional tightening
where — it's what he calls the Creativity Cycle — where you loosen up things, you
m a k e connections between things that normally wouldn't connect, and you don't
tighten right up, you just provisionally tighten [that's right, that's right] and then you
let it go again [that's right]. Y o u k n o w it's almost like...
375.W2: That might coincide to what, again I can't see the difference between drafts,
you k n o w h o w many drafts; I have no idea. Where does one begin and one end? But
perhaps I've started to think of a draft as being when I've printed it up and it's all
perfect like that [points to printed interview sheet] and that's one draft. A n d then,
w h e n I get another printout, and I don't k n o w when that will be, then that's another
draft.. .but it's been.. .so that might be a provisional tightening, isn't it? [yes, that's
right]. Just for n o w [let's see h o w it's starting to look] and then you go through it
once again...yeah.
376.CS: A n d then you go back into the composing [that's right] having done that and
this forms a type of scaffolding [that's right] within which you can loosen.
377.W2: M m m m , but you can't get the scaffolding first [no] or rarely [that's right].
Although I think that each work has its o w n necessities.. .its never, it's not the same
thing twice. Just because you've written one novel doesn't mean that you k n o w h o w
to write the next one. In fact the whole process as I've said to you is discovering
h o w to write it. A n d w h e n you know h o w to write it you've got your [the novel's
done] it's thefinal...stage.
378.CS: Except there would be some sort of metaskills that you carry from one novel to
another.
379.W2: O h certainly [in personal management]. O h you leam.. .certainly, certainly.
A n d it becomes your, your work. There's a professionalism about it that you sit
d o w n and write. A n d you have to, there's always a doubt: 'Maybe I can't do it
again.'.
380.CS: Though it seems to m e , that one of the things I'm interested in is the way
writers and creative people generally manage themselves emotionally [yeah].
You've talked about the doubts, you know, 'Can I do it again?', and the fear [ m m m ]
of entering into the composing stage, the fear of the excitement.
381.W2: Yes of just boundless excitement. Y o u k n o w you could explode [yes] and
then what? [laughs].
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382.CS: Y o u see most people avoid that like the plague [yeah, yeah]. What's the
difference do you think with creative people? H o w come?
383.W2:1 don't k n o w [laughter]. Does it say, ah, you can certainly get it and you have
to find ways to c o m e down. I mean I can c o m e out from writing really spinning and
hyper and I'm ready to.. .Sometimes I don't want to see anyone, and sometimes
times I want to spin around talking and uhh... 'cos I've still got a lot of energy. It, it
varies. I really have a most erratic writing life. I can write very quickly w h e n I'm
writing. A n d w h e n 1 talk about reworking going through it with the pencil, that's
creative work, it's not edit, it's not a line edit [yes]' putting a c o m m a in [no I think]
or changing a word.. .it's a real, a real re-looking at. It's composing again...[yes it's
a different style of composing], yeah [it's not as loose]. I think it's very loose. I
think you can do almost anything [oh O K , I'm sorry yeah] with that. Y o u can cross
out whole sections, you can tuck in pages and pages of other stuff that c o m e to mind.
It's extremely, I think, veryflexible.Once you k n o w you are not bound to what's
on.. .it gives you a springboard, but you're not bound [I'm wondering] to it.
384.CS: I'm wondering though [I find it extremelyflexible]yes .. .1 guess I didn't mean
it. I was thinking I suppose of that idea of provisional tightening... [ m m m ] , and then
letting go. It seems to that the process before it is very loose in that there is almost
no censor, almost [ m m m ] . . .and that's the worrying part, it's the diving into the pool.
385.W2: Yeah. Or perhaps there is a censor at work that stops you, that stops you when
you are actually filling that blank page. The censor can stop you. It's always there.
W e have always [I guess it's relative isn't it?] got the voice of our culture is sitting
on our shoulders all the time [yes]. So that's not.. .1 don't think that as necessarily
the free-est stage at all [oh O K ] . I think that there can be inhibitions there [ m m m m ] .
But once you've got something down... you are then free [that's interesting].
386.CS: I'm still.. .1 must say I'm a bit perplexed.. .about the distinction then. A h , I can
relate to and understand what you are talking about with the reworking and that being
quite free [free and very creative], yes [because you can reject what you've
written...you k n o w you've got something you can work]. That's right. A n d it forms
lots of little springboards [ m m m ! , m m m ] as you go through them.
387.W2: .. .Ideas and images and solutions present themselves to you.
388.CS: Y o u see it's interesting. S o m e writers talk about the w a y they get
springboards... [ m m m ] and it m a y be picking up a writer they really admire and just
reading a passage [ m m ] music, paintings, photographs. So it sounds a little bit like
you use your initial drafting as the stimulus material almost. I don't know.
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389.W2: Well it's just continuous. It's a continuous process. It stimulates yet more
thought. I mean you can't have them all in the first, in the first creating. Y o u can't
ever.. .You're getting something down, but everything isn't there yet...[so it's
almost]. You're still adding to it and its getting deeper...[so the first stage]. You're
not cutting back, you're getting deeper and deeper with each draft.
390.CS: Yeah, I understand. So the first stage is more like breaking the drought
391.W2: That'sright.Getting something d o w n [forging something] and then you can
explore it [it's almost like breaking d o w n a wall, and 'Oh. N o w I can see all these
things']. Yes but that's not more genuine than the rest, and in fact it can be less. It's
just an essential beginning.
392.CS: N o , I think I understand that and it's less exciting or less interesting in a w a y in
that...
393.W2: The early stage less interesting? Yes, yes. Yes, in a w a y [because]. Because
you haven't yet found the possibilities [yeah yeah].
394.CS: So there's more faith involved in that first stage?
395.W2: Yes. Yes. It's very hard. It's very hard and um.. .to create something.. .it's
quite hard work I think.
396.CS: I'm happier n o w ! [you understand that], yeah I think I do.
397.W2: Yeah. I think it's a very important point [yes] because from the outside you
might think oh thatfirststage is all, you know, you'refloatingup there and you are
creating this and that.. .and then you get very methodical as you, as you rework it.
But it's almost the opposite [yes, I understand that and I think]. A n d it's real
important that first stage — its just the beginning of something.. .and all its
possibilities c o m e over the months and all those wonderful insights and additions and
whatever paths to go d o w n c o m e out of that.
398.CS: Yep. Because w e are so conditioned aren't w e to feel like w e have to k n o w
things in advance.
399.W2: That'sright.That's right.
400.CS: A n d it's very distressing to sit d o w n and have no structure, or what appears to
be no structure.
401.W2: M y daughter is doing Medieval, a Master's in Medieval Studies in N e w York
and her, she has a very wonderful medievalist that's her seminar teacher.. .she's
sending them into original sources. She says 'Don't formulate your questions first'
(they have to make, do a paper) and she wants them to, because you never know, if
you formulate your questions the answers you want [will be determined] before you

Ago to the material. Y o u are going to be missing everything out. A n d I thought what
wonderful advice.. .go to the material, read it, and then certain questions will emerge
from your personal, your o w n individual, unique relationship with this material. A n d
that's exactly what you're talking about, isn't it?
402.CS: Exactly, and it can be upsetting and that's w h y I guess I was asking about h o w
writers manage their emotional lives, you see.
403.W2: But just to go with that image, I think w e are also taught to think that you start
with something disorganised and chaotic and you progressively m o v e toward
order.. .and I'm saying that it's not that at all [no]. You're actually moving toward
more and more uncertainty from that first draft, that first whatever [yep]. You're
actually getting bigger and more unknown and more, u m , complex. So you are not
going from here to the final product, you are really going from here [motioning
outwards/expanding] and ending up with something that stands.
404.CS: A n d it's m u c h later [yeah] that you can really abstract, uhh look from a very
abstract level, like you [that'sright]talked about before with the metaphor [that's
right], and then you can comprehend the whole [that's right] and it takes a lot of
structuring.
405.W2: That'sright,so it's a lot of writing, writing, writing; paring back. This is your
loosening and tightening.. .writing more, paring back. But you can't get to that final
thing without having written all around it [yes which is all preparation], yes [you
know, to use the stages of insight]. I suppose.. .preparation.
406.CS: Well, what they mean by preparation is complete immersion in the relevant
domain.
407.W2: Yeah, that's right. A n d so what you leam, you're saying these meta-elements,
is this is h o w you work. Y o u leam h o w you work. Y o u leam to trust it. So that I
think comes with experience with writing.
408.CS: I agree. I don't think this is, um.. .although it draws on innate capacities
[yeah], I think this process is a learning process [yes you are always learning] that
you have to get better and better at [ m m ] . It's not like returning to some sort of
pristine state.
409.W2: The pristine state. I think first novels have an energy to them that is glorious.
That's w h y so m a n y succeed, yeah, and you just have a spirit and energy and the
more you write, I think, the more you understand or give yourself over to it. Y o u
have to find ways to retrieve that energy, which is quite hard. I don't like
distinctions between established writers and n e w writers. Y o u k n o w it's, w e are all
in there messing about together [yes that's right]. A n d you don't k n o w just because
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you have written several novels. Y o u are still at the beginning always. It's
truly.. .that's not a fake modesty, you really feel that you are the beginning.
410.[break]
411.W2: Y o u must discover what everyone before you has discovered...[chuckles] and
it goes on forever [yes]. Y o u k n o w there is no h o w to. A n d I think that the best
counsellors are, and psychologists, therapists, are the ones w h o k n o w that. M Y
P A R T N E R often talked when he was teaching in the clinical [psychology] program
that students really wanted overheads that said this is what you do... 1 2 3 4. A n d
they found it very difficult to allow themselves to go with, I guess to improvise, and
certainly experience would help you there too wouldn't it?.. .To get a confidence and
yet you have to be inventive and responsive.
412.CS: Yes, and it's an enormous responsibility when you operate in that
fashion...[yes m u c h more for you than for me.. .a book isn't going to harm any
body]. But still its the same process I think where you need to draw upon your o w n
resources and it's scary. Y o u think, you k n o w there's a tendency to want to be able
to lean on [yes!, yes] what you have done already [that's right, yes ...you're out on
the front line there].
413.[side one finished]
414.W2: Favourite writer?....And really a more sensible question is what is your
favourite book? At the m o m e n t because not all writers whose books I like, do I like
all their books [yes that's right]. S o m e books are just wonderful and others not. A n d
you'd expect some variation wouldn't you? A s w e explore...
415.CS: Yeah some days I think I'm atrocious in the counselling room [yeah, yeah].
A n d it's usually because I've not being sort of flowing with the client and open and
so on [probably just a bad day], just tired or something.
416.W2: A n d you can see afterwards, I bet you can see afterwards what you maybe
should have said [oh yeah] right, and you get that insight later. Well you can pick it
up the next session [that's right]. Yes and that's good. They can see your process
too [that'sright].They want answers from you, I'm sure.
417.CS: [CS suggests the structure of the remainder of the interview.. .reviewed the
insights w e had discussed: the caving and play examples.]
418.1 do want to ask you in particular, I think you have sort of covered it [have I given
you good examples that you can use?]. Yes [the caving one?]. Yeah I think that's
fine and the play one as well.
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419.W2: They seem like tiny little, I mean they're big, I guess when you are figuring
out structure or 'what's this novel really about? Should I divide it into?...Oh it can
fall into these three parts.'. I m e a n there are these great big questions.
420.CS: But you k n o w when you realise that, like for example when you started to
realise the metaphoric structure of the play [yeah, yeah ]. What's that experience like
for you? Y o u know...
421.W2: O h it's great. It's neat. Yes ! That's great! It's a wonderful feeling to see it
working there. A n d quite humbling in a w a y because it's as if you didn't do it
[chuckles]. It's been given to you. A n d yet I k n o w that it is m y intelligence that's
presiding over the whole thing [exactly]. It's, it's.. .I'm not just a blank medium
[ m m , neutral sort of ] yes. But w e don't have works, it has to go through. That's the
other.. .whether something is autobiographical or not, you know, it has to be passed
through the writer or else it doesn't have any spirit [yes that'sright]of any sort. It
doesn't have any life if it hasn't um.. .been given. I think of it as being passed
through somehow [yes]. It's got to have that presence there.
422.CS: A n d this sort of feeling that, is sort of, you know, sometimes people describe it
almost as a euphoria [ m m m ] you know.. .up.
423.W2: O h yes. It's very pleasing.
424.CS: A n d it lasts for a long time?
425.W2: Yes. I'm having such a good time remembering the play! [laughs].
426.CS: Yes. A n d so this is even a long time afterwards [yes. Well it closed two weeks
ago]. Yeah, but a long time after you finished writing [after I finished writing] yes.
Y o u see, one of the things that intrigues m e is that, you know, w e talked briefly
about the different sense of self. A n d uhh.. .it seems to m e that there's an interesting
paradox that happens. A n d that is there is an emptying out of self [ m m m ] you k n o w
where you surrender and you enter into it [ m m ] and the recognition that, the sort of
humbling recognition that it's not me, some sort of ego that's driving it. Yet out of it
there is a sort of profound self-validation.
427.W2: A n d you k n o w that you are the one [who's responsible] that it's yours, yeah.
Yes, yes. So yes, there's a tremendous self-validation, I mean a confidence as well
as acknowledging the flaws [chuckles] that must exist.
428.CS: Yes. But it is a curious process isn't it?
429.W2: It is. It is indeed.
430.CS: Y o u know, because there is on the one hand it's the emptying out of any sense
of self, even experience of self as you.. .like in the m o m e n t when you saw that
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metaphoric structure [ m m m ] , I'm sure you were IN the realisation of it, not thinking
about yourself [ m m m m ] or anything else [ m m m m ] .
431 . W 2 : Then I started seeing it everywhere. O h I could.. .there were maybe ten very
specific instances that I didn't realise at the time I was writing were handing, were
informing [yep], giving texture and meaning to the overall story [yes]...and that's
thrilling. H o w does that happen?
432.CS: Does this m a k e sense to you? U m . . .is part of the good feeling about it a
sensing somehow that you are connected to this, to this larger process? Y o u know
you said it is humbling, and it's not you directing it, but it's very self-validating.
433.W2: It's humbling and.. .what's the word, validating, yes. It's both. But they are
not necessarily um... [contradictories] in opposition are they [no]. Because humbling
doesn't m e a n that you don't take pride in your work. Y o u claim it as your own. Y o u
can't just say 'Oh shucks, I don't k n o w h o w this happened!' [laughs]. Because I
m a d e it happen.
434.CS: Y o u see, I guess what I a m heading towards is that it's almost like the opposite
of alienation [ m m m , m m ] . . .in the sense in which it seems to m e anyway from what
people say, it's like having an experience of being connected with their work, you
k n o w with the work, and with almost the things the work are talking about [ m m m
m m m ] . Y o u k n o w when you were talking before about the guy caving, there's very
m u c h a sense that guy was you and was not you [that's right].
435.W2: That'sright.I've sometimes think I let the characters borrow m y clothes and
m y apartment in N e w York, like you are a scout for a film set... Y o u say " O h look
I've got this apartment, I'll let them live in that one [laughs]. They can have that
room, and that view and that position.', and then they take it over. So once they get
going on their own, they can do what they like. So, it doesn't, it's not like writing
from life.. .yes. Y o u become them rather than they are you.
436.CS: But there's a bit of both isn't there? [I suppose so.. .laughs]. I m e a n there is
certainly, at the very least there is this mixing and confusing of self and others, isn't
there [ m m m . M m m ] .
437.W2: A n d that's exciting. It's, it's exciting ah...I k n o w writers w h o say they can't
write in thefirstperson because it feels as if it is them and it is inhibiting. A n d
others say thefirstperson, I find first person quite freeing, because it is not me.. .1
become that [it's a pretend first person], it's like I'm acting. Like I think of, you
k n o w those little baby suits, you put their feet [laughs] and their little arms [yes] and
then you zip them up [laughter]. I feel like I've done that. I've kind of stepped into
this person. I'm zipped up and then I can go! [laughs]. 'Where are w e going? Are

A-49
w e going up n o w ? " [chuckles] [exactly]. So thatfirstperson frees m e whereas for
another writer I k n o w it's just absolutely 'Ohhh T, I, I can't do it.' H e then writes in
the third person and it's still about him.. .he doesn't realise.
438.CS: That'sright.It seems to m e that writers play tricks on themselves
439.W2: Yeah. Yes. Y o u make tricks, you find what devices, you have a mnemonic,
you k n o w certain pictures. I put maps on the wall, sometimes I have music
playing.. .for one.. .1 couldn't use music while I was doing the play 'cos I was
hearing too much, it interfered with the dialogue [dialogue]. U m , I don't mind if I
find a piece of music that suits m e , and I just play that. S o m e people, I k n o w that
Helen [Gamer] can't have any music when she writes, it just interferes too much.
A n d yet, I mean I think w e all have to hear what w e are writing, it's also [an auditory
experience] yeah it's aural. Y o u hear your phrasing and your rhythms which for
every sentence are important.
440.CS: See, one of the things that also interests m e is, this, again, our normal
conscious processes are very linear and not very dimensional. So that what seems to
inspire and lead to insight for writers, you know, but for other people, is a, it's almost
like a fully-embodied experience. It has all the dimensions, you know, the visual,
they can hear it. Sometimes it's quite, it's even olfactory, you know.
441.W2: Well yes. It's, it's...it's unifying in that way. A n d I think, when I see, I think
it's very different from, it's not therapy. It's very different.. .And it's not. I don't
k n o w if it's on a continuum with schizophrenia. But when I've seen, read books you
know, of art works that schizophrenics.. .that seems quite different [yes] to m e . It's
not transformed or...although you can get [it's not contained within meaning
structures I think] yeah, m m m . A n d it's not.. .it doesn't work to heal.
442.CS: Yeah.. .1 think.. .see I guess w e are in stage four [of the interview] and I can
start telling you a bit about what I think.
443.W2:1 think there is a healing, even though it is not therapy.. .there's a... [oh yes.
It's good for you]. It's good for you, yes.
444.CS: I think so, and one of the things I...
445 . W 2 : Even when you are writing painful stuff, and most people are drawn to the
painful [yes] when they write, I would say. It is certainly m y experience with
students [ m m m ] . They are not writing about the happy picnics with their parents.
They are writing about the pain [that's right]. A n d it's, there's some that, I think
there is a mechanism in us that, uhh, takes us as far as w e can go at the moment. So
sometimes you are right on the area and you think 'I can't bear this' because it's not
just euphoria, it can be terrifying, very painful. Though I a m convinced for the writer

Athere is a mechanism that takes you right to the cliff edge. 'This is as.. .it's O K . Y o u
can go this far, today,' [chuckles]. A n d you are protected, there's a protective
presence [yep.. .it's like...]. It stops you falling over into, you k n o w to death, or
whatever. M a y b e another day you can go even further.
446.CS: That'sright.It's like, uhh, I think pretending and make-believe is important in
that sense because there is always a sense in which you are, even though it can be
very authentic, and the best writing is, there's still a sense in which you are playing
and you are pretending, and you are making up. A n d you k n o w the difference
between the two [yes you do]. The schizophrenic [doesn't] doesn't k n o w that he's
living in a castle in the air [that's right]. W e still k n o w it's a make-believe castle.
W h a t was I saying before?.. .Oh yes. So it's almost like there's a sort of
transcending emotional or affective stance that the person takes that protects them
through the process [ m m m m ] , do you k n o w what I mean? It's all done in the context
of that. A n d if you don't, then you are in trouble I think.
447.W2: Yes. Yes, and that also has to do with transforming experience. There are
writers w h o transform nothing. It really is a transcript of their lives and it's not
processed in any way, or understood. It's a transcription. Whereas I think that
transforming is the mark of a fiction writer.
448.CS: It's about meaning of course, isn't it? [yeah]. I mean it's about creating
something and making it meaningful without simplifying it.
449.W2: Because w e can only use our o w n experience really. I mean it is crucial to use
it. T o reject it.. .where else can you k n o w about jealousy and treachery and anger
and love unless it is from what you've experienced and what you see experienced?
So you have to, otherwise where do you get it from. Books? Literature can't get
itself from literature.
450.CS: There's a strange interplay, it's something Bill Warren, — he's m y cosupervisor, a very interesting m a n — he talks about using our subjectivity in service
of objectivity [ m m m , m m m ] . H e doesn't mean the sort of objectivism of, you know,
modernism. H e really means w e have to utilise our subjectivity, w e have no other
resource. But it has to be to m o v e beyond our subjectivity to open to what IS, not to
h o w w e want things to be, or something like that [ m m m ] . That's his definition of
objectivity, of allowing things to be h o w they are, not h o w w e want them to be. A n d
I think that really is what you are taking about in m a n y respects [ m m m ] .
4 5 1 . W 2 : A n d you have to be able to turn.. .1 think some...so there are writers w h o don't
transform, w h o are just transcribing exactly what happened to them, and I've heard
people say 'It really happened like this.'. Well the truth is no excuse [laughter] is

A-51
what I think Ellery Queen said that... 'the truth is no excuse'.. .and it isn't. W e are
dealing in a different kind of truth, and there are the ones — oh what was the other
kind? — oh! w h o are very good at seeing the folly in others. A n d you can certainly
take almost anyone and show their.. .they have veiled it and it's exhilarating to
execute on the page, especially someone w h o you are not keen on, w h o you are angry
with. Y o u can do a nice job on the page, but you have to, in a way, go beyond that.
A n d you have to certainly be able to turn that searchlight on yourself. A lot of, I can
think of...I won't n a m e names, but I can think of a lot of writers whose o w n persona
is just perfect, and everyone else is a just a bit...
452.CS: Whereas the great works really are the ones where w e find ourselves
identifying with really [yes] truly horrible people [yes].
453.W2: O r there's a, there's an ability, as I say, to turn that scathing or that
examination on.. .it's not just them; it's also us. Y o u know, rather than I have the
answers and those people are full of folly. Uhh, and a writer w h o does it beautifully I
think is Jessica Anderson w h o has a compassion beyond.. .She can see the folly, say
in an easy target, say an Eastern Suburbs wealthy wife. W e could all poke fun at, but
she can go beyond that and show the compassion. S h o w that person as a person
[exactly]. A n d she can turn that searchlight on herself and I admire that very much.
454.CS: [CS checks for any other issues needing coverage in interview] Oh.. .we're
doing pretty well here I think, [laughter].
455.W2: W h y won't you play a film actor by going up and doing something! [laughter].
I think I'll tidy m y desk! For a while.
456.CS: You'll clean some lids and things!
457.1 wanted to ask you about the social aspects of writing. A n d that is, with insight
generally, there are stages where people in the creative process don't want to talk to
people about their creative process. A n d pretty universally once they've had a major
breakthrough there is somebody they really want to tell [rnmmm] or there are people
in their life that it's important they talk to about it. Does that ring any bells for you?
458.W2: ...Yes...When I started writing I wanted to certainly show things very
quickly.. .This isn't an exact answer to your question but I'll say it anyway [it'll do].
I'd write a story and run out and show it [laughter] and 'Here... what do you think,
what do you think?'.. .to m y husband. I n o w tell students 'Look, don't show your
work to your nearest and dearest.'. Because that's a kind of censor as well, at work.
'What'll he think?'. But then I'd go to a group and w e would share stories. N o w I
don't feel a need to show it to anyone until.. .1 don't want to, until I'm finished. A n d
then I would have two or three people, I have two people in N e w York who.. .my
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writer friends there, 'cos that's where I started [writing] writing, and you k n o w I
lived there for a long time [no, but]. Yeah I lived there for 26 years [oh, O K . Y o u
were b o m ? ] here. I went there in m y early 20s and then started writing there. So
that's where m y writing life was until I came back, so that's where they happen to be.
W e will read one another's manuscripts when w e think it is more-or-less finished,
before I show it to an agent, m y agent. So n o w I have no need to show anyone. I
don't particularly like talking about it, anything, n o w either. A h h h .. .except like
this, talking about, it's fun for m e to talk about the play or to talk about [certainly in
retrospect]. People don't actually want to hear [chuckles]. It's like your dreams.
Y o u say 'Guess what I dreamt last night?" 'Oh, yeah' [mock yawning].
459.CS: Exactly.. .My wife's not interested in m y writing at all you k n o w [laughter]
It's terrible.
460.W2: W h e n you are in therapy and you are in analysis and here's someone w h o
actually wants to hear your dreams! [exactly] whoa!
46l.CS: I frequently say to m y clients you know w h o worry about being inept in social
situations. I say: 'shut-up' [yeah]. Just listen to people and they'll find you
endlessly fascinating
462.W2: That's right [laughter]. They'll all want to please you.
463.CS: Well they'll just feel so appreciated that someone is actually listening.
464.W2: That'sright...lookat someone and really listen.
465.CS: I say "Listen to where they are coming from. Ignore the words and
enter.'.. .and of course what they find anyway is that they spontaneously enter the
conversation because they have forgotten themselves. Anyway. But so...
466.W2: So.. .this is fun to talk about as I'm sure you are getting really wonderful
responses from writers [yes] because w h o ever asks us h o w w e work? Y o u know.
W e m a y not let you go [laughing]. We'll hold you by the lapels [laughing].
467.CS: Well this is one of the problems you know I'm really thinking 'How can I cut
this shorter?' Y o u know, to transcribe it. I'll just do less interviews!
468.W2: Y o u haven't heard anything. W e have more to tell you. Y o u want to know
h o w I work? Well of course! So it's veryflatteringand quite pleasant to talk about
in this situation. I never talk about it otherwise.
469.CS: Yes, I think that.. .Well that's what I was interested in because you see one of
the things that seems to m e about creativity and genuine n e w insights into things, is
that there needs to be a certain remove from conventional social trains of thinking
and restraints [ m m m ] . Y o u talked about the censor, and you don't want to add other
people's censors to yours. U m . . .but it is a communicative process [rrimrnm] and
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when w e do have a breakthrough with something, normally, in whichever domain,
whether it's writing or not, there is an instinct or...
470.W2: Well I would say I had a terrific day, or I just figured this out.
47l.CS: O h , O K . So it m a y not be about the content that you are sharing [no] but it's
about your experience [yes, yes.. .1 would say]. But then when you do find someone,
for example [my group] like this interview [oh yeah] or the group, it's very important
to share and to have the process validated, isn't it?
472.W2: M m m m ! Well it is very, it is actually interesting to think about, but I don't
think it interests that m a n y people [ah]. Although people come to those writers'
festivals and listen to writers speaking [they're packed out aren't they?] and I think
'Why do they want to hear this?' you know. Y o u just want to, maybe you just want
to look at the person. It's a very.. .That's a mystery to m e w h y people do turn up to
listen to a writer.. .who.. .the writer is often so ordinary compared with the work
[laughter]. The writer is no more interesting really than anyone else.
473.CS: But people find that interesting, I think that can be validating for them.
474.W2: Wanting see h o w someone looks, I guess and the voice.. .Uhh.. .If you like the
voice just like you like seeing the jacket photo in the book.
475.CS: Yeah, but you see I found talking to the writers very interesting, you know I
mean... A n d I think I've been careful to choose m y writers, if I m a y be
complimentary [yeah] in the sense that I'm not interested in the sort of, if I can say,
the Bryce Courteney type writers [no].. .because I think he's largely using a more
conventional intelligence and, masterfully, but not necessarily breaking any n e w
ground.
476.W2: Yes and maybe not all that aware. H e knows exactly what he wants to do. H e
says he's a storyteller and he wants to tell stories and he's not...What's he say, I
heard him speak. H e said. 'People say: h o w do you write? H o w do you write?' in
one of these festivals. 'Well' he said, 'you need a lot of b u m glue.'. I think 'Oh!
W h a t a horrible image, a horrible image'. But what he means is you have to sit in
your chair and work.. .And so I found.. .1 guess I'm actually an extremely visual
person and whenever I hear people with these metaphors I get a picture of it and it's
so distasteful! [exactly]. Certainly when I went to the U S as a young w o m a n ,
somehow American speech — maybe I hadn't noticed it here — it's extremely
vigorous in its metaphoric language [it's sort of muscular or something isn't it? ].
Yeah, the shit hits the fan, it's a crock. A n d I had great trouble at first every time I
heard it I would visualise it you k n o w and I'd think 'Oh please! I don't want to see
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that!'. But anyway, I found that jarring, but that kind of advice is what he.. .and
people really want that, the people w h o come to festivals.
477.CS: Yes, but um...
478.W2: .. .And he knows he's telling a story and...
479.CS: Y o u see, there's a social aspect too, isn't there, though. W h e n you read a book
that you really love, there's something that happens [ m m m ] in that isn't there where
you are entering into a [yes] social domain [yep] and you know. A n d presumably
you'd be thrilled when you occasionally c o m e across readers w h o have lost
themselves in your work.
480.W2: It's lovely!.. .and it's, it's this power, it's a mystery really. A n d the critical
theorists, the literary critics, theorists, ah.. .can't take this into account. They almost
want to deny it, particularly contemporary criticism [yes]. There's no talk about the
power of literature, uhhh that mystery. It's a glorious mystery because I feel it when
I read.
48l.CS: Yes because there is a tendency 1 think where they relativise everything, don't
they. Y o u know, these are all just discourses.
482.W2: M m m the word 'discourse' just 'chooo' [and we're written by discourses and
determined] that's right. A n d I suppose it's a study of its o w n and it's a useful
language, but it's a very.. .1 think one has to struggle to find the language. I think
one has to struggle tofindthe words to describe a book as the reader.. .not to have a
series of phrases at your disposal. I mean I think it is quite limiting. But anyway, I
a m not talking about m y work as a writer, but as a reader I think there is no
accounting for the power and that glorious mystery that's just wonderful. A n d if
someone does happen to get it from your work [yep] you k n o w I'm thinking of
Tolstoy [laughs, yes exactly]. Nabokov or something.
483.CS: I remember reading Dostoyevski, you know, and just you k n o w strange sense
of being transported to this country [yes] that's so foreign to m e , you k n o w the
Brothers Nabakov and the Idiot.. .what was it?.. .the brothers [the idiot and the
Possessed and the Brothers Kamarazov] yeah.. .and all of a sudden feeling a kinship
with this person's insights into h u m a n nature [that's right, that's right] that otherwise
were so foreign.
484.W2: A n d that is with us today, whereas the um.. .theorists of the time are not with
us are they? [that's right]. There's an enduring, I don't k n o w what. I'm sure it
would be interesting, a history of literary criticism on what is being said when, and
certainly w e k n o w about twentieth century.. .Anyway, what they were saying in the
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nineteenth century is no longer with us, but the works are, aren't they? [exactly] so
there is something that w e really need.
485.CS: A n d there is another social dimension too that it seems to m e one, and one that
is difficult, um.. .but.. .and it relates to the sort of critical theory I guess.. .And that is
the sense in which writers are written by the multitude and layers of discourse in
which w e are immersed. Y o u know there is a sense in which w e are written. I don't
think it is the whole story [ m m m ] , but often you know when people report the flow
of [rnmm] of creativity, it's they are hearing discourses, you k n o w they're hearing
whole dialogues.
486.W2: But you're right. W e are written.. .but it's a mysterious, wonderful [yes] thing
[laughs] and uhh.. .and fun. A n d then there is the whole politics of writing and the
whole politics of publishing.
487.CS: It's very troublesome [yeah] isn't it? I mean I guess I have a perspective on
that via m u m ' s work in the Arts Council, and the viciousness of the attacks between
people.
488.W2: Yeah, 1 feel kind of free from that in a way, but it's been changing in front of
m y eyes, and I've always thought that if you write something that's good and
[chuckles] worthwhile, it will be recognised.. .but um.. .the marketing side of things
becomes so powerful [that's right]. A n d I don't know h o w that in turn is influencing
writers.
489.CS: The other, of course, interesting aspect of that is, perhaps a less negative
aspect, is a sense that there is a community of writers.. .in the sense that you have
books and writers that have been very influential [yeah]. I mean all writers do, and
particularly as you said, books, particular books that influence you. So w e are
always a part of a field [that nourish you in some way] and an ongoing sort of [ m m m ,
m m ] conversation.
490.W2: A n d I don't think a writer has m u c h choice about h o w he or she writes. Y o u
might think Til write...' because people say, again say to you 'Why don't you write
a best seller?'. I would say [laughing] 'Oh, yes w h y don't 1?' [good idea]. Good
idea. Y o u don't have m u c h control over h o w you write. Y o u write the way you
write. Y o u write the best you can. It m a y not...It m a y or m a y not sell. N o w I do
think you can analyse some of those genre pieces and perhaps [turn them out]
produce one. But that's quite hard too.
491.CS: Yeah I would think at peril too to your normal writing [ m m m m ] unless you can
m a k e some sort of very clean distinction.
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passion, and your full attention. Not just say 'I'm just doing this for money. This is
what I'm doing now.'. In fact m y whole experience, when I was in N e w York and
trying to find ways to make money, u m I tried writing for comics, love comics...'cos
I'd heard you get $15 a page. This was back in the 70s and um, $15 a page of [just
the bubbles] script, yeah, just the bubbles. 'Oh! I can do that!'. A n d I did it...1 said
'Oh this is not m y real work.'. A n d as a result I wrote very bad copy and I mean I
kept having captions that took up the whole frame, you know too m u c h writing [yes
yeah]. It's a skill that. But I did it with condescension and they didn't turn out well
at all and I took then into the Warner comics building, I saw h o w dedicated they were
to their work and an artist had come in with a new cover. It was a w o m a n kissing her
lover, and they said 'Oh Vinnie! That's great! Look h o w you've done that kiss.
Look h o w her hair (her hair was coming down) look h o w you've done her hair.'. I
mean they were giving everything to this. They weren't saying this was beneath
them, m e , which is what I was saying. So, if you take up any of these tasks you
really do have to give it your full, full passion [yup] and even then it might not work.
But w e can't um.. .we may.. .1 feel some writers are choosing subjects n o w because
they seem commercial possibilities. Particularly at the moment, u m , 19th century
stuff seems to [be appealing] be appealing yeah.. .convict days and exploration...
493.CS: Certain subject matter — a bit like thefilmindustry went through.
494.W2: Aboriginal, convict.. .yes in the past.. .Confirming some of our, I guess some
of our ideas about ourselves in the past. John Forrest, isn't it?
495.CS: Yeah That's right. A n d the other aspect too that w e have I think touched on is,
when you for example showed m e that quote from Gadamar [yeah], about
conversation, that I think this is a very definite social aspect.
496.W2: Is it pronounced Gadamar? I'd like to know if I'm saying it wrong. Have you
heard it?
497.CS: That's h o w I've heard it [oh, good, O K ] but I don't know what the correct one
is [yeah]. W h e n you were saying Gadamar, I was thinking 'Maybe that was the
correct pronunciation', so I don't know [laughter] either [OK, what was I saying
earlier?]. The thing about the conversation as being something that is bigger than us,
that w e don't plan and w e don't institute.. .and it takes, w e get to go along for the
ride as it were [yeah]. It seems to m e that's also what happens in creativity and
writing: there is a relinquishment in individualist control, some sort of ego, you
know, structured direction-making, which implicates us in our surrounds [ m m m m ]
u m m u c h more. So this is at the deeper level, the social level I think . Almost the
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social level that includes, you know, all the reality [ m m m m ] . I felt that very strongly
when you were talking about the caving experience, you k n o w the sense in which
you merge into landscapes [ m m m , m m m ! ] as well as into other people.. .you know, a
sort of pragmatic dimension.
498.W2: It's.. .yeah.. .in that is... Yes you do merge into other people. It's visual and
it's more in the language. W e haven't really talked about actual language which is, I
think, you have to love.. .that love for words [words and the cadences]. Yes.. .All of
that is terribly, is wonderfully gratifying. So that's an exploration too, what you are
doing with words.
499.CS: But you k n o w I can still remember, I remember, I felt what you were saying
about the grains of sand [yes, yes yes] do you know what I mean?
500.W2: There was something quite frightening about going into a little hole in the
ground [yes absolutely.. .and squeezing between]. O h yes and you can get caught
[caught exactly] in the passage. So it's wonderful that they turn up for us aren't
they? Those images [amazing] [laughing].
50l.CS: [On leaving, W 2 also talked about h o w important it was that she received
writing grants.. .not only for the practical matter of being able to write, but for the
sense that one's respected peers had valued her work.. .It gave her great confidence.]

502. WRITER 3
503.CS: I'd like to know anything about the way in which you organise your work, any
strategies you use, any tricks. H o w you organise the household. Just anything that
comes to mind.
504.W3: Right. It's very simple for m e these days because since I became a mother and
a m working full-time, it's a question of creating an empty house or an empty office.
So I have to be quite.. .1 can no longer afford the luxury of the procrastinatory
processes that I used to go through. I have to really kind of hit the ground running
and I have to put in quite a lot of effort. In a way it is kind of both spontaneous and
planning ahead. It's kind of thinking to myself I'll try to get [partner] to get [son] out
of the house for two hours on Sunday morning.. .and then of course there's all sorts
of other things that are likely to come into play.
505.CS: H o w old is [son]?
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506.W3: He's six and you k n o w he's likely to be sick or [partner] might not want to do
it or whatever it m a y be. I have this plan in m y head. I'll get this two hours and then
the second that front door shuts.. .boom...[laughs].
507.CS: H o w is that different to h o w it used to be?
508.W3: Well. I've always worked as a journalist as well as writing but, until the last
three years, it wasn't full-time and it was mostly in the preceding 15 or 16 years
home-based. I worked for the [newspaper] for seven years from h o m e and so I could
go with m y creative flow m u c h more easily.
509.CS: Has that changed the nature of what you write in any ways.. .are you tending to
write short stories?
510.W3: Yes. The fiction is shorter and the novel I'm working on is quite episodic
[laughing]. So in some ways it's kind of.. .yeah in some ways I find that quite
frustrating. But in other ways what I've learnt is that I've always had quite a short
attention span. Every writer — that is one thing I learned from the [writers'
interviews books] series — is that every single writer worked differently. I tend to
be someone w h o can concentrate at an incredible intense level for about an hour, and
that's it. So to do the work that I do and to do fiction actually in some ways, as long
as I can get a bit of time to do the fiction, actually quite suits me. I quite like going
from one thing to another.. .whereas, um...
511.CS: Well this would be a perfect job for you then [editor of newspaper magazine].
512.W3: Yeah it is. Yes, particularly here you know where it's kind of ten minutes on
one thing and ten minutes on another. The d o w n side of that is that you get a bit too
scattered so that when you want to come, where you've got to go to is d o w n there
[points to her stomach] into the deep recesses of yourself you are actually dangly and
to get there, you can't go there instantly.
513.CS: That's right and by the time you get d o w n there your time might be up.
514.W3: Yeah. That's right. So you have to be quite....So I tend to work a little bit at
the weekend, at night. If I have a deadline for something I'll take a morning off work
and work from home. Sometimes I'll come in here [work] early. I just have to be
quite creative about h o w I find the time to do it.
515.CS: So let's say w e take that day or morning you take off to work at home. H o w
do you get d o w n to those deep dark recesses? W h a t do you do?
516.W3: Well, I find them quite easy to go d o w n to. It's a question of just being still
for a minute.. .for m e . A n d for some reason, which I can't quite fathom being by
nature outwardly a reasonably cheerful and optimistic person, m y short stories are
usually rather black. A n d it doesn't take m e long to get there.
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517.CS: So do you begin with a m o o d or something like that? D o you feel the m o o d of
what you 're writing? H o w does that work for you?
518.W3: Well, what usually happens is that whatever it is that I'm writing is usually
sparked by something visual. I've worked out that that's what it usually is for me.
519.CS: Y o u mean you've had a mental image of some sort or you've seen something
in the real world?
520.W3: Well sometimes it will be in the real world.. .but sometimes.. .but it's an image
created by something, either by reality or by something that somebody [has said] has
said, you know. 1 mean the other day a friend of mine and I were laughing about —
she has to go and spend Christmas with her very extended family — and she really,
really, really doesn't want to. A n d w e were talking about the things she could do that
would really shock them and I said you could hire a black male model and arrive
with him and just not explain him, like, just not explain him for a week. A n d 1 just
suddenly got this line in m y head... 'It was the black male model that did it'. N o w I
don't yet k n o w what that story is but that's a great beginning to a story.
52l.CS: It's interesting you know because although, as you say, every writer seems to
have a different method, every writer that I've spoken to and the ones I've read about
all talk about the importance of getting a central image [mm]. N o w sometimes it has
different sort of sensate qualities. For some people it can be even auditory or you
k n o w smells. But they all seem to talk about, they get this metaphor or image and
they don't k n o w where it is going to go but they have a feeling like this is worth
following. I'm very pleased that that's the case (later in the interview w e can talk
about w h y that might be the case). So here you are at h o m e and everything's been
tidied up, your world has been tidied up, or at least the doors have been closed [both
chuckling]. A n d so mentally you just still yourself? [Yes. Yes I still myself]. A n d
what do you do? I mean physically, literally. D o you just sit in your chair?
522. W 3 : Well I just sit in m y chair and I turn on the computer and I usually.. .these
days the procrastinatory method is m u c h less than it used to be, but I'll still usually
m a k e myself a cup of tea. A n d you know I might pick a Tarot card. Sometimes I'll
pick a Tarot card and u m just kind of look at it for a minute or, you know, just kind
of approach the computer sideways, you know. I'll give it a few sideways glances
before I actually go in there headfirst.
523.CS: That's interesting because.. .because you had more time before, you actually
spent more time procrastinating. This is not an unusual experience for people w h o
have busy lives to notice in retrospect [yes], but most writers have talked about these
littleritualsthey have. S o m e talk about.. .1 think it was W I talked about what she
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called the bookends of her day. She's in a very different circumstance, but she has a
time w h e n she starts and a time when she finishes and she can fit that in fairly well.
Other writers talked about finding themselves going to the bathroom and just
cleaning things, cleaning lids on shampoo bottles [yes]. Are any of your rituals that
sort of mindless?
524. W 3 : Well I can certainly do cleaning. Cleaning is a very good procrastinatory thing
for m e . I can do any amount of cleaning and persuade myself quite easily that the
house must be clean before I can write. But I really have to try and force myself over
that at the m o m e n t [because of the time constraints], time constraints.
525.CS: But what do you think that's about, this sort of...it's not just about
procrastination is it?
526.W3: U m m . . .well I think it is. I think it is. I think it is a type of fundamental
procrastination because you k n o w as a writer this thing that you do, you both love
and hate.
527.CS: Well that was going to be m y next question. W h y procrastinate? A n d what is
it you hate about it?
528.W3: Well it's the tussling and the fact that you get this image in your mind and that
it is never the same. The words are never as good as the image. So the realised
product, it's constantly frustrating because the product is never as good as the thing
you have in your head.. .and.. .so that's always frustrating. A n d also you hate it
because it consumes you, you k n o w [No. Y o u better explain that. I mean I might
have some idea but...]. Well, you, you k n o w you are going to go plunging d o w n
there and then you're with whatever m a y h e m and murder, and incest and greed and
chaos, and whatever it is that you've created you're kind of in it. So that's quite
exhausting.
529.CS: Is it bad w h e n you're in it? Or is it more the thought about it?
530.W3: It's not bad when you're in it but it's really, for m e anyway, it's really intense.
I always feels afterwards almost as if I've had a vein drained. I mean that's almost
h o w I think of it: like there's this vein in m e and it fills up and it gets drained. A n d at
the end of it that's h o w I feel.
53l.CS: A n d do you notice going into and coming out?
532. W 3 : Well again I used to more because the going in and the going out took longer,
but n o w really the going out stops. Like I mean I'll look at m y watch and I think 'Oh
m y G o d they'll be h o m e in ten minutes I better stop'.. .you know, or I'll type
furiously until the last second when I hear that doorbell go, ' M U M ' ! and the dog
comes racing in [and that's it] and that's it. It has to stop.
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533.CS: This is probably not necessarily directly related but sometimes questions come
into mind, given that you are so busy...[why do I keep trying to write?.. .laughs].
Yeah.
534.W3:1 knew you were going to ask that. Well for m e that's a really important
question. W h y do I? I don't know w h y I do. Anybody would say, and in fact
several people have said to m e 'Why don't you just stop. You've done, you've
written, you know, three non-fiction books, you've written two kids' books, you've
written two works offiction.'.But for m e this is what I have.. .this [points to office]
is what for various reasons I do to make money and because I'm good at it. I know
I'm good at journalism, but I also find it quite easy to be good at it. N o w , it's taken
m e a long time to realise that not all people do and that's actually something that I
can be proud of rather than constantly thinking ' O H m y G o d I'm a journalist and
that's next worse to being a used car salesman.', and that perhaps that is a way I can
actually do something that is worthwhile. But at the same time it doesn't satisfy m y
innermost being and so I H A V E to keep writing and even if all I do is I continue to
produce little bits until, you know I retire on the superannuation from [her employer]
or life moves on. Y o u know, I will keep on writing.
535.CS: Although you feel drained immediately after.. .it sounds like from what you
were just saying that it's also an enlivening practice for you [Oh it is. Yeah.], so
when do you get enlivened?
536.W3: Well, you get enlivened. Well I suppose, because for m e anyway, I always
have this storyline mulling over. So when I finish m y work and I do feel a bit tired, I
mean I don't feel utterly exhausted but I feel like, you know... [draws in deep breath]
you know, and I come back to normal everyday life but then quite soon after [you're
back into the novel].. .in m y head I'm back in it [the novel] and I'm thinking 'I
wonder if that really worked or maybe it would have been better this way, and what's
going to happen next.' and, you know, then I'm waiting for that next bit of
information that will come to m e about what it is I'm working on that will tell m e
h o w I'm going.
537.CS: We'll jump back a second now. Let's say you're back in this day you've taken
a morning off work... [some chit chat about owner of paper]. So you're there and
you are writing away and so then things go wrong and it's not quite working. You're
not happy. W h a t do you do?
538.W3:1 just stop. A n d since I'm usually working on a number of things I can either
m o v e onto something else or I'll just give up and that's when I'll go and clean the
house. I'll do it a different way around.
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539.CS: Have you sort of found that generally speaking there's no point in pushing?
540.W3: I think there's a point when you get to a certain stage of the book or the story
where you are heading towards the end and for m e anyway you must push through,
and then even if you know it's not working you kind of have to keep on going and it
kind of consumes you. A n d you persuade yourself into thinking sometimes that what
you're doing is working and then it's only a little bit later or a few months later - it
m a y be a day later or it m a y be six months later - that you realise that no it hasn't
worked. But u m , for m e that's when the real speed tends to build up towards the end.
541 .CS: A n d some of the writers I have talked to have talked about the importance of
reworking and that it's not a secondary process [no]. It's in some ways even more
creative. Is that the way you feel about it?
542.W3:1 think that's absolutely true. A n d also in many ways it's more enjoyable
though, because if you can give yourself over to it because you've got your structure
hopefully and you've got your main idea and you've done your scaffolding. A n d
n o w you are really doing, making adjustments to the building.
543.CS: So the part prior to that was more like going into the deep end and not knowing
what was what. Is that right? [yes, yes]. That's the bit that is a bit forbidding and...
544.W3: Yeah, well. Very forbidding. A n d then you, you know, again like with this
novel that I'm writing, working on at the moment, I was actually convinced it was
finished, you know. I was convinced it was finished. A n d it's taken a bit of
convincing m e otherwise. But I n o w know and I actually.. .and what very often
happens for m e is dreams. Dreams will tell me. A n d quite recently I had a dream
that actually even said to me. I just dreamt that I was starting, that I was working on
the novel, but instead of working on the novel on the disk that I had, I was working
on m y new, on that laptop [pointing to desk]which in fact is a fairly new one, and I
was starting again, and I had a blank screen in front of me. A n d I just knew that that
meant that I have to stop, I have to, even if I use some of the material that I've got —
which I will, but I have to actually go through the physical process of retyping it in.
[whispers]. Which is very frustrating! [chuckles].
545.CS: It is. A n d you say that the dream, this is something that happens a lot.
546.W3: Yes. I've dreamt whole short stories...
547.CS: Not every writer talks about that. I mean most people talk about...There's an
interesting book called Writers Dreaming by Naomi Epel. A n d so most writers will
talk about dreams but they vary enormously on h o w important they are to them. H o w
does it work for you? Y o u wake up and the dream is fresh and you k n o w straight
away? D o you write it down? What do you do? H o w does that work?
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548.W3: I don't write m y dreams down. I used to, there was a period when I used to. I
find that just a complete waste of time...if I'm going to be writing anything I'd rather
be writing m y fiction. So that's that really. But what happens is, well I either get
woken up in the night with it because it'll be some blinding thing, or in the morning
I'll think 'Oh, that's a funny thing that I dreamt. I wonder what that was about?'
Then I lie there and think about it. Usually it will come to me.
549.CS: Yes it's interesting because right throughout the insight literature there's this
sort of notion that people are working on some sort of project — not necessarily
writing or any sort of major project — and they work on it and they inhabit it, you
k n o w [ m m m ] . They live inside it and dream about it and so on. A n d they'd be
walking around in their day-to-day life and they'll see something that will spark off
things [ m m ] . I'm wondering whether.. .it doesn't seem to be necessary to be a
dream. It can be anything. D o you also get this experience you know? D o you see
characters wandering around? A n d you think 'Ah that's what I need or some aspect
of the person'. Is that h o w it works?
550.W3:1 think that's right because you get to a point where again that tends to happen
when you are actually working on something and it's almost like, but again, I would
see it in quite psychological terms, like in Jungian terms that it's.. .it suddenly seems
that synchronicity begins to happen. N o w which comes first? The chicken or the
egg? I absolutely don't know. All I k n o w is that you get into perhaps a slightly
heightened state of awareness. D o you create those things that are useful to you? O n
another day w h e n you weren't thinking about this particular story, would you pass
these things and they would have no effect on you? Or, are they sent to you? I don't
know. But I kind of think about that because I mean if I was working on a short
story, you know, that maybe touched on offices, I could go through months and
months and months here and.. .you k n o w I'll go h o m e and say something funny that
happened or something terrible or whatever, but it doesn't stay with me. But if I was,
I bet you anything you like that something would happen. I would think 'Right, O K
I a m going to use that.' and something else would happen and I would think 'I'll use
that.'.
55l.CS: Well in the horrible cognitive literature they'll say that, they would say that
you have primed yourself, you know, and you have raised the threshold for things to
c o m e into awareness and there's all sorts of things.. .it's not appropriate to go into
now, but there are a number of ways of making sense of that. But something that is
very interesting about that I'd like to ask you about is that — and it hinges on this
question of whether you caused it or whether it was given to you — and that is that
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writers tend to talk about, especially when they are really flowing with their work
and you k n o w they are sitting and it's great...um...There's two things that seem to
happen that seem to always happen together. There's a different sense of self
... [ m m m ] you k n o w you talked about some sort of transcending and also the work
has a sort of quality of exteriority or as if it's coming from without. Does that reflect
your experience?
552.W3: W h e n I feel that I'm doing m y very very best writing I feel it's being beamed
into m e . A n d these days that there's almost, again perhaps because I have to say 'I
must work, I must work now.', that there's almost no pause. It's like 'chhooo'
[guttural noise] and it's straight out. A n d if I stop and I listen I can hear it. The
words c o m e and I type.
553.CS: Yeah, I m e a n this seems to be very, very c o m m o n , you know, [yes] in creative
writers at least. But not only in writers. Y o u k n o w in the sciences and in most
intellectual endeavours [well, Einstein, Newton] yeah, that's right. Y o u k n o w this
sort of idea of, particularly a very high sort of abstract imagery and things like
this[mmm], and very pregnant metaphors [ m m m ] that just seem to keep emptying
themselves [yes],
554.Why don't w e have a look at one of the times when you recall that sort of
experience? Or a breakthrough when you were stuck. Have you got anything that
you.. .is a favourite?
555.W3: Well m y clearest one because it is quite simple... was with [novel] when I had
finished thefirstdraft and it had, at that point, kind of two layers. It had a
contemporary relationship and it had a parental relationship and a child relationship
in the past. So there were two things going on together. A n d I knew that it needed
something else, but I just, I didn't k n o w what. I didn't k n o w where to go with it. I
had been sort of, kind of thinking about it and I'd been wondering all sorts of things.
I'd been looking at writers that I admired, like Margaret Atwood was one w h o was
dealing in a similar kind of territory, to see what she had done and the things she
made her characters do. A n d I was trying to think of a way of putting an exterior
story line that would just lift it up above just relationships — which is basically what
it was about. A n d then I went as a journalist to the Blue Mountains for a weekend
do to a Medieval, to write about — I saw it in...see there again now.. .how did this
happen? I was sent the Sydney University Continuing Education thing which 1 a m
always sent and every year I've read it and I've always thought 'Oh that would be
interesting to do' and have never got around to it.. .and there was this thing on
Medieval Literature, particularly on King Arthur and Guenivere, and it was a
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weekend being convened by Stephen Knight in the Blue Mountains. A n d I rang up
The Age and said 'Look um...' — and there were a few others as well that I'd picked
out — and I said 'Listen one of these weekends sounds fun'. 'Cos you have to go in
there and you have to really get into it, and you have to get dressed up on the last
night. 'Which one do you reckon?' and they said 'Go for the King Arthur and
Guinevere because it will be fun to write about. A n d anyway w e wanted a picture of
you in a wimple.' so [laughter]. I did this weekend up there with Stephen and he
started talking about Arthur, Lancelot and Guinevere and about the nature of myth
and you k n o w h o w they probably hadn't even really existed despite everybody
wishing them to exist, they probably hadn't existed, and then h o w Merlin had
actually been a late introduction, in fact even so had Guinevere. A n d I was sort of
saying, and then there was something he said about Lancelot and I said 'They can't
do that because that's not what Lancelot was like!' and he looked at m e and said
'[W3] they can do anything they like because it's myth.'. A n d it was like: 'Of
course!.. .You can do anything you like.. A n d so, suddenly it was aha!...'cos I
thought Arthur, Lancelot and Guinevere — because the book had been dealing with
triangular relationships, and here you had this kind of classic one, and I chose to
explore it mostly from Guinevere's side, but really from all three of them. A n d
suddenly that gave m e a way into a whole different story line.
556.CS: A n d when you had the aha! feeling was it immediately then that you knew, not
so m u c h exactly but you knew you could project what was going to happen. Or was
it more precisely that you just had a subjective sense of confidence you saw it? Y o u
k n o w what I mean? W a s it later that the pieces really started to click together or was
it all there and then?
557.W3: O h at the time it was so extreme that I thought 'If I had a typewriter or a
computer (I can't even remember if I was on computers by then... I think I was) if I
had a computer here I could write it now.'. But of course then, ah so I was euphoric
— but then of course reality does actually hit in and then you start working on it and
you think is this, was this really such a great idea [exactly, yeah], you know. A n d
then gradually, you know, Guinevere became somebody w h o got terribly bad P M T
and Arthur was not terribly sympathetic. Lancelot was m u c h more sympathetic.
Y o u k n o w Merlin kept busily trying to tell everyone there was disaster portending
and nobody taking any notice [chuckles] and I began to really enjoy that [chuckles].
558.CS: Yes. N o w you see thatfitsin perfectly. I mean the standard stuff in the
literature is about, you know, that w e do all this preparation, in whatever form,
research, writing, anything you know. A n d then w e get to a point where w e just get

Astuck [ m m ] , which they call impasse, and then supposedly the problem enters a
period they, they call incubation [ m m m ] . Y o u know, which is a stupid term but we'll
just use it because they do. I don't like incubation because it suggests nothing m u c h
is happening [yes] and I don't think that's the case, I think there's a lot going on. Ah,
maybe not consciously. Anyway, then comes the insight. N o w often insights are
wrong, they can't really be wrong in literature, but you k n o w what I mean [yes].
They don't work [No, but they give you a way through that impasse to begin with],
that's right, and then you get to another impasse [yes] and there are cycles of
creativity. A n d then there's this period of elaboration and verification, you know,
and then presumably more and more problems and ongoing things. N o w that one is
interesting because you got stopped, didn't you? Y o u were there and you had the
euphoria, and as you said if you had the laptop you would have been straight on it.
Can you recall ones where you did have the availability or you were by yourself or
you could jump?
559.W3: U m , I think well something very strange again and it goes back to the end of
the story, something very strange happens to m e at the end of stories. Because I'll
get stack three or four paragraphs before the end of a story and I won't k n o w h o w it's
going to end [it's always a problem isn't it, ending?] and somehow it's almost like
they getfinishedfor me.
560.CS: So you write something and you see in what you have written that that's the
w a y it should be or...
561.W3: Yes. Usually the ending are absolutely right. But if anybody had said to m e
'What do you think the ending to this story will be?', it wouldn't be what has been
chosen for it by whoever! M e or them [chuckles].
562.CS: Y o u see I'm very interested in (the stages of this interview are n o w starting to
merge).. .I'm very interested in what in c o m m o n language w e call intuition as a sort
of precursor to insight [yes]. And, ah, see what do you think intuition is, for
example? Y o u k n o w what's your gut feeling about it?
563.W3: Well when you say gut feeling that's exactly what I think it is. I mean I think
that's the intuition, um. People w h o are in touch with their intuition are generally
reasonably in touch with their feelings, I think, and u m , intuition is not thinking.
A n d it's very hard to describe what it is, but it's not logic and it's not thinking and
it's not going in a straight line.
564.CS: But it's not illogic either, I mean it has a logic of its own.
565.W3: O h ! it has a logic of its o w n but sometimes it's completely illogical and the
only thing. I mean I've found that working here in journalism where I have to make
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very instantaneous decisions has actually heightened m y intuition which I hope one
day will benefit m y writing w h e n I ever get time to do it because I'll be presented
with what appears to be an insurmountable problem.. .and what I've actually had to
learn to do is to instantly find that still place and just go in there and sometimes I'll
say to them all 'Just shut-up and let m e think.', you know, 'Stop telling m e this and
this and this and this and let m e think.'. A n d I'll just literally go in and c o m e out
with the answer.
566.CS: A n d you'd be very hard-pressed to explain h o w or w h y [very hard-pressed].
M a y b e subsequently you could trace the paths.
567.W3: Yes but at the time you can't, um...
568.CS: There's actually some encouraging research on this sort of stuff at the m o m e n t
about slowing the mind d o w n [yes]. There's a guy called Claxton who's written a
couple of books. One's called — it's a great n a m e too — Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind
[ohright...that's very good, I like that]. A n d the idea is that when w e really need
to...when w e are stuck with something or when w e are confronted with a very illdefined problem, something that does not necessarily have an answer — it m a y not
even have any answer — that w e have to enter what Heidegger calls a more
meditative state which is most like a.. .instead of, he says, rather than w e are waiting
for something to happen [ m m m ] (in the sense that w e are projecting some sort of
outcome), he calls it a waiting upon [ m m m ] and so it's like, u m , he uses the word
'releasement', for example, whatever turns up we'll be happy with sort of thing [yes],
rather than trying to k n o w in advance I suppose. A n d it seems to m e that this has
been c o m m o n across all the writers that I have spoken to and it's very strongly a part
of the work that I'm interested in.
569. Y o u mentioned feelings before. W h e n you're right into the writing process — this
is going to be a sort of trick question really, because I reckon you are probably fairly
non-selfconscious when you are in that [miiimmm], yet at the same time there's some
part of you that knows, is still keeping the sense of self together and is working
through your feelings. Can you sort of? Does that give you enough of a ramp to ran
up there to say something about that?
570.W3: Ahh, it's a bit hard [it is]. It's very hard to describe it, you know, it's very
hard to describe it. It's the same thing as writing. It's the same feeling I get if I'm
writing a good piece of journalism. I mean they are not that far removed.
Um... [yeah I don't think it matters what you are doing in creativity]. Yeah. It's
definitely harder and more complex when you are doing the fiction. Journalism has a
different set of rules and things [that's right it has a tighter structure] and a tighter
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structure and it's not as long and all of that sort of stuff and it has certain rules that it
follows. But, um.. .1 suppose.. .1 don't know, that's a very, really really hard
question to ask [I know]. It's almost impossible to define it and that's w h y again is
that thing that it does actually finally come d o w n to which I hope scientists never
find a reason for.. .is why people have to write and w h y they have to paint. A n d I
think it would be a terrible thing to k n o w that... [because??] because there must be
some things in this universe that w e don't k n o w about. A n d I think h o w the creative
spirit worked should be one of them [chuckles].
57l.CS: Well I guess m y view on that, 'cos I came to psychology fairly late from a
humanistic sort of background, but it seems to m e that one of the things is w e k n o w
bugger all really. Y o u know, either as scientists or as people generally. Y o u k n o w
w e are confronted with impossible complexities. A n d I think one of the — oh G o d
this has opened up a can of w o r m s hasn't it! — I think originally h u m a n beings
operated in terms of feelings, and there's a lot of evidence from all sorts of quarters
that the mind began in our emotional [ m m m ] ways of fitting in with the world around
us and then later language developed. A n d then w e developed what w e call thinking
[ m m m ] , but it's not like w e weren't thinking before [no], it's just a very different
style of thinking. W h a t were w e just saying? [reminds m e about not wanting to
define the creative spirit too much]. O h yeah. I'm not worried about that because it
seems to m e that things are so complex, you see it's the very complexity of things
that requires this w a y of operating. D o you k n o w what I mean? I think it is enough
for us to say that, for m e it would be enough to say, for example, that if w e didn't
operate in that way, we'd be up shit creek. The other m o d e of operation is very
important [you're talking about logic...yes], logic and control and day-to-day stuff.
It's very important. Y o u don't want as they say creative airline pilots... [but the best
airline pilots will be creative, though you see] only when things go wrong.
572.W3: Yes but that's what's been b o m e out in business study after business study, is
that the really good C E O s the really good managing directors, they are all highly
creative [exactly] and they all rate intuition as their number one asset [exactly] and
they make, they talk about their dealing with millions and millions of dollars — I
mean I've been reading about them because suddenly m y reading has become about,
you know, shares and Business Review Weekly and things, but you read about some
of these guys and the ones that are really interesting to read about are the ones w h o
say 'Well yeah, O K it was a 50 million dollar decision but 1 had to go on m y gut
feeling. That's the only thing I can use.'.
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573.CS: That's right and also this notion that they sort of take a game-like attitude to it
[yes] where it is 'Yeah that felt right, you know, I should win nine times out of ten if
I keep doing that. I'll lose occasionally.'.
574.W3: Yes. So I think that that's really, um, I suppose that what I'm saying is that...
575.CS: I think I k n o w what you are saying. Y o u don't want, you hope that no-one
ever comes and puts creativity into a box.
576.W3: N o , because you can't. A n d the other thing is that you actually.. .and in a
sense that is w h y human beings are wonderful because they defy that. Because you
could sit d o w n and you could and you could say to somebody 'Now this is h o w you
write a novel. This is h o w you do it.'. Y o u could give them, you could be Tolstoy or
somebody and you could give them in very direct terms: 'This is what you should do,
this is what you should do with your characters, this is h o w you do.'. A n d you could
even take somebody w h o is a really good writer and do that, and you won't produce a
novelist [that'sright].So these complex things that exist that are, I think one's
childhood is very important to whether you become a writer or not, or a creative
person, let's say. Y o u know the kind of nurturing or lack of it that you receive. Your
o w n kind of personality, your o w n talents.
577.CS: Just let m e jump in there. Not everybody is a writer or not everyone is as
creative as everyone else [no]. Not everybody is very comfortable in doing what you
are describing, for example, going down within yourself...or quietening right down.
Have you got any theories as to w h y that might be the case? [why they don't], yeah!
w h y doesn't everybody do that?
578.W3: laughs] U m m u m m . . .1 don't know h o w to put this without sounding [oh well
just say it. No-one else is going to hear this]. Well I was in therapy for 15 years
right [in Jungian?], no mostly behavioural. But a bit of Jungian towards the end [oh
O K ] and um...and I've leamt a lot through all sorts of, 1 mean 1 read, or used to read a
lot, of psychology and in all its forms and psychotherapy. A n d I think one of the
things that happens, I hope in that process, if you become, I hope, in quotes 'a
healthy or healthy-ish' human being is that you leam not to be too defensive and you
leam not to be scared of the dark side, and you leam that you are not perfect and that
you never will be. A n d those are probably very big things that you went into therapy
in thefirstplace for because you probably were extremely defensive and very
frightened of the dark side and thought you ought to be perfect. A n d when you face
those things then you find that you can; you almost replace the nurturing you didn't
get with self-nurturing, and then you are able to operate from a basis where — you
k n o w one thing I noticed working with these people here, and I mean that they are all

A-70
actually terrific, and it's a really nice team, but h o w hard one of them will find it to
say sorry if they've m a d e a mistake. They find it incredibly hard. Whereas for m e if
I've stuffed up, I'll go right out there and I'll say 'Listen guys I'm really really sorry
but I've stuffed up'. N o w I'm not saying — that's what I'm saying I don't want to
sound arrogant — I'm not saying that this is a, that I'm wonderful and they're not.
Quite the reverse in a sense. I'm just saying that sometimes, for whatever reason,
some people are more able to, look in there. A n d for m e it's those reasons.
579.CS: Yes I think that sort of touches on it. Y o u see, the thing that's always present
w h e n people are in a creative state of mind is the lack of self-concern [yes] and they
are not afraid [no]. A n d it seems that when w e take away people's fear that they
automatically become more spontaneous and creative, and one of the things that w e
have been taught to fear from a very early age — young children don't necessarily
fear it, they can though — is being confronted by things that w e don't understand
[rnmm]; being in the midst of things of such dimensionality that w e can't just, you
know. We've been taught, you k n o w our schooling, that what w e have to do is to
control it [ m m m ] and fit it into some.. .And I think this is something w e do have to
leam as well, even though there is a certain natural spontaneity, a sort of
childlikeness. W e have to relearn it in lots of ways. It's sort of like paradise
regained isn't it? [ m m m ] where you have to leam to be able to go into that sort of
void, that openness [ m m m ] . There's a contemporary theorist called Matte-Bianco, a
psychoanalyst of the sort of later types. But he's also a mathematician. A n d he's
tried to work out what the system unconscious was about. O n e of the things he says
is that emotions belong emotion in the unconscious. A n d the thing about the
unconscious that makes it unconscious is that it works in more than three dimensions
plus time. So our normal operating, you know, is height, length, width plus a flow of
things over time. A n d w e can handle that consciously. But he says that all — and he
has aboutfivestrata of consciousness — he says all the lower ones increasingly
become more and more dimensional. A n d he says that metaphor finds its h o m e in
the unconscious because it operates simultaneously across dimensions. Y o u know,
w h e n you talked about an image before, when you get an image that forms the basis
of the work, what I hear is something working multidimensionally [ m m m ] . But, of
course, w h e n w e are worried about understanding, w e are going to steer away from
things that are multidimensional. I think that is the realm of [ m m m ] intuition. It's
not unstructured. In fact in a w a y it's got more structure than w e can handle [ m m m ] .
580.[discuss progress of interview]

A581.W3: Y o u want to talk about the nature and genesis of creative insight? Because, I
do think that, um.. .1 was having a few thoughts about that. I mean I do think maybe
in this sense it is only — this is a personal thing [ m m , that's what I want], but 1 think
that for m e that W 2 talked in the (interview) series about, you know, as a writer you
come against this outcrop of shale coming up again and again and again, you know,
and then it means something. A n d it's something that has to be sort of looked at.
A n d I think that, you know, for m e there's something, and I think a lot of writers
would say this too, that as a child you are quite aware of being in some way different
[yes] and certainly that is something that I think is very strong. That, u m , you know,
as a child I felt odd often, and I felt that I was observing things in a very different
way to other people, and I often felt quite alienated from the everyday world. So I
think that that's often, you know, perhaps creative people are b o m not made, you
know, I don't know. Then it depends probably on what happens after [that's right
whether that propensity is given scope, opportunity and encouragement and so on]
yeah.
582.CS: Encouragement and so on...Yeah W 2 , no actually W I , talked about the way
her father nurtured that in her.
583.W3: M m m m . Well you see I got the reverse. I got a lack of nurturing in a major
way, and so for me.. .and yet somehow I always knew I would be a writer.
Somebody asked m e when I wasfivewhat I was going to do and I said I was going
to write books and, u m , breed horses and live in the country. That's what I said.
584.CS: Well, one out of three isn't bad.
585.W3: O n e out of three.. .and Iride![Points to picture ] That's m e riding
etc....[describesridingin wild country in the rain ].. .But it was really.. .that was
great. I mean I don't yet know even what it will produce, but it will produce
something because at the very least I was able to be quiet for five days and for m e
that was like a miracle.
586.CS: [talked about myself and thesis writing and having to push, but knowing you
can't push insight] A n d you have to slow yourself down so you can go fast [yes,
that's right]. But going back to what you were saying about whether the creative
person is b o m rather than made and knowing as a child, I remember as a child, I'm
not a writer obviously — I mean I can sort of write but — u m , picking up a little
rock. A n d it was such a vivid experience I picked it up and put it in m y hand, I was
aboutfiveI think, and it's like it had a certain luminousness to it and I felt like it was
a person, you know? That sort of thing. It was a very strong thing and I was sort of
looking around to make sure no-one else was watching [rnmm], do you know what I
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m e a n because I knew even then that people wouldn't understand this. Y o u know,
they'd think this was silly. A n d so w h e n you talked about knowing you were going
to be a writer that struck quite a deep chord with m e , I think. That there is a w a y of
knowing, you see, part of what I'm interested in is writers also talk about, and people
w h e n they have insights, they talk about feeling connected [you do]. Not only
about...
587.W3:.. .Well I don't mind saying what I feel connected to. I believe in angels and
fairies and, u m , devils and G o d and the universe and the creative spirit and spirits,
and, u m . Y o u k n o w I frequently have conversations with dead people, you know.
It's not u n c o m m o n for m e at all. I speak to them as if they were alive. So your rock,
you probably picked a rock that had some people's spirits in it and, you know, so you
didn't deny that.. . W e spend the rest of our lives [yes trying to get back]. A n d w h y
do w e not believe in things just because w e cannot see them? Y o u know, I find that
really w h e n people say to m e 'Oh I don't k n o w h o w you can believe in that.' and I
say 'Well you know, w h y not? Just because you can't see it doesn't mean it isn't
there.'.
588.CS: It's interesting question. I have a private practice that I ran in Coogee and,
uhh, often the trouble with clients is they don't trust any of this [no]. A n d they cause
great pain, for example, in relationship to each other because they just operate on the
words the other person is saying [yes], but they are being driven out of these terrible
feelings of hurt and the hurt is operating at this very implicit level [yes], at the level
where if they just slowed d o w n a little bit.. .Luckily for m e I think m y research is
going to be quite some use to m e [oh that's good]. Well I really chose writers
because I thought they'd be articulate — which they are [ W 3 laughs]. Well I thought
I could ask academics but that would be boring and...
589.W3: A n d painters are extraordinary because, whilst what they do is brilliant [that's
right... I know] u m , they have a very weird w a y of speaking. They've almost got
into academic jargonese. It's almost impossible to have a normal conversation with a
painter [I know]. They start analysing their work.
590.CS: That's exactly w h y I didn't interview them [chuckling].

591. WRITER 4

592.CS: .. .the ways in which you organise your working life, any tricks of the trade,
h o w you think about it and so on?
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593. W 4 : Well I have a bit of a schizoid existence as writer because I spent half of m y
creative life, as well as editing a magazine that's just m y main job, m y actual creative
life proper is as a writer/performer.. .So I'll often work through m y body rather than
just sitting d o w n writing, which has interesting ramifications. A n d secondly, the
other half of m y creative life is a dramaturg. So I look after, each year I look after
four orfivewriters assigned to m e largely by the [name] Theatre C o m p a n y and u m ,
or individual performance projects. So they are either plays or performance works.
So I inhabit both sides. O n the one hand I have to encourage myself to write and
work out strategies. O n the other hand I have very definite techniques I've
developed in recent, over four or five, years with a group of leading Australian
playwrights on h o w to write, get them through blocks and get them thinking. So it's
quite interesting. The funny thing is I haven't really applied them to myself
[chuckling]. I haven't been writing so m u c h lately.
594.CS: [points out parallel in therapist giving but not following one's advice!]
595.W4: Anyway. Perhaps first I'll just talk a bit about m y writing. Just stop m e w h e n
you want. Between 1987 and up to about 1993 m y partner, [partner name], and I
created a large number of big collaborative performance works, largely performed at
the Performance Space, but also around Australia and even a slice of one in N e w
York. U m . N o w the process there is intensely collaborative. Because I'm not a
playwright, though I have written — when I was younger person in Adelaide I wrote
several plays - and I didn't take greatly to that process of just sitting d o w n slogging
away because I'd been an academic and schoolteacher most of m y life and here I was
40 and I just.. .sitting at a desk, you know, hitting deadlines and all, just felt horrible.
It's like more of the same, it didn't feel creative. Whereas, in the early eighties in
Australia the whole terrain of performance opened up.. .different ways of working.
So the impetus for a show m a y not be a playwright's text. But it might be a group of
texts or pre-existing text. It might be a slice of the Bible or a scientific text. It could
be a designer's idea, that a designer would create a set and then you would respond to
that.. .It's the reverse of the normal process. They were also multi-skill operations.
So often the writer would be the performer, or the director would be the
performer.. .would be the writer. The text wasn't always dominant. You'd be
working with dancers and stuff and they were never background or secondary kind of
elements. They were right in there with you. So the whole idea of writing became
radically dispersed in a very post-modem way. In a very influential and creative w a y
which is starting to begin to influence mainstream theatre. So, it changed the burden
in a way. It was still a tough process.

A596.For example, someone would come up with an idea. It would c o m e from a dream
or, you know, it might just be a concept like 'accidents'. A n d uhh, you'd get together
a team of interesting people w h o you thought might be interested in this. W e did a
show called the [work title] in '921 think. A n d w e had a theorist w h o was very
interested in the theory of accidents and w e had four performers, w e had a set
designer, w e had a composer, a set designer w h o basically curated art objects that all
looked like accidents either that had happened or they were waiting to happen. A n d
so the whole performance became like a gallery, a [work title], because museums of
technology don't celebrate the accidents of technology. A n d as the great theorist
Paul Verilio said: 'You invent the freeway, you invent the pile-up; you invent a ship,
you invent the shipwreck', and so w e did that.
597 .Now within that, instead of having to conceive of a whole work I would write m y ,
m y specimens. Y o u k n o w I would write.. .1 would guide people around and
introduce them to an art object, and uhh.. .Or I'd just say 'In this space I a m talking
about accidents of responsibility. The cup fell off the mantelpiece, the cup was
pushed off the mantelpiece, the cup was pushed off the mantelpiece by someone, the
cup was pushed off the mantelpiece, perhaps I did it. Yes. Yes, I pushed the cup off
the mantelpiece. Yes, I did it. I'm guilty. So!'
598.So there'd be different ways of engaging with the whole idea of accidents, some of
which became intensely personal. So in those kind of works everyone is coming up
with different ideas and you eventually glue them together and I suppose in a w a y I'd
play dramaturg or overall director, although I'd share that role and w e would develop
the work together. A n d n o w I found that very, very satisfying.
599.CS: It's sort of interesting because with the writers I've spoken to there is a very
similar process it seems to m e . Most writers, no all, have said they don't start off
with this sort of grand vision or master plan [ m m m m ] and they are writing by the
seat of their pants, and by gut feel and intuition, and there's just all these fragments
[ m m m ] which they continually revisit, rework [that's right], and occasionally they
get a central image that seems to unify them all, or something like that, or even a
scene that will.. .And it's right at the very end, if then, [yeah] they get a sense that
this will c o m e together [yes, that's right]. So in that way it doesn't seem to m e that it
is that entirely different.
600.W4: N o . It's just that the difference in this is that you are drawing on other people
all the time [yep]. It's not that 'private' kind of thing. N o w , uhh...So that's an
example of a very diverse work. Then there are the more, what I would call the more
coherent writing exercises. A n d I will use this example as w e go along today. It's a
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work called [work title] which w e did in 1987 in Sydney. Uhh. A n d then it was, w e
brought it back in I think '93, '94, it's been performed around the country, in the
National Gallery in Canberra, on the Gold Coast, in the Adelaide Festival in 1994.
It's a deeply personal work about the death of m y parents w h o died in 1980 within a
few days of each other. A n d so the whole process of grieving, even if one of them
had died it would have been complicated, but it was incredibly complex. A n d it did
take m e seven or eight years to actually.. .it was a kind of exorcism, it was a kind of
act of belonging and forgiveness and stuff like that. N o w that was a more coherent
exercise. I wrote, you k n o w I got funding, you know, for m e to write it and I wrote it
from A to Z. But in that I was writing at a number of levels. I was writing a text
about m y relationships with m y parents goingrightback to the arrival of our families
in Australia in the 1830s. Going through a lot of family history and the kind of
mythology that builds up in a family and.. .you know, messes it up or whatever, and
makes it glorious. But I was also working with a lot of family photographs which
were shown to the audience, so it was like a slide night that had become a theatrical
experience. Also [partner] played a strong role as well. She wrote her o w n material
and co-wrote the dialogues with m e , which came out over discussions over this very
table, uhh , in which she was a kind of interrogator, the lover as interrogator quizzing
m y relationship with m y parents.. .It was a very intimate piece.
601 .CS: So this certainly reminds m e of the sort of things I do with [my wife] in our
relationship. W e talk about each other's family [yes].
602.W4: Except this is kind of pushed up to another plane.. .and some of our best work
has been done here over this table — breakfast meetings where the consciousness is
still very open, um.. .you k n o w just a cup of tea, just talk for a couple of hours, note
it down, and then we'll go away and write our o w n pieces. Then we'll give them to
each other. So it's a very vulnerable situation. Y o u have to be...ready for it, and w e
do see a lot of each other [chuckles], um. But in that process the difficulty in that
one in 19871 was still in a kind of residual stages, I think, of a kind of mid-life crisis.
I'd gone through some big changes in the 80s. But also this exorcism was very
difficult. So writing it was a bit agonous and I was noticeably grumpy for a lot of the
period which I'm not usually a terribly grumpy person.. .but anyway people
noticed.. .[chuckles]. I grew a big beard [laughter] and even became kind of hermetic
a bit. A n d [partner] would say 'He's d o w n the back typing'. U m . . .So.. .In that
respect, I mean, we're very project oriented and I always say 'we' in these things
rather than T [yes], the works are intensely collaborative and that's very important.
W e call our business partnership [title indicating their partnership] because w e have
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maintaining the good relationship by allowing, you know, being able to be together
and apart. So that's really important I think for our o w n writing clarity, w e have to
acknowledge each other's writing skills, the integrity of what w e are saying, and not
being too censorious with the other. O n the other hand w e have developed a w a y of
performing where w e speak very rhythmically, almost musically together in and out
of sync.. .and that's one of our main themes — being in and out of sync. So for the
process to work well w e do have to be geared as a couple.. .whether it's a radio show,
a performance show, a gallery show, whatever. So that's one important theme is that
sharing process.
603.CS: Which is, as you say, very different to most writers who, not only do they
work, u m , solo and they set it up normally as a private thing, but also they don't
share their work until it's finished.
604.W4: That's right, They're often afraid to.
605.CS: O h most of them don't want to, they don't want to tell it to anybody. N o w
what's going on there? I mean, 'cos you mentioned this being a very vulnerable
process.
606.W4: Well I think the other area I work in, which is as a dramaturg, which is
nurturing. I only work on n e w plays, brand n e w plays.. .preferably once they are one
or two drafts in and the playwright and the director of the company that's.. .has
purchased this thing are thinking 'Oh dear [laughter].. .not sure about this.'. A n d I
see m y job.. .a classic dramaturg is a kind of person w h o says 'Have you got your
characters right, have you got the plot right?'. I don't do that stuff.
607.CS: Y o u c o m e in with a set of precepts or...
608.W4: Yeah. I don't do that sort of stuff. I don't talk about those themes. I talk
about.. .1 try to get them back in touch with their vision. N o w in play writing, I
think.. .1 don't k n o w the difference, but playwrights are m u c h more used to an open
process. N o w there are some famous playwrights w h o won't let you touch their
work. I won't n a m e names but there are a couple of prominent ones w h o just brook
no interference. A n d their plays are weaker for it. But, some of the younger and
more emerging playwrights under the influence, often of American rules of, you
know, creative writing courses and things like that, are m u c h more open and
recognise the jewels and gems they can get that other people will throw their way in
response to their work. So anyway, I've developed this face-to-face approach with
playwrights, and again it happens at this table (they c o m e to m e , I never go to them).
They visit, and I refuse to call myself a 'script doctor' which is almost a jokey term
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in Sydney about dramaturgs. Because I think that always assumes the script is sick
or ill or something is wrong with it. Whereas I'm always working from 'This is
good. This is what you've done.. .why doesn't this bit fit with that? W h a t do you
see here? Don't tell m e what it means. Don't tell m e what are the themes. W h a t do
you actually see here? W h a t do you see on stage, on an imagined stage. O K forget
that. W h a t do you see
609.if you imagine the same characters in the real world?' A n d so it's a kind of
visualising process. A n d so I work with playwrights w h o are willing to be open.
W h o are willing to be vulnerable. I'm not going to give them solutions.. .Um, but
I'll ask them therightquestions.
610.CS: See...what's the vulnerability though?
611.W4: The vulnerability is to.. .classically.. .the individual western writer as you said
is a very private person w h o comes out with their product at the end, gets all their
friends to read it and is deeply insulted if they don't like it and never speaks to them
again. Whereas I think with the theatre [publicly dismissive but inwardly
wounded].. .Whereas the theatre has always had a degree of that openness. I mean
Pinter working with, u m , what's his name, Ball the director of the National Theatre
you know.. .Very close listening relationship. Pinter was a m a n of the theatre
himself, was an actor, could direct and sit at rehearsals and take notes. N o w Angels
in America, that big play that came out of the States a couple of years ago.. .a huge
success internationally.. .Seven or eight years in thorough dramaturgical processes.
Most of the plays I work on two years, three years, I'll see that person once a month,
every n o w and again it is accelerated...And it's vulnerable because these people have
to have such a strong belief in themselves in an incredibly competitive field and yet
here they are sitting and listening to someone saying 'You're wrong. You've got it
wrong.'. But saying it in the nicest possible w a y 'Look you know.. .this is, you're
not living up to the image. You've generated this image, you've generated, you've
created a conceit. But it's still not an image. It's only a metaphor. It doesn't have
any stage life. Where are you going to find that?'. A n d I try to do it as positively as
possible.. .'cos they are very.. .even some of them are very tough nuts, but they're
quite fragile.
612.CS: In this domain?
613.W4: In this domain and I think, you know, in literature what's happened I think is
the demise of the literary editor. Most of the big publishing houses around the world
have less and less editors. So m a n y books you can see.. .you read n e w novels and
you think 'Good G o d with an editor this would have been...' [really really good]. So
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some of that listening process has been cut out and I think novelists and poets are
m u c h more private people and they'd like to finish it. Playwrighting, I think
generally, is a more open process. A n d ah, the vulnerability in m y case is that this
stuff that [partner] and I write about is about our lives. N o w early on in the mid 80s
a few critics dismissed us saying, 'Oh confessional rubbish.'. A n d w e would say,
'Look, it takes just as m u c h art, maybe more, to construct these things into a
meaningful work, even if w e are performing.'. 'Of course it's a distillation, of course
it's been censored. These are what */versions of ourselves.'. But it is, you know,
because w e are not disguising our selves in our o w n work with character names and
fictional situations and because w e are performing it in real time as opposed to the
time leaps in a conventional play, there is a feeling of vulnerability. The most
vulnerable I did feel was in [work title] recounting the lives of m y parents, m y family
history, and opening it up as an example of a way to look at grieving. A n d it was a
work about grieving and the process of grieving, which I think there is quite a few
plays around about that at the m o m e n t which I think is really interesting. So that is
where the vulnerability comes in.
614.CS: Yes it's interesting too. So you are more-or-less self-consciously — I don't
want to use, I won't use.. .chuck it out as soon as I say it — there's sort of a didactic
purpose, in the sense that you are not just writing you k n o w something that's
entertaining or so on, but you have a really strong sort of social purpose.
615. W 4 : Yeah. I think a lot of playwrights do too. They like to bury it in the body of
the work and then it's up to the audience to get it and, of course, a lot of people got
upset about David Williamson's increased, for example his increase in didacticism in
recent years. His distrust of post-modernity and shifting political allegiances and
staff. U m . . .With us, sometimes our works are pure reverie, you know. There's one
work called the [work title] which is about all of those moments where you think
'Where have I put the car keys? God, w h o a m I? Whatgeez!' Right through to
looking.. .which is a three hour work for the audience to wander in and out of.. .at
any time go to the bar, have a drink, come back in and they'll see something they saw
just w h e n they were leaving and go 'Hah!.. .deja vu.'. A n d w e subjected them, it's a
really, a big three hour poetic work which w e just do, w e perform in cycles... the
same pieces over and over again, and different combinations with different people.
A n d the work, always, the work itself is really calm and minimal. But in the brains
of the observers and in us! Y o u think 'God. Where a m I ? Didn't I just deliver this
piece?' [laughter]. A n d they are very subjective works...that's [work title], you
k n o w the role of the m o m e n t in our individual lives.

A616.But other works, like the [work title] is quite didactic. O n e w e did about the
masculine body, one of our most popular works, all but flows. It was a big poetic
and didactic work about, u m , h o w m e n relate in terms of their body. A n d certainly in
our attitude to theatre and performance w e are didactic because w e are always taking
away the props you know. The performers are the writers and they are addressing
you directly, and our level of performance is very m u c h like you and I chatting now.
W e just talk. If w e are playing in a big theatre w e wear little head mikes so
everyone, w e don't have to raise our voices, w e don't have to project. Very intimate.
We've done performances, like w e did one two years ago where four of us performed
at a big dinner table with a hundred people also in the audience all at their dinner
tables, all being fed. A n d it was all about the manners and customs that go with
meals, and the kind of dirty jokes that come out at dessert time [when the wine has
started to take effect]. Yeah, and the big speeches over the main course to everyone
were very m u c h about, w e all decided w e wanted to talk about food when w e were
growing up. A n d so w e all dredged our memories, and it was very emotional. Y o u
k n o w people in the audience were weeping while eating [chuckles]. So...
617.CS: C a n I take you back? [yes]. Y o u were talking about doing the dramaturgy
work with n e w playwrights [yes]. A n d you talked a little bit about when it's almost
like they've lost their vision [ m m m ] . It reminds m e of, I don't k n o w if you are
familiar with this philosopher Suzanne Langer [yes]. Yeah, and she talks about the
presentational and representational modes of consciousness. It seems to m e that you
are working almost exclusively, no not, but m u c h more predominantly in the
presentational m o d e [yes]. Could you talk a little bit about that? The w a y in which
what's happening for that young writer for example, when they drift away from their
vision and what's happening to them when they get back into it. I k n o w that's a very
difficult question, but...
618.W4: Well, sometimes I think it is just a question of sustaining the vision. Because
you said before that there are writers who, ah, you k n o w they piece together their
vision and it arrives at the end. I think what happens in theatre, which is such a
different animal, the playwright, I think often they do have the vision first up
'Boom!' 'Jeez!' 'Great idea!' It's either a bit of plot has occurred to them that they
don't k n o w h o w to finish it, or it's a visual image. I work a lot with people who've
got an image.. .they can see a trapeze artist with a broken back and her dead twin
w h o died at 11 years of age is haunting her (it's a play that will be on at the Belvoir
Street Theatre this coming year. W e just did it in Adelaide and it was very
successful). A n d so in that case you've got, you know, the main actor can't move.
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She's in a brace with a broken back, and the dead sister is kind of swinging all
around her on this big metal steps and stuff like that. N o actual physical, no physical
theatre devices but there are enough bars and things to.. .And she is a demon sister. I
m e a n she was a psychotic kid and they burned the house d o w n together and
murdered dad's parrot and ah, it's again, it's an exorcism piece.
619.Now this young writer had written this originally as a radio play which the A B C
purchased. Just a reverie. It was an idea. It would sound nice with music on radio,
at forty minutes. Then Playworks, the National W o m e n Writers' Organisation, came
to m e and said 'Well, here's a bundle of plays. Which one grabs you?' A n d I looked
at this one and I thought 'Gee what an image! It's just so powerful, it's terrific, what
an idea. I don't k n o w where it goes.'. A n d I said 'I'll work on this one.'. A n d two
years d o w n the track it went on. A n d I think for her, the struggle for this young
playwright, she had the image, and she knew what it was about, the conflict between
the sisters, one is n o w 30, the other is still 11. A n d there are issues of guilt and the
role of the parents in their relationship. But she had never grappled with narrative
really. N o w I'm not a great fan of narrative. I think it's there all the time. There are
more interesting things to do. What I had to do was gradually help her connect her
vision, which was about about interiority and exteriority, about exorcism, about
various kinds of guilt.. .um.. .and ultimately about grieving, an unresolved grieving
process as a fantasy.
620. H o w to spin that into a narrative which would catch mainstream theatre directors
and audiences. A n d it has. It has taken us two years to do that. Very slowly. Very
spare, poetically written play. A n d it just means that every m o m e n t of the unfolding
narrative has to be informed by the original vision. That, you know, ultimately the
consciousness that guides this play is the w o m a n who's on her back. Y o u can't slip,
you've got to be careful h o w far you go into the consciousness of the demonic,
vicious angel you k n o w who's out there, because that's...You k n o w w e are not seeing
her subjectivity. It's like a.. .So all the time, and [playwright name], the writer came
up with, once she knew what I was on about, came up with some beautiful drawings.
621.So all the time w e were pushing forward linearly, and at the same time, and this is
what I do all the time, I'm always concentrating on the moment. Traditional
dramaturgy thinks narrative.. .forward, forward. Have you got the audience? Have
you got them hooked? Whereas m y belief is in the moment. So, for m e she always
was creating two models. O n e was like the stone in the pondripplingout. That's
where the movement was going. Then there was a line going through that. A n d so
all the time, I'd say if she'd invent a n e w scene where the narrative was going, I'd
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say 'It's beautiful, it's terrific but.. .ah.. .you've gone into some other space. This
character in this bed couldn't experience it. It'd be allrightif it was a movie, or
you've got split consciousness, you k n o w you'd see three or four people's point of
view. The power in this work is its subjectivity.' [and maintaining the line of
subjectivity through it]. Absolutely. Right to the bitter end.
622.CS: Yes It reminds m e , you see one of the things I'm interested in is, u m , there's
several different lines but they are pointing in the same direction. It's what one
psychologist calls loosening and tightening. Another one calls it symmetrical and
asymmetrical thought [ m m h m m ] . A n d it s basically this idea that — a n d it links to
the Susanne Langer thing — that there's a sort of dynamic interplay, there has to be,
between this sort of loosening process (like you talked about before with you and
[partner]), being loose after breakfast. A n d then you go your separate ways and
you... [yeah]. So there's a sort of creative cycle [ m m m ] where you have to embed
the vision and the ideas and the stuff in some sort of structure that doesn't do
violence to [ m m m m ] the presentational feel of it [exactly. Yeah].
623.W4: Yeah. N o , that's good. Yes. Because in traditional dramaturgy and editing
often there is a lot of violence done and there are some playwrights in Australia,
prominent ones, w h o won't work with dramaturgs because they've had nasty
experiences of being told what to do, and where to go, what's wrong with this play.
'It's sick.' and ... Yeah, it's a punishing kind of thing and there is no, there's not
enough loosening or sharing of the...
624.CS: A n d do you find when you are, the other writers allow this process — y o u
k n o w without very consciously thinking about those larger issues of the narrative
structure and so on — but in the end w h e n the piece presents itself and then you
examine it through those sorts of spectacles, do you find that it does have those sorts
of structures anyway? Or...
6 2 5 . W 4 : T w o things. O n e is it doesn't always — and I've just been through an
interesting process, we've been working on a play with [playwright name] who's
quite a significant Australian playwright, and um.. .until he's kind of written the
vision through w e won't k n o w about the structure. I m e a n I think what happens,
once, once they feel they have followed their vision through and you've nurtured it
all the way, you've got a complete work, then it's m u c h easier to talk to them about
structure and stuff like that [OK]. 'Cos often that will still be problematic and you
say 'OK', and the director's got to say 'When w e meet tomorrow...' — I always act
as the buffer between the director and the playwright, and I hold the playwright's
hand and I basically would see the dramaturg as on the side of the writer. So often
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when I go to rehearsals I'm saying 'No, you can't cut that bit out. Yeah, cut that bit
out.. .yeah. Is that allright?That's not a problem. It just means the scene is starting
too early. But you can't drop that. This is what the play is about.'. So those
structural things, the closer you get to production, those structural things, by then I
think the playwright is confident enough for you to talk turkey. Y o u know, to say
'OK, structurally it's wobbly here'. Y o u k n o w something was notright.Often it
comes back to an issue of vision or metaphor.
626.CS: Metaphor is something I want to talk to you about [ m m m ] . Because it seems
to m e that the fact that you can get a central image, like that image you were
describing of that w o m a n , and it operates as a metaphor throughout the whole work
[yeah]. A n d it seems like it is almost infinite in its possibilities [ m m m ! ] like the
things kind of empty out of it. Can you talk a little about that? I k n o w again these
are all difficult things.
627.W4: Well it's difficult, um. I'll talk about it in a fairly concrete way. I worked on
a play called [play title]. It's been around the world, [playwright name] wrote it. H e
had it in his drawer for five years. Y o u know someone wanted to do it and someone
wanted to do it and they gave it to m e and I thought 'Oh no, not another famous
person play.'. A n d the director said 'No, no.. .this is good'. A n d I looked at it and
there are few scenes where Kafka is dreaming and he meets a Yiddish dream theatre.
N o w in real life Kafka became a Zionist and actually did b u m p into a Yiddish theatre
company. The rest of his family and friends hated it, trashy Eastern Jews, you know,
terrible people. H e was, he loved the passion and the freedom, the wildness and the
'scumbagginess' of the whole thing. So anyway I get this life of Kafka which is lots
of Kafka reading aloud, bits of Kafka to the audience in the time-honoured famous
person play model.
628.But the thing that grabs m e is this Yiddish Dream Theatre. N o w , if it had been true
to Kafka's biography he would have just met them. But in this, [playwright name]
has Kafka dreaming this company and so I've said 'Well look, you know, at the
m o m e n t it's a small part of the play, it's a conceit. It's not a full metaphor yet. It is a
not a full w a y of organising the play. There's no dynamic principle in it. It doesn't
have a life. W h a t I want you, what I would work with you on — because the scenes
with the lover and the scenes with the family are fantastic — I would work with you
on this, making half the play,' (that was the condition), I said 'half the play has to be
with the Yiddish Dream Theatre.'. So, he was off, you know. H e was running.
Because often you only have to say a word or two. And, so a whole play virtually
starts. Y o u k n o w Kafka's writing and he goes clunck [head falls down, asleep] and
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there's this Yiddish Dream Theatre and it's a Kafka-ish situation. A n d that's what I
really pushed.
629.1 said 'You've got to put Kafka in a Kafka-ish situation.'. A n d so they say to him:
'OK. Are you ready? You've got the lines down?' and he says 'What?' A n d it's that
nightmare that everyone has where you are suddenly in a play or on the stage and you
are supposed to deliver a speech, and you think 'What!'. A n d they say 'The boy is
hopeless!'. Not only that, all the members of the Yiddish Dream Theatre look
exactly like his family. They're played by the same actors. So you've got two
strands. You've got his real family, you've got the dream family, and as the play
goes on they become one [they start to merge], yeah. They gradually throw off their
props and things like that as it heads towards Kafka trying to work out whether he
can afford as an artist to even actually have a social life.
630.CS: So the question is w h y do w e have to operate that way in order to communicate
what w e want to communicate?
631.W4: Well, if I had been a straight dramaturg I would have been talking about
themes and er, 'What are you at here?' Y o u k n o w the standard dramaturg line is 'Tell
m e what your play is about in a few words.'. Well 1 never do that. That closes it
down. But I would talk about the images and uhh... 'cos I think that activates the
writers' brains more. If they want to talk about themes, they can. But, by and large I
hold that off as long as possible 'cos I think the abstracted versions of what the play
is about get in the w a y of what they are trying to think.
632.Whereas the metaphorical approach I think, u m , which is still relatively rare in this
area, is one of, it's such a loosening thing, and it gives them access to other things.
Like I always say 'What are w e writing, what's this scene about? Is it the scene
you've conceived for the stage, or have you actually imagined it in the real world?'.
Too m a y playwrights, for m y money, actually sit there and write as if they are seeing
the thing on stage. A n d I think, 'Well yes.. .that's good. But h o w are you going to
get access to your deeper levels of vision, if you don't, like a novelist, see this as
actually happening in the real world?'. A n d then I say to them 'Well if that happens
in the world, wouldn't that be terrific if it happened on stage?' So you just kind of
drag things in. So there's a dialectical thing of in out, in out, which I like. W h y w e
need it? Well, it just seems to m e fairly, in these circumstances, a m u c h less artificial
w a y of working. The whole thematic structural approach is like writing the dust
jacket, the cover notes before you publish the book.
633.CS: Yes. It's sort of interesting, I m e a n in some ways I'm asking you questions
that I'd desperately like answers to myself [yeah]. Within contemporary psychology,
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limiting, you know. But there's some interesting sorts of things happening n o w
where, with postmodernism is having its influence [ m m m ] , and where w e are
viewing mental life as more an internalisation of our social being [rnmm]. So that
thinking is m u c h more metaphoric and symbolic and as some people call it,
'enacting' [oh yeah].. .like a theatre of the mind but not the old dualist type of idea of
a mind in here and a world out there [yeah]. But a world in which it's a derived
capacity to be able to.. .um, a derived capacity to be able to think, first off. But
initially thinking is done in interaction with people [yes] with very little babies and
so on. A n d only later do w e get the capacity to actually think in the absence of other
people [rnmm] or even the objects. So.. .and I think that metaphor is certainly closer
to [ m m ] this more radical, or basic or... way of operating in the world. A n d again it
is only later that w e become more literal. So there's a lot of evidence, for example,
that young children can appreciate metaphor before they can appreciate literal
meaning [now that is interesting...operating by analogy and...] exactly [yeah].
6 3 4 . W 4 : It's like Halliday's linguistics [yes] where the child has a limited set of terms
with which to describe m a n y things...[that's' right] {indecipherable}.
635.CS: It's almost been a tenet that w e begin with literal understanding and then w e
build, then w e work up towards this complex thing called metaphor.
636. W 4 : Yeah. Well I think ontologically the same sort of thing happens in the
construction of a play. The way I work anyway is that I'm asking the writer to, in a
w a y to abandon the standard technical and classical techniques and ways of naming
the script, to kind offlurryaround in the m u d of their creative thought.. .See what
else is there to draw on it, constantly. A n d then worry about the kind of structural
things a bit later once they'vefleshedout the vision more.
637.CS: Yes. This thing about metaphor, and analogy and so on is that it begins to
unite often quite disparate [ m m m ] domains, which obviously is the avenue, and all
evidence points that way, to creativity [ m m ] . That w e get, w h e n w e are thinking
more literally, more representationally, w e keep getting what w e already k n o w [yeah]
w e just keep going d o w n [that's right] the same channels [yeah]. N o w one of the
things that does interest m e is, a big part of thesis that I'm interested in is, the role of
emotionality or emotion [ m m m ! ] in creative thought. 'Cos nobody likes to be
confused and uncertain and lost, not knowing where they are going. Y o u know, I
think it's a fundamental part of the h u m a n being to be able to anticipate things. In a
sense what you are saying to the writers, playwrights and yourself is 'Well, let's not
k n o w where w e are going' [yeah, let's get emotional, chuckles]. Yeah. Can you talk
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you think that emotionality links into insight in particular — when people all of a
sudden go aha! you know.
638.W4: Yeah. Well it's two things. I always insist that the writer sends m e their latest
draft. O n e of the funniest things that happened to m e was that I worked with
[playwright name] for a number of years and established a good relationship. I said
I'd never work in theatre again, but you know, I was seduced back into it and I
started working with him. A n d I do that thing where, you know, w e start at the start,
even if there's a whole draft there. W e might spend weeks on the first scene [OK].
Or, if it's scenefive,you know, if he said, if I said 'Where did you start this work?'
and he said 'Oh it was really this scene.', I'd say 'Well let's work at that for a
while.'. O n e w a y or another it's starting at some beginning point.
639.So I'm going right back to first feelings, strong feelings, about the work, and I insist
on working that and working that. Now.. .and then I got to work with one of the
bright young thing female playwrights in Australia w h o n o w lives in L A writing film
scripts. She was just so impatient. I mean, w e had our first meeting and I thought
'This is going well.'. She said 'OK.. .I'll be in touch in a month.' and I said 'Yeah,
that's allright.'.I said 'Just rewrite that first scene and rethink it after what w e have
been, re-feel it after a day.'. She said 'No I'll write the whole thing, and I'll send it
to you.'. A n d I said 'No. N o . Y o u just write [chuckling] the first bit.'. A n d she got
so grumpy ! 'But h o w ? I've got to get this in. and I...' Product, product, product. I
said 'Look, you know, if you rewrite it in terms of what w e discussed today, I mean
it could go in a totally wrong direction, or you won't have anything to draw on.'.
Anyway, she eventually slowed down.
640.CS: This slowing d o w n is something I'm very interested in...
641.W4: Slowing d o w n is absolutely critical. W h e n I say to people, you are in for two
years of this, or three years, you know.. .The established playwrights, they k n o w it.
They k n o w what that is. The younger ones get very impatient, and uhh.. .But then
once the weight and the process is revealed to them, and you k n o w they treasure it I
think, really treasure it.
642.CS: W h a t is it about slowing down?
643.W4: It's.. .1 think the pleasure of it eventually comes from reflectiveness. Y o u
k n o w that you are not going like this [mimics rushing]. A problem for them, they
often have to go and make money. That's increasingly a problem as funding levels
drop.
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644.CS: But is it about, is reflectiveness about not having to look at the end product all
the time.
6 4 5 . W 4 : Yes, that's right. Shorter term goals. I do a lot of shorter term goals, but
constantly reminding them of [title of play], which w e talk about enthusiastically.
'Where is it going?' Because they need both things. The excitement, as I was saying
before, you need the excitement of the moment, I concentrate very m u c h m u c h on the
moment.
646.CS: Is what is happening.. .it seems to m e a very important part of, the thing about
emotionality is that, it seems to m e , that the absolute constant is that people forget
themselves [ m m ] when they are in creative moments [ m m , oh yeah]. They are sort
of liberated from self concern and worry and doubts and so on. [yeah]. A n d that
almost is the definition of creativity when w e are liberated from self concern.
647.W4: Well yes. There's that, and just as important I think for the playwright, and I
don't k n o w about other forms, is the pleasure in crafting, which is also quite
inspirational but it doesn't quite involve that forgetting. So in a session, if I'm
having a session with a writer, I regard these sessions as creative sessions. So they
have their private writing time. I read, they send m e the stuff a few days before. I
read it V E R Y closely, might only be two pages, it might be a whole script. I make
detailed notes, but I'll always narrow it d o w n to two or three things. I'll never hit
them with a million things. Never. I've seen that do enormous damage. They don't
k n o w where they are. A n d I focus on those things, and I focus as an act of discipline
for myself. I m a k e sure they, if it's early in the process still, they are reasonably
removed from ideas of technique and structure and plot and stuff like that. W e are
still talking about what it's going to feel like, and I'm always saying to them 'Real
world on the stage. W h a t happens on the stage?' A n d they tell m e what happens on
the stage. They say 'Was it all right' and I say 'It's fantastic!.. .where is it? It's not
here.'. You're told: 'It is there!' and they said 'There!'. A n d I say 'It's one word,
it's not enough. H o w are you going to fill it out?' A n d sometimes w e are just on
crafting things and I say 'Well you've got a lovely metaphor running in this page,
and then it runs out. Y o u know, what if you pushed it? W h a t would happen if you
pushed it a bit further?' U m . . .the sessions get very emotional because often w e go
into a spin, you know. It's a spin where, you know, things will occur to m e that
never occurred to m e two days before. A n d I'll say.. .they'll tell m e something and
I'll say'That's It!!'.
648.CS: A n d what's happening there?
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650.CS: Y o u see this is one reason I included a dialogue part in these interviews [ m m ]
in the sense that together with the writers w e were going to come up with something
that neither of us had thought about, or C O U L D think about. N o w what is happening
there? Because I'll just say too that this happens with writers even when they are by
themselves [yes] with their text.
651.W4: O h yeah, yeah. Y o u have those moments. I think one of the strangest things
is that thing where people always think you k n o w your text backward. But often you
text becomes alien. I mean people said to m e , I was you k n o w in m y mid 40s, I was
straggling to remember the lines, something that happens to all actors in their mid
40s pretty well. A n d someone said to m e 'But you wrote it.'. I said'This stuff
haunts m e . This is alien. This is a dark night visitation of...' I gave up writing late
nights in m y 40s and started writing in the morning you k n o w when all the barriers
are down. I start at six and just write for a few hours, which I prefer now. A n d it just
comes out! A n d you get to reshape it later on and it frightens you what's there, it's
close to a dream state.
652.CS: There's heaps here that I want to talk about. Talking to [W2] [rnmm w h o I
worked with a little bit recently], that's right. She actually said that it was m u c h
easier for her to talk about the play than it is for her to talk about [her novels]. She
said 'Well there are so m a n y people involved that I feel like...' and so that very
m u c hfitswhat you were saying earlier about a collaborative as against [yes, a
dispersal of pressure]. Yes.. .and especially as she loved it and so she could talk
m u c h more positively about it than about her o w n work.
653.W4: I wish I could have, I didn't work, u m , the actual director was the dramaturg,
so I only got to work with her once or twice. I would have loved to have worked
really closely with her because I think the play deserved a better response than it
got.. .But this is just by the by.
654.CS: But anyway she was talking about how.. .she has the sort of, she thinks of
writing as two phases.. .There's a sort of procrastinatory stage [ohh]. Y o u k n o w she
talked about diving into the pool. Is it cold? [ m m m ] . A n d where you are really
going into the unknown. But she feels like the most creative part is the reworking
[yeah!]. So you dive into this thing and you get a few things, you draw out a few
things to work with...
655.W4: Well, w h e n I'm working with playwrights I'm essentially asking them to
revise their vision. Not revise the vision, but to go at it again, and to get closer to its
core. A n d also w e spend a lot of time speculating where things might go next. They
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records all our sessions on tape. Other people just take notes. S o m e people just
absorb, [playwright name], the great poet, uhh, did her first play in m a n y years last
year (it was very successful, it's just been on in N e w Zealand.. .and I think she had
almost left the play writing scene). A n d she was the most lateral person I've ever
worked with. Y o u k n o w I'm used to people w h o are just one-to-one. A n d I'd work
out h o w they work. Y o u know, whether they are literalists, whether they work
through image w h e n they talk, whatever, I have to nut that out quickly, [playwright
name].. .it's long pauses. Her eyes roll up into her forehead [laughter] and she
thinks. She's one of those people that, if you suggest a line to take, that'll inspire
another line for her.. .So you always know, and you have to — it would drive some
dramaturgs nuts [because you assume she is going this w a y and she's been inspired
by what you've said because of some lateral association]. That's right, so for m e it
was a relief after a while.. .you know, because I knew she would come up with
something fantastic. But that was a great relationship, a marvellous relationship. In
fact, there is a textual account of that, of a talk that w e did, which is, which is, might
be interesting for you to read.
656.CS: So there are several things here. So one is this, the creativity, the really
buzzing stuff.. .I'll just tell you something. I mentioned before the loosening and
tightening, but it's not as simple as that. Like, so, if you go really loose there's no
structure. A n d so, more like w e are terribly afraid of that very loose stuff, but
occasionally w e have to visit it [indecipherable.. .let go, yes]. But w e don't normally
work in that domain and creativity is, I think, what w e do with what comes out of
that domain. That's what this psychologist Kelly called provisional tightening.
Cycles of loosening [ m m m ] and then provisional tightening [yeah] and then back
into the looseness [that's right] and then provisional tightening. T o m e that's what
you are doing here [yes, as a guide] and it's when w e provisionally tighten. A n d w e
get the insight, the insight comes when w e tighten, not when w e are in the loose
staff.
657.W4: N o . The loosening fuels you. I always say 'Go back, wallow around and
you'll c o m e back with something, it might be dreams or whatever, you'll find
something.'.
658.CS: But it's then that you re-read the draft [ m m m ] and you are in tighter m o d e and
you think 'Oh shit. That's interesting!'.
659. W 4 : Yeah. O r often, and I think this is really important, a good dramaturg tells the
writer what they have achieved. It's like when one is a student at university and you
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structure']. A n d you think 'What?! W h a t did I really do? People w h o got Bs and Cs
got heaps of comments on their papers. I want to know what I did.'. A n d as an
academic I used to enjoy that.. .it's like taking your best students and saying 'Well,
what do you think you did?' A n d often finding out they didn't k n o w what they had
achieved.. .because the next essay wouldn't be as good.
660.CS: W h a t I really liked about this essay was...
661.W4: Yes. A n d with good dramaturgy you have to remind people of their vision.
Y o u have to remind people of their authenticity, their right to invest emotionally in
this. That it's not going too far. Always pushing them and saying 'Let this scene go!
W h a t you are telling m e is m u c h more powerful than what is on the page.'. 'Well 1
don't want to be indulgent.'. I say 'Indulge yourself! W e can always cut back. Y o u
can craft it back. Let go.'. A n d with [playwright name] when I did this.. .we did this
dialogue on stage in Griffin after the show one night. I actually titled the dialogue
'Did She Jump, Or W a s She Pushed?'.. .which I think echoes the kind of fears that
some people have, you know whether they are about to be murdered or their work
sacrificed. Is there someone else's vision intruding? So I'm always cradling them a
bit saying 'This is your vision.'...
662.CS: Yes that'sright.See again this comes back to emotion doesn't it. I mean
there's just, it's dangerous territory isn't it? [ m m m ] . Because to be creative you have
to loosen up [yeah]. Y o u have to not know h o w its going to end up [um h m m ] . A n d
you have to allow yourself to go in deliberately to not understand, deliberately
creating conditions [yeah] where you don't understand [yeah]. N o w normally that
provokes anxiety [ m m m ] . In our day to day lives [ m m m ]if w e are driving a car and
w e don't understand what is happening w e are terrified [yes, oh yeah]. So what w e
are doing in a way is deliberately subverting what nature has programmed into us.
663.W4: That's right. Yes and u m and it happens in degrees. I mean some playwrights
I've worked with I just can't work with. I've said to the director, 'Look this is not
going to work, they are too tight'. A n d it's all craft, it's all get that product out there.
I've said 'They are never going to write the great play. They are a good playwright,
they'll never write the great play.'.
664.CS: It's the Bryce Courtney school of...[that's right].
665.W4: It's get it out there.
666. [tape end]
667.CS: .. .If w e can finish up on... [basically indicating that w e have covered the topics
I wished to cover quite well],
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668.There's two things I'd like to finish on. O n e is that when people report having a
breakthrough or insight into something, there's lots of qualities to the w a y they
experience it. Often people talk about really feeling connected [ m m m ] with the
world, the universe [ m m ] . But it's in funny sorts of ways. For example, the insight
seems to be coming from without, sort of almost external to them and they get to
spectate it [yeah],to be the vessel almost through which it comes [ m m m ] . Yet they
sort of k n o w it's them [yeah]. So there's a strange sense of self that seems to....
669.W4: ... A heightened sense of self. It's like you are on a roll. I k n o w that myself
sitting there writing and thinking: 'Yes! this is it!...keep going, keep that, the next
sentence is already in your head, keep it going.'. A n d it's terrible thing if you are
interrupted or something [yes] classically where you k n o w you've got to get it d o w n
in the m o m e n t and ah. S o m e people are good at keeping it in the head. I usually, I
do have to be writing it, but I k n o w people w h o just hold these things in their head
and write it all d o w n afterwards, which is amazing [yes it is ]. But it is, it is I think
for m e it's an in-and-out state at once. I don't go into a total type of [exclaims]
whooo![oh no, no!]. It is definitely, it's dialectical. Y o u spin in and out of it. Y o u
lose it for a little while, or you relax and then it goes back in. Y o u think 'I'm going
to finish this thing.'. Y o u k n o w it's quite a state.
670.CS: A n d it involves the body doesn't it? [ m m m ] . I mean it's like...[ arash],yeah.
A n d I think this is very important [ m m m ] and there are some neurophysiological
studies n o w on what happens when people are working creatively [oh yeah?]. For
example, w e k n o w that if we, you get 'creatives', people w h o are involved in creative
fields all the time.. .you get them to do a standard IQ test and a 'normal' person — a
non-creative person [chuckling] to do a standard IQ test and they do E E G s on them,
and for both (they've taken a baseline) and they both more-or-less peak at the same
sort of thing doing the IQ test. W h e n they do the same with the creativity test, where
they give them a creative task, the 'normals' go up to about the same level as for the
IQ things, but the creatives go below their baseline! A n d so what's happening is a
m u c h more diffuse [rnmm] activation of the neocortex, [right. Yeah]. O K , so this
seems to be some sort of physiological counterpart [ m m m ] to being able to think
very laterally and to loosen up thinking where you are working associatively rather
than transitively, logically [rnmm. Yeah, yeah.]. A n d to be able to do that it seems to
m e that, one of the things I'm pushing towards, is that a lot of the mind's activity is
about survival. Like when w e operate day-to-day a huge proportion, all our senses
[yes.. .all these mechanisms] mechanisms.. .we care about, you know, 'Does he like
m e ? Doesn't he like m e ? A m I good enough?'. All aspects of survival. A n d it
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seems to be that in this state a lot of that is quietened down, it is backgrounded. It is
a type of meditative type of state [yeah]. The mind is still enough — this is w h y I
was interested in what you said about slowing them d o w n — when the mind is
actually still enough, to be able to pick up all these subtle nuances and
[mmm]...because they are coming very fast [yes].
671 . W 4 : Yes... x lx complexity theory. Or whatever, if w e are operating in a number
of levels in a kind of state which is basically always on the edge, then everything has
to be, it's like, you know, people light incense, they've got to write in their favourite
position [that's right]. Like in Jungian terms, [partner] is a real feeling type, you
know. Everything has to be [motions with hands], you know. I don't worry so m u c h
about that. But I still like m y conditions to be right. But I don't have a daily writing
ritual because our ordinary work governs that. W e write from time to time. But
w h e n w e write, w e really write. The circumstances do have to beright.Just the
right amount, not too m a n y cups of tea. The right amount of incense. I like to work
with music. A s soon as I get onto, if I think I'm on a roll, the music goes off, and
then it's really the music of the piece that's sustaining me.
672. So, all those things are important. If there's too m u c h light coming from outside, if
there's just too m u c h noise from the street. Y o u only need one factor to upset the
equilibrium and the state of equilibrium is lost and you just can't write.. .you know,
the duress kind of thing happens. So it has to be a very stable state. I've never, I'm
not one of the school that believes that you have to be in tragic circumstances or
depressed or poor to write. I never found that to be true and I don't k n o w any writers
w h o do. I mean, mostly there has to be some basic level of comfort and security.
Y o u can't afford to have that, you have to be able to block out those anxious
thoughts. Surrender them and so there has to be pleasure in the creativity.
673.CS: Yes, which makes it, it is what Theresa Amibile calls, it has to be intrinsically
rewarding.
674.W4: It does. It has to be.. .and against enormous odds, but it has to be.
675.CS: A n d if you start offering people extrinsic rewards, it cuts d o w n their creativity
[yes that'sright].Y o u say I'll pay you to write a book.. .and then people have all
sorts of trouble.
6 7 6 . W 4 : Yes. S o m e do. If they are already established authors and they get it they
think 'Thank God. I'm going to get paid at last!' [yes]. Y o u k n o w I've seen so
m a n y young authors, people in the last few years w h o have managed to pick up two
year fellowships which have just been liberated.. .You k n o w it's just the burden of

A-92
the kind of working in restaurants and cafes [exactly] is gone. A n d for others w h o
are too young it's, it hasn't worked out. They just go to pot!
677.CS: Exactly, whereas [W2] told m e that apart from the practicalities that you just
talked about, there was an enormous sort of social validation for [ m m m ] her when
she was given grants [yes.. .that's another kind of thing. Yes]. So w e haven't really
talked about that very m u c h too. I mean, obviously the work that you have been
talking about is inherently social in its genesis [very collective, collaborative] and its
m o d e of creation [it's shared yes]. Yes. So in lots of senses w e didn't need to talk
about the social whereas with writers, with writers w h o write novels, I need to say
well 'How does that work? W h o do you talk to about your work?'.
678.W4: Well, even in the performance area the writer's not the top dog that they are in
the novel or the play. A n d they'll often just write texts which are then used and
transmuted in performance. So they are often a different kind of animal. Whereas
you are talking very m u c h about the individual creator.
679.CS: Well. W h e n I talk about the social I've sort of got two things in mind. O n e is
the idea that all our thinking is socially derived [rnmm] in the sense that w e leam a
trick of reflexivity such that w e can think in the absence of even vocalising, or other
people — which is pretty extraordinary, you k n o w w e take it for granted. The other
thing is h o w important it is to share [ m m ] what w e have been thinking about [ m m ] .
N o w what.. .seeing as you work collaboratively you get to share it in the m o m e n t
don't you?
680.W4: Yeah, constantly and at various stages. Or if I'm working with a writer as
dramaturg, I mean, there is every month some times when things are really hot and
heading towards production three or four times a week. Yeah so it's intensely social.
W h a t you have to do is keep the writer's sense of self coherence. A n d in the big
collaborative processes for ourselves, you have to really believe in what you are
doing. Because everyone else is doing what they are doing and it all connects, but
u m , you have to, it's, but you can't afford, in m y line of work, you can't afford to
have a single notion of consciousness or of absolute privacy. Y o u have to have a
notion that one's psyche is m a d e up of parallel and conflicting elements. That's not
madness. It's a healthy way of being.
68l.CS: However, you just said though that you need to help the writer keep their sense
of self coherence?
682.W4: Keep enough sense of coherence, especially the writer, because they are going
to be judged on their own. It might, the review might say 'magnificent production of

Aa very ordinary play'...[clicks fingers]. Done. Gone. U m , whereas in our work it's
not so...critical.
683.CS: Yes, you're more background aren't you?
684.W4: Yeah, or before. It's interesting since I've been dramaturg, I've been getting
kind of review notices 'cos I've had a few successes. Y o u know, four or five plays
I've dramaturged have done well, so it's one of those rare things in Sydney in 1994,
'95, and '96 that I was getting reviewed as well, and very positively. I only got
really slammed once, it was a production at the Enmore Theatre. It said 'Even
though they've brought the big guns in like [W4], this production...[indecipherable
and laughter]. Y o u k n o w if only they had known I was working with an 'hauteur'
director w h o hardly let m e say boo. I didn't really get to advise on the thing at all, so
I was very grumpy about that [especially getting slammed]. Yes, but by and large
it's a background role and a lot of people don't understand what I do. They just think
I cut and paste or tell the author what to do. Whereas I see m y role as a very creative
one, not just a craft.
685.CS: I'm very interested in it...it's a counselling role, isn't it, really?
686.W4: Well that's it. Someone said to m e , someone was wary about working with
m e and said — they must have talking to s o m e o n e — said 'Oh, you know, it's a bit
too intimate for me'. A n d I said 'Yeah that's fine if they don't want to.'. I said 'I
don't quiz them about their personal life if that's what they are worried about.'. If it
connects, I'll think yeah, I can say to them 'I think you should think about this. Is this
you?', [playwright namej's big block with her play [title of play] was that the central
female character was just not that interesting. Everyone around her was good, and I
didn't want to talk traditional dramaturgy. A n d [playwright name] was difficult
anyway, she was so lateral. A n d one Saturday afternoon w e were sitting here and
she's fagging away [mimics cigarette smoking] [out the window]. Yes. A n d I said
u m , you k n o w -1 didn't want to use the word 'trouble' or difficulty'. I said u m
'What I think you have to look at is the fact that Joy is you.'. A n d she went
'Ohhh!'... 'cos it's quite unlike her, a tough working class w o m a n who's got kids,
separated from her husband, this is the character. Nothing like her, but really quite
like her! [Yes. Chuckling], A n d that was the breakthrough. That was the big
breakthrough on that play. Because the director kept saying to m e 'Ohhh, it's
fantastic but the central character, she's...immobile, not living.', all that kind of
thing. Then it just twigged that there were a number of connections with [playwright
name] which I won't go into [no, of course]. But I just had to say that and it, the
floodgates opened and away w e went and she could create that character now, an
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that was good. I forget what .your question was n o w but!
687.CS: N o , we're sort of swimming around the social dimension [I think that's...] and
validating self [oh that's right, yeah] and collapsing the distinction between self
and...
688.W4: Well, someone said to m e dramaturgs should never tell the writer what to do.
A n d I said'Oh! That's a pity'. A n d they said'What? D o you m e a n you tell them
what to do?' I said 'Well, there are different ways.'. I said 'Sometimes I'm
conducting a Socratic Dialogue. I know the answers, but I want them to find them,
'cos they are already in the play. I'm not giving them something that's not in the...I
would never suggest anything that is not inherent, already in the play. A n d I'm
always guiding them back into their o w n play. A n d I said, u m , sometimes, I said
'There's no such thing as a dramaturg,' I said 'sometimes I'm confidante', they tell
m e things they wouldn't tell any one else. They say afterwards 'Oh that was great.
That was just like going to a counsellor.'. I say 'Sometimes I'm like a counsellor.'.
It's very structured. I'm helping them get back in touch with their play, therefore
their life, it's their creative life. Sometimes I'm a personal trainer. I say 'You're not
working hard enough [yes that's right]. 'What have you been doing? Yeah, you were
going to do this a week ago.. .Come on [knocks on table three times]. What's
happened to your ability with metaphors? Y o u know, you can do this. This is not
poetry.'. A n d I'll be quite tough in a nice way, but I'll really push them. A n d I say
to them.. .1 said to this person T have four orfiveroles. I'll switch. I'll calculatedly
switch those if I think I'm not getting somewhere with them. I'll go the other way
because it taps into different creative and personal needs of the person.'. A n d I think
that's m u c h better to admit those types of things than to pretend that it is pure
clinical, objective and I'm out of it somehow or other, [exactly] and I'm just guiding
them through a craft exercise.
689.CS: Well, of course the fascinating thing when you read the general insight
literature, you are looking at scientists and academics, you know, all sorts of people,
people in business and creative people in the arts, is that even in the so-called 'really
tight' and logical and rarefied atmosphere of physicists and [oh yeah], you know,
they all talk about doing hard work and then goofing off [rnmm] and allowing their
mind just to wander [yeah], lazy Sunday mornings [ m m m ] where they get their best
ideas. Y o u k n o w the walking the dog and the...
690. W 4 : Well I have walk the dog sessions with writers where I just say.. .they say 'Are
w e are going to talk about this?' and I say 'No, let's just talk around it for a bit.'.
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becomes a very relaxed talk about everything else B U T this.. .and it's just a w a y of
getting around. Y o u need to alternate those sessions. They can't all be hard nosed
[that's right] and tough.
69l.CS: I never know, when I work with clients you know, uhh... A client last night is
bulimic, you know. A n d I said ' W e need to get a bit more structured here. W e need
to really plan the stuff you know.'. O f course I knew this was fatal, you k n o w
because what w e did then w e had this loosest session where, it was great [it was
good] and right at the end she said 'Well what about those short term and long term
goals?' A n d w e scribbled a few things down. But I think this is very important, you
know, that the.. .it's freeing people up from having to be able to figure it all out.
692.W4:1 think for m e the.. .big, the thing I happened upon as a teacher in m y younger
years was a sense of teaching people through structure. N o w that's different from
aiming at achieving structure and all that. I remember reading the art critic Erin
Sweig, one of those y a m s in a Paladin paperback, and he talked about artists, h o w he
thought artists see. They don't see the detail. They head towards the detail. It's a
structural picture. I remember all the cognitive stuff I did as a trainee teacher where
people see things and all the time 1 was teaching I was always trying to.. .um.. .and
doing m y early kind of work in performance, I was always looking for a kind of
image, or a picture, then heading in towards thefleshingit out, and that always
stayed with m e . It stays with m e n o w with playwrights and uhh, there's always a
feeling that there's something there and it's being realised as they are working on it.
A n d we're sharing it and the picture is getting bigger and clearer and as soon as you
discover this m o m e n t 'Choooo, w o w that's great! A n d that's good!' A n d 'Oh here's
a bit of ponderous stuff.'.
693.Like I'm working on a political thriller play at the moment, so there's a lot of
ponderous narrative stuff w e have to work out. That's been one of the toughest
pieces I've ever worked on to keep the vision alive [whilst you have to work out all
those]. Luckily it's about a bank manager w h o has visions. H e has visions and he
sees things about Jewish money in Swiss banks and he sees people burning
themselves in public places. Y o u k n o w so that poetic dimension is kept alive by that
aspect of the script. A n d a lot of the political stuff, the thriller staff, is just 'Well if
w e do that there, then that... no w e can't do that.... no-one would believe that.'.
694.CS: Well let's finish up with one question then [yeah].
695. W 4 : Well anyway just to finish that, the structural thing you k n o w is big for m e .
A n d I think that is the way into it for everything. Finding the image, like, easy ones,
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the stone hitting the water and rippling out as I was saying with that play earlier and
then drawing a line across it. Those things are really important.
696.CS: Yes, I m e a n there's normally a central issue whether w e are talking about
creativity, with counselling clients, or with writers there is always something central.
N o w . . .this is the toughest question of all probably and it relates to what is happening
when w e are being creative. W h a t happens when w e have an insight? Um... we've
talked a lot about emotion and about being, letting go of structure, w e talked about
metaphor, about disparate domains being brought together. W h a t do you think
happens when a person has an insight?
6 9 7 . W 4 : U m . . .well it's funny. For m e it's either of two things. O n e is you are
suddenly in tune with yourself, which I think, that it's like there's almost layers of a
complex being all start vibrating together and you have a sense that what you are
writing is what you wanted to write. The other thing is thefrighteningone. Y o u are
suddenly writing something you didn't k n o w you were going to write. Y o u didn't
k n o w you could write. A n d I think that's two different things. They are very similar
but they are different. A n d I think sometimes that's the strange one, the one where
you are writing it and you are thinking 'This is fantastic but does it fit? What's it
about? W h a t a m I going to do with it? It's going to take m e off on a whole n e w
scary direction.'.
698.Sometimes when I'm in the dramaturgical position writers are talking and they say
' W o w ! I could do this! A n d I could do that! But God.. .Oh I don't k n o w if that
fits.'. A n d they are so excited and then I help them. I say 'Well yes. O f course it
fits.'. A n d it's more difficult on your own. U m . So I think the important thing
about it is that the m o m e n t is the buzz of the moment. W h e n everything, you are
suddenly in tune, everything is vibrating. It's a physical and intellectual experience
all at once because you have to recognise it. So not off with the fairies.. .uhh.. .its
difficult. Even with visual artists I think they k n o w it's happening. It's a knowledge,
conscious knowledge it's happening. I think the critical thing, it only completes
itself in the m o m e n t after when you think 'What is it? W h a t a m I going to do with
it?'. So you k n o w it's happening, you k n o w what it's about, because it is in tune,
even if it is 'inverse'. It's there, but then it's like.. .I'd be thinking 'Ohhh.. .and you
k n o w people do throw things out'. So you think 'Well that was an insight. I don't
k n o w what kind and I don't k n o w what to do with it.'. They put it into a pile. Or
they say 'Yes...right yes.'...[frequently people have insights that subsequently they
look at and say 'No it's rubbish']. Yeah, exactly. So it's that knowing it. N o w in a
collaborative situation where you are helping a writer, you know, there are people to
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tougher process. I'm amazed at the number of writers w h o do keep copious notes
and keep drawers full of things [yes] and dig around in them and say T was right all
along!'. I'm a great one for going back to the first draft. Y o u k n o w I'm often
pushing people to go back — I ignore the intervening drafts because that gets too
m u d d y [back to the original vision]. I've been in dramaturgical meetings where
people say 'Now in the third draft you did such and such, but there was a line from
the second one.'. A n d I'm thinking 'God. This is getting so technical. This is
muddying everything'. But I do believe that often in the first draft you find treasures
and things that came from naked insight where they didn't feel that inspired or
thought they had an insight.. .but it just came out.
699.CS: W h a t comes to mind is the things the writers have told m e about central images
in their works and h o w they only later saw h o w it just resonates through the [yeah]
whole work and they had no idea at the time... [yeah m m m ] . But it just sort of grew,
it grew from that.
700.W4: Well, conectivity is an enormous part with this, that feeling of being in tune
with the moment. U m and the musical metaphor is actually a very good one. I think
one of the things that is.. .when I'm working with writers on narrative I say, 'Well
just forget the narrative at the moment and just think of this musically as theme and
variation, theme and variation.'. A n d then we'll think about it as it's unfolding as a
story. So that musical thing is a good one. It's not exactly, it's by analogy, it's not
exactly a metaphor. I say to them 'We've got to come back to that image again. It's
really powerful. We've got to bring that back in.'. I'm not saying what w e have to
do with the story. 'Get that image back in.'.

701. WRITER 5

702.CS: So the first thing I'd like to talk about is the way you organise yourself. A
don't care what time frame you talk about, whether you're talking about minute to
minute or project to project, year to year. U m , preferably the range of things.
703 . W 5 : W h a t do I do to organise myself on a day-to-day basis?
704.CS: Yeah, day-to-day basis. H o w you organise your life so that you can work
creatively.
705.W5: Right. Um.. I've found through experience that I can work, u m , w h e n I'm
fresh in the morning I can work, say between 9.30 and something. I mean, the thing
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that's very hard to understand is h o w I'd work if I didn't have a family, because I've
always done this with a lot of noise and a lot of people around. So the m o m e n t they
all go out the door is really the moment when I start working, even though I could
have been more creative had I started earlier. So when they've gone I begin and that
tends to be about 9.30, and I work until about 1.00. U m and then at 1.00,1 suddenly
ran out of steam. A n d u m , you k n o w I have something to eat or go for a swim or do
some sort of outdoor.. .walk the dog or something outdoors. A n d then at night again
when they're in bed I work again. So it'd probably be two, four hour stints, you
know, seven or eight hours a day, but broken up.
706.CS: W h e n you have a swim or take the dog for a walk do you often get good ideas?
At that point?
707. W 5 : U m I tend to, depending on the stage of the project. I do. I've worked out
quite a few things u m , on walks. Or at the beach or so forth. It's particularly useful
when I'm at some sort of point where the.. .not a writer's block, but a sort of
structural block [an impasse?]. Yeah an impasse and that has proved useful, on quite
a few occasions. But usually when I come to a block I find that I can write m y way
through it, anyway. So it's a combination of just sort of writing through it and you
know doing draft upon draft upon draft until suddenly a sentence escapes from the
other sentences. So it's a combination of that process and the exercise/thought
solving.
708.CS: So when you say a sentence escapes, you are not thinking 'I must break this
block. I must break this block.'. But you've got a general sort of faith that if you
just keep following a...
709.W5:1 have, I have got a general faith. Even when I'm, even when I'm at a low
point I do have a general faith that I'll overcome it. N o w having said that I also feel
that the initial, the initial idea I have is never quite fulfilled. The book is never quite
as good as I thought it was going to be. It's different, and interestingly different, it's
always a bit different. But the general idea that gave m e the huge sort of burst of
enthusiasm and excitement is never quite fulfilled.
710.CS: We'll c o m e back to the organisation, because I'd like to follow that little
thread. The huge burst, or.. .How does that happen? You're living life and then all
of a sudden you get an idea?
711.W5: Yes. Well it can be something, u m something I've read or something just
crops up out of the blue. But I have an idea for a story or a book and and I'm almost
too thrilled by it to pursue it too far in case it vanishes. So I sort of, you know, think
about it, and think around it and think whether someone also has.. .somebody else
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recently done something like this?.. .In which case, don't bother, you know. U m .
But if all things being equal, if it does still seem like a good idea then I, you know, a
huge rush of enthusiasm takes over. A n d I, you know, read about it if it needs some
sort of basic research or whatever. Y o u know, I ask about it, I talk about it. I find it
hard to stop talking about it, as I was doing out there [laughter — as W 5 was
enthusiastically telling m e about his latest project before the interview!]. So I'm sort
of engrossed by it. Then begins the actual work. Then it's the slog like any job to a
degree, but you do all sorts of ruses and tricks to keep yourself, to keep yourself
interested, basically.
712.CS: W h a t are some of the ruses and tricks?
713.W5: Well you've got to, you've got to sort of, I have to tell myself that I know
what I'm doing even when it is patently obvious to all, to m e more than anyone, that
I mightn't yet, that I don't know what it is yet. So I set out sort of headings and
chapter headings, and you k n o w I might pin things up on the wall, index cards or
whatever. I mean, I sort of tell m y self I'm busy and I know what I'm doing. Even
though I don't; with [novel title] the latest novel, I put up all these, a whole wall full
of index cards of what was going to happen at every stage like a story board, like a
film story board. A n d then never looked at any of them!
714.CS: But that served some sort of purpose for you, though, didn't it?
715.W5: It did serve a purpose, yeah, absolutely.
716.CS: A n d the purpose was?
717.W5: Well, it was a fallback position, in a way. I was telling myself it was a
fallback position [a security blanket]. A n d I also knew, I knew, what I wanted to
happen. A n d if I was to read it again — which I didn't after I'd first put them up — I
could see there was actually a narrative occurring [yes], you know, along the wall
and it'd end somewhere. A n d things happened along the way that were, u m , feasible,
and so forth. But that's what happened, they didn't, none of it... via a different route
the same end was reached [yep]. But I generally need to know, u m , I need to know
h o w I want it to end. A n d it mightn't always end always like that...
718.CS: So what's that little bit about there? So, you say 'I'd like to know h o w it's
going to end.'. It's probably obvious to you, but h o w come? W h y is that important?
719.W5: Well it's .. .1 like to k n o w that it is going somewhere, I think, is probably more
accurate. It's not just sort of staying here, there's plenty of...
720.CS: H o w do you feel when you don't know?
721.W5: Um... all right. A n d in fact the ending's never been the same ending yet. But
I need to know. I need to think I k n o w h o w it is going to end.

A722.CS: That's what I'm trying to dig at, you see [yeah]. A n d if you.. .is it anxiety?
D o you have a sense that 'I don't even have any idea where this is going.', then you
just can't work or... ?
723.W5: N o , no. That's allright,that's O K . I just plug along. But, um, no, it's not a
source of anxiety, but it is a source of security to k n o w that's a very good ending I've
got there [ O K ] you know, and I'll try to keep that as possibly the what's going to
happen.
724.CS: Yes. So rather than it being an avoidance of a negative.. .it's the building of
possibility or something like that [yes].
725.W5: Yep. The whole process is for m e , even though it takes m e ages and there's
always money worries during it and things, it is actually a very optimistic process,
and I feel m u c h happier when I have a project going, even if it's one you k n o w that's
you k n o w sort of really tip-toeing along, you know, two steps forward, one step back.
But I feel better, and I feel more, I like the feeling of every morning sitting d o w n at
the wordprocessor.
726.CS: This seems to be a real theme, you know. The interview with [WI] comes to
mind. Where she was talking about h o w good it is for you, you know, physically
[yeah], you know, to be in the flow of writing and things [yeah] coming together.
727.W5: Yeah, and it's interesting that I believe that too. Even though physical
evidence shows, I usually get RSI or I've got a bad back at the moment, right on cue,
sort of thing.. . U m the back's really giving m e trouble. A n d other times I've had you
know, tennis elbow, or something else that's wrong, structurally. But even that
doesn't affect the fact that I think it's good for you [good for you]. Yeah! [chuckles].
728.CS: Yeah, that's right. It's sort of a question of the spirit as against the...
729.W5: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Because it is actually sort of bad for you, and you're sort of
twisted up and...
730.CS: D o you write by hand?
731.W5: N o , I don't any more. I have in the past. I write on a laptop.. .but it is
obviously very small and it's not, you k n o w ergonomically it's hopeless. But I mean
I sort of quite like working on it.
732.CS: D o you then print out and then work on the paper?
733.W5: U m . I also did that at the beginning because I came out of the tradition of
typewriters, having been a reporter. It took m e a long while to make the m o v e to
computers, and then a long while to make the m o v e to laptops. But now, you see
the.. .you want to talk about creative bursts and things, and one of those things that I
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would mention, whenever that.. .whether n o w or later [yeah, do it now] is the advent
of the computer to it, because that has actually changed the way I operate and the
w a y I think.
734.CS: How's that?
735.W5: It was very m u c h a freeing, a freeing-up, u m , happening. The first one I used
was also with a book that freed m e up too. So it was a combination. I don't know
which.. .where the machine ended and the thought processes were in it. But certainly
the book called [novel], which was based on Ned Kelly's life, it was an imaginary
life of N e d Kelly A n d it was very m u c h a loosening up process creatively for me.
A n d I think the computer was part of that.
736.CS: Because of the way you can word-process with it. Is that it?
737.W5: Because I spent so m u c h time, I wasted so m u c h time because I like writing
clean copy. I don't like messy copy hanging over and things and that was because I
had to have it clean when I was [a journalist], yet again a work habit. But I was just
sort of tipexing and stopping and re-writing and there were so many drafts and...
738.CS: It was slowing d o w n the flow.
739. W 5 : It slowed d o w n the thought processes. It was just hopeless. Hopeless. So
once the computers eliminated that, then I just flew and uhh, the writing of m y books
is m u c h quicker n o w then it was, and not, and more, in a way, more, more, you know
some people say they can always tell a book written on a computer and I think that's
bullshit. U m . I think m y book's more thoughtful since I've been using the
computer.
740.CS: W h a t do people mean when they say that, do you think?
741.W5:1 don't know. It's think it's just part of the, you know, the exquisite people
w h o think, w h o talk about fine writing and stuff. I mean I think that sort of selfconscious, u m , the sort of things poets say [a sort of preciousness?]. Yeah, it is a
preciousness. I think it's precious. A n d if you, I mean fine if that is what you want
to do, but I don't see any advantage whether you write in a neat little crabbed
handwriting, or on the best built computer in the world. Y o u know. So what?
742.CS: Yeah, and as you know, there seems to be a varying opinion on this. I know
that several of the writers really love the advent of wordprocessing, however, they
really do like printing it out, and having a piece of paper, to work on [oh yes!] and
scribble on and all that.
743.W5: O h , yes. I like that too! Yeah, it's got to be on paper before it's real. But in
the thinking stage I think it's fine on the computer. N o , it's certainly real to m e . I
pick up all sorts of errors I've made as soon as I see it on paper.
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744.CS: Yes. A n d there are things you can do on paper, of course, you can't do on a
computer still, sort of [ m m m m m m ] arrows and all that sort of staff, very fast stuff.
745.W5: Yeah. It's been a huge disappointment to libraries. We've all lost a lot of
income, not being able to sell our various paper drafts. It amounts to quite a bit of
money, on a novel, say.
746.CS: Yes, of course there's that book by Kate Grenville and Sue Woolfe wasn't
there? [yeah]. They used a lot of that, you know, Peter Carey's voluminous drafts
and so on. So just taking you back. The kids are out of the house, and things have
quietened down. W h a t do you do? M a k e yourself a coffee?
747.W5: Yeah, I have a coffee. U m . I read the paper until there's nothing left to do, till
I can't procrastinate any more. But I need to really thoroughly read.. .1 read the
sport, finance, everything.
748.CS: What do you read first?
749.W5: O h I read the front page. I read the news. I mean I'm interested in the news
most.. .then I go back. At the m o m e n t I read the cricket. I might read that first, but
normally, if it's not a...
750.CS: That's pretty well what I do actually [laughter].
751.W5: If there's no [cricket] tests on and it's not A F L season, I read the news first.
Then I go to the desk. A n d work till one. One-ish. At the last stage — this is at the
early stages of the book like I'm at n o w — at the last stages, you know, everything
else just goes and I just, every spare minute, as soon as someone walks out of the
room, I, you know, I walk round with the computer.
752.CS: Through the house?
753.W5: Yeah.. .and at night you know I'd take it to the dining room table.
754.CS: So it sort of inhabits your life at that stage? Is it because, is it that you get
more and more absorbed into it, or is it because you are getting close to finishing and
there's deadlines? What's happening there?
755.W5: U m , I'm getting more absorbed into it and I'm getting close to deadlines. But
I k n o w there is a state when I'm totally absorbed in it and it's usually about two
thirds in, when I start to dream, when I dream of the characters [OK] as if they are
real people. N o w I don't in the daytime wander around talking to myself or them or
anything. Y o u k n o w I'm not that absorbed. But I am, at night time they do become
fully-fledged personnel in the dreams.

A756.CS: And, a lot of writers have talked about h o w they carry the book around and
they're just out in the street or something and they see someone. A n d almost
everything seems to be about the book...
757.W5: O h yes, yes. U m . It's extraordinary. In fact, that's the case and , if you do
reach some sort of minor impasse, it's amazing h o w something you see or do it's as
if it's like a sign from heaven! Y o u k n o w it's like the Monty Python finger coming
down. A n d saying 'Try this!'. I mean even to the stage of some, some religious nut
will leave a pamphlet in the letter box, and it will say the words! That's happened to
me.
758.CS: N o w this seems to be almost universal. In the.. .psychology has gone very
cognitive. A n d I'm.. .there's some very interesting things in that, but I'm not a
cogntitivist. Anyway, when they talk about insight they use the classic stages, a sort
of a preparation stage that arrives at some sort of impasse, where w e try everything
w e already k n o w [ m m m ] and repeat the same mistakes and eventually put it, either
consciously put it aside or give up in frustration. A n d then it enters incubation
(which I think is an admission of failure on the part of, in the imagination of
psychologists). But then there's this sort of 'aha!' moment. A n dfrequentlyin the
literature the people talk about this. That the mind is sort of primed, and it's just
waiting for some sort of incidental cue [yeah]. But it only happens to the prepared
mind. But it does seem extraordinary doesn't it? A s you say you even get a
pamphlet and there are the words [ m m m ] . D o you think at that point though, there
could have been any one of dozens of things that could have, that would have, you
know.. .in the sense that you are so ready, and so alert, was that T H E thing, do you
think? O r something else could have happened which would have...
759.W5:1 think something else possibly could have. I mean.. .but that was the first
thing. So it's hypothetical I guess. Yes and that feeling of openness, even though
it's there because you've reached some sort of, well not blockage exactly, some sort
of impasse, is actually not a bad feeling though too. Y o u do feel very alert. It's the
feeling you get, there's a particular sort of hangover that can give it to you. Where
you've sort of got tunnel vision, you know. O n e without pain, but all the
unnecessaries are cut out and only what is vital to your brain is being allowed in —
and there's a particular sort of receptive feeling when you are in foreign parts too,
w h e n you are travelling. Y o u notice things that you don't, you never notice in
Australia [that'sright,in your h o m e town or anything]. I mean you don't notice, you
don't particularly care about passers-by unless. But you do if you are in Ral Pindi or
something, you know, where the passers-by are fascinating [yes and the colour of the
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sky] and the habits, you know, are absolutely extraordinary. So there's a sort of a
receptive, there's that sort of receptive thing. There's a sort of receptive fatigue
though that's a part of that, u m , like the hangover, where you do feel like some sort
of antenna or something and you k n o w you do soak stuff up,
760.CS: Yes that's quite interesting. There's...they've done some studies, some sort of
E E G studies you k n o w on brain frequencies and responses, and they're sort of cute
some of the studies, but they get people they call 'creatives' [chuckling] versus
'normals' — basically people w h o are working in creative activities [yeah] and just
people off the street. But what they do is they give them standard IQ type tests and
they measure their baseline E E G s and as it changes w h e n they are involved in those
sorts of, you know, fairly linear type IQ items. Then they give them creativity tasks.
A n interesting thing they find is that the baseline actually of the creatives, the
baseline of the amount of activity going on up here [pointing to head], is actually
lower than normals to start with. W h e n they do the IQ test they pretty well c o m e up
to about the same level, you know, of activity on the IQ test. W h e n they do the
creativity tests the normals go up to about the same level. The creatives actually go
below their baseline level [hmm!]. So what they're finding is — one psychologist in
particular is calling, what he calls defocused attention — which sounds very similar
to what you are talking about.. .This sort of state of cutting out all the peripheral sort
of activity. And.. .you see one of the things I a m very interested in, is the use of
metaphor and associations, analogy, that sort offigurativetype thinking, and one of
the things that might m a k e that possible is having this lower-level, wider spread
activation in the brain. Which, instead of having immediate stereotypical responses
to things, you know, like you get all sorts of remote associates, it's m u c h looser.
W h i c h then allows you to m a k e connections between otherwise dissimilar [ m m m m ]
domains, if you k n o w what I m e a n [ m m m ] . It would seem to m e that a hangover
could quite potentially bring that state about.
7 6 1 . W 5 : It's not one that you seek for those reasons but [ N O ! laughter] but it's not a
bad little by-product! [that's right...laughter].
762.CS: Especially as the by-product is usually so horrible. But that's very interesting.
7 6 3 . W 5 : It's interesting. I experienced one of those particular hangovers and during the
experience w h e n that condition overcame m e I wrote that into the novel, into the
particular novel [novel], so I had N e d Kelly talking about hangovers. A n d
mentioning all the types of grog, you know, a whisky hangover, a brandy hangover,
and the various effects. But I actually wrote that during one of them, so...

A764.CS: So it was very real [yeah]. Anyway, so here you are, you are in your office and
you go to it. What about when things are not really, not really working, not
flowing.? W h a t do you do?
765.W5: I'm quite easily diverted, I mean I might, u m , if the postman comes I might,
you know, if I hear him I might go out there and open the mail, and if the mail is
interesting I'll read it, and you know all that sort of stuff. Or the dog might be
whining and I'll take it for a walk or something. Y o u know what I mean. It's not a
hard-and-fast sort thing. I don't have a T must write you know 1500 words a day.' or
anything like that. I've never ever counted up the number of words I've written in a
day. A n d it always used to amaze m e that people sort of.. .literary journalists were
confounded that Graham Green only wrote 200 words a day. Well I mean, that'd be
good; I'd be happy with that. 200 quite good words a day would mount up quite
quickly to a book [it certainly would, wouldn't it]. Yeah. So I wouldn't get anything
like that. I mean, when I, towards the end of a book I might get um, you know, a
thousand. In the beginning I'd be lucky to get u m , you know, a hundred, probably.
766.CS: A n d that doesn't worry you because you've been through the process a number
of times [yeah].
767.W5: Yeah. N o , it doesn't worry me. I mean I'd prefer to be faster, but I.. .So
what? Yeah.
768.CS: Yeah, I think that's an important thing I mean, one of the central things I'm
interested in is the way people handle themselves emotionally. Because I think the
whole process is one of emotional self-management [yeah]. D o you k n o w what I
mean. Like obviously with new writers there's a lot of anxiety about that sort of
issue.
769.W5: There's always a degree of anxiety and it's not that it becomes easier, but you
just k n o w that you've done it before and you felt like that then, and so it will happen
again. So there's a sort of confidence in yourself, really. The process doesn't
become, you don't become any more facile, or, you know, there's no sort of easy
way through just because you have done it. The only thing is I think the increased
confidence really.
770.CS: That's right. It's what I call a sort of transcending affective calm [ m m m ] .
Even though while in the process itself it's very difficult, and slow, and clumsy and
messy and all that [ m m m ] , but there's a sort of overarching sense that this is all right

[mmm, mmm].
771.W5:1 also think, there's all sorts of other things that can affect this. I mean, I know
m y first book was quite successful and it was quite, it was well received. But it
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didn't have that — those weren't the days when being a young novelist was a big
deal. I mean, no-one said 'young novelist'. I mean 1 was 30 or something. I'd been
writing since I was 27. But no-one, the term 'young novelist' was not used by
reviewers. N o w if you are 38 you are a 'young', you know the agegroups. .. [indecipherable] has raised the ante a bit, so a 38 year old is a young
novelist and fuss is made. But there wasn't any fuss then and so I was able to segue
sort of evenly into each book, I think. But n o w I know writers who've had a huge,
extravagant fuss made of their first book, w h o are virtually, you know, they've been
rendered sort of impotent!
772.CS: Yes.. .because their sense of sort of expectation [yeah!].
773.W5: Yeah, and the second book, no-one gives a fuck.
774.CS: Yeah, 'cos often first books are very, very interesting, aren't they? There is a
sort of energy about them.
775.W5: But there is also an energy, there is also a marketing energy directed to them
which has got nothing at all to do with the contents or anything. It's a media thing
and a marketing thing. Y o u just write 'a dog sings' or something, you know,
[laughs] it's sort of pretty silly. But, it's a bit of a shame because there's a lot of
people w h o are over-praised, and w h o n o w really struggle.
776.CS: Hopefully they will work through it [yeah] but it's something they have to
overcome. I think that's what I was getting at a little bit before. Theresa Amibile, a
person w h o talks a lot about creativity and motivation, and they do very simple
things, but they get people to, you know, create something, design something, and
they just do things like if they offer them any motivation it actually cuts back the
creativity, you know. I know w e touched on this earlier when you said you worked
through that one about deadlines and things like that. But it does seem to m e that
you are playing tricks with yourself, and very useful tricks [ m m m ] , in that you are
just not looking at the end product. Y o u are not looking at, in a sense that what
rewards you are going to get, or will it be good enough, or...
777.W5: O h you can't. No... Y o u couldn't possibly do that.
778.CS: So your thing about putting all the cards on the wall. A n d you say 'I've got to
k n o w where it is going to go.'. It's almost like you're playing little games with
yourself [mmm],..You say 'Righto.. .at the very worst I've got a good ending
[ m m m ] . I'm heading somewhere [ m m m ] . N o w I can forget about that [ m m m ] and
get on with it. Get on with being present [yeah] to where I a m now.'. Is that the sort
of...?

A779.W5: That's , no that's exactly right. The whole thing is about tricks with yourself,
playing tricks with yourself.
780.CS: A n y other tricks?
781.W5: U m m . . .I'm probably not conscious of them all even [that's right]. Not really.
It sort of helps, I guess it sort of helps and this is sort of, you k n o w part vanity, part
everything I suppose, it sort of helps if you've been... a bit of praise coming in from
leftfielddoesn't hurt. Y o u k n o w that's a part of the bolstering of self.
782.CS: O h , [W2] told m e the incredible effect it had when she got a grant [ m m m ] . Not
just the practical stuff of being able to sit and work on it [ m m m ] , but just this sense
of one's peers, peers that one respected [yeah], they said 'You're worth it.'.
783.W5: Yeah. Yes, well I'd agree with that. U m . . .to the same extent, of course, a
negative, something negative happening can really throw you for days.
784.CS: Yes. Like a bad...
785.W5: Well, just a sort of sniping u m [comment], something malicious. A malicious
thing in print.
786.CS: A n d there's heaps of that isn't there [oh yeah] in the literary world?
787.W5: O h yeah. O h yeah. From people who've never had to put up or shut up
themselves. So, that can be very damaging but it can also be, well for m e , there's
also a sort of 'Well, I'll, up you!' It can work as [add a little spice] like success is
the best revenge sort of stuff.
788.CS: Yes. But there's a lot of that, isn't there. This sort of inner game, as it were
[yeah], sort of you know.. .like the inner game of tennis [yeah]. This is the inner
g a m e of writing. Y o u see I'm very interested in this, in notions of self
consciousness. So, for example, you know you are watching a good tennis player, or
a good sportsman, cricket of course, and you can see when the cricketer is not being
present to, to playing the stroke [ m m m ] . W h e n there's doubts in their mind, when
there's other, when there's self-consciousness going on. Then, of course, they're
lost, they're at sea, their feet don't m o v e [they're not sort of in the moment] yeah,
exactly. A n d it seems to m e that that's hugely important in whatever endeavour, to
bring creativity to any endeavour, it's, it's finding ways in which to not be concerned
about self [yeah]. A n d it seems to m e , we've been talking about it being an
inherently healthy thing to do, that's the healthy bit about it, is that w e forget
ourselves [yeah]. Can you talk about that? Y o u mentioned before about, you know,
dreaming the characters and so on, and then two-thirds into the book you become the
book almost.

A789. W 5 : Well the book becomes real to the extent that I a m sort of in it. I a m on the
same journey, if you like. Momentarily, or the characters are on, you know, in m y ,
whatever I'm doing. Walking down Pitt Street or something — they've joined m e in
doing that. Y o u know, buying a loaf of bread or something mundane, as most of m y
dreams tend to be. So that's quite, um. I've had a couple of supernatural type
feelings, though, that are a bit weird, because I'm not actually into, I'm not
particularly a new-ager or anything. But I had a, um.. .I'd been writing about — this
is again with [novel] the Ned Kelly book — I'd been writing about um, Dan, his
brother's dog, and h o w it was behaving during the siege at Glenrowan. U m . Y o u
know, it was hit by a bullet and was running around squealing and things, and u m ,
m y then, m y n o w 20 year old son, then he was only 10, and I were, he got the tent for
Christmas and w e pitched it in the backyard of our place in the Central Coast. A n d
during the night he would sleep in there by himself. So I would sleep in there, out
there with him. A n d during the night I had this really very strange experience of this,
there was this growling noise woke m e , and there was this muzzle of a dog, or a wolf
or a something, or a fox, something you know, a canine, very vicious, teeth bared,
muzzle, it was coming through the side of the tent. A n d um...
790.CS: This is not a dream, this is, this did happen?
791.W5: Well, I'm not sure. I woke up.. .we had a big torch which he insisted w e take
with us, I woke up hitting the side of the tent, hitting at it. A n d then I woke up fully
and I a m actually awake holding the torch. So the.. .what obviously happened I
would think is that sort of thing was on m y mind and a possum or something was
growling on a stump nearby, because they can make a hell of a din, and you know the
brain did the rest [yes, exactly]. But it was so real, the segue into, from dream into
real life was absolutely so subtle and it was like real life itself, the way things
happened, progressed. But, it sort of really quite unnerved m e , even remembering it
n o w there's [tingles] yes. A n d I've had a few things like that, a few things where u m
... .Well this will sound bizarre, I certainly wouldn't say this publicly, but I had the
feeling that what I was doing was being watched by N e d and it was approved [yes]. I
had an approving feeling come d o w n or something.
792.CS: This doesn't surprise m e at all. S o m e of the conversations I've had with
people, like with [WI] for example, she has a very interesting relationship with her
characters and with writing. A n d she talked many times about a sense of not telling
people about what she is working on because she will betray it [ m m m ] . N o w , I said
to her 'What about when you finally publish it?' and I can't remember the details of
that now, but she had a way of making sense of that too. But there was very m u c h
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this sense of being true to, and doing justice to, and also this sense — and all the
writers have talked about this.
793.W5: T o imaginary characters?
794.CS: Yes [ m m m ] . A n d all the writers have talked about this sense of exteriority,
even though it's your creation, there is some sort of sense in which you're more
listening to it, you're.. .or you're dreaming about it and it's coming to you, and your
task is to be as faithful as possible [rnmm] to this. D o you have this sense as well?
Is that a part of what you are talking about?
795.W5: Yes, I do. U m . . .it's a different.. .At the m o m e n t because I'm working on this
non-fiction book as I said, this causes a different problem to arise. A n d even when I
a m dealing with formerly living people w h o are n o w dead, I have this feeling of
responsibility towards them.. .um.. .and I'm not sure whether this is a bit misplaced
because the feeling of responsibility that I should have, if I a m writing some sort of
memoir, and I a m the child observer, it should be real to h o w I felt about them then,
at the time. Not h o w events since have proved things to have been. So there's a real
dichotomy in that sort of area — an ethical/creative sort of problem. A n d also the
storyteller thing comes into it too where I want it obviously to, I've got to restrain in
a sense, I've got to leash what normally I'm trying to unleash [exactly]. So all this is
creating interesting tensions. I hope that they are good, I hope that it ends up being
good.
796.CS: Yes, it probably will be useful to both genres in a sense.
797.W5: Yeah. But I'm also, I'm not actually a great believer in sort of genres in a
way, and I don't k n o w why. Just because someone has said, you know, 150 years
ago: 'Well, we'll call this a novel. It is more than 50000 words long and less than
[that'sright,laughing] then this is a novel.'.
798.CS: Fortunately with post modernism there has been a decent sort of loosening up
of most of...
799.W5: Well there has in some ways, I mean ,and yet this whole n e w advent —
Demidenko sort of stirred it up a bit — I mean the literary journalists are sort of one
the 'Is that real? Is that real? Did you make that up?' [that's right!].
800.CS: I love it [laughter]. I mean , I'm not, obviously I'm not as involved in the
literary world, so I just thought that whole thing was fantastic, you k n o w it's such a
joke anyway [ m m m ] .
801.W5: Well it's that whole Aboriginality thing too. It's extraordinary.
802.CS: Yes.. . N o w just coming back to that approving sense, you had this sense that
N e d was approving of the job you had done. The other thing that strikes m e with
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scientists having breakthroughs with things and that, is that when people m o v e into
that sort of state, they have this sort of sense of feeling quite connected to the world
around them [yes]. Y o u know when you have this sort of breakthrough [yeah]. A n d
it is a bit mystical in that sense .
803.W5: Yes it is. I, I.. .It's also, it's very pantheistic, I mean in m y case [yeah, yeah] I
feel like I'm exceptionally connected and that book was a breakthrough in that way
too. A n d I was writing it, I wrote a lot of it up on the Central Coast in a bushy sort of
atmosphere and I noticed things. A s I was putting myself in his situation, or putting
him in m y situation, I was looking at things, I mean, I looked and examined and
wrote about philosophically, gravel! [laughs]. I mean I'll getrightd o w n to, you
know, right d o w n to it. A n d I found gravel, this shows you h o w nutty I was about it,
I mean I got to like different sorts of gravel [that's not nutty] and rocks and ants and,
you know, I did think 'Let's get right down to Australianess.'. Y o u k n o w right at its
literal level.
804.CS: Well you k n o w there's Patrick White and gobs of spit isn't there? Y o u know?
805.W5: Well I guess so, gobs of something with Patrick. But, u m , I found bark on
trees interesting. Y o u k n o w 1 found the dirt fascinating.
806.CS: Which is like you said when you travel, you begin to notice features like that
[yeah]. But w e don't normally travel in our o w n country in that mind way.
807.W5: No.. .so there's a general freeing up process in all sorts of ways I think at this
time. And, I guess in speaking I haven't actually tried to link the two, but someone
close to m e had a breakdown just before then and, all of a sudden, there was chaos.
W h a t had been previously serene was chaos. I mean it was a general fugue state that
flowed over everyone else. A n d then that ended. A n d then this heightened
sensitivity and creativity period occurred. Just looking at it I would imagine that
would've had a great deal to do with it.
808.CS: I'm sure it would. I mean It's a bit like your hangover too, I mean there are
some sorts of perturbances to the, just the normal, running d o w n the normal slots
[yeah]. Y o u k n o w some sort of loosening up. In fact, one of the main psychologists
who's informed m y work is a guy called Kelly and he talks about loosening and
tightening [ m m m ] of construing [ m m m ] . Y o u know, the way w e construe. A n d that
uhh, what he calls a creativity cycle is just alternating between looser and tighter
ways of understanding things. Tighter construing is when w e pretty well anticipate
the world in the same way each time. It's very reliable. So if you are doing a
mathematics problem you do it the same every time. But when w e think more
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the same construct [yeah] do you k n o w what I mean? [sure]. A n d he talks about
what he calls provisional tightening, so you loosen things up and you play with
nonsense and absurdity — you don't usually tell people about this because they'll
think you're crazy [ m m m ] . But then you provisionally tighten. Y o u just get a feel
for whether that's going to work and then you let it go again.
809.W5: Yeah. I use that. I do that.
810.CS: D o you?
811.W5: Yeah. I mean I have the series of cards I used when I was writing the last
novel, which is just basically based around surrealism and things, and I'd m a k e up
some sort of piece of verse based on one of these pieces of absolutely, you k n o w in
an extreme, surreal art. A n d I'd just run with it. Each morning before I started. A n d
some of then actually ended up being pieces that I tamed into proper sentences and
so forth. I had a character w h o was having typhoid delirium during the disease, and I
was able to use that in that.
812.CS: Yes, especially because of its looseness and thefloridnature of it or something
like that. A n d you k n o w the w a y — say when you are doing that, and there's
probably a predominant sort of emotional feel about the verse or something like that,
is that predominantly h o w it works? Is it, does it have a sort of a.. .Because it's not
literal meaning you are on about there is it?
813.W5: Well, I've done it with literal meaning and just absurdities. So I've used both.
The absurdity one, the absurdity m o d e to get m e thinking really, just to get things
flowing really [a bit stuck, a bit stiff] yes, just sort of to loosen up, like an exercise.
The other though, I've — oh I suppose in a w a y some of the passages that I wanted
to carry a fair bit of emotional weight I wrote in verse and then turned them into
prose. But they were ones without any extraneous words in them. They weren't the
ones with, you know, frogs eating weet-bix or something. These were things actually
occurring in the story. But I did them in verse and then put them into prose.
814.CS: Yeah, 'cos, see I mentioned before that I'm not really a cognitivist. I probably
should tell you what I mean by that now. A n d that is that, it's sort of useful that
psych decided to bring the mind back into respectable study, but it's only quite
recently that it's beginning to say that maybe this distinction between emotion and
thought is very artificial. A n d in fact one theorist I'm interested in talks about
emotions as just being a different style of thought, uhh, and one that in lots of w a y is
more complex than logical thought, more multidimensional, and certainly invokes
the body more directly [ m m m ] . A n d in fact seeing emotionality as the basis of mind.
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Language and more logical thought drawing from that, being a subsequent
development, and always having to go back to it to draw inspiration, ideas, and to get
out of the vicious circles or logical solipsisms, you know [ m m m ] . So that's w h y I
guess I'm sort of asking you about the emotional feel of things. So you see, for
example,frequentlywriters talk about a central image or just a feeling they have, or
that 'This isright.'and you don't k n o w where it's going but it's almost like they are
checking back with a type of emotional barometer, or emotional 'That feels right.
This is right. This is going.'. Can you illuminate that in any way?.. .1 k n o w it's a bit
vague.
815.W5: Um... well what sort of works for me. W h e n something is, seems like a good
idea it's, I think, that is sort of quirky that is really for want of a better word. I think
of the actual word quirky, I mean that is meaning sort of fascinatingly different I
suppose [yes]. Not sort of kinky, necessarily [no, no, no], but sort of stands out as an
idea or a thought or something I've just seen, or, and then things quickly, u m , it sort
of absorbs all the air around it and things come into it [yeah]. U m in fact it can be
sort of anything.
816.We, u m , w e were in Broome this time last year. W e went to a crocodile farm next
door to the hotel — it was something to do with the kids. A n d it was one of the most
fascinating things I've ever seen. Because, u m , and the whole novel is building up in
the mind.. .It's ran by one of those great white hunter types, who, you k n o w he's got
his o w n television program and everything. But he's genuinely one of those outback
sort of guys. He's sort of from central casting, but um, he.. .these days
whenever.. .this is just some digression! Whenever a crocodile attacks an Aboriginal
camp or something, whenever it's seen as a man-eater, you are not allowed to kill
them now. So he takes them in. H e has to go and get it. He's paid, you know. Also
n o w though, of course, all these crocodiles are breeding in these places and he's got
thousands of them. But in the wild, one egg in ten comes to adulthood. A n d of
course in his artificial environment ten out often do, and hence all these mutant
crocodiles running around [ohh]. Things with no tails and no bottom jaws and he
turns on a light and scrabble, scrabble, scrabble in this tin shed, and there's this huge
crocodile, with no.. .just with a b u m ! Y o u know with buttocks and no tail! A n d the
tail is half their body-length. A n d it's like something out of the Stars Wars Trilogy,
but the second one, where all these sort of mutant space creatures are sitting around a
bar [yeah, yeah]. Well, it's like that! A n d you know the kids are sort of agog and
I'm agog and it was very very strange, very strange. A n d it was like a dream, it was
like a surreal painting and immediately a novel occurred to me. A n d that won't be
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enough!
817.CS: Yeah, that'sright.But it's like a, there's a sort of .. .I'd like to explore this,
I'm not sure what it is about this but I'm sure it is really crucial [ m m m ] . A s you say
the word is quirky, because there is something, it's different enough to mainstream
things, like everyday life, the normalcy of everyday life, to some w a y shed light on a
reality about life that's more real than the normal w a y w e understand — I haven't
expressed that very well, have I? D o you k n o w what I mean? It is a part of normal
life but it has a w a y of highlighting what w e don't normally see... [ m m m ] or
something like that [ m m m ] . Can you help m e with that?
818.W5: Well only in the specific instance, in that what stood out for m e as
representing those things was that immediately, I mean this place is Beagle Bay —
Darwin's boat landed nearby [Oh, O K ] evolution... [indecipherable]. So instantly,
this rather quirky little episode on an afternoon when these late 20* century people,
tourists, planning to do something with their kids, suddenly becomes something else
with all this other stuff just desperately saying 'Here I am.', you know. 'I'm part of
this theme too.'.
819.CS: It's interesting though, isn't it. It's almost like again you've gone to this place,
and not expecting anything, [no, just wanting a holiday] and all of a sudden it sort of
shakes you, you k n o w [yeah]. There's something sort of strange happening here, and
it's talking to you almost [yeah].. .as you say it felt surreal.
820.W5: It's those things that interest m e , I must say. A n d then the normal malefemale staff which interests m e too, in a general way as a sort of middle-aged
heterosexual writer. That will come in; that's a given. It doesn't.. .but the other
things are the sort of focal signposts.
821.CS: These sorts of images.. .and everything can sort of hang off them, can't they?
Y o u k n o w [yeah] and they'll go in a thousand directions, and twenty of which you
might use [yeah]...and that's what I'm interested in metaphor for: because it seems
to have this, you get this, or symbols, you get two or three main symbols and things
that recur and writers say 'Well I didn't plan that, but when I look back at the end I
can see h o w that just...' [yeah], eventually they ended up through all the drafts and
redrafts aligning themselves with these central metaphors. A n d sometimes they
don't even, they still haven't realised that the book's finished and some critic points
it out [yeah] or some friend reads it and says 'Did you realise this?' [yeah].
822.W5: Well I'm surprised no-one's pointed out to m e — and I'm well aware of it, but
I have a lot of lions in things that I write about and I k n o w why, and I deliberately —
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the river from the South Perth Zoo and in the morning when they were hungry you
could hear the lions and the water of course would carry the sound [yeah]. A n d I can
remember lying in the sleepout.. .look at that, a delicious thrill as a little kid. Look at
the lion! A n d liking it!
823.CS: Yeah and the images in your mind...
824.W5: Being scared, being a bit scared, but liking it. Rather that it was happening
than not [yeah], even though I knew they would eat m e if I was there, in their cage
[yeah that's right.. .laughter]. A n d I wasn't! A n d u m , I had N e d Kelly and a lion.
Y o u know, I've had lions in all sorts of things. A n d I've used the, I've used the
South Perth Zoo about three or four times as people travelling across the water and
hearing lions and things. W e ' d been on a safari where, u m , through, in a way having
to face up to, not that I initiated it, having to face up to my.. .1 used to dream about
lions as a kid, all the time, and they were coming to the house and things. Because as
I went to sleep you know there'd often be, roaring!
825.CS: Yeah, that's right so you were in that sort of hypnopompic [sic: hypnogogic]
state just before you go to sleep and there's this sound comes out.
826.W5: A n d in the dreams I'd always be, they'd see m e and they'd come towards m e
and I'd lie down, this is aged six or something, I'd lie down on thefloor— in the
dream — and they'd sniff m e — you know I'd play possum and they'd sniff m e and
I'd be O K , and I'd wake up in the bed in the sleep-out. So I mean that lasted for
years and years and years and I used to be scared of the M G M lion, you know, in the
matinee...
827.CS: It's really interesting, I remember when Abe, m y son, when he was about five
or six. H e could pretty well read by then, but he, and he'd sort of read everything
and w e used to get him, u m , you know Where's Wallyl you k n o w that stuff? [ m m ,
m m m ] , there's a Where's Wally magazine...
828.[tape end.. .described [my son's fear of stories about space and comets hitting the
earth],
829..., Something that's childlike, isn't there, about the state that you are describing?
[ m m ]. Y o u know, it is no coincidence that you started talking about yourself as a
child and the lions roaring and things like that. I got that sense when you were
talking about going to the alligator park, it wasn't just your kid w h o was
[chuckling]...
830.W5: O h no! O h no! Absolutely not! I still, I mean without sort of boasting, but I
enjoy playing with the kids and w e have a great time and he likes the fact that I do
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to his movies with him and I like going to the zoo and that sort of stuff. Just the
same as I like going to art galleries too, in a way, to see good paintings, and
good.. .And I'm a film critic as well, but I get something for m e out of those things,
83l.CS: Yeah, exactly. A n d there is something I think that w e lose there in that, and
that is this sense of presence to things, and not just the surface of them. I guess what
I'm thinking of is, you know the way kids have imaginary friends and [yeah] oh
just.. ..when you were describing the gravel. I've ended up telling most of the writers
this, but I had a very vivid memory as a kid picking up a little rock. A n d it was
almost like it was — it was an ordinary little stone — but I remember having it in m y
hand and it was like it was glowing, you know, and it had a personality, and I
remember thinking 'I better not tell any adults about this, they'll start to worry.'
[yeah]. Y o u k n o w but it was really alive for m e , it was like, it was precious [yeah!].
D o you k n o w what I mean? A n d it was such a strong experience and it seems to m e
that is exactly what you are talking about [ m m m ] , you k n o w when things strike you,
strike your eye as it were [ m m m ] . A n d it is very m u c h about feeling though isn't it?
I m e a n it is a body state, of a sort of energy or something like that.
832.W5: Yeah, well it's u m , its certainly all where it comes together. U m . . .I'm
remembering, well I had an imaginary friend too, called John Gordon, or so I'm told.
I can't remember it, but the child I a m speaking of the son, the eldest child, a five
year gap between you know, siblings. U m . . .But if I see something slightly harsh or
cruel happening to a child — and I don't mean, like everyone would, like being hit,
say, by a parent. But if I see a father brow-beating a child, it has a really very strange
effect on m e , it makes m e feel very, very bad. Whether that's projection, or whatever
[no, not necessarily]. Part of it's m e as the child, part of it's m e as the father that
wouldn't do it, to his...
833.CS: Well it's probably emotional sensitivity. I mean...
834.W5: But it makes m e feel very bad. Y o u know. I think about it, I go h o m e and
write it down, you know, I make a note about it, for whatever reason.
835.CS: N o , I think I k n o w what you mean. I have a friend writing a book on, it's
really a book about spontaneity, but his view is that emotions are primarily
communicative devices. That w e are inherently built, nature has built us to respond,
to participate in the being of the other person, to [right].. .as in sympathetic motion
almost. So when a baby cries, is upset, the normal thing is for us to feel as the baby
feels [ m m m ] . Not to cry, but to feel it, and then to fix it [ m m m ] . A n d then over time
we're basically taught to inhibit that, you k n o w to suppress it, and so those sorts of
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find that distressing because they've cut off [ m m m ] their sort of emotional
resonance, their emotional sympathy. But you couldn't be writing the sorts of novels
and doing the sorts of things you do and not have that openness.
836. W 5 : M m m . But It's funny, I mean it just, I can remember another case walking
past Woolworths in Park Street one day and seeing an obviously recently, newlyarrived migrant family, I don't know from where, but they had, they had sort of
middle-European clothes on, and u m , they'd gone inside and bought the little boy,
they hadn't, I don't know w h y they wouldn't take him in with them to try them on,
but he and the mother waited outside — I mean it was that sort of stuff. H e and the
mother waited outside in the street while the father went in and bought a pair of
shoes, a pair of sneakers, Woolies sneakers for the boy. But the look of delight on
the boy's face as the father brought out this thing, it was just extraordinary! I mean it
was absolutely extraordinary! A n d it was a very, it was a very moving m o m e n t and I
wonder if they fitted or not! [chuckling]. But I just looked as I was going past, but it
was extraordinary! It was, and I've thought about it since, I mean it was a pretty
mundane sort of m o m e n t really, but um, but it really, it was the only thing happening
in the street, you know, as far as I was concerned at that time. It was a really,
gigantic sort of thing. The look on the boy's face was beatific.
837.CS: Yes, it's very interesting, and then again, w e come back to this idea then. Like
that could become a metaphor for a whole book couldn't it? [ r n m m m m ] . I mean, this
sort of sense of, you know, you then thinking: 'Well w h y did that m o v e m e so m u c h
[ m m m ] and what was it about the boy? W h a t is it about the relationship? [ m m m ] .
W h a t does it say about h o w w e normally are? [ m m m ] . W h a t does it say about h o w I
raise m y son?'. Y o u k n o w [oh sure] what does it say about our culture and the way
w e are inundated [yeah] with, you know, materialism and so on?
838.... [break....]
839.You mentioned about talking a lot about when you get really excited about a project
and you are into it and you want to tell everybody.
840.W5: Well, I don't want to tell them, I want to N O T tell them; however, when I'm
asked I spill the beans. Y o u know, so I'm actually resistant to telling them anything
about it.
841.CS: H o w come?
842.W5: Well, I don't want it to get out. I want it to, because it would be better, you
k n o w the element of surprise will be good.
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844.W5: Yeah, exactly. A n d also I do think that if you talk something out then
everyone says this is a bit of a cop-out, but if you talk it before you've written it, it
tends to be lesser in some way. It's all those things. However, if I a m actually into it
and it's occupying m y mind at the time, once 1 start, then it seems such a good story
that I can't help telling it [yes]. Y o u know, I presume. Y o u can tell by people's
reaction. If you're talking about, you know, your writing 'My latest sonnet is such
and such about...', you know... 'What time is it?' [laughter].
845.CS: That's right. It's that old tale where people are telling people their dreams you
k n o w [laughter].
846. W 5 : Well if you are actually telling them about somebody you k n o w w h o killed
people, and he was hanged and this is what they found he did, the, you know, it's
different.
847.CS: That's true. W h a t about this sort of, the social side of things. I mean. There
are two dimensions I'm interested in. O n e is the very obvious dimension. Most
people have their important people in their lives that they need, or want to, to talk to
about their processes, you know [right]. So that's one level. The other level is to
what extent is our creative thinking sort of socially-imbued or socially-structured or
socially constituted. Does either of those give you an avenue to say something?
848.W5: U m m . . .Well I guess creativity is for m e bound up in what's going on around
me. I mean one of the reasons, there's an old, hardy perennial lecture topic at
writers' conferences which is 'Why do I write?'. A n d it's always, you know, it saves
m e time sort of thing. But it, but if you do actually think about it, if you are a writer
and you think about it, and I'm trying to pin it d o w n as accurately as I can for m e , it's
because I want to understand h o w things are. A n d until 1 see it written d o w n by m e I
don't k n o w what I think, which until I see myself, written down. A n d u m , it's all a
matter for m e of trying to m a k e sense of m y , in a way, you know without getting too
sort of municipal about it [laughs], about m y community, and u m , you know,
Randwick, say then, Sydney, and then Australia and then the world, sort of thing.
U m , so it's sort of, I'm educating myself with each book in a way. I mean at one
level. Y o u k n o w I'm trying to see h o w it all fits in, you know, where everything
comes together and.. .by m e recording that, even if what I'm recording is totally out
of m y imagination, it seems to make u m , it seems to make the world a skerrick more
easy to understand.
849.CS: A n d you said something quite a while ago about it never quite matches the
vision you had for it.
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over the threshold to do it, then I obviously think the sky's the limit. Y o u know, this
is, this is going to be the best book ever written, sort of thing. Which is necessary —
this is one of the ruses of course — so it's mainly that I think.
85l.CS: W h a t about the sense in which nanatives seem to come or dialogues seem to
come. O n e of the things I'm interested in as well is that seems that things c o m e as
wholes almost, you know, like writers talk about, they get into that sort of creative
flow and it's like they've got to keep writing and the narrative just seems to flow and
they've got to write to keep up with it, not all the time. I mean, as you say,
sometimes 200 words would be wonderful in a day [yeah]. But other times it's
almost like they're transcribing. Is that sometimes?
852.W5: I'd like it. I must say, I'd really like it to be the case.. .it's more plugging
along for m e [OK]. It's plugging along and then making it seem that as if it had
c o m e like that [chuckles]. I mean in a way it's making it seem effortless really.
That's part of the deal.
853.CS: M a y b e I've misrepresented it a bit too. I know about the sort of, which I think
is likely bullshit [the muse] that's right... 'inspired writing' [chuckling], you k n o w
like William Blake and that sort [yeah] of thing. But maybe it does happen to some
people but...
854.W5: It happens in bursts every n o w and then [yeah]...not often enough for me.
855.CS: Yeah, I think everyone would like that to happen [yeah]. It would m a k e the
process a lot easier, wouldn't it? But some sort of sense there though that what one's
being faithful to is a sort of, It's almost like an ecological validity to the way
something is presented. It's like you're creating life again, or the social matrix, or,
you know, trying to get this to be real or something like that.
856.W5: Yeah, I m e a n you're getting into the G o d areas in a way.
857.CS: I wasn't thinking about that, but please explain! [laughing]
858.W5: N o , but the playing G o d thing [oh, O K ] as the novelist is, I mean, in a way is
the, well it's the general overview in a sense, to a degree, and it's also certainly if you
use, if you're using the third person you can make, you m a k e people's minds, you
can m a k e them distinct, you m a k e them walk. Y o u are not just saying 'He went up
to the shops.'; you are saying and he was thinking 'Shit...I need such and such.'.
A n d there's very much, that is a freeing exercise in itself. The choice, of, I mean
having chosen that voice. Third person gives you m u c h more range. But it doesn't
personalise it obviously like first person does. A n d second person sounds a bit
lectury and you k n o w 'You do this, you do that' sort of thing. But.. .And I'm using
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first person n o w and it's another restriction I'm finding apart from non-fiction, in that
I'm wondering h o w I'm going to get inside the murderer's head. So I think there's
going to have to be a sort of bit of guile and sort of business to get through to get to
that. So it's um.. .1 mean the only way, the easiest way to deal with everything, the
life around you, the social aspect of things, is the third person which gives you total
sort of freedom, but u m , and is often easier to read. I've had people say to m e — I
don't k n o w h o w restricted they are in their minds — people come along to a talk and
they say T couldn't read your book.'. Well. O K . [thank you very much! Laughter].
'I loved all of them, but this one was written in the present tense.'.. .So do you know
what I mean? W h y should that restrict them? They'd like to have had it happened
already.
859.CS: Yes sometimes people are like that, aren't they? I mean reading books is funny
anyway , isn't it? I mean you'll be in a m o o d [yes] and then you pick it up a year
later and it's 'Why didn't I read this?' [yeah]. What about telling people? I k n o w
that.. .principally writers have said to m e , 'When I'm really in it I don't want to tell
people what it is about.'. But almost all of those have said that there are points at
which there are certain people in their lives that they want to talk to about what
they're doing. D o you have people like that?
860.W5: Well, the only one really would be m y wife [a novelist/short-story writer]
who's in the area and knows about that sort of thing. But in a sense u m , perhaps
because of that I tend to leave it, I tend not to tell anyone until it's really quite late.
She's thefirstperson to read it, but it is a completed.. .she gets the paper, you know
she gets the manuscript. A n d then she comments, before anyone else, before a
publisher. But I don't go to her with little sort of problems like 'How will I get them,
you know, to Fiji or something when they are in Sweden.'.
861,CS: I remember [WI] saying that u m , I've forgotten her partner's name, but
anyway saying that he's perfect because she'll go and talk about something and he'll
just grunt [ m m m ] and that's all she wants [ m m ] you know. She'll have the sense that
he understands or whatever or is sympathetic [rnmm], but she doesn't want a
comment or a guidance or something like that. But it's more like, it's very important
to her to go occasionally and say 'I'm doing this .. .what do you think about this
image?' and he'll go ' m m m yeah.. .'[rnmm] u m , so I sort of wonder. There's
something I haven't quite got m y head around, with writers anyway. A n d that is, you
see the whole process presumably is about communication, because you are writing
words that people are going to read. But in lots of ways that seems to be very
background or very.. .do you know what I mean?

A862.W5: Yeah. I don't.. .1 k n o w I've read interviews all the time with people saying
that they, of course without their wife they'd never would have written such and
such. A n d u m , they are just people w h o aren't even in the business. But I m e a n I
couldn't say that because I.. .I'm just a bit too scared I suppose that if she, that if I
got any — and she is the same with me... — that w e just need m e to pick up a hint of
not liking it or disapproval or something and it would wreck it! It would wreck it.
863.CS: I think that's what [Wl]said [yeah]. He's perfect and he's a writer too so he
understands...
864.W5: So I really can't. I need to be totally convinced. It needs to be finished and I
need to be totally convinced of it. Then I'll show her. A n d then if she points
something out I'm confident enough to either dismiss it or to take it on. A n d I do.
She has done that. I've said 'That's a good point'. A n d certainly things like you've
got, you know, he went in that door and you've got him somewhere else. Y o u know,
all those sorts of structural things.. .just sort of editing.
865.CS: Yes that's interesting because I interviewed [ W 4 ] yesterday, and even though
it's different because he's talking about dramaturgy and things like that [ m m m ] , but
his role as a dramaturg with young writers is very similar to that. Like he basically
sees his role as saying 'Now what's your vision? Keep it to the vision. Don't worry
about all the structural things.', and so on, and it was very m u c h this sense of being
very.. .um, solicitous and very gentle with the writers and saying 'It's allright.Keep
to your vision. Trust yourself.'. It's very m u c h a sort of counselling role... [ m m m ] ,
which I think is exactly what you are saying, you know. Just even one negative
comment could be enough to reallyfloorthem. It's a very delicate process in terms
of self-validation and self-concem.
866.W5: O h absolutely! Yeah. This is one of therasesand u m generally sort of
bullshitting yourself that you k n o w what you are doing and you'll do it.
867.CS: So that's where the social comes in too I guess...It's important, it's really
important. It's important to the extent that we're so easily deflated if someone else...
868.W5: O h yes. It divides into thirds for m e . A third of the time, in any project, and
it's always about the same proportions, a third of the time I think it's terrific and the
vision has held. A third of the time I think it is absolute bullshit, and say I'm looking
at a word — if you look at any word long enough, you know, it looks nonsensical, on
large-scale.. .Don't translate that.. .multiplied by a hundred thousand. A n d a third of
the time I don't know. A n d it's exactly that. I don't. A third of the time. That's the
three thirds, and there's the terrible feeling w h e n you finally hand the manuscript
over to the publisher and there's sort of more worries in it than I know, but I don't

Ahave to worry if it's going to get published or not, do you k n o w what I mean? That's
not a worry of mine. But, so I know that they, I'm not sure that they'll be dinkum
with me. I'm not sure if they'll say...
869.CS: It's a bit different because you have been well published and your name is
going to sell them and so...
870.W5: So I'm never quite sure whether they're u m 'Yeah that's really good.', which
would mean to anyone else 'That's shithouse.', really. So I've always got to, I mean
I'm always on tenterhooks when I've submitted a manuscript.
87l.CS: A n d then when do the tenterhooks come out? W h e n are you more at peace?
872.W5: W h e n enough people w h o I.. .say when the agent says it's really good, the —
although you see I don't.. .1 must say I trust m y o w n judgement better than I do
theirs. So even if they both were not that enthusiastic, that wouldn't be quite it. That
would disappoint me.. .but um. Y o u know I sort of write the sort of books that I like
to read and I k n o w that they read other sorts of books. So I think, I just think m y
judgement's better. However, I can still be offended and put off if they didn't like it.
So I guess when thefirstpositive from someone important.. .A really positive review
from Andrew Reimer, say in the Sydney Morning Herald, their main critic, then I'm
right then.
873.CS: Yes 'cos he's a fairly hard critic too isn't he [yeah].
874.W5: So um. Yeah it's sort of pathetic.. .but um...
875.CS: Well that's what I'm interested in. It's not pathetic, I mean.. .largely what
writers do, and I think creative people generally, is they are going against nature.
Y o u know, what they are doing is.. .you see I think human beings are basically wired
to anticipate the world. A n d uhh, n o w w e have an amazing capacity that when w e
reach impasse of any sort, to sort of, you know, if w e are not too threatened by it, to
become playful with things [ m m m ] you know. But really it's quite amazing to m e
that w e then often deliberately put ourselves in situations of deep uncertainty and so
on [ m m m m ] , you k n o w what I mean? There's something magnificent and crazy
about it at the same time?
876.W5: A n d also very threatening to some other people [oh yes!] because it's just, and
this is more a curiosity to m e , that when I was a journalist full-time for 10 years, and
I've been a novelist for about 20 or something, but when I was a journalist to m y
knowledge I had no enemies. But I was in a company structure so there were people
under m e and there were people over m e There were people jealous of m e , there were
people w h o weren't. But as far as I knew, they, none of them hated m e . But people I
don't k n o w hate m e now! Y o u know what I mean? [yes] because of something I've

Awritten [exactly] or what I represent: Sydney writing rather than Melbourne writing
or something. D o you k n o w what I mean?! I mean all these fucking stupid labels.
Or that I'm straight and not gay, or that I'm a novelist and not a poet, or, do you
k n o w what I mean? They sort of generalise whether they just happen to, or that I'm
successful. That'll do it!
877.CS: Especially if they've just written their first novel and no-one has accepted it.
878.W5: So it's u m , I mean all these things are a bit strange and u m a bit sort of woolly
and silly, so you have to, um.. .and very provincial and you've really got to look, I've
got to constantly look at the sort of big picture. I don't mean in terms of.. .not in
subject matter, necessarily, although there's nothing the matter with that, but I have
got to really think beyond the little pool and think of what the absolute creative
possibilities that are there and that I might possess, and that are there for m y work.
U m , and remind myself of that in some way or another.

879. WRITER 6

880.CS: So the first thing I want to ask is how do you go about organising your creat
life? W h a t do you do? Its a big question! [laughter], you can start anywhere. I mean
you can revisit it [laughter].
881.W6: Chris. See I'd probably immediately say what do you mean, m y writing life or
m y creative life? I don't think I organise m y creative life as such. U m . . .Organise
m y writing life and m y professional life or, whatever, u m m , and.. .Look! Head m e
off or stop m e if I'm not keeping to the point. I generally work within a context of
having a wife w h o has a business which requires her to be out of the house, and m y
working at h o m e and having a twelve year child w h o has to be looked after above all
by m e , or whose school etc. etc., needs to be taken care of by me. So I have usually a
fairly abbreviated day at each end. I, by and large, I work in a separate part of the
house.. .yeah a study up there [points to back garden] which actually was originally
designed for, u m , [partner] to deal in books in from home, she, it's packed with
books as it happens, but it's more where I work and.. .But because it's a complete
dwelling, it's got all the facilities and the rest of it, it's a place where w e have friends
stay frequently...So, there's a...ah, it's not sacred for m e . People c o m e and stay
there and I've got to work elsewhere, yeah. But um,.. .oh G o d I was reading, rereading a review of myself by an Irish writer the other day. It's a review I constantly
refer to for various reasons because the first book I wrote, and it got published in

A1982, it got into the hands of a m a n w h o was editor of a thing called Books Ireland,
which is an Irish, straight book review kind of thing, and he sent it to review, for
review, as a favour to m e to someone w h o then did, u m , a marvellous hatchet job on
the book. But.. .and he started off by saying u m — you knew where the review
would lead— his opening line was T have never yet met an Australian I like'
[laughter] umm... [that's relevant isn't it!]. So!.. .but, one of the things he actually
accused m e of was that there was not a whit of concentration here. A n d it's u m , that
was as near as w e got to actually talking about the book, but u m , it's as dismissive as
I can be of the review generally because of the animus that obviously fuelled it.
That's worried m e a bit, and, u m , I think partly, u m , perhaps I simply have not been
as, well as concentrated as devoted, u m , to writing as I, let's say, imagine some or a
lot of other writers are. M y day is shorter. I by and large probably write shorter
books and I take a long period between getting them out and it's partly these sort of
factors that c o m e into play.
882.Also, though, I sometimes wonder if in fact m y actual concentration, that is keeping
m y mind, or keeping circulating in m y mind material that I'm dealing with at the
moment.. .whether I do that as m u c h as perhaps I should or I would like. In fact I
k n o w that 1 feel good about the work that I'm doing if in fact I a m partly distracted,
u m , at any time of the day. Y o u know that I go to bed actually thinking about
something I'm trying to write. And, by and large, that's not that
common.. .Um.. .And I'd probably like it to be.
883.CS: Does that happen at particular stages of the book?
884.W6: U m . . .It's.. .I'm concentrating more near the end of books, I mean I've just
finished something at the moment in the last week or two. Finished what I regard as
finished for the moment.
885.CS: That's pretty well what every writer has told m e actually. That it's the same
for them.
886.W6: Really? Well u m , to some extent I compare it to m y Jesuit days when I was in
doing philosophy and... .1 frequently, I would say, well very frequently I would fall
asleep actually thinking about matters that w e have been discussing in lectures or
whatever. But the intellectual content of m y life was perhaps more dominating than
it is perhaps now. N o w , O K , I didn't have a wife, a child and endless domestic
responsibilities and the rest of it. I mean it was all handled in a religious life. It was
h o w Aquinas could write all he wrote because he had nothing else to do, u m , he was
waited on hand and foot...And I k n o w that's part of it. But, yeah. It's ambition.
Always to be more concentrated than I am. T o be....

A887.CS: W h y do you think, in the times when you are more concentrated? What's
happening there? W h y ? Can you see any pattern in that?
888.W6: Um... Yeah I'd say it's either because things are going well and I'm enjoying
what I'm doing and, not so much.. .I'm enjoying it, yeah, because I feel it's going
well, because I can actually see a way ahead [yes] and.. .because even while I a m
seeing a w a y ahead n e w little problems are springing up so I get that sense of
progress.
889.CS: So there's an overarching sense of progress that allows you to deal with the
emerging problems with more of a sense of confidence or something like that?
890.W6: Yes. Yes exactly. 1 mean it's both going together. It's because I'm, I'm
actually writing, the words are going down. I'm quite pleased with what I'm getting
d o w n and at the same time I a m seeing the problems as I go, but because there is a
sort of surge, I a m confident about the ultimate outcome. I a m pleased in fact that the
problems are arising because I k n o w that that's the book is getting more complex and
interesting and more a challenge both to m e and for the eventual reader. Yeah, yes,
all those sorts of things.
891.CS: A n d the contrast between that and the times when it's not.. .what's happening
for you personally, like I say when it's going bad?
892.W6: It... .It.. .Let's say about three months ago, for example, I'd been working on
this book for a couple of years and I, this particular book is another, the last few
books I've done have all been autobiographical memoirs sorts of things, rather,
they're not fiction really, except they're, perhaps they're.. .the chapters are
individually.. .semi-short stories, semi-essays. So it's.. .1 can't talk about myself as a
fiction writer as such at the moment. But nevertheless that's the way it is. A n d so
the last couple have been in this m o d e and this current one is about myself — and the
w a y I usually describe it is 'my affair with Ireland'. And, u m , Ireland has been a
long-standing interest dating back to at least 1973 when I started a postgraduate
degree in Irish literature and I have a lot to do with m y grandfather w h o is Irish and
all these things came together and I went to Ireland while I was doing the degree and
so on and I've gone back m a n y times since to keep up with things Irish. A n d I read a
lot of Irish literature and I review Irish books and so on and so on. U m , and so
this.. .it was.. .yeah this.. .this book arose out of.. .to some extent I've got all this
material, all this Irish material. N o w I want to do something with it. And.. .you
k n o w I suppose OK.. .1 want to do something with it, but I don't want to do an
analytical book x Ix, say, Vin Buckley's Memory Ireland — which I think is a
terrific book but.. .1... H e was an academic, he was an intellectual in a way I don't

Aconsider myself. H e had a kind of brimming confidence that he could tell the Irish
exactly what was wrong with them and do it in a w a y that diagnoses what [they must
have hated that!]. N o , indeed. Yes they certainly did not. But I think it's a very
good book. Nevertheless I couldn't do that. Nor did I want it to be a travel book,..
merely nice things to see in County Leecham [?] and h o w I met x and y and so on.
So part of the problem was what is it going to be? Also.. .There was a, there was an
agenda underlying that I suppose which was that I'd started to write about, and I still
do in various ways, myself and m y son [son], thinking of writing a longer book about
fatherhood. The.. .that became very problematic, partly because writing about a child
isfraughtin a w a y that writing about parents is simply not. A n d such a book would
likely enough, therefore, be coming out right in the middle of his adolescence and so
on and so on. Y o u know, be careful. A n d it was even more fraught for m e because,
while I could be writing about fatherhood in the context of [son], m y child.. .1 have in
fact another child extra-maritally, w h o um.. .So that I can't actually write about the
marital child without it being.. .1 wanted to talk about when I came to writing the
Irish book. So, perhaps as a result of that I look, you know, I suspect that u m , the
w a y I.. .Ha!.. .To go back, the distinction I keep coming up against for myself is that
while I was quite convinced by (as I was saying to you before) the Lonergonian
account of cognitional activity and its, its — more than resemblance really — its
more or less identity with what went on in myself, and I don't see any strong reason
to reject that. Nevertheless, the insight there was that.
893.1n the classic case you k n o w Lonergan's examples are Newton's apple and
Archimedes Eureka where it is sharp, sudden. It is clear [like mathematical examples
and things like that]. Yes. Yes. Whereas for m e as a writer it has never worked in
that sort of way. It's.. .the Lonergonian examples, you know, they work for getting
riddles and all those sort of jokes.
894.CS: In the cognitive literature they talk about well-defined puzzles and ill-defined
problems.. .and most of life's circumstances are ill-defined problems, are definitely
the latter [Right. Yeah, chuckle]. Where there m a y not even be an answer.
895.W6: Yes. Yes. So that although in retrospect w h e n I'm writing I — particularly in
retrospect 1 think — I say 'Yes. I had a certain insight there.', um.. .It's as though I
don't recognise the insight for some time after I have had it. Or it has eased itself out
rather than c o m e in this sudden flash w a y that quite reflexively I notice happening at
the time.. .It's a double pleasure of having the insight and realising you have the
insight. It's not like that w h e n I'm writing.

A896.CS: N o , most writers say that. There are sort of occasional occurrences of more
direct insight when they realise they are having it. But mostly they talk about, they
have a sort of initial surge of feeling that this is, that they are heading in a right
direction. Or they discover a metaphor or a scene comes to mind, or an image and
they just keep, it seems to be re-occurring or lead to things, and they've got to keep
trusting to that and eventually towards the end they begin to see that this in fact was
structuring the whole thing [yes]. A n d sometimes even they've published the book
and they haven't realised it [yes, oh yes]. Someone has pointed it out to them [yes
yes yes]. They see it with a sudden shock of recognition [yeah].
897.W6: Yeah, I mean I agree with that entirely. O h , I must remember when I was a
Jesuit there was a famous case. W e used to publish a magazine called Cognition. I
did m y first writing and publishing in Cognition, but it was famous for the fact that
some young Jesuit years ago, Bernard O'Brien, had written an article about Four
Quartets or something or other. A n d G o d knows h o w but Cognition subsequently
published a letter from T S Eliot saying 'I had never thought of this point you've
made. It was not m y intention . But n o w that you point it out I see in fact that it is
there and you're perfectly right.. .but it never occurred to me.'. A n d this is
happening all the time.
898.CS: W h a t do you think is happening there because I'm very interested in this
process where, often it is a metaphor that continues and resonates through a work or
some sort sort of major theme. H o w come this can happen? That w e can be
spending years on a project, devoting our entire intellectual and emotional and
financial resources to it and yet w e can't quite see it, yet w e follow it? I k n o w that's
a very difficult question I'm asking.
899.W6:... [long pause] I better talk around it I suppose because I.. .Yes. I don't think it
would ever be the.. .oh gee, the major metaphor; the major theme that you remain
entirely unconscious of. See what u m , in this particular case the book that I
eventually decided...Ah.. .eventually.. .began to write was — the terms that I use —
a book about m y affair with Ireland. N o w probably, that partly came from the
rejected book — the whole notion of some sort of sexual thing that carried over, that
kind of metaphor.. .was still there and had to be coped with and so that drifted across
into this. But also.. .the fact that so traditionally Ireland was seen as a w o m a n . I
m e a n m u c h more than any other country I can think of. But a terribly, well
ambivalent or multivalent indeed, w o m a n . A n d the classic locus for it must be u m ,
Yeats' The Countess Kathleen where this old w o m a n has c o m e in and she's incited
the young m a n to go and join the rebels, to join the French in 1778. She goes off and

Asomeone else comes in and they say, the person w h o has just come in, 'Did you see
an old w o m a n going out?'. A n d he say s 'No. But I saw a young girl and she had the
walk of a queen.'.
900.And.. .so that Ireland is both a sort of a, a seductress, and yet a very maternal figure,
mother figure: 'My four green fields. M y four brave sons'ralethis whole tradition'.
U m she's ah.. .the w o m a n w h o sends Wilde every mother's son and yet he's the
mother of them all as well and so on and so on. So, that metaphor, which was a preexisting metaphor, became a sort of a , yeah a bit of another hook in the w a y I started
to develop this whole thing.
90l.CS: It's not so m u c h though that w e are completely unconscious of the metaphors.
But the significance doesn't.. .there seems to be that w e follow the metaphor rather
than w e direct it or something like that?
902.W6: U m . . .ah.. .geee... [pause]. Yes.. .1 don't know that we.. .yeah...the actual, the
formation of an entirely new metaphor for something or other. I suspect that's
rarer... Yes, there's some sort of pre-existing metaphor which w e spin out and see
m a n y more relevances or meanings for. Yes, I suppose I probably like to do that in
this book. For example, I think this is.. .the w a y I perhaps have worked, at least as
conscious of the way as I have worked as I'm aware of, is a particular incident or a
story, a few words will sort of seize m y imagination. I can't say any more than that.
I like them! I think 'That's nice. That's neat. That's moving. That's affecting.
That's interesting.'. Or something or other.
903 .And , n o w what I do with it? What I do with that? It requires usually something
else to suddenly hook into that and you start to see a connection. A n d not until the
other hook comes along do I feel like I can use it and I.. .Now I wouldn't even say
that I'm always aware: 'Right the other hook has arrived, I can n o w start.'. It's
sometimes, I perhaps, I think 'Look.. .I've lived with enjoying this particular moment
or this scene for a while. I'll start writing about that' and perhaps because I'm in the
midst of doing something else the hook, the second hook emerges. I'm not
being... when...
904.1n this case for example. This book is set entirely in Ireland really, and incidents in
Ireland. But, I'd been, a few years ago.. .1 was staying with a brother of mine w h o
lives outside Bungandore. And, he's got a little cottage and a few acres of hillside
scrub. A n d sitting on the veranda and they look d o w n towards Lake George. A n d I
was there with his youngest child w h o was a baby of about six or seven months or
something else. Sitting on the veranda there was [son] m y son and his two cousins
and they were mowing the lawn d o w n the front and I was having to hold the baby

Aand the rest of it. N o w , quite suddenly, the elder child w h o was about ten months
older than [son] (they were all very close in age these three boys), they.. .he's
m o w i n g in a rectangle in this sort of paddock d o w n the bottom and he sort of did his
circuit and then he handed over to the next one and then he suddenly started 'rrrrrr',
he started running up towards the veranda and towards us. I didn't k n o w what was
going on. H e jumped over the veranda, ran on the veranda, bent down, kissed the
baby sister, tamed around... 'rrr' runs back just in time to.. .and this.. .1.. .wanted to
do something with this lovely moment, lovely scene. But, but what was the meaning
of it for m y literary purposes? I didn't know. I mean, I had to give it a meaning.
905.CS: In a w a y you had to be true to it too, didn't you?
906.W6: Indeed! Yes I did. I did. So that went into the, into the sort of cupboard for a
while. N o w , as it happens, I mean I'll have to get people's reactions to it, I have
m a d e the last chapter for this book out of it. But O K , this last chapter is set in
Bungadore. N o w it's — whereas the rest of the book is set in Ireland — I think part
of the connective, w h y I felt.. .felt. W h y it was, let's say it forced itself into this
book and w h y I felt justified in letting it force itself into this book was that the
essentially there was aritualdance of a kind going on and the dance metaphor has
become probably the one of, if the main metaphor of the whole book [unifying], yes
it is. A n d u m , and I've used it as an epigraph. In fact I've got four dance things from
Irish literature as epigraphs but the first one is that one Yeats says 'I a m of Ireland,
the holy land of Ireland. C o m e and dance with m e in Ireland.'. A n d so there's a sort
of closure to this because in fact the dance is in fact taking place amongst the family
back in Australia and, but it's... [pause].. .whether or not it works and the rest of it is
[laughs] not relevant for the moment. But I think.. .yeah there was a m o m e n t w h e n I
felt, uhh, 'Yes there is reason, there is justification for this particular dance to come
here as a sort of coda.'. A n d it was about, there are other elements that allow that to
take place. It was about a n e w family, the beginnings of a n e w family, an Australian
family, a very Australian family. It's out in the countryside, it's in a paddock and so
on and so on — as opposed to the rest of the book.
907,In some ways the clearest moments of insight that I've perhaps been aware of
always have been these moments when I can see a connection between two incidents
or two of these that have gripped m e or have seized me. M y first book years and
years ago, I mean a simple sort of story, but I always remember the, uhh, two
separate experiences. O n e was that uhh [partner] [wife] and I were travelling in
England going and visiting bookshops around the country and w e were, w e had a
place called the Old Tower.

A908.[phone message interruption].
909.We had an address, the Old Tower, and it was a bookshop. A n d w e drove around
and w e could not find it, in the fields, somewhere in southern England. Then
eventually w e realised w e were on, w e saw old Nissan huts and the rest of it, and w e
realised w e were on a kind of abandoned World W a r II R A F aerodrome and, and oh
God, you k n o w this is.. .And then suddenly w e come this old control tower. And, of
course, I had the image in m y mind of the 'old tower' a sort of Yeatsian tower, a
Miltonic tower, that sort of thing, something grand and the rest of it. But, no it was
an old.. .and indeed the guy had his books and his bookshop and it was all terribly
hideous. It was cold and it was bleak and all the books were affected by d a m p and so
on. It was out in the middle of thisflat...just you know weed strewn, bits of Nissan
hut and concrete and the rest of it. But it was.. .it got me. I sort of, perhaps the,
yeah.. .1 liked the moment. I liked the incident. Then I.. .but again I didn't know
what to do with that and then I read Ross Campbell — remember Ross Campbell,
used to be a Bulletin journalist? Mainly famous for those books, books of columns.
Y o u know, 'Are you married daddy'? and so on — a thing that just wouldn't be a
joke today. I mean nobody would be very interested [laughter] these days. But he
did a book of reminiscences near the end of his life which I forget, but he was in, I
think he must have been in bomber command, and he talked about h o w near the end
of the war Luftwaffe pilots got very cheeky, daring, foolhardy, courageous, and they
used to lurk around English aerodromes,fighterpilots, and wait for the bombers
returning. N o w the bombers were all, you k n o w they were over their h o m e base and
they thought they were h o m e safe at last as they were coming in to land. These
Luftwaffe pilots would come out and, you know, just gun them d o w n at the last
moment. A n d u m , I found it quite a shocking little story and suddenly I had a short
story. I wanted to write a story about somebody w h o was in air traffic control and
had not given pilots sufficient warning and as a result he locked himself up in this
tower that he committed his sin in, as it were, for the rest of his life and so on and so
on. But it was, it required two quite similar experiences. O n e I read in a book,
another something I had actually seen. Then to bring them together, to get a story
out of it.. .But bang, I suddenly...
910.CS: Most of the accounts of insight have this quality where it's the bringing
together of apparently unassociated [where the genius is, yeah] and bringing them
together in such a way that the [telephone interruption] people involved see its
Tightness.. .yeah so this bringing together of disparate things. W h e n did you see that
link, when you were actually reading the article, the Campbell article?

A911.W6: [pause...] N o I don't think it was. I'm talking about a long while ago, I can't
.. .But ah, no.. .1.. .it wasn't. But I think the image had enough.. .it played on m y
imagination long enough to kind of resonate there for a while and probably, yes,
setting some sort of resonances which [clicked fingers] brought the other back to
mind as well. I think it.. .yeah I think more that.. .It was.. .as I say I found it
disturbing, kind of horrific in its way. N o w I have got this weakness. I've forced
myself the other night — mainly because I wanted to check it out for [son], to go and
see Saving Private Ryan. I kind of didn't want to, but I just couldn't sleep. Have
you seen it? O h it's, it's...It's kind of.. .Essentially it's a B-grade American war
movie, but the images of the dying! Most hideous and I find that, they just, these sort
of visual images do grip m e and I can't...
912.CS: Well it's interesting. Most of the writers, if not all actually I'm thinking, have
talked about this. About the way in which they are in a situation or they see an image
and it pervades their consciousness, you know. Like [W5] told m e about -1 think it
was outside Gowings in the city - what seemed like to him to be a newly arrived
migrant family, sort of Eastern European. A n d the mother and the child stayed
outside the shop and the father went in to buy these shoes. O h no. It was
Woolworths, that's right, and came out with a pair of Woolworths runners, you
know. A n d he said the look on the child's face was absolute joy. Y o u k n o w like
beatific, you k n o w [yes, yes]. Just the way he was retelling the story and obviously it
m a d e such an impression on him, comparing it to our kids, you know. Y o u don't
give them a good enough Sony game they're disappointed [chuckle] and this kid got
a $5 pair of... [yes, yes, yes]. But this had obviously really made a very profound
impact on him. W h a t I'm interested in, and you mentioned it there, it's like it sets up
some sort of resonance. But there's a sort of a, it's incomplete, or it hasn't had its
full expression yet, or it creates a sort of tension or something like that.
913.W6: Yes, yes. It's.. .it's got to find partners or it's got to become a link in a chain
somehow or other to acquire its full meaning, or a new meaning. You.. .it's as
though you.. .and I've taken it in as a gripping image, but I want to reinforce and
somehow alter and amplify that meaning. A n d I have to do it with other connectives,
other associated images. But I've got to find those and I've got to give it a n e w life
somehow or other. A n d not just the meaning it originally had for Ross Campbell or
for m e w h e n I read it in Ross Campbell, but um.. .yeah. It's a n e w and an enhanced
life if you think of it in those terms.
914.CS: A n d in the w a y that you described it too it's not just a.. .if such a thing is
possible, it's not an emotionally neutral grasp of something. A s you say it is a

Agripping image. It's something that moves you [yes] quite strongly [yes. yes]. A n d
this seems to be a very very important part of it that it involves the person
emotionally, you know, intellectually, sometimes bodily.
915.W6: Yes. It can vary. The sort of.. .the other, an early, again, example I cited was
.. .a w o m a n came here one night for dinner and she was at the time, she was over 40.
Her mother had died a year or two previously. She was a single w o m a n and she
lived on a country property in southern Queensland. A n d she talked about being out
in the country and she would occasionally need household items. A n d she said 'But
before I shop I always go and have a look at one of mother's wedding presents.'.
'What do you mean mother's wedding presents?'. A n d she said 'Well.. .to see if
there was any of the things I needed amongst mother's wedding presents.'. 'What do
you mean? Are they all still there as such?". 'Oh yes' she said. 'Mother never
opened her wedding presents.'. A n d I said, you know, the obvious thing...now the
woman's over 40, therefore the mother got her presents 40 years ago. I said 'Why
did your mother never open her presents?'. A n d she looked blankly at m e and said
'Oh!.. .oh the war I suppose?' [laughter]. N o w I mean, but there again it was a.. .it
wasn't emotionally gripping. It was just so weird!. But the question was obvious.
W h y ? You've got to say. So to some extent I had.. .my story was there m u c h more
ready-made in a sense. I had to come up with an answer to the question why. So I
wanted to write a story and indeed 1 did. I mean I wrote a story 'Wedding Presents
for Breakfast' and it was about not opening one's wedding presents but it was kind of
giving it a reason, giving a context. Trying to make up a story that would make
sense of that kind of action. That was a fairly m u c h more straightforward kind of
thing in a w a y because I just, I came up with an answer. A n d you k n o w it's a lighthearted, comicy sort of story.
916.CS: That's right. But you see it doesn't have to be pathos, it doesn't have [no, no]
to be.. .1 mean that one, there's still an emotional tone there in that isn't there?. It's
sort of like 'This is intriguing!'. 'This is surprising.'. 'This is a bit funny.' [yes yes
yes]. A n d its those qualities that then make your creation work [yes, yes]. Like the
image would be empty if it was just a formulation, a sort of mathematical
formulation [yes, yes, yes]. A n d it seems to be that that you have to be true to.. .[yes,
yes, yeah],
917.W6: Yes.. .perhaps true to the way I received it to some extent in the first place.
Though in fact the teller of the story, if you like the original guardian of the story,
wasn't even a story.. .it was just sort of something that happened to come out in
passing, talking about a nice teapot she used recently, or something.
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918.CS: There's something about what she told you, moved you and then sets up a
process whereby you need to articulate that [yes] in some way [yes]. A n d you're not
sure at the time what it is.
919.W6: Yes yes. It's.. .yes I mean it's certainly is, it.. .The underlying process is the
time I suppose, is of finding a n e w pattern, giving a n e w meaning, setting up a new
structure that doesn't previously exist, even if it is an intelligible structure.
920.CS: But it's not as if — you probably are familiar with the philosopher Susanne
Langer, and her, she makes a distinction between what she calls representational
consciousness and presentational consciousness. Broadly the distinction is that our
more, like language, tends to be representational in the sense, not the way a poet
would use it, but in the everyday sense in which the medium becomes less important.
W e can., .names of objects are fairly arbitrary [yep]. Things can represent other
things. But it seems to m e that most of our life is lived within, and she says that
presentational consciousness is m u c h more primary. Y o u know, for example, music
operates entirely in a presentational mode. It still communicates, it still has
messages, but they're not.. .you can't describe a piece of music without changing it
[yeah]. Y o u know, you don't get it. It has to be in that medium [yeah, yeah]. A n d it
seems to m e that's what also you are describing, um. Y o u just can't tell somebody in
a representational w a y what happened to you when that w o m a n came into your house
and just off the cuff mentioned this thing. So what you had to do was find a way to
communicate it, not literally, but figuratively, so that it holds something of the
communication, but not in a representational way.
921.W6: Yeah, yep, yes. Yes. Yeah I know. I'd agree with that entirely.
922.CS: So, to c o m e back to our earlier discussion about Lonergan, it's not about the
sort of.. .necessarily.. .you have an aha!. But the only way you can communicate it is
by giving the person the whole short story or the novel.. .and even then they m a y not
get it.
923.W6: Yes, yes ... Yes.. .but I wouldn't want to um., .1 do want to insist on its being
something.. .that you are not just passing on. It's something that you are [creating]
creating, yeah, [oh absolutely]. It's a n e w entity. Which is w h y I.. .1 think it's a n e w
element that you are looking for, or you are adding elements together all the time so
that [oh yes], I had one sort of experience with the Ross Campbell and another sort
of experience with this aerodrome.. .um. Although each of them were images
personally arresting for m e , in their o w n right, what I eventually wanted to create was
not just to transmit those two [absolutely not, no] feelings, but something n e w as
well.

A924.CS: A n d this raises another question, a sort of philosophical question. A n d that is
that if one takes a more naive realist, objectivist view, then an insight isn't just an
insight, it's an insight into reality the way it is, and it's fairly cut-and-dried. Or,
perhaps a less objectivist view would say that insight is a w a y of creating coherent
patterns of meaning, [yes. Yes]. That aren't necessarily unrelated to reality [no, no].
A n d I think what you are saying obviously is in more accord with the latter, [yeah].
Y o u k n o w it's not like you wanted to capture what happened in this room and then
give it to someone [yes, yes].
925.W6: N o ! No.. .um.. .But the great phrase to m e in the olden days always used to be
— must have been Aristotle — 'the mind is as it were all things' and that u m , for the
mind, or anima you know, human soul, um.. .that is.. .What you are trying to do is to
get that other h u m a n soul, your reader and the rest of it, to find him, herself in all
these other forms, all the time, experiencing reality in it, you know. It's a protean
thing. Get them into this new, n e w form, n e w way of being in the world, n e w w a y of
living [yep].
926.CS: Y o u see, that's what I think is interesting. In m y o w n work I'm looking at the
w a y in which what insight reveals, and I don't necessarily think of insight as just this
sort of m o m e n t of aha!.. .It's definitely a process that moves in cycles. Y o u k n o w
the classic stages are the preparation period, then an impasse and then the aha!, and
then elaboration and the verification. A n d then, as you say, other problems c o m e up,
so then there's a n e w preparation period, an impasse and it's sort of ongoing and
there can be larger ones operating and then smaller ones inside [yeah, yep] it and so
on. U m . . .what were w e just saying? I think I just lost m y track.
927.W6: Ah.. .um... Talking about insight.
928.CS: O h yes. Involving the reader [yes yes]. Y o u k n o w you talked about the
protean nature of it [yep] and so it's like what insight reveals is a different w a y of
being and it's certainly a different m o d e of, u m , of thought. A different m o d e of
being such that...Let m e tell you for example. Sometimes there have been
experiments done —you'll like this — with people they call 'creatives' versus
'normals' [laughter] by which I think they mean people w h o are, you know, are
actively involved as you are in creative things.. .And they give them, they take a
baseline E E G measure, their brainwaves and so on, and then they give them an IQ
test to do, you know, and they measure where they peak, and what the level of
activation is. A n d roughly the creatives tend to have a lower level of E E G generally,
but w h e n they do the IQ test they roughly climb to the same levels in activation.
W h e n they, sorry in IQ tests, when they give them a creativity test, something very

Ainteresting happens. They find that 'normals' tend to go up the same level as they
did for the IQ test, but the 'creatives' have a tendency to go below their baseline!. So
what they are finding is they have a m u c h broader spread of activation across the
neocortex and the brain generally, but the activations are all not as extreme, not as
high [yeah, yeah yeah]. A n d some of the speculations that come from that is that
what happens is, it's more like a meditative state of mind where there are a lot more
associates being triggered simultaneously but none of them are sort of being preempted, you k n o w [yeah yeah]. Which would allow for a m u c h broader possibility
of grabbing analogy and metaphor and so on. But it also is subjectively experienced
differently for the person, you know. It is more like a meditative state in which they
are calmer and they report a sort of looser mental processes and daydream and
reverie and absorption in the task [yes]...and less distraction. Y o u were talking
before about less distraction. So, it does seem to m e what you are talking about is
involving the reader in a similar process. W h a t you want them to do is to recreate
that process. Is that the way, for example, you experience it when you read? A n d
something grips you?
929.W6: [long pause]. Uhh.. .[laughs]. Yeah it seems a contradiction, I suppose. But
in some ways I'm always very conscious when reading that this is a n e w intelligence
being brought to bear and I a m very, I a m reading it and I think very intelligently and
so on, but I a m reading it very partially, at least very partially in comparison to all
sorts of other potential readers, and maybe even vis-a-vis the author. Yeah, to what
extent is m y pleasure at, u m , say Wordsworth's Daffodils, reproduced in another
mind or another intellectual-emotional being? I find that a sort of a strange one. I
k n o w m y feelings of, feelings I've got of a sort of harmony, symmetry, contained
beauty which makes m e feel very euphoric. Um...the words, the pictures the words
have evoked, have wrought m e into a certain state and I kind of, I'm terribly agnostic
about whether or not people feel the same sort of way, I suppose. I'm not answering
your question directly [no, you are I think]. So that although you k n o w when you are
a writer, you're, um.. .but then again I, I'm probably not [laughs]. I sometimes
wonder whether if I were a reader I would be interested in the sorts of things that I
write [yes!]. I mean I really do.
930.CS: Well, you see, most writers have said to m e that they don't really think about
their readers too m u c h [No. I think] because if they did, that would dry up the well.
931 . W 6 : Yes, yes. Y o u need a certain number of readers who'll c o m e back to you and
say T really liked that.' [that's right]. But you probably won't press the point and

Aask them exactly what they liked or really try to grill them too much. But you know
they're there and that's necessary for you.
932.CS: A n d I remember [WI] told m e that she was just blown over by the occasional
person w h o said something moved her, or moved him [yes!] when she was reading.
It was so important to her to [yes, yes] hear that, and miraculous almost [yes, yes].
933.W6: Yeah that's.. .yeah I agree entirely. Um.. .but I.. .um.. .But there is this gap,
as I say, where I don't, u m , yeah, I don't know if I was introduced to [W6]'s writing
and I was somebody else I would bother reading it. I really don't all the time. I just
have that kind of.. .1 don't know what you call it. This is probably diverging a bit but
I thought of a distinction I want to make. Uhhh.. .There is I suppose what you're
calling the creative insight as to the way in which I a m dealing with metaphors,
reworking incidents and so on, and u m , then there's also a m u c h more obviously
technical kind of insight [yes].
934. For example, I think I started to say a long while ago and, u m , deflected myself,
um.. .I'd been writing this book for a couple of, for a long while, and I had.. .and to
some extent it wasn't written in a.. .strictly chronological way. I was doing pieces
and all the time I would be re-thinking 'Well that might go before that. N o . I've just
written that. That probably comes way back there.'.. .And so on and so on. But I
was withholding the reading of it, u m , from A to Z, until about three months ago.
A n d I sat d o w n and 'Right, I'm going to read it today'. A n d u m , I read for day one
and I got quite depressed. I thought. 'No this, is not.. .as a reader I'm not, I don't,
I'm not rating this very highly.'. I read day two and I was, I felt m u c h better. But
the thing about it was that I think I saw pretty immediately, I mean it was an insight,
it was a fairly straightforward insight, w h y I had been depressed by day one, and w h y
I was not by day two.
935.Thefirsthalf of the book suffered from a particular... .What was, in fact was going
on was that part one was far too analytical, semi-sociological. Whereas part two of
the book was, you know, m u c h more of this dramatised, personalised experience
[touching the feelings] yes, m u c h more. The first part was something I liked doing
but shouldn't have done in this context. I mean this was.. .If I'm going to do an
article about contemporary Ireland, well this is the sort of stuff that I write. But this
is a book, and not about contemporary Ireland [yes]. So, so it was u m , yeah, that was
a pretty sharp and immediate insight [that's right] u m , as to what was wrong and, of
course, that.. .and initially I just felt sort of depressed and thought 'Oh m y God', you
know, 'this is not good.'. In contrast to the second day I still felt this is not good, but

AI didn't feel so depressed about it because I knew, I had seen also what was wrong
and...
936.CS: A n d also it's often a question of just looking at it on another day.
937.W6: Yeah. Though.. .no, no, I knew it was wrong [oh sure!]. I knew it had to be
rewritten.
938.CS: But you know, sometimes that, there's something about emotion too, like the
depression. It's not that you, anyway, this is probably getting a bit off the point, but
the second day, often it is just a simple matter of having a sleep [laughing] and [yes]
and coming back and thinking 'Yes it's bad.. .but I don't feel so bad'.
939.W6: Yes, O h no, it is. N o I don't um... .Yeah... I mean it didn't last. I mean it.. .If
I hadn't been able to see m y way, see what was wrong with it [it would have
deepened it!]. Yes indeed. But as I did almost immediately, u m I felt well that was a
useful...
940.CS: I guess the only reason I bring that up is that one of the constants of the insight
literature is this sense of putting something aside for a bit, and coining back to it later
[yes yes]. U m , w e do get trapped in assumptions and feelings, and that frequently,
almost universally, people talk about well.. .get frustrated up to a point, and
depressed or whatever language they use. A n d they either just leave it in disgust, or
quite consciously put it aside, knowing that when they come back to it later they are
m u c h more likely to see, get an insight into what the problem is.
941.W6: Yes, yes, yes. Yeah, I mean the time lapse is uhh.. .it's kind of terribly
important. I k n o w I've sent this manuscript off for a few people to look at and 1
k n o w already, I'm starting to think 'No, chapter such and such [redraft].', yes. But
even, u m , this was a case of seeing something something I, I did it. This book
worked in.. .1 mean I re-read, I re-read.. .1 kept a journal of the first time I went to
Ireland and I wrote a lot of letters back to m y family. A n d I had all those, and I reread all those. A n d to some extent I made notes on what ones, incidents, moments
seemed to be worthwhile thinking about doing something about. U m , and uhh, one
particular incident, for example, was that, uhh, I met a girl at a dance who.. .1 met a
girl at a dance [smiling], who.. .um.. .and I didn't choose that because T met a girl at
a dance', but obviously, you know the metaphor's playing there and it hooked it in.
U m m m and she — I was having a bit of a whinge at the locality I was in which was
Carlowe, and saying it was very dreary and culturally dead place and so on and so on
—

So she said 'Come over to Bagnall's Town', where she lived 'and sometime I'll

show you around. I'll show you the real Ireland.'. A n d I did. I went over and u m ,
she showed m e around. She showed m e three things. She took m e to a forge, which

Awas still working as a forge. She took m e h o m e to her parents for a meal and the
father was a great sportsman and had caught a salmon or something or other and w e
cooked it for dinner and had that. A n d she took m e to visit a very elderly single lady
w h o was the remnant of the Anglo-Irish ascendancy in that town , w h o lived in this
grand old crumbling mansion. And.. .um.. .now I, I remembered.. .1 suppose I
remember that because she was a nice, oh I felt a bit sort of sweet towards her for a
day or two, and it was a nice sort of day's gesture and so on and so on.. A n d I
wanted to use it.. .but only in the writing of it and starting to.. .and I realised all sorts
of other things about it. Such as, that, you know, the T H R E E , that she gave m e three
things, you know, hence, you k n o w three wishes. But also, and not until I really had
finished a draft of it, did I suddenly see that, and this was.. .1.. .that in fact I had had
reservations about all three of the things she had offered m e , yes. O n e was that the
forge was disappointing. It was kind of small and it wasn't very.. .terribly noisy and
so and so on [laughing]. Secondly, I never did like fish very m u c h [laughing]. A n d
thirdly, the mansion was so crumbling and so on and so on, the high point of it was
that she had this collection — upstairs in the bedrooms, she had this, all these trestle
tables. I m e a n it was B A R E and it was ran down. I mean there was no wallpaper,
N O T H I N G . Nothing at all in all these bedrooms upstairs except trestle tales, trestle
tables, and the trestle tables were full of shells, her collection of shells. But kind of,
the shells were like you would pick up on any beach in Australia! [laughing]. A n y
child would get all these shells in any one holiday. So. So I.. .suddenly realised that
.. . O K I've talked about being given wishes, and about being thrilled about being
given wishes, but being.. .sort of, somehow or other cold-eyed, ah, about the wishes
as well, and finding something not, not nasty at the heart of them, but something sort
of slightly lacking for m y particular needs, or particular outlook and the rest of
it... each of those.
942.CS: See there's something in what you are saying and w e talked before about the
presentational m o d e of consciousness and there's another theorist — I won't go into
m u c h detail here but — he talks, he's more a psychoanalytic background. But he
talks about what he calls two modes of thought, and it sort of can fit a bit onto
representational and presentational. H e calls it symmetrical and asymmetrical. A n d
it's more in the symmetrical mode, which he says is m u c h m u c h more
multidimensional and tends to be unconscious —that w e can't hold it all in
consciousness — and the way that w e get things into consciousness is usually
figuratively. So, it seems to m e that what you do is that you have an experience of
something and like it's really big, and you k n o w it's got all these dimensions. A n d

Athen w e spend months, even years, unpacking it [yeah], you know, like 'Oh, there's
this other aspect to it. Yeah, that's right [yeah] that was there too!'. So in a w a y w e
knew it all in the experience, but w e didn't k n o w it all [yes, yeah]. So w e have this
sort of unconscious way in which w e can embrace something multidimensionally,
uhh, in one go [yes, yes] and then w e can.. .there's this amazing task of almost.. .it's
not, as you say, trying to recreate that, because you are making something new, but
even in making it you have to make it multidimensional. It has to have all these
nuances and you k n o w working in all the things that c o m e into it [yes yes].
Otherwise it doesn't live for the reader.
943.W6: Yes. That, yeah, yep, yeah... A n d it only happens, at least to m e , in the course
of writing it [yes!]. I m e a n it's, it's um...
944.CS: That's something that surprised m e a bit because u m , I think more naively
when I began the interviews with the writers, I'm thinking, 'Ah yes, there's going to
be these sort of big moments of "aha"!' and [you write it all down] and you're almost
listening to it and it's being dictated to you [yep]. But I remember, I think, yes [W2]
said to m e 'No, the really creative stuff is in rewriting, in redrafting' [yes]. That's
when she gets really excited.
945.W6: Yes, yes. Yeah. I think I kind of, well that certainly was the case
here...um...I m e a n things that become terribly obvious to m e in retrospect, such as
the three wishes were allflawed,it least in m y view, wasn't kind of clear to m e [no]
even after I'd written it down. So that I then went back and say 'Ah! I realise that is
there, and yes that is important in terms of the whole book. Um.. .gee, aren't I lucky!
Something as important in terms of the whole book I hadn't actually realised I was
writing.'. Y o u know, the story wouldn't have made nearly so m u c h sense in terms of
the whole [that's rightjif that element hadn't been there, but that...
946.CS: W e have this sort of intuitive feel like 'Gee that works.'. A n d it m a y not be a
long time before w e realise w h y it worked [yeah, yes]. Y o u know, so there seems to
be like a guidedness [yes] to it [yeah]. I mean frequently writers have talked to m e
about this sense in which, uhh, even though it's their creation, a sense in which it
seems to be as if somehow they've got to listen to it, or it's exterior in a way [yes
yes], uhh, which is difficult to articulate [yes].
947.W6: U m , I ah, yes, I u m , yeah. I do that too. I.. .urn.. .then when you go, and as I
did in this, you go 'Right. I realise that.'. Y o u go back to it. 'I want to touch it up,
to bring out this, the flaw element a bit more, but without overbalancing it.'.. .urnmm
[you don't want to be didactic]. Yes.. .and so that.. .to some extent the fragility, the
sensitivity of the original experience is retained. I don't want to point the reader to

Aseeing the flaw before the reader realises that there was a real gift and the gift was
accepted and enjoyed [that's right] u m m m . But that's the rewrite stage.
948.But um.. .yeah guided is true. Something that has always struck m e . I've always
an overwhelming feeling of.. .um...T didn't realise I had that idea in m e anywhere.',
'It's amazing where that came from.', and that kind of thing. The whole notion of
inspiration and the rest of it as something that is pumped into you. But sort of
surprise, a kind of genuine surprise after the event that that was there.
949.CS: So that's one of the sort of things I'm interested in. W e seem to have a sort of
intuitive...we have to trust in our intuition. A n d there's a lot of.. .fortunately the
cognitive psych is beginning to — well the word 'cognitive' is starting to lose its
meaning because there's a lot more n o w that w e k n o w about the w a y in which our
brain is structured and emotional centres are really built right into the centre of all
cognition [yes, yes, yes]. Whereas in the past it was largely treated as a result of
cognition, or something like that. It's n o w more-or-less seen that most of our
thinking is filtered through the emotional centres of the brain.[tape off to explain this
toW6]...
950.What about?... Y o u mentioned just before about sending drafts off to people. So
there's a point where you don't even want to read the whole work yourself, you k n o w
like you mentioned you hold off on that for a while. But then it gets to a point where
you do and you re-work it and then it gets to some point where you send off some
drafts. N o w what's that about? W e are not talking about publishers yet, or editors?
O r are w e ?
951.W6: U m m . . . W e are talking about both [laughter] in this particular case, yes. N o ,
I've sent off a draft to, in fact in this case, to u m , my... [name of person at publishers]
at U Q P because they published the last book and she's, you know, like to see it. But
to some extent it's um.. .well that's both...'are you interested in publishing it? A n d
what do you think about it?'. But also I sent off a copy to Morag Fraser w h o is the
editor of Eureka Street and that's because she is a very.. .I've found her a very tough
critic of mine, been a very good editor. The last book went to her and she scribbled
and scrawled all over it. She's very tough. It's a bit disheartening really. But I
thought better n o w than w h e n the book's c o m e out. U m . . .1 think.. .I'd be interested
to see what she does with this because, whether it's I have got attuned to her lines of
criticism and take steps to avoid her having to make those criticisms, or whether it's
just some sort of natural improvement, I don't know. But for example I did a piece
recently which she published in Eureka Street which I k n o w she , u m , well she had a
few strong reservations about the first draft of, but before she even had time to get
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came to her looking at it a second time she found that everything she had wanted to
say was more-or-less, I had taken care of myself. A n d with this particular, this new
book...
952.CS: There was something I wanted to ask you was w h o is it, or is there anyone, is it
important for you to read your stuff and to approve of it?
953.W6: U m m . . .gee. Uhh.. .1 don't know that there is any individual that is an
absolute, that has to.. .Probably as long as there is some group of people, I think.
Even if that group is a changeable group of people who, u m , are willing to proof and
endorse it.
954.CS: But that process is important to you?. That there is somebody, out there [yes].
955.W6: Yes it is. Um.. .Whether it's at the book publish stage or the manuscript
stage, yes. Though doing this at the manuscript stage is uhh, it's m u c h more of a
prophylactic kind of move. A n d this particular book, given that there is a lot of.. .1
think Morag thinks that I'm a bit, in matters to do with w o m e n , the body, sex, I think
she has difficulty with m y writing on this as there is a fair bit of all those things in
this book. U m . . .1 thought maybe she'd be a good touchstone really. A n d while I
think I've got more and more self-critical of m y writing over the years, and tend to
revise m u c h more — which is partly a by-blow of computer technology these days
which.. .but it's also just I'm more naturally self-critical. Even allowing for that, I
get to a certain stage where [you are too close to it?]. Yeah, yeah usually. I want
someone else to have a look as well. And/or, look, it, u m , maybe I would see the
problems if I put it aside for another three or four months and did nothing. But w h y
not short-circuit that and let somebody else have a look at it straight away and they
can get back to m e in a couple of weeks and maybe I won't have to spend so m u c h
time waiting till I have cleared m y mind a bit.
956.CS: It is an interesting sort of, there's a sort of.. .it's confusing isn't it because, as
w e said, the writers seem to be principally writing for themselves, because they get
inspired by an idea and they go with it, and there's the process and so on. A n d then it
m a y even be damaging to think about readers too much. I mean you think about
broader things too, I know, technical maters [yeah, yeah] structure and so on. But as
you said, you don't even k n o w whether you would like to read your books [yes]. It's
curious isn't it [yes] given it's a communicative process, writing words to be read,
[yes].
957.W6: Yes, it is curious, I mean.. .1 mean I have, I have a slight uneasiness about the
uhh, self-indulgent nature of it and m u c h more so in mine, 1 think m u c h more so in
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straightforwardly, or nakedly self-confessingly so, u m , it's m y name and everybody
else's real name.. .um.. .in a way that, you know, novelists don't have to, to bear
[even though with novelists, generally speaking, it's all being funnelled through
them]. Yeah, of course, but nevertheless, the public doesn't see it that way...
Whereas with m y case I'm saying here is a book about W6's twenty-five years
having something to do with Ireland. 'Well what the heck! W h y should I bother
reading that?! I mean w h o are you? I mean if you were...' and all I can fall back on
is the quality of the writing, whatever that means. U m , you know this is going to,
you're going to be [well, w e touched on it] I don't know, moved.
958.CS: Yeah, that's right. W e touched on that before. Because one of the things that
seems to be almost universal about the insight experience, and you know, a part of
that is getting the image that works, being in it or something, is the sort of sense of
connectedness — and it is a fairly, I think it often borders on a mystical type
experience.. .where, you talked about it, it can be euphoric. Where all of a sudden
you are not alone and you know, you are connected with the world around you, and I
think with other people. U m , and when.. .1 know for example when I read something
that really inspires m e , you know I forget about myself [yeah, yeah]. Y o u live inside
the imagery, or you feel it physically.. .um and so [yes] there does seem to be a
development of a different sense of, experience of, self. Predominantly, selfforgetting. So even though it is about you [yes, yes], it's not about you, if you know
what I mean? [yes, yes],
959.W6: U m . . .No. That's a whole other issue to some extent that, ah, is probably not
relevant, but um.. .1 mean I have this odd sense that, you say it's not about m e , u m , I
mean I would write things d o w n that I wouldn't tell m y closest friend. I would write
things d o w n and give [it to the public!] it to m y publisher [yes].. .yes [exactly] yeah,
and then again, then I sort of look at this book and I think, you know, 'In 12 months'
time I'm going to have to, you k n o w talk to radio interviewers or something another
about it.'. Um...T'm going to be a bit bashful.'.
960.CS: It's interesting, you know. I've got a client, a bulimic client, you see. A n d a
big thing about eating disorders is keeping them secret, you k n o w that's h o w they
work [yeah, yeah]. Y o u know, you keep them secret, and ah, you give people around
you absolutely no permission to acknowledge that it exists. A n y w a y [chuckling] I've
got this one and I was talking to her about, you know, about some strategies and I
said 'Well. You're going to have to tell four people in your life that you are bulimic.
W h o do you want to tell? Y o u know, you can start easy if you like.' A n d of course
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know, relatively you know. She doesn't want to tell the close friends and her
intimates. Because if you do it's got implications then [yes]. Y o u live with these
people [yes yes] or you come with them a lot [yes, yes ] and I'm sure there is
something of that in [yes ! yes] what [yes, yes, yes].. .We had a great laugh about it
[yeah].
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962.CS: I want to ask you about just how you organise your creative life and you can
use the decade as a time frame or you know, an hour if you want.
963.W7: O K [laughs] Well I've never been a full-time writer. I guess that's the place
to start. Perhaps nobody is. But I've always had to either have a job, a part-time job,
or look after children. So that the means the time I've had to work is very precious
and it's usually been kind of paid for in some way by other activities so it's very, it's
very precious and I don't therefore have any problem with getting in the m o o d or in
the way of getting organised. W h e n I have the time, I go to the desk. That's the kind
of basic parameter. People always say to m e you know, sort of 'Do you work until
you get into the mood?'. Well, clearly not, with m y distractions. At the moment, for
example, I have basically school hours, minus half an hour on each end to kind of get
to and from the school to pick up the younger one.
964.CS: Sound like what [WI] called her 'bookends'.
965.W7: Bookends? Yes, yes. That'sright.U m . N o w within that time I k n o w that m y
work suffers from a lack of daydreaming time. Because I have a restricted period of
time I feel I should be actually writing during that time. A n d I think that's actually a
big problem. Because I think the most important part of writing probably happens
when you are not actually writing.. . U m so that has that unfortunate effect that you
want to rash in and you feel 'Oh panic. I've only got two hours. I must put
something d o w n on paper.'. A n d I think that that's very counterproductive for
creativity.
966.So what I've leamt to do is not to bother with any of the periphery things. Not to
think 'What a m I going to write about'. A n d most certainly not to write nice
sentences. Basically I think that that restriction has forced on m e a stream of
consciousness thing where I just make myself just start writing, u m , and in a w a y I
suppose I a m trying to daydream as I write.. .by that stream of consciousness thing.
So a lot of m y first drafts have no punctuation. It just goes on, page after page of
staff. A n d in the course of doing that I generally, eventually, find the thing that I
want to follow. I'll write a sentence and I'll think 'Ah...that's where it starts.'. A n d
I'm away. U m , in terms of the physical organisation, u m , I, I've always written at
home, I used to have a back shed at the bottom of the garden. A n d 1 n o w have a
workroom upstairs. But for some reason I find it harder n o w to work at home, and
for the last few years I've had the use of a room at Sydney University, and I've used
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that more and more. I find that going to a room.. .for some reason the seductions of
housework are more seductive as the years go by! [laughs].
967.CS: This has been a recurrent theme.
968.W7: [laughing] I don't k n o w why. I used to be able to just blank all that out but
s o m e h o w I find it harder. A n d I think it's probably to do with the fact that what I
have to write n o w is less urgent than it was. I feel I've actually written out some of
the more pressing things, so I'm on a less desperate level. A n d therefore those
distractions c o m e in more easily. So at the room at the university I have been very
careful to have absolutely nothing. There aren't even any pictures of the kids there.
There's no phone. It's just a desk, a computer and a chair. So that's terrific. U m it's
very important to me.
969.CS: Is that difficult when you go into that room sometimes that it doesn't have
distractions?
970. W 7 : U m . If I feel the need for a distraction I have only to walk outside or go to the
mailroom or up to get a coffee and I almost certainly b u m p into someone I know, so
it's actually perfect. The breathing heart, the living heart, the beating heart at the end
of the corridor. I don't k n o w w h o coined that phrase, but some writer coined it for
exactly that thing. Y o u want to be alone but you also want to k n o w that people [are
around] are available when you need them, basically. Bit of a ruthless attitude.
U m . . .so, no. It's a great feeling.
971. Flannery O'Connor had this theory that you just bored yourself into writing. She
set herself, she, I mean she had another restriction because she was ill, but she had to
sit at her desk, say for three hours every day, and it didn't matter what she did there
but she wasn't allowed to do anything else. A n d out of sheer boredom she'd start to
write and I sometimes find that quite useful. Not to allow yourself. I never read or
research or anything like that in that incredibly precious working time.
972.CS: Though you will do research, you would do research but not in that time.
973.W7: Not in that time, that's right, [this is writing time] yeah. It's very important to
m e to have, the only way I can allow myself to submerge into writing is.. .well let m e
start it from the other way, I'm terribly afraid of letting time getting away with m e
and forgetting to go and pick up the kids. There's this incredible anxiety as the
afternoon gets on towards two o'clock. I always get very anxious so I always have
an alarm clock or something like that. A n d if I have that I can relax. But if I don't
actually have an outside signal, I mean just having a watch on is not enough. So
that's a trick that I have learned. It took m e a long time to realise that that's w h y m y
afternoons for some reason I couldn't concentrate. A n d you k n o w I'm a bit slow, a
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bit slow on the uptake [laughter]. Y o u k n o w it finally occurred to m e that if I had an
alarm clock I could relax.
974.Um.. .in terms of h o w I do it, I usually do a first draft by hand. I've always done
that. There's something very private about it. There's something physically nice
about the pen across the paper. A n d I'm fairly fussy about m y pen, although at a
pinch I'll use anything.. .though I prefer a nice pen and nice paper.
975.CS: A h , w h e n you say private do you mean, if you, because it's sort of not in public
form?
976.W7: Yes. I think to m e that it is very important that it's very.. .even the actual look
of it, is deeply private. A s soon as it's on the computer screen, then it has a public
look, to m e , so it's readable, and it looks m u c h more like a finished thing.
977.CS: Well, this relates a bit, doesn't it, to when you're saying you feel the pressure
that you have to write, and produce something [ m m m ] and again this has been a
recurrent theme, u m , that.. .what's inimical to creativity, what gets in its w a y is this
focusing on the output end [yeah, that's right] on the product.
978.W7: Yeah, that's paralysing.
979.CS: So this is a bit of a sleight of hand isn't really [yeah], I mean,
980.W7: I've called it exactly that. I call it that to m y students [oh, O K ] . Y o u have to
invent a sleight of hand that works for you, that what you are writing will never be
read by anybody but you. A n d you yourself m a y never read it again. It's just for
here and now, and whatever trick works. The fountain pen.. .exercise books work
very well for m e — the smaller the better actually, the 'squidgier' the better
[chuckling], because it's u m , it's like you are just taking notes, it doesn't matter. It's
got that feel about it.
981.CS: Yeah, I've been writing some stuff just lately just on the P h D and it's scary
because it's a bit — it sounds a bit like you are talking about — and I have to say to
myself 'Well.. .of course I'll rewrite this later' [yes, chuckling].
982.W7: Well I have to, u m , I always write the draft number on whatever I'm doing and
with the current book, for example, which I think might be actuallyfinished,but I'm
actually working on draft 27 [oh m y God]. So if I'm writing draft three at the top of
a n e w exercise book, I know, I'm quite confident that this is nothing like it's going to
be. So that is good.
983.CS: A n d as you get closer to, you know, w h e n you get to draft 26 and draft 27,
does it change then? Does it get different? D o you have more confidence to call
it.. .a.. .is that h o w it works, if you k n o w what I mean?
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9 8 4 . W 7 : Yes. After I've got about, usually about 100 pages of hand-written, usually
just fragments at that stage. I've got really no idea where I'm going. But it then
reaches a point where you've got a sort of critical mass, and at that point I type it up.
A n d at that point, usually, I can see that the fragment that I wrote on the first page of
the exercise book has something to do with the fragment that's 50 pages in. So as I
type I kind of put them together, roughly. A n d from then on it has a slightly more
public look. But whenever I get to a hard bit, even now, if I have a scene that really
isn't working, the w a y to m a k e it work again is to do it by hand again, turn the page
over and write on the back in hand.
985.CS: O K . So there's a fairly clear demarcation there between the sort of looser
creative problem.. .something generated by a problem or uncertainty or confusion,
[ h m m h m m ] on one side, and that's mucking around with a pen on a piece of paper,
[ m m m , that'sright.Yeah]. A n d then the other side is where it's starting to get
tightened up a bit, u m , which is a little bit more logical by the sound of it, or a bit
more consciously ordered or something.
986.W7: That'sright.I allow myself to start, start structuring it.. .at about, well.. .1
suppose by the end of the first draft.. .somewhere half-way through the first draft I'll
have some idea. A n d then I'll start something that's called draft two because I'll
then have a sort of structure. The danger, though, and that's been particularly so with
this last book, is that I will try to arrive at that structure too quickly. N o w that I
k n o w that's h o w it works, I a m impatient to get on to that bit of the process. A n d of
course the lack of time is another thing that distorts the process because the quicker
you can get it structured, and that's a real problem because it, it just takes twice as
long, basically.. .if you truncate those, that exploratory part of the process.
987.CS: So that's interesting, so what you're saying is that by not hurrying, and by not
having a sense of having to pull this thing together, you actually get it done quicker
[much quicker. I would think]. So there's going to be lots of mind games you have
to play w h e n you are, you know, a well k n o w n author and you are writing to a
deadline.
9 8 8 . W 7 : Yes. That's a huge distortion. I try to resist deadlines. I never sign option
clauses so that I don't have a sense of the publisher breathing over m y neck for the
next one. But there is a kind of, I mean people ask m e , you k n o w 'When are you
going to write another book?'. A n d you do have that panicky sense that this is what I
do n o w , so w h y aren't I doing it, sort of thing. Plus, of course, the financial
distortion that w e need to produce books all the time to go on making some money.
U m . . .um there was something else I was going to say there about that.

A989.CS: I mentioned I think about mind games...
990.W7: That'sright.A n d the other mind game is knowing that it's probably going to
be published. That's the huge difference between m e writing n o w and when I
started, oh Christ! A n d that's a really difficult one because you k n o w that no-one will
tell you if it's really crappy, and that's true, you know, more and more.
99l.CS: But is there literally no-one w h o will tell that? Will [partner] [husband] tell
you?
992.W7: U m m . . .he might make some noises. But he, I think, will be reluctant,
probably quite wisely too! [laughing]. There are various people that I have used for
this book, but it's pretty difficult, I mean if.. .It's very difficult to be negative about
somebody's work.. U m . . .publishers certainly can't be trusted because they just want
to get it out there. So that's a real problem whereas when I wrote [novel]...that was
bliss! Creatively, because I had more time than I've ever had since and above all I
had that sense that 'Oh, what the hell? This will never be published'. All the time
that I was writing that book the sleight of hand I used was 'One of these days I'll
start writing a proper book, a proper novel. But this is just, this is just m e having a
good time, '[self-entertainment]. Yeah! A n d that's w h y it's, that's w h y it's a good
book.
993.CS: With [W4], I spoke to him and he talked about the demise of the literary editor
[ooh yes...if w e ever had them], yeah that's right. A n d it has struck m e that that
would be an incredibly useful thing for a person to have. Someone w h o really would
tell you.
994.W7: A n d someone w h o can do the big picture. Someone w h o can say ' O K I can
see that this book.'.. .you see when you are writing you don't k n o w what it is about.
But somebody else can [yes], a good writing teacher does that. A n d you can say
'Well O K , I can see that this story is trying to be about a conflict between a father
and a daughter. But you've got all this other staff as well.. .so, you know, shave that
off, and that's what you're really about.'.
995.CS: N o w h o w come, h o w come the other person looking on can see and the creator
can't.
996.W7:1 don't know, because the creator can um.. .a gap of time is enough. Y o u
k n o w I can n o w see what I was doing in [novel]. Well you don't want to think about
it too clearly because you k n o w that would stop the creative process. But there's
actually more to it than that. Because you see I'm actually at the point n o w where
I've actuallyfinishedthis book and I would really like to k n o w what it is about so
that I can talk about it in public, uhh, clearly, and, you know, and interestingly. So
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it's not that I'm still exploring the ideas and yet I'm still longing for other people to
tell m e what it is about.
997.CS: Yeah...why would you use the word 'longing' there, by the way?
998.W7: U m . . .well, because I know that it could become something. I k n o w that in
there there is some kind of interesting thing going on, and I have a vague sense that
it's about the idea of perfection which in fact I'm thinking of calling the book.
Whether w e have to be perfect or whether it's enough to just simply be human. But
what I'm frightened of is that I will miss the opportunity. Right n o w I have a chance
to change it, but you know, two months d o w n the track will be too late. A n d what I
fear is that I will see it too late.
999.CS: A n d the book's already published [yeah] and you could have polished up and
brought out these nuances.
1000.W7: Yeah and it's a longing because it's almost as if the book is, I mean this is a
bit corny, but it's almost as if it is a living creature, and you are frightened of doing
the wrong thing by it. I mean, it's a bit like with your children and you think, you
k n o w 'Should I be getting them to leam the piano? Will they be missing out on
something? Will be they less than they could be if I don't give them that
opportunity?'
1001 .CS: I think I can relate to that. It strikes m e sometimes too that, like when you go
into a room where there are people, and you can't be watching yourself if you're
going to be having authentic conversations or things like that [ m m m ] . A n d so
whatever you do with people in that [ m m m m m ] circumstance is, is you expressing
yourself and you, and w e don't seem to, w e can sort of back off occasionally, but if
you back off, then you're not in the conversation.
1002.W7: Yeah that's right! Y o u become so self-conscious, you're watching yourself
perform, yeah.
1003.CS: A n d then, as you say, it takes you out of the creative end of the stick and it's
almost like, as well, I don't k n o w whether the metaphor, it will carry through, but,
you need to, while you are creating — and that might be over a long period of time
— obviously you oscillate a bit. Y o u m o v e in and out of that.[yeah] so you'd be
stepping back and looking at it. A n d then you'd be coming into the process. But
more-or-less, you're more in it than out of it, in the long term [ m m m m m ] and you
can't afford to back up too much. A s you say, there is this concern about tightening
it up too quickly.
1004.W7: A n d over-simplifying. It's a little bit like, I mean it's interesting when you
write d o w n dreams, which are at the time, are often totally opaque. But if you tell
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if you look at those notes six months d o w n the track. So I don't k n o w what that
process is, but it's obviously a, it's almost as if there's a protective mechanism um...
that your unconscious is sending up these messages, but your unconscious doesn't
want them to be hijacked too quickly, because they won't do you any good. It's got
to be not fully understood for it to produce change. I think.. .having had the
experience of having a few dreams that were totally life-changing without m e
understanding them. It's like their therapeutic aspect.. .ah...is not compatible with
them being understood.
1005.CS: Yeah, I mean,frequentlyclients you know w h o come with problems, u m ,
when they've overcome them they find it hard to conceive what their problem was
[yeah, yeah, yeah]. The whole thing has changed and they recognise there was a
problem [but it's hard to remember what it was], but the panorama has changed so
much, and it m a y be something like that where [ m m m m ] that the thing is so
significant that it has to happen for it to.. .I'm not being [ m m m ] very articulate about
this process. It's very hard to be.
1006.W7: It is something about being actually embedded in it though [yeah]. Y o u are
enacting a problem in some w a y [that's right], you are not outside looking in.
1007.CS: Y o u see part of the problem I think is that w e are the lens through which w e
look anyway [yes], so that if you change, when the lens is in the process of changing,
then when you look through it, everything is obvious. But in the processes of it
changing you can't sort of, it's a bad metaphor, but you can't have two lenses at the
one time.
1008.W7: Yeah. Well it's the Heisenberg principle isn't it [yeah], basically.
1009.CS: Yes. That'sright.Y o u see w e are already imperceptibly moving into the
thing [laughter] where you are talking about your theory of creativity [yes] and so on.
[yes]. Is there anything else that stands out? Like what do you do, for example? I
k n o w you said you don't sit there and wait for the m o o d before you start. But, within
your normal work practice there'll be times when everything is cooking and other
times when it's not [yeah, yeah]. W h a t do you do when it's not?
1010.W7: U m m m . . .Basically I go back to free-associating on one thing or another.
Sometimes it will be um.. .well, with [novel] I used toflipthrough Shakespeare till I
got to a phrase that I liked. A n d when I just got to a phrase that caught m y eye,
without asking myself why, I would just start writing. A n d sometimes I'd have
several goes at the same phrase, and nearly always, I mean they are all in the book.
Sometimes I've just lopped the Shakespeare off the front, but what remains is

Asomething surprising. So that works really well. Different things seem to work for
different books, though, and u m , that worked for [novel]. It didn't work for [novel].
A n d it hasn't worked so well for this book. With this book, this book has been more
conscious and that's what's been wrong with it, I think. A h , sometimes I look back
over what I've written and out of three pages of what I've written there might just be
one phrase that I like. So again, I'll kind of write that at the top of the page,
basically, and try and m a k e myself just keep going. A n d sometimes it drifts into
kind of notes to myself. Like, you k n o w 'This is really boring.' and 'What a m I
doing here?'. Sometimes it drifts into kind of u m , um, commentary on the process.
But then, something will happen and it'll take that littleright-angleturn, and I'll find
myself writing a sentence in another voice, which is the voice of the book, as
opposed to m y o w n voice [OK],...So those are the sorts of things.
101 l.CS: This is an interesting contrast that frequently comes up too. Y o u mentioned it
then: 'the voice of the book as against m y voice'.
1012.W7: Yes [laughing].
1013.CS: U m , because one of the things I'm very interested in and it's c o m e up a lot,
and it's very consonant with the research I've done, is this, u m , definite change in
one's sense of self [ m m m ] um.. .when one is moving into a creative experience. That
there is a sense that the self is still there present and observing and making
judgements. But there's also a very strong sense that the process somehow is not,
one is not self-conscious. That it seems to be coming from without rather than from
within, that it seems to have its o w n spontaneity and m y job is to keep up with it
[hmm, m m , yep]. Can you talk about that [yeah, yeah] process at all?
1014. W 7 : Yes, I absolutely agree with all of that. It would be easy to say that you are
constructing a persona when you.. .but it is not actually that either. U m . . .It's more
like you are allowing a self to speak that is normally censored [uhh huh]. That's
what it feels like to m e [right]. Which is w h y the more conscious you are of the
audience, of course the more disastrous it is. So it's very like, I mean when I was in
analysis, w h e n that worked it felt exactly the same as when writing was working.
A n d w h e n it wasn't working it felt the same.. .self-conscious, watching myself. But
above all, policing in case something slipped out, that I didn't want to slip out.
1015.So for m e , and that's w h y it's so important for it to be private. Because you have
to be able to u m , those words have to lead you from one to the other without you
thinking 'Oh I mustn't get into that territory', in both those contexts. The only
difference is that whereas with analysis u m , well in m y experience, the words come
up and they are dealt with there and you then m o v e on, but of course with writing
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you then work on them in a very conscious way, and shape them and make them
public. A n d you are using that initial, very unconscious outpouring only as a basis.
1016.CS: W h e n you said it gives the chance, I think, for another self to have a voice
[ m m m ] , is it only one other self?
1017.W7: O h no! [chuckles]. N o , I should have said that. But at the time you are
writing, I m e a n for any project I think perhaps there's one.. .maybe that's not even
true. I m e a n for [novel] I discovered within myself that misogynist that that book is
written in his voice. I.. .it was very difficult in the beginning for m e to discover that
that was m e . I wasn't making it up or writing about it. I was writing out of it. U m ,
and for this book, yeah, this book has been harder, and I'm sure that part of it is that
I.. .oddly enough it was easier for m e to write about that obnoxious person and to
admit that he was part of myself, than it is for m e to admit that these characters are
actually parts of m y self. I don't k n o w w h y that is.
1018.CS: Well, I think that, uhh, one of the things that reveals is that uhh, to be a moral
person you have to understand their evil. I mean [absolutely] it has to be a part of the
way you conceive, you perceive the world and conceptualise [yes] and so on [yes].
O n e of m y favourite psychologists, a guy called George Kelly, he talks about the way
w e understand the world basically being in terms of contrasts [ m m , m m m ] . That
everything, that every way, w e can't understand anything unless w e have what w e
call the relevant contrast for it [yes, absolutely]. So you can't understand goodness
[yeah] or tolerance...
1019.W7: Without actually identifying the opposite within yourself [yeah]. It's like, I
did a little bit of reading in Jung, when I was writing [novel], and he, of course, has
that Shadow, the theory of the Shadow, which was perfect for what I was doing.
[exactly] So I think it's that. It's allowing, as when you lie on the psychiatrist's
couch [do you actually have to lie d o w n on the couch?]. O h I did , yes [oh
wow.. .the traditional analysis]. Oh, it's wonderful, absolutely.. .Well.. .in that way it
was yeah. A n d I found that so freeing, so totally freeing. I felt very selfconscious
thefirsttime, but within seconds I felt, yes, I don't have to either make eye contact
and not m a k e eye contact. I don't have to have that choice. Nobody's looking at m e .
It was wonderful. Freud was really onto something I think when he.. .just that one
physical action m a d e such a difference to m e . U m . . .but you k n o w you've got to,
you find yourself saying things which you would say 'But I didn't m e a n that!'.
U m . . .and that's wonderful because, you know, you did mean that. But only a part of
you meant it. That's right. Y o u don't have to identify yourself with that monstrous

Aperson w h o has just said, you k n o w 'I want to kill m y mother' or something. That's
not w h o you are, but it's one of the things that's in you [that's right] and it was great.
1020.CS: A n d of course you already made the comparison between that process and the
process of writing [ m m m ] . I mean, lots of, it's commonplace isn't it for writers to
say that the writing process is therapeutic ? [yes].
1021.W7: Yes and I mean, that's misunderstood I think in the sense that it's like you're
just pouring out this kind of confessional stuff. Kind of getting it off your chest
[yeah]. But it's m u c h more sinister than that. 'Cos I think it does mean going into
those [novel] [yes] and u m , articulating them and kind of owning them.
1022.CS: A n d it wouldn't always be sinister I should imagine, either. I mean...
1023.W7: O h , in m y case it often seems to be! [oh O K ] . But no! it probably isn't.
Actually in this book, no. I've discovered the other parts as well.
1024.CS: Y o u k n o w it's more constructive I think in that sense too...[mmm] in that
you're, you know, it's a way of evolving yourself, building, you k n o w different
voices and uhh...
1025.W7: It's the sinister, less acceptable ones obviously that are mostly hidden,
though, in all this, and so I guess that's the feeling of discovery [yes] to allow those
ones out [that's right], to take the policeman away from the door.
1026.CS: A n d useful for other people because they can rid the neighbourhood [yes, yes]
of those aspects, you know, and 'Oh she's as bad as me!'
1027.W7: That's right. M a y b e it's not so bad after all! [laughing].
1028.CS: Allright.So.. .we've got, so your practices are fairly straightforward [ m m ] .
1029.W7: Yes, nothing fetishistic.
1030.CS: Yeah, I m e a n a lot of writers are, they have all sorts of tricks [ m m yeah] and
things. Sleights of hand that you talk about.
1031.W7: Yeah, I feel I haven't got time to m u c k around with that. I mean I have done
some of m y best writing sitting in the car writing on the back of the disprin packet,
for example. I remember I wrote a beautiful scene waiting to pick up Alice from a
birthday party. I had ten minutes. I was siting in the van. I had nothing to write on.
So I took apart this aspirin box [laughing],. .so yeah.
1032.CS: N o w what's happening there do you think? I mean, because the insight
literature is pretty clear about this: that most people's insight actually happen, u m , by
happenchance. Y o u know, [right] on the toilet and [yeah, well] on a walk.
1033.W7: There's something about, and this leads on to your next thing about, you
know, those moments, those epiphanies.. .um. If w e are ready to talk about that, are

Ayou ready to talk about that yet? [yeah, yeah, go into it]. Yeah, u m , I mean Keats
talked about negative capability, and I'm sure that's exactly what he meant [yes].
U m . . .the greatest experience I had with that was writing, was when I was writing
[novel] which is, I don't k n o w if you have read it, is a book about an incestuous
father. A n d the problem that 1 set myself was 'Well why? W h y did he do it?'. Not
what did he do, but what's going through these men's minds when they do this?...Or
anything like that? A n d I had been writing it for about three years and I kept coming
up against this barrier that I couldn't work out w h y they do it. Really and truly I just
couldn't understand it. A n d I decided to give it up, basically. I decided to abandon
the book. In fact I didn't decide to, I did abandon the book.
1034.CS: N o w , let m e just say that in the classic accounts of insight, you have a period
of preparation that leads to frustration or impasse [oh right], where either voluntarily
or involuntarily the problem is put aside [ohhh].
1035.W7: O h well I'm a cliche then [a classic] I'm a classic cliche in this situation, [a
classic is better than a cliche]. A classic, yeah. Well I think it's, that, it was a lifechanging experience for m e because I had always paid lip-service to that idea of, you
know, Negative Capability, and you know. But, the thing is you couldn't, you can't
fake it. Y o u can't pretend to be abandoning a book. Y o u have to genuinely.. .And I
was driving along, oddly enough, past Callan Park [a psychiatric hospital], the old
Callan Park here [oh that's very appropriate]. Driving along.. .most appropriate and I
suddenly felt this weight lift off m y shoulders as it suddenly occurred to m e T don't
have to write this book.'. T can write something else.'. A n d it was like somebody
coining along and saying 'You don't have to do that exam. It's O K , I'll give you a
degree anyway.'. A n d it was such a relief! It was a glorious feeling, and I
immediately started to think about some other projects that I might do, and the world
looked different. I m e a n I looked around at Rozelle and it just, it was alive, it was,
there was full colour in everything. It was crowded by this terrible anxiety. So I
tamed into the park at Callan Park and sat on one of those seats [laughter. M a d
woman.] yes! A n d as I was sitting there a voice came to m e , not quite like Joan of
Arc, but it was very vivid. A n d it said to m e 'You don't have to understand. Y o u
only have to write it. Y o u don't have to understand it.'. It was that phrase 'You
don't have to understand.'. A n d it really was like a voice. I could virtually hear a
h u m a n voice saying it.
1036.CS: W a s it the voice of the character?
1037.W7: N o . It was not the voice of the character. At the time I wasn't in analysis,
but it was a bit actually like m y analyst's voice. It was a woman's voice. A n older

Aw o m a n . Very tolerant and you know, wise [CS laughs], Un-judgmental.
Understood w h y it was so difficult. But just: 'It's all right. Y o u don't have to
understand. I k n o w you don't understand. I understand that.'.
1038.CS: I have a task I sometimes give m y clients. A n d often I give it to them before
they c o m e to see m e [oh right]. So they ring up and I say 'Look, I'd like you to write
something for me.', you know. A n d I get them to write a thing where I say "I want
you to describe yourself as if you were a character in a play and it needs to be written
from the point of view of a friend w h o knows you very intimately, and very
sympathetically, perhaps better than anyone ever could k n o w you [right! A n
interesting thing to do] and to write it in the third person [mmmm].'. A n d you see
the thing is, like this voice coming to you, it's someone w h o knows, understands
everything you're going through [yes], but understands you sympathetically [yeah,
yeah]. A n d it's so difficult for us to take that perspective on ourselves [yes]. And, of
course, when people write this thing down it's all full of self blame and hatred and...
1039.W7: Yes, but what a brilliant thing to do. I mean that in itself would be
immensely therapeutic.
1040.CS: O h it is. Often people come along and I can tell.. .1 mean I should stop doing
it because [it makes you obsolete] yeah, exactly [redundant, right]. Anyway.
But.. .particularly as you experienced that voice as non-judgemental [yep] too I think
was important.
1041.W7: A n d not pretending that it didn't matter [yes]. Not denying the problem
[that'sright].Simply incorporating it into a larger view in which 'Yes, you don't
understand, but it's O K because you don't have to.'.
1042.CS: Did you come to understanding, by the way, of w h y m e n do that?
1043.W7:1 did! Yes. A n d that wasn't an epiphany. It was a gradual, very gradual
process. But as soon as I, as soon as I thought I didn't have to understand it, of
course I did! A n d I don't k n o w what that passivity is. I mean it feels like passivity. I
suppose it's just an opening the unconscious a little bit more. I went and did a bit of
reading, and that was very valuable, because I found a couple of b o o k s — I was
groping m y w a y towards some idea of incest that had to do with um.. .polarised
gender roles, basically. The way that m e n have to split off the kind, nurturing,
uncertain parts of themselves. U m , and therefore their hatred of w o m e n is actually
envy as m u c h as hatred, because w o m e n are allowed to do all those things that
they've had to kill in themselves. So when I found books that articulated all that
m u c h better than I had, it was a great relief. So the process of understanding
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it.. .yes.. .1 can only say.. .well you see I went through eighteen drafts of that book.
So you know, it took m e a long time to work it out.
1044.CS: So anyway. Here you were, you were driving along [yeah] and there were
several stages to this one, wasn't there [yes]. So there's in the car, and as you said
this great weight seemed to be lifted [ m m m m m m m m ] . W h e n you.. .if I had to feel
the w a y you felt when you were driving along, h o w would I be feeling?
1045.W7: Before I.. .when the thing struck. Well it was like a physical, yeah. That's
w h y I tamed off the road. Because it was like a physical u m 'lightness' is the only
word — I felt as if I was actually in danger offloatingoff the car seat! I was aware
that I was actually not driving very well. It's like.. .it was elation. It was ah, almost
like a drag-induced, u m , euphoria.
1046.CS: W a s it, you know, you are probably familiar with the experience of
dissociation. W a s it that sort of sense too, with a sense of unreality about things too?
1047.W7: Um...no. In a funny way it was the opposite. It was as if I had been
dissociated and just, suddenly things were integrated. That's w h y the world suddenly
looked as if it were in full colour [it was vibrant]. Yeah. Things were in three
dimensions. That was a house. That was a fence, you k n o w [ah O K , yeah]. That
kind of slightly 'trippy' clarity of things where you feel the sense of cohesion and
integration.
1048.CS: A n d did that sense of cohesion and integration include you? I mean when
you were looking at the house [mm, yes].
1049.W7: Yes. Because instead of saying, instead of identifying myself as a w o m a n
w h o is writing a book about an incestuous father, and that had become a role I could
no longer do, instead of that I was n o w just part of this world, and it was all open to
m e . If I never wanted to write again, I didn't have to. It was a sense that, instead of
being off in this awful little ghetto, the 'writer' writing about this thing, I was a part
of the world and I could choose to be part of it in whatever w a y I wanted.
1050.CS: Yeah, 'cos, u m , again a part of the.. .one of the themes that I a m trying to sort
of articulate is this idea of connectedness [ m i n m m m ] feeling.. .and it's almost a
mystical experience I think in at least the sense that, u m , people feel content and
these experiences feel very m u c h like a part of the world. Y o u know like they
[ m m m m ] don't feel separate [ahhh!]. U m , this is one of the almost identifying
features of a large insight. Y o u k n o w w e [yeah, sure] have all sorts of insights. But
this sense of connectedness, and it's not just to other people, it can be just a profound
sense of integration.

1051.W7: Yes, I mean it's the nearest, non-pharmaceutically induced state I've had to
tripping — not quite that great. I didn't see the grass growing [yes], but it was like
that marvellous sense that you were simply part of, you know, a great organism [yes,
a bigger thing] yeah.
1052.CS: Well, I'm glad you said that because you know, ah, that's more grist to the
mill. But, um...
1053.W7: Yeah. It's interesting isn't it, if w e are all saying, if you know [yes] clearly
this is not.. .1 mean that whole notion of the artist as the special magic person.
1054.CS: That's right. Well, in a way they are, though. Um.. .but it's not because it's
coming from within the artist [ u m m m ] like there's some sort of special, you know,
repository of genius type [yeah] genes or something. But it's more like becoming an
instrument, or resonator [yes], ah, letting go, and what you described is a classic
letting-go.
1055.W7: Yeah, but you see, are you going to interview say, physicists? Or
mathematicians? [um]. Because that would be really interesting.
1056.CS: It would be. I mean, maybe in another lifetime! [yeah, sure].
1057.W7: Because I have a feeling that problem-solving, which to m e is all it is really,
is probably the same for everybody [yeah], except w e happen to do it.
1058.CS: Yeah, I mean I chose the writers, you know, but I could have just as easily
chosen scientists [or even engineers], engineers.. .but particularly creative ones. I
mean you.. .the good thing about choosing the writers was that I knew that they
would be grappling creatively with problems whereas an engineer m a y be a rulebook engineer.
1059.W7: Yeah, that's true [I might say the Bryce Courteney of
the... laughter... engineering world! ]. Yes! That's right [laughing].
1060.CS: But ah. Y o u know this theme is very strong and...[tamed tape off...and C S
explained some of the theory of Matte-Bianco to [W7]].
1061.So when you'd gone off the road and you're sitting on your bench in Callan Park
[[WI] laughs], ah, what happened then?
1062.W7: Well the voice spoke to me. O K . A n d what happened then? Well, giving
m e permission not to understand was all I needed. Because I thought 'I can write
about this man.'. There was no, there was a huge flood of stuff from m y
unconscious, scenes that I could write. Voice: I had his voice. N o problem. So I
just went back h o m e and got on with it basically [oh, O K ] . A n d I stopped trying to
understand.
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1063.CS: W a s there sort of a residual state? Y o u know in the sense like...
1064.W7: Yes. A n d there were several things that I had already been using — actually
I don't remember. M a y b e this was when I started using this? — I used music for this
book, to try to remind m e of that state. U m , it was partly to, it was partly because it
was music that made me.. .well I don't k n o w h o w it operated actually, but there was
a particular piece of music that I played thousands of times. A n d it made m e feel
kind of like that m o m e n t of epiphany had made m e feel. U m . . .another trick, I
suppose. Uhhh, and I'd get myself into that same corner again of trying to
understand it. U m , and I just kept hanging on to those words like a mantra: 'You
don't have to understand.'.
1065.CS: Well, this is your o w n personal version of Keats' negative capability, isn't it?
1066.W7: Yeah. That's right. Yes [chuckling].
1067.CS: A n d you actually had to experience it [yeah] for it to really take root.
1068.W7: A n d I had to genuinely abandon the book [yeah]. I mean genuinely really
think 'OK. That's one for the bottom drawer.' which I had never thought before.
I'm terribly stingy about using every single thing that I write [yes, because of your
time constraints]. Yes, exactly.. .1 don't produce that much, so I've got to use
everything. A n d to think of actually throwing away several years' work and
hundreds of pages. A n d to genuinely, I mean you can't, you can't fake it, that's the
trouble. I couldn't make myself pretend to give it up [that's right]. I have, with this
book, w h e n I get into difficulties, I've thought 'All right, well, I'll abandon it again.
It worked last time.'. But, you k n o w [oh no. Y o u can't]. Y o u can't fool yourself.
1069.CS: Well it's very interesting isn't it? I mean, ah, there are, it seems to m e there
are parallels with you k n o w classic religious experiences [absolutely, absolutely,
yes]. W h a t do you see there?
1070.W7: U m , well the classic religious, I mean I had a classic religious experience
walking along a beach which was very like that. A physical, physical sense of you
know, G o d being right there beside m e [where were you?]. I was on Seven Mile
Beach, I'd been at one of those church camps. They have a camp place up at the
northern end. A n d when walking along the beach 1 can still see it so vividly. A n d I
just k n e w that Jesus was right there beside me. I mean I couldn't actually see him,
but that was irrelevant. It was the physical presence. It was, yeah, very, very strong
A n d very like, very like being on acid [yes], I mean there is a similarity across all
those things. A n d the few times I've meditated successfully, u m , it's a similar kind
of feeling, but it's very difficult, isn't it, to actually describe exactly what it is.
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107l.CS: Well, one of the things that Matte-Bianco does talk about is that this sort of
more symmetrical m o d e of thinking, ah, is m u c h more multidimensional [ m m m ] .
U m , and he actually demonstrates it mathematically, which is not important n o w
[ m m m ] in terms of set theory. Like there are things called infinite sets that
mathematicians play with. They have very strange properties. A h , one of the things
that infinite sets break d o w n are notions of identity. Y o u see, there is no end [the set
actually includes everything]. That's right. A n d then you have strange anomalies,
like, if you have the set of all natural numbers, one to infinity, and then you have,
say, the set of all perfect square roots.. .no, perfect squares.. .Normal logic would say
that there are less perfect squares than there is... [natural numbers], but if it's an
infinite set then there's not. So they have a certain equality of number [oh right!,
yeah] and so on [yeah] and so on. So it then looks.. .what happens when you.. .and
then he talks about what happens when you reduce, when you're moving from a
realm of higher dimensionality into a realm of lower dimensionality, if you do it in
geometry you get distortions. Like, you may, if you have to represent a triangle in
one dimension as a line [ m m m ] , then you'll have repeatings of points. So you can
imagine if you had A B C [traces a shape of a triangle] [hmm, h m m ] , to make that into
a one dimensional representation you have to have A B , B C , C A [oh right, yeah]. So
you're having a repeating of the A point. A n d he says that's what happens anyway,
that w h e n the unconscious enters into consciousness w e get these, w e often get these
strange distortions, what seem to be distortions, or illogicalities [ m m m m m ] , because
w e get this repeating of dimensions to try to represent it [rnmm, m m m ] in what he
calls three dimensions plus time, which is normal consciousness.
1072.W7: Yeah and you can't do it. It's like Mikata's projection of the globe. There's
actually no w a y not to distort it.
1073.CS: N o , and one of the things that that means is that metaphor, for example, or
symbolism more generally, becomes very important because it's a way of borrowing
from the realm of higher dimensions and making it [yeah] understandable and
graspable [that'sright],because they are operating in more than one domain at once
[yeah], and so on. So that sort of experience, that sort of classic religious experience
[ m m m ] and the meditative experience is one, though, where w e are letting go of our
lower dimensionality — which is the normal conscious m o d e of operation — and
moving into a more multidimensional [ m m m ] experience which naturally means that
w e feel a part of things around us because w e are not making those hard and fast
[ h m m m ] distinctions [yeah, yeah].

A1074.W7: Yeah.. .makes sense. We're part of the infinite set.
1075.CS: Yeah, and you know, I'm not particularly religious, [yeah, yes], but Jesus
would then be a symbol [ m m m ] for that experience [yeah, yeah]. A very potent one
because it's filled with all sorts of metaphoric [yes that'sright]and mythical contents
[yeah]. But it is interesting [laughing]. I don't k n o w where w e go with that.
1076.W7: It's very interesting. It's heartbreaking when it stops happening. I mean
those people w h o talk like, you know, poets in particular I suspect, w h o rely m u c h
more on that, they don't have the grid like a novelist does, certain sorts of structures
[yes]. U m , the grief when you lose that is like the grief of losing religious faith. In
fact, it must be a terr.. .it is a terrible hole in your life to have lost that dimension
[yep]. I can understand w h y writers take to the booze, because it is a desperate way
of trying to recapture that.
1077.CS: Well it was interesting that [W5] was talking about uhh, some of his best
writing being done in the sort of hangover state the next morning [ahhhh!, ahhh] and
I think it's because of this sort of loosening that it does [yeah, m m m ] it's sort of, u m ,
slightly unreal [yes] and you k n o w the censor or whatever you want to call it [it's not
quite you] yes.
1078.W7: This is, oh this I just the hangover speaking [chuckling... yeah that's right].
Y o u can say anything [laughter]. Yes it's never.. .alcohol has never done it for m e ,
or drags, but ah, I can understand that.
1079.CS: Yeah. All right, so.. .Um, just back to the bench at [oh the bench. O K ] Callan
Park. And, ah, the voice! [yes]. N o w , who?.. .you don't know w h o the voice was?
1080.W7: N o . It wasn't actually a voice I knew. Just generically.
108l.CS: I wonder w h y it had to be a voice, if you k n o w what I mean? Like a separate
voice that came from without?
1082.W7: It was also as if written. I've had that experience several times, as if written.
I say in interviews you know, 'written on the sky in letters of fire'. The title of one
of m y books came in like that. Uhh, w h y a voice?
1083.CS: Well why, ah, separate, if you know what I mean?
1084.W7: Yeah, yeah. Well I don't know. M a y b e it's part of that being given
permission. U m m , you have to assign a sort of authority figure [yeah] maybe.. .1
mean maybe that's what I was doing.
1085.CS: Maybe, it's hard to.. .1 don't know either, I mean, it's interesting. Because
it's not as though you were thinking about it beforehand.
1086,End of side one

A1087.W7: Which I'm trying to think.. .It was not as great a one [insight], so perhaps it's
not actually very useful [it'll do]. But it was deeply useful for this book. With this
latest book I've written for four years about a w o m a n w h o refuses to fall in love,
basically. There's a bloke in the book, I mean she's obviously made, they're made
for each other, obviously. She's been fobbing him off. A n d for four years I haven't
known why. A n d I have occasionally allowed myself to think 'Why might
somebody feel like that?' B e quite frightened of getting — frightened of intimacy,
basically [yeah ]. A n d I have allowed myself to think 'Well. What's her problem?'
But it was as if I.. .1 mean I've answered that question in one way, in other books.
O K , you know, if your father was incestuous with you, that would be one reason
why. But I didn't want to do that again. U m , and just before Christmas, when it was
almost too late to make a change, several people read the book and clearly didn't like
it much, basically. A n d I got slightly panicky. 'I've got to work out, I've got to
finally understand this character that I've created.'. I mean to write for four years
about somebody and really not understand the most basic thing about them is very
odd. [ m m m ] . A n d I knew that somewhere there was a key. A n d I sat at m y desk and
it was a m u c h more conscious thing, like 'This is a problem that I have to solve.'.
Quite a different experience from the Callan Park thing.
1088.And I almost thought ' O K W h a t are the reasons that might make somebody like
that? OK...having a child, sexual abuse would be one. O K . W h a t else would would
there be?'. A n d suddenly, seemingly out of the blue, was the idea that one of her
husbands had committed suicide, in a very horrible way. A n d that this.. .and she
feels responsible, basically. N o w I don't know where that came from. So it was that
same sense of.. .and as soon as I thought of it, it was C L E A R L Y right, and, this was
the thing about it, it was as if had always been there. It was as if for four years I had
been working knowing that, writing about it. A n d I hadn't just actually bothered to
put it into the text. It had that sense about it. I don't know what that means.
1089.CS: O h , that. Look, this comes up all the time. Talking to [W2] about that.
Uhh.. .there was a metaphor in, I can't remember what the work was now, but
anyway, talking about it, she has done a lot of caving [oh has she!] yeah [ohh! Gosh.
I k n o w [ W 2 ] quite well. I didn't know that about her. Ahhh]. A n d there was an
image in one of her books, I think it was a book, u m where a guy is caving and
there's very close descriptions of the physicality of it [ m m m ] . Y o u know, the grains
of...as he's dragging himself through this very narrow [oh! I couldn't bear it!] this
very narrow opening [ m m m ] . But what he actually is doing is this is the exit from
the cave and his head popping up through this grass [ohh!] in a field, you see [right],
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and, of course, it was only m u c h later that she realised that it was a sort of metaphor
for birthing [ m m m , absolutely, yes...obvious to anybody else, anyone else reading]
yes! Exactly. A n d again, and it's come across a lot where there's a sort of central
image or theme or metaphor or sometimes just a feeling, that permeates a work
[yeah]. Like the whole work flows from it [yes] um... I think w e could probably, I
could, you know, talking about multidimensionality would go some of the w a y to
explaining it. That w e get a symbol or a central image [ m m m ] and it's like this flood
from it. But it is weird h o w w e m a y not even k n o w what the image is for us yet,
while it is informing the work [yes].
1090.W7: It m a y be. N o w I've forgotten what great writer said this. But some great
writer said 'Every novel is written in order to conceal one sentence in it', or words to
that effect [right]. A n d as soon as I read that I thought 'Yes. That's absolutely true.'.
A n d maybe that's why, it's like, you, it's such a concealed thought that you can't let
yourself, for whatever reason, you can't allow yourself to think it [yeah] and yet the
whole work has to be written to try to understand it.
109l.CS: Yeah. But then you have to unconceal it when, presumably when you realise
that a good reason would be [yes, that's right]. Y o u then put it up front for the reader
to give [that's right] them scaffolding.
1092.W7: But I had.. .but this was at the stage where the book is virtually finished
[yeah] so, but yeah, that's right.
1093.CS: Y o u go back and paint it in, presumably.
1094.W7: That'sright.I frantically spent the last four week just sticking it in [yeah].
A n d it didn't take much. I mean that's the incredible thing! Just a few sentences, a
total of maybe a page of writing and yet the whole book is suddenly...
1095.CS: Well it was fascinating talking to [W4], Uhh, particularly as he's not, you
know, a novelist. But he does a lot of dramaturgy work with playwrights. I think he
was on the Literature Board for quite a while too, I think. A n d he talks about
keeping the writer in touch with their vision [ m m m ] . Going back to the m o m e n t [oh
right]. A n d he emphasised it over and over again in the interview [yes]. A n d it's
very much, you k n o w 'No.. .just get in touch with this feeling. This is good. This is
where the action is.'[That'sright].'This is it [yeah]. Just write from there [yeah].'.
A n d constantly bringing them back [ m m m m m ] and he's saying 'Why is this here?
Does thatfitwith that?' Y o u know? [right]. There is something about it. I can
imagine it is a huge advantage for those young writers — though some of them aren't
young, they're quite established — because what you're doing is you're trying to do
it on your o w n [yes, that's right]. Y o u know, the loneliness of the...
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1096.W7: Yeah, and you, there isn't really any w a y of sharing it with anybody [no].
There could be a problem, though, because sometimes that shifts. I mean you often
start a book with one like, little motto like that, but by the end of the book you realise
that was only a device to get you going. A n d to hang onto it toorigidly[so you
chuck it out, but it got you somewhere]. It got you somewhere, yeah, but you have to
be prepared to.. .and if perhaps there is an outsider w h o feels it's their job to keep
bringing you back to that it could actually [that's right] short-circuit something.
1097.CS: It would depend on the sensitivity of the person then, wouldn't it? [yeah]. So
then there's trust and all sorts of issues involved [that's right]. A n d novelists seem to
m e to be fairly, u m , what's the word?.. .Monastic or uhh, [yes] almost, not reclusive,
but...
1098.W7: Well I think a novel is such a big thing. I mean a play is a fairly focused
thing.
1099.CS: A n d it's a more shared thing [yeah that's right] and enterprise. The ego is not
as tightly tied in, I don't think [chuckles] [yes, that's right]. I mean there's no doubt
that your works are you, if you k n o w what I mean? Whereas a play, by the time it
gets on stage, [they are a collaborative thing]. Yeah.
1100.W7: Yeah...[laughs]
1101.CS: So, with this other book you had this realisation [about the suicide, yeah],
1102. W 7 : A n d I immediately thought of the person that I know, to w h o m this
happened. Not somebody I k n o w very well. So there was obviously a real life thing
in m y m e m o r y [yeah], somebody I haven't seen for 12 years or something [yep]. So
there was that, and I almost needed to have that to give myself permission [for it to
be authentic], I thought 'Oh O K , I can base it on what happened to Allen.' so yeah,
in that case I needed to feel that.
1103.CS: See, then there is afloodof associations, aren't there? [yes]. Y o u see because
you've got this, you've got this whole narrative there, or collection of narratives that
are associated with this person you knew [that's right, yes, yes]. Until that point you
hadn't consciously seen any connection [yes] between that and what you were doing
[yes, that's right, exactly]. A n d then there's this suddenflurryof implications [yes]
and so on, arriving.
1104.W7: A n d suddenly it all happens [yes]. That's right, and I phoned somebody...
m y agent, and told her that I was going to m a k e Harley's husband have committed
suicide, and she then told m e about a particularly gruesome w a y in which she had
heard of someone killing himself. A n d that could slot straight in, like, at that point it
no longer needed to c o m e from m e [yeah]. She's told m e that and it's in there and I
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think it is probably right. It's sickening, but I think it's probablyright.A n d at that
point I could function on quite a mechanical level, anybody could give m e what I
needed.
1105.CS: Yeah, well one of the things w e haven't talked about is.. .which has been a
constant theme too with writers, is about reworking [ h m m h m m ] . Y o u have
mentioned doing lots of drafts, uhh, and I mentioned the notion of loosening and
tightening. N o w what Kelly says what happens is that he had a thing called the
Creativity Cycle. Where w e loosen the way w e construe things and then he talked
about provisional tightening. So it wasn't [ah haaa!] tightening right up.
1106.W7: Yep. That's just the word I use to m y students: 'provisional', m m m .
1107.CS: Where there is this sort of process where you....
1108. [interruption]
1109.yes so, provisional tightening [oh yeah, yeah] is where [that's right yes], if w e
carry on this analogy of bringing disparate domains or disparate realms in together
and just playing with them [ u m m h u m m ] or w e are not caring whether they don't fit
or not. But then there comes a point where w e might, where provisionally see
connections [yep]. W e don't tighten right up, w e just explore the connection.
1110.W7: Yes. Exactly. T o m e it's like a scientist saying 'Oh. O K . Let us hypothesise
that this is the w a y it works.' [as if, sort of ]. A s if 'We'll go on and we'll see what
happens.'.
111 l.CS: Y e p [yeah]. A n d then what about reworking? W h e n you, you k n o w talked
about 27 [chuckling]. I k n o w [W2] [embarrassing isn't it] was saying that she finds,
the initial diving into the pool she finds very difficult, but not as creative as the
rewriting.
1112.W7: That's interesting. Yeah. A h , yeah, to m e they are very different in a way
[yeah, well they were for her too]. Yeah. U m , creating in, I suppose, different ways.
Yeah, the reworking is a matter of, um.. .the generating of it in the first place.. .is
somehow just opening the channel to the unconscious and letting it out. But, there's
a thing about u m , altering, altering it for the.. .1 mean for example, you could have
written a scene and you realise that you've actually written it about the wrong
character. I mean I had a scene in [novel] where the daughter was playing tennis
very badly, [yep] and I thought it was her scene — or was it him playing tennis? —
anyway, I, the thing that had to happen was that I had to give it to the other
character, the opposite character. Turn it inside out.
1113.CS: N o w , h o w do you know that?
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turn it on it's head? W h a t if I turn it inside out?'. I don't know.
1115.CS: There's probably something there though as well, though, where it just didn't
feelright.I mean [yeah, you wouldn't].
1116.W7: Y o u wouldn't, I suppose, think of doing [yeah] that if you didn't feel
unhappy with it.
1117.CS: 'Cos there is a distinct difference between something that sort of lives [ m m m ]
in the text and something that doesn't [yeah].
1118.W7: A n d maybe that's the difference. U m , beginning writers find that very
difficult. U m , the fact that you can have written the right scene, but given it to the
wrong person, is, in a way, it doesn't make sense. A n d so the fact that you have
written a scene which you know to be good. Like 'OK, the tennis business looks
good. G o o d writing. It's funny.' and all the rest of it. 'What's wrong with it?', you
might think. So, u m , the difficulty is to, is to understand that it can be the right thing
in the wrong context. Yeah, I'm not making m u c h sense there.
1119.CS: N o . I know. I mean I'm struggling with this too. I mean because it's
difficult. But, it's something to do with things, Ahh, all fitting together [yes]. It's
almost like, you know, the Christmas lights coming on. Y o u have one light that
doesn't work [ m m m m ] , that's the wrong light, and at least the old sets.. .1 think the
n e w sets... [laughter]. D o you remember that with Christmas trees [yes that's right.
O n e went and...] you have to search [search through them all] and shake them all
[yeah, that'sright].But u m , it's somewhere related in that idea. I was thinking of
something else while you were talking too...bad practice!
1120.W7: Yeah I feel there is something about. Y o u see I'm a great believer in
revising, but, under provisional structures.
1121 .CS: O h I know. Again, in talking to the writers, and even in m y o w n work with
the doctorate, most of them talk about the sort of speeding up near the end [ m m m ] ,
where, I guess this is where the structure starts to become very apparent [yes]. Is that
your-experience as well?
1122.W7: Yes. Certainly. It's like you have eliminated more and more, gradually, of
the extraneous possibilities.
1123.CS: A n d do you find you have more energy then as well? Like, do you? Or is it
more of a slog?
1124.W7: Yes?...Oh. Is that true? It's more confidence. Yeah. It's a nicer kind of
energy, because in the beginning there is a huge amount of energy but it's terribly
anxious. It's really like m y palms get sweaty sometimes thinking 'This isn't, you
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I can do that.' at the end, so it's m u c h more confident, happy.
1125.CS: Which sort of links to a question of audience, doesn't it [ m m m m ] , because w e
talked before about.. .all the tricks you are playing, so that you are pretending like
no-one else is [they are not there, yeah] not there, but you are writing for people as
well, aren't you? Or are you?
1126.W7: N o ! I'm not [laughs]. [Where does it come in though?]
1127.Well yes, I am, that's true.
1128.CS: Because 1 wouldn't believe that it wasn't important to you [laughing] what
other people think about your writing [yeah it is].
1129.W7: It is. It certainly doesn't begin as that [yeah]. But ah.. .yes.. .at what point
does it become a...
1130.CS: It's like intimacy though, isn't it? I mean is that the point? That.. .the books
reveal w h o you are [yes] and until you are ready with the product...
1131.W7: In fact yes. I think you're right. Because you have to first of all find it for
yourself. But then you have to conceal it again [yeah]. Y o u have to hide that
sentence again [yeah]. E m b e d it in the book so that only you k n o w it [yeah]. Y o u
have to dig it up and then you have to bury it again [yeah]. That's right, in a way that
it will show other people what you have discovered [yeah] without really showing
the roots of it [without identifying you], yeah.
1132.CS: But you are very interested, I would assume, when people resonate to your
books [yes]. I m e a n that must be a nice experience.
1133.W7: It's a wonderful experience, yes. It's um.. .and it's almost, it almost has that
dissociated feeling, because it's almost as if the book has, the book is smarter than I
am. The book has somehow done this, rather than I.
1134.CS: Well again, that is a very c o m m o n theme and it carries on this idea that it
comes from without, almost [yes, yes]. Or that it's, to use the Matte-Bianco scheme
of things, it's of m u c h higher dimensionality than m y conscious mind is [yes, yes].
So it's a sort of wisdom that's inherent in us, but we...
1135.W7: W e are not actually responsible for it.
1136.CS: Well, w e can't grasp it all at once [yes], and really a novel is an edifice, isn't
it? [ m m m ] . It's very multidimensional. It's a huge thing [yes, yes]. A n d you
patiently build it.
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1137.W7: Yes. But it's really created by the reader. I mean you create one novel when
you write it, but every reader obviously creates their o w n novel, by reading it in the
light of their o w n life.
1138.CS: That's right, but it is interesting that there seem to be more or less universal
themes that people can share [yes]. I mean, it's not an entirely different novel.
W h e n I read [novel it's not, you know, entirely the Chris Stevens version.
1139.W7: O h yeah. That's right. There's a big overlap. But then there are some books
that, you know, people like very much, and leave others absolutely cold, so it's
obviously very... [yeah, and there's timing and that too] yeah.
1140.CS: A n d there was one other thing I was going to ask you, which would probably
do it. See, one of the things we're circling n o w is the social dimension. Uhh, 'cos
even though I understand that, you know, most writers sort of write for themselves
[ m m m m ] , ah, there are several social dimensions in it. A n d one is that all their
material is socially derived.
1141.W7: yes. Usually from fairly close at hand [chuckling].
1142.CS: That's right. But also that it has a certain autonomy, ah, frequently writers
will talk about hearing voices and narratives, and T got the character's voice' [oh
yeah, yeah] and they hear the voice or they see a whole scene [yep, yeah] and so on.
A n d it's social in the sense that, you k n o w at least theoretically I think, that what w e
do is w e have all these narratives, including symbolic and visual narratives [ m m m ]
and aural narratives and all the senses that are in this vast neural architecture, and w e
plug into them, you know? So in a sense it's social in that way, but it's also very
personally social, in the way that you are suggesting. Like it is important to
communicate, in the end...
1143,W7: Yes, that's true. I suppose 1 a m reluctant to look too closely at that. U m m m .
I m e a n w h e n Ifirststarted writing and I got a lot of rejections slips I felt very good
about that because I k n e w that I wanted to go on writing, whether or not anybody
wanted to publish it. A n d that somehow made it feel legitimate, the fact, you know,
that I was doing it for it's o w n sake. That somehow made it O K in my...
1144.CS: W h o would read the books though, then? Before you were published.
1145.W7: O h nobody! Nobody [no-one?]. In fact, until this last book I've never shown
anything to anybody, until I had absolutely finished with it. This is the first book
I've ever shown to readers looking for response.
1146.CS: O h I can understand that aspect of it. But you would have finished books
before that had been rejected [oh I see what you mean].
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1147.W7: Yes. Yes I showed them to one or two people. Yeah.
1148.CS: W h o were they? Were they family? Were they friends?
1149.W7: O h N O ! They were writers in fact. I wanted their professional opinion, yeah.
1150.CS: A n d that was qualitatively different was it to sending it off to be rejected?
Y o u know, the publisher?
1151.W7: A h , h o w do you mean? You're getting at something I'm not quite...
1152.CS: Well ah, you were, ah, sending stuff off to publishers [yes], and it didn't
devastate you when it came back [right, yeah].
1153.W7: But did it.. .when I showed it to people?
1154.CS: W a s it qualitatively different? Y o u had chosen several people.
1155.W7: Oh. I see. N o I don't think it was. Because there was always some narrative
that I could tell myself by which their opinion didn't matter, in some way.
1156.CS: But n o w it's different anyway, isn't it, because, you know, [yes] you are well
k n o w n [yeah] and also [it's a problem] you've had the experience of people saying
'Oh. I read your book and I loved it.' [yes]. Or even more intimate, they say 'That
scene in the...' [chuckling].
1157.W7: That's right. 'How did you know?' [chuckling],
1158.CS: That'sright.N o w that complicates matters, doesn't it?
1159.W7: Infinitely. Yes.
1160.CS: Because here you have this private person [yeah]. W h o is toying with being
very public with the very private [yeah, yeah]. Y o u see, I'm interested in that. There
is, there's a lot that goes on there [yes].
1161.W7: A n d because you are not sure what you are revealing until long after you
have revealed it, that's worrying. It's like telling your dreams to somebody [exactly]
and later thinking 'Oh m y God! I told them that dream and they knew what it was
about and I didn't.' [I didn't, exactly] and that's scary, yeah.
1162.CS: Well I often say to clients, you know, like, 'cos I think w e live in this sort of
illusion of privacy [yes]. In some ways it is. I mean w e can think thoughts, and w e
do all the time, that w e don't express. The other side of the coin is, other people can
see all sorts of things about us that we're not aware that w e are doing or that they're
aware of [yeah, absolutely]. Our body language [we're reading them all the time ] all
the time [yeah].
1163.W7: But you're right. It's like a little cocoon. It's like being in a car and picking
your nose the way people do it at the stoplight [that's right!]. This illusion, or
cocoon.
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1164.CS: That's right So you are toying with that, though [yeah], by putting it out there
in the public [yeah] in the public space.. .which is very interesting.
1165.W7: A n d I suppose that's, it's partly where all the rewrites come in, I think, as a
concealing thing. W h a t I think of as, you know, making it, you know, priding myself
on its structural beauty and [well, they're important things] they're important things,
but in a w a y I suspect they're just layers of very beautiful camouflage.
1166.CS: Yes. It's interesting isn't it?
[Laughter. End of interview]

